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“While most people understand first-order 
effects, few deal with second- and third-order 
effects. Unfortunately, virtually everything 
interesting in business lies in fourth-order 
effects and beyond” 
Jay Forrester 
 
1. Introduction 
My strong interest in the phenomenon of strategic change has its roots in the early days of my 
professional career. After obtaining an advanced degree in computer sciences I left university 
and joined an international corporation headquartered in Croatia. I became responsible for a 
major R&D project in the area of computerized control systems, which eventually generated 
an extremely successful product line and led to my fast elevation through the management 
ranks. 
 
From the very first days of my managerial career I knew that, although it was to a large 
degree intertwined in the “socialist” economy of former Yugoslavia, due to its presence in the 
international market the corporation I worked for had to offer competitive products or services 
in order to sustain its success. My team managed to turn a division with “me-too” products 
and mediocre performance into a highly energized, ambitious and ultimately successful 
international player. However, the business environment in former Yugoslavia1 started to 
deteriorate significantly in the mid-1980s, and the corporation faced huge challenges. While 
we were successful in bringing our division to measurable success in international markets in 
the early 1980s (e.g., we were the number one company worldwide on the World Bank 
tenders for certain types of energy control systems in 1986 and 1987), my colleagues and 
myself were less successful in maintaining that position, both for the division and the 
corporation as a whole. When in 1989 I became Senior Vice-President and a member of the 
Executive Board of the corporation I witnessed its dive in performance. Despite all our 
transformation efforts, the corporation was forced, several months after I left it for the world 
of academia at the beginning of 1991, to enter technical bankruptcy. 
 
In the past decade I had an outstanding opportunity to closely witness (in several cases as an 
active participant) a number of initiatives in Central and Eastern Europe. Few of these were 
government-led, aiming at changes in the macro-economic frame; the vast majority were 
played out on the corporate level, some profoundly successful in turning the fortune of a 
company around, others generating little more than prolonged pain and misery. Through my 
activities as faculty member of the leading business school in the region and as consultant to a 
number of general managers2 I had a true “living laboratory” where I could study, interpret 
                                                 
1
 I am using the phrase “former Yugoslavia” to refer to the “Socialist Federative Republic of Yugoslavia”, which 
existed under different names in one area of South-East Europe from 1945 to 1991, after which it ceased to exist 
in its prior form after the formal declarations of independence on the part of Slovenia and Croatia (and later 
Bosnia and Herzegovina and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia).  
2
 The management terminology in the region recognizes no universal term for the person formally in charge of a 
company. The reasons for this are simple: the legal framework defining corporate governance is a recent creation 
and differs from country to country. Words such as “general manager”, “president of the management board”, 
“CEO”, “director” etc. are often used arbitrarily and, to avoid misinterpretation, reference to the local legal 
situation should accompany the term. Throughout the text I shall use the term “General Manager” to designate 
the person with legal responsibility for day-to-day operation of the company (even though a somewhat more 
appropriate title in Croatia and Slovenia would be “President of the Management Board”). To avoid confusion I 
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and help manage strategic change processes at first hand. These activities stimulated my 
curiosity further and led to a more focused interest in change processes, eventually resulting 
in field research and the empirical data used in this thesis. 
1.1 Problem definition 
Central Europe as a whole, and particularly the companies operating in the region, have 
undergone a major process of transformation. On the one hand, this process has been unique, 
influenced by specific historical conditions and local cultures, a specific economic and social 
context, and the particular intensity of change. On the other hand, it may also offer 
conclusions interesting for other regions in transition and for a better understanding of the 
process of corporate transformation as such. While I witnessed the process in the whole of 
Central Europe, I shall focus my research in the next chapters on Croatia and Slovenia. This is 
not because I believe that the transformation in these two countries fully represents processes 
in others, but because I had much better access to the empirical base in these two countries, 
granting the necessary robustness to my research. For this reason I do not claim that the 
results of this research apply to the whole region beyond the level of general applicability to 
corporate transition processes. 
 
While Central Europe may be used as a geographical term, a more common political 
definition usually follows the lines of divisions created after World War II and leaves Bavaria, 
Austria and Switzerland outside the region. Even if one accepts the narrower definition to 
include Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary and Slovenia (leaving as an open 
question the precise borders between Central and Southeast Europe and the affiliation of 
countries such as Croatia or Romania), the region’s economic outlook is complex and often 
subject to highly divergent qualifications. In my work I defined “emerging market 
economies” as those economies featuring two things: a rapid pace of economic development, 
and government policies favoring economic liberalization [Arnold and Quelch 1998]. By that 
definition the region as a whole can be classified among “emergent market economies”, or 
“economies in transition” [Hoskisson et al. 2000], the phrase most often used in the region 
itself and by the politicians and institutions involved there (such as the European Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development [EBRD 2002]). These terms, however, say little about the 
specifics of individual countries, and even less about the different profiles of the companies 
thriving and failing there. 
 
As the name “economies in transition” implies, a common characteristic of companies in the 
region is the process of transformation they entered when the political and economic system 
began to change. While exact dates differ from country to country, for most transition 
commenced roughly between 1989 and 1991. The degree of change in the environment was 
huge, and generated a need for discontinuous change on the company level [Ansoff 1988]. 
Some companies did anticipate initial changes, but the previous political and economic 
environment left limited room for pre-emptive adaptation. The majority reacted by following 
one of several patterns of transformation. The first period of change featured the 
transformation of political systems from single-party authoritarian regimes to multi-party 
parliamentary democracies. At the same time, economies (most, with the exception of former 
Yugoslavia, which had a mixed economy comprising a relatively free goods market but state-
interventionist labor and virtually non-existent capital markets) were converted from centrally 
                                                                                                                                                        
shall use the term “Board Chairperson” to designate the person with legal responsibility for long-term 
governance of the company (in Croatia and Slovenia, given a two-tier board system, the appropriate title would 
be “Chairperson of the Supervisory Board”) [Filipovi et al., 2001] 
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planned into free-market systems. This transformation coincided with the collapse of regional 
markets, producing a significant loss of revenues for virtually every business in the region. 
Thus the key challenge for companies was survival, which – because of the sudden drop in 
revenues – required rapid streamlining, i.e. a focus on core products and services, reduction of 
excessive costs, and downsizing to match reduced market opportunities3. 
 
Although the period of initial transformation on the company level in most cases lasted from 
two to five years, it typically did not end with stability. New changes in the environment 
followed, this time characterized by the opening of markets and increased local and foreign 
competition. Companies in the region were challenged to further improve their 
competitiveness, or perish. Many found that a focus on cost, rather than value-added position, 
was unsustainable. In many cases a local market focus proved to be similarly non-viable and 
had to be replaced with an orientation towards regional or even global markets. This 
transformation phase has proved even longer than the first, and the majority of companies in 
the region are still in this second phase4. It is highly likely that even in the most developed 
countries in the region, such as Slovenia, this stage of transformation will last at least another 
decade, and companies from less developed countries may need several decades to catch up 
with their western counterparts. Better understanding of the transformation process may 
therefore be highly beneficial for managers in the region, making this research even more 
relevant. 
 
In order to adapt, companies had to go through a sequence of transformations, each requiring 
a strategic change management process [Kozminski 1993]. While both academic and popular 
management literature deal extensively with the underlying issues of competitiveness and 
strategic change management, a significant portion of it is not, for several reasons, easily 
applicable or even relevant when clarifying the varied performance of companies from 
Croatia and Slovenia (Table 1.1). 
 
When looking at the body of research carried out in the fields of competitiveness and strategic 
change management, one cannot but observe a bias towards large North American companies. 
Some research published in the leading academic journals was performed in emerging 
markets5; significantly less dealt with Central Europe; and even less focused on companies 
originating from that area (the effects of privatization being the major research interest 
[Uhlenbruck and De Castro 2000]). Within the region, Croatia and Slovenia attracted minimal 
attention on the part of external researchers in comparison with countries such as Poland, 
Hungary and the Czech Republic. Some research was done locally and published in domestic 
and international journals, but it mostly took an economic perspective [Milanovic 1999, 
Alexeev 1999, Halpern and Korosi 2001] and was rarely dealt with the area of 
competitiveness as seen from the company perspective [Prašnikar et al. 2000], or with 
strategic change management in a specific regional context [Bojnec 1999, Newman 2000, 
Kets de Vries 2000, Filatotchev et al. 2000]. Furthermore, Newman [2000] argued that no 
theory of intraorganizational change could deal explicitly with an external environment that is 
so chaotic.  
 
                                                 
3
 In the literature on organizational transformation this is often referred to as “defensive restructuring”. 
4
 In the literature this is often referred to as “strategic restructuring”. 
5
 See Academy of Management Journal [43(3) 2000] as a good example with a fairly representative sample of 
theoretical approaches, subjects and geographical coverage. 
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Level State-of-the-art literature 
(Western focus) 
Requirements of Slovenian 
and Croatian companies 
Environment • Dynamic markets within 
relatively stable socio-
political environment 
• Stable capitalist structures 
• Discontinuous change in 
all components of the 
environment 
• New questions of purpose, 
business model, form of 
control 
Organization • Large multinational 
companies with 
autonomous business units 
• Relative abundance of 
resources 
• Medium-size niche 
players with functional 
structure 
• Shortage of most 
resources 
Individual • Well educated managers 
• Stable career paths and 
expectations 
• Management as a 
completely new 
profession, old mindset 
and lack of skills 
• Pressures encouraging 
opportunistic behavior 
 
Table 1.1 Key differences between western and local focus 
 
In terms of company size, standard research deals with both ends of the scale: the majority of 
research samples are from multinational companies (MNCs)6, but a certain portion covers 
small and medium-size companies (SMEs). The latter, however, are in most cases new 
ventures and entrepreneurial “gazelles” (i.e. fast-growing small businesses). I find it 
interesting to focus research on companies which do not reach the size of the global players in 
their industries. These companies, in relative terms medium-size7, dominate the corporate 
scene in Croatia and Slovenia (and, as a matter of fact, other countries of Central Europe) and 
are integral to the economy in other geographical areas, such as Benelux. 
 
I find the argument of size (and structure, which is in most cases the consequence of size) to 
be relevant to the theoretical discussion, since much theory and analysis important on the 
MNC level (e.g. strategic portfolio analysis, cross-divisional synergies based on core 
competence, globalization, institutional influence of size on the change process) are often 
neither applicable nor useful with regard to medium-size companies (which are typically 
functionally organized niche players, or cost players in regional markets, and have a relatively 
small number of managers). Also, the resources available to middle-size companies for 
                                                 
6
 Throughout the text I shall use the abbreviation MNCs for multinational companies. I am using the term as 
reference to companies having operational subsidiaries in countries outside of the region holding their 
headquarters (typically having global presence).  
7
 Throughout the text I shall use the abbreviation SMEs for small and medium-size companies. Note that most 
countries explicitly define the size of small and medium companies, typically for accounting, tax and/or 
governance purposes. However, definitions vary both in terms of the measurements used (typically the number 
of employees, but some countries, like Slovenia, also use alternative yardsticks such as total revenues) and 
numbers (definitions of the lower limit of employee numbers for medium-size companies are typically in the 
range of 50 to 500). In this thesis I use the term medium-size (or middle-size) company somewhat differently: I 
do not refer to a strict legal definition of size, but rather to companies which have several hundred or up to a few 
thousand employees, typically have one major operational division and, while possibly present internationally, 
are not MNCs. 
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enhancing their capabilities are significantly more limited than those of MNCs, and the level 
of inherent flexibility is significantly lower than among entrepreneurial ventures, both 
implying that routes to competitiveness may differ according to company size [Chen and 
Hambrick 1995, Stock et al. 1996]. Finally, the process of strategic change management is 
also influenced significantly by the size of the company [Hannan and Freeman 1984, Singh 
1990, Haveman 1993, Chen and Hambrick 1995, Harari 1998]. 
 
The other reason why I could not assume that research carried out outside the region is fully 
relevant to the transformation process of companies there is these companies’ specific cultural 
background. Corporate culture has been identified as one of the key elements of inimitability 
contributing to competitive advantage [Barney 1986, Fiol 1991], as well as being a major 
issue in strategic change management [Schein 1985, Vollman 1996, Breu 2001]. And 
corporate culture has been clearly linked to the cultural context [Hofstede 1980, Schein 1985, 
Breu 2001], which is in Central Europe both rich and highly specific.  
 
Given the specific context of transition in Croatia and Slovenia outlined above and described 
in more detail in Chapter 2, it is compelling to commence a thorough examination of the 
regional applicability of general theories related to competitiveness and strategic change 
management, and to develop a suitable theoretical model which will endure empirical tests. 
 
Finally, as well as questioning the regional applicability of state-of-the-art literature on 
competitiveness and strategic change management, I have observed another major 
shortcoming worth discussion. Most of the existing literature focuses on only one of the three 
aspects which, I believe, are crucial to explaining differences in the success rate of 
transformation efforts in the region: context, content and process [Pettigrew 1987]. Only 
rarely does research focus on the multidimensional aspects of all three. I believe that keeping 
all these dimensions in perspective is mandatory for understanding the results of 
transformation, and I shall accordingly devote sufficient space in my thesis to cover them. 
1.2 Objectives of the thesis 
The main objective of this thesis is to develop an integrative analytical framework based on 
state-of-the art literature in the areas of competitiveness and strategic change management, 
adapted to the specific requirements of Slovenia and Croatia, in order to explain the observed 
transformation processes and support companies in their further transformational efforts. 
 
In terms of the political, economic and social context (which Pettigrew [1987] called the 
“outer” context), I shall try to clearly identify and detail the specific context of countries in 
transition, in particular Croatia and Slovenia. I will present this context holistically in Chapter 
2, and will also refer to it in the critical literature review in Chapter 3. The inner context 
[Pettigrew 1987] will be defined company-by-company in case descriptions in Chapter 5. 
 
Regarding transformational efforts which companies have undertaken (referred to in the 
following chapter as “strategic change management content”), I shall refer to the wide body of 
theory on the concept of competitiveness. I justify this quite simply: improving 
competitiveness is of key concern throughout the region and is the explicit goal of almost all 
transformation efforts. The increased globalization of business coincided with the opening up 
of the business environment in Central Europe as a whole and in Croatia and Slovenia in 
particular. Opening up occurred in two directions: outside-in and inside-out. All the countries 
in the region are candidates for European Union membership, some immediate (2004) and 
others in the next wave, which means that all have had to drastically alter both institutional 
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frameworks and current practices, which in turn has lowered barriers to foreign companies 
wishing to enter local markets. In addition, political and economic risks in the region have 
been significantly reduced and governmental efforts to attract FDI have in general increased, 
attracting foreign companies [Kozminski and Yip, 2000]. On the other hand, companies from 
the region are increasingly doing business outside it, either because they have found truly 
better business opportunities or because this is a desperate attempt to solve problems 
unsolvable in local markets. In order to survive in open markets, companies from the region 
must achieve an appropriate level of competitiveness. This is widely recognized by 
management and researchers, and is the prime motive for recent transformation efforts8. 
 
In looking at competitiveness, I shall examine a few theoretical frameworks that have in 
recent years occupied the research community, in particular the resource-based view of the 
firm, which has in the last decade established itself as the most influential theoretical 
framework for understanding how companies achieve and sustain competitive advantage 
[Wernerfelt 1984, Barney 1991]; also the dynamic capabilities approach [Prahalad and Hamel 
1990, Eisenhardt and Martin 2000].  
 
Concerning the ways transformation has been implemented (I refer to this in the following 
chapter as the “strategic change management process”), I shall look at key aspects of strategic 
change management, including some distinct management tools and concepts as re-
engineering, organizational learning, organizational transformation, and leadership.  
 
Based on the literature review I shall construct the research model, setting out an expected 
pattern of behavior according to the influence of context, current transformation content and 
process, and how these influence the outcomes of strategic change. Then I shall compare it 
with the empirical findings and, where necessary, adjust it. 
 
My ultimate goal within this thesis is thus to identify a number of factors: 
- those which are internal by nature (often called “organizational”), i.e. dependent on the 
company and potentially directly or indirectly influenced by its management (as opposed 
to external factors, which depend primarily on the socio-political or industrial 
environment and are not under the direct or reasonable indirect decisive, systematic and 
sustainable influence of the management of any single company), and 
- those which explain the process of strategic change and the difference in outcomes of 
various strategic change efforts, which in successful cases eventually lead to improved 
company performance compared to the past and to the performance of local competitors. 
 
In the methodological approach providing the empirical basis of the thesis, I agree that 
intangible resources as source of competitiveness should be diagnosed via qualitative methods 
[Zahra and Pearce 1990, Rouse and Daellenbach 1999]. This approach is in line with that of 
established studies of organizational cultures and change phenomena [Pettigrew 1990], and 
accordingly both dimensions of my research are processed in a methodologically uniform 
way. To this end I have built the empirical base on an in-depth analysis of case studies from 
Slovenian and Croatian companies. Although I am aware of potential shortcomings (presented 
in Chapter 4), I shall attempt to generalize my findings into a simple conceptual framework.  
                                                 
8
 In a recent survey 82% of managers indicated that their companies face the need for change. The survey 
indicated that their number one priority was to develop a business strategy to achieve competitive advantage (on 
the scale from 1 – least important to 5 – most important, this goal went up from 2.90 for the period of previous 5 
years to 4.89 for the period of next 5 years) [Filipovi and Gudi 1999] 
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1.3 Structure of the thesis and short overview of chapters 
1.3.1 Methodological structure 
In order to help the reader find the way through the methodologically fairly complex study the 
key concepts and their location in the text are explained below. 
 
The conclusions offered in the reference literature and, in particular, the application of my 
resource-based view of the situations in Slovenia and Croatia (chapter 3.2.2) prompted me to 
focus on the concepts of perceived urgency and perceived feasibility of change as 
determinants of strategic choices made by top management. In other words, my conclusion is 
that the managers decide whether to initiate any changes at all or not, as well as what kind of 
changes they would like to achieve, on the basis of their views of how urgent it is for the 
company to improve its competitive performance, as well as what they thought is the 
likelihood of a successful outcome of the attempted changes. 
 
The study of literature related to the process of change management indicated that a three-
phase model is the most appropriate to describe change. Thus, the concept of a trigger phase, 
a design phase and an implementation phase is introduced in 3.4.2 (Fig. 3.11). 
 
Top management proceeds from the trigger phase to the design phase only if and when 
convinced that the change is needed and feasible (3.4.2.1, Fig. 3.12). 
 
The research model developed in 3.4.2.2 predicts that managers design the changes based on 
the perceived urgency and feasibility of change, and that the design includes strategy, 
organizational structure and systems. Three main design outcomes are defined based on the 
literature review: defensive restructuring, strategic restructuring and non-aligned changes 
(Fig. 3.13).  
 
Based on the literature review, the research model predicts some specifics of the strategy, the 
structure and the systems, as well as the required key resources, leadership interventions and 
barriers to change become obvious in the implementation phase of a defensive (3.4.2.3) and a 
strategic restructuring (3.4.2.4). 
 
Based on the assumptions derived from the research model and observations from field 
research, a methodology is developed linking the indicators of perceived urgency and 
perceived feasibility to the outcome of the design phase. Aggregate weighted indicators of 
perceived urgency and perceived feasibility are converted into pairs of points and presented in 
a diagram, in which different areas are associated with different outcomes of the design phase: 
no change, non-aligned changes, defensive restructuring or strategic restructuring (chapter 
4.3). 
 
Questions arising from the research model (3.4.3) led to a field study comprising a set of 
detailed case studies of seven companies carried out over a period of thirteen years (Chapter 
5). Up to four different change cycles are identified in each of the cases. The field research 
focused on identifying indicators of urgency and feasibility for each change cycle in each of 
the companies (6.2.2 and 6.2.3), which were then fed into the calculation model presented in 
4.3. The results are shown in diagrams (6.3) that describe the nature of individual change 
cycles for each of the companies. Finally, details of observed characteristics of defensive 
restructuring change cycles (6.4) and strategic restructuring change cycles (6.5) are compiled 
and their consequences for the research model established. 
Nenad Filipovi  Chapter 1 
Strategic Change Management of Medium-Size Companies:   
Insights from Slovenia and Croatia   
 8 
1.3.2 Short overview of chapters 
Chapter 2 presents a rough synopsis of the change occurring in former Yugoslavia between 
1981 and 1991, as well as during the period on which research is focused (1991 to 2003). It 
provides the reader with a better understanding of the context of change: the political, social 
and economic environment in which the observed companies were operating. In many ways 
this environment was unique, while at the same time it shared many features with other 
environments exposed to large-scale change, especially in countries in transition. Thus, while 
strong reference to the context has been maintained throughout the text, similarities have been 
pointed out as useful starting points for possible generalizations. 
 
Based on the key challenges for management identified in Chapter 2 the text develops into an 
overview of relevant literature on competitiveness and strategic change management, 
presented in the first two sections of Chapter 3. Since both concepts are widely covered in 
academic and popular literature, I first identify the principal “schools of thought”, which have 
dominated the literature in recent years and can potentially be applied to the context I am 
exploring. I then narrow my focus to key, universally-accepted common conclusions and 
major controversies which are a matter of contemporary debate. Throughout this literature 
analysis I highlight the applicability of the concepts presented to the context of countries in 
transition. In the final part of Chapter 3 I present the research model, which brings together 
the content of strategic change focusing on competitiveness improvement, and the process of 
change management, both adapted to the context described in the Chapter 2. 
 
Chapter 4 provides a brief overview of the research methodology used in the study. It outlines 
in more detail the rationale behind the chosen research strategy, and discusses the merits and 
limitations of case-based research. It also lays down the criteria for case selection; it presents 
the basis for an analytical approach to the cases, as well as the methodology used in 
supplementary interviews and accessing secondary data sources. In the final section of 
Chapter 4 I present the methodology used to calculate the point values in “perceived urgency 
of change – perceived feasibility of change” diagrams. 
 
Chapter 5 presents a detailed analysis of the empirical data from seven cases, compiled from 
different sources: annual reports, media archives, consulting reports, teaching cases, 
structured interview with executives and middle managers, and feedback on preliminary 
conclusions from independent experts and company representatives. As well as these cases, 
summaries of research findings from individual cases are presented.  
 
Chapter 6 is dedicated to a cross-case analysis. It explicitly answers the research questions, 
and demonstrates how the empirical data conform to the research model expectations based 
on the literature review, also indicating where there were critical mismatches between 
expectations and empirical findings. The final section provides a refined version of the 
research model. 
 
In Chapter 7, finally, I summarize my conclusions, with particular emphasis on new insights 
arising from the specific research context and their potential for general applicability. 
Although the research was not conducted with the objective of generating prescriptive 
conclusions, in my summary of the project’s implications I also outline implications for 
management practitioners. 
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2. Characteristics of change processes on the macro level in Croatia and 
Slovenia in the period from 1981 to 2002 
In order to understand the strategic change processes at the level of any individual company, 
it is necessary to understand both the external setting and the internal forces influencing the 
change. Both of these dimensions allow for some context generalization, while leaving room 
for case-by-case analysis of individual companies (to be presented in Chapter 5). In the 
present chapter focus is placed on the political, social and economic environment of Croatia 
and Slovenia, which has had a significant influence on the change process at the enterprise 
level. As well as illustrating the key manifestations of change, this chapter explores its 
challenges for management and thus sets out more clearly the research questions in 
anticipation of a literature review and the construction of a research model. Given the need for 
brevity, some of the descriptions and analyses presented have been simplified. 
2.1 Choice of the relevant geography 
As stated in Chapter 1, some countries with “emerging market economies” share a similar 
historical context of political and economic change. Some to large degree also share key 
elements of the cultural context. This is especially true for the Central European countries as 
defined in 1.1. In order to maintain context validity for my research, I have narrowed the 
choice of relevant geography for the ethnographic research described in this thesis to only two 
countries: Croatia and Slovenia. However, since some of the companies observed carry out 
significant activities throughout the region9, I shall in this chapter both lay down a potential 
basis for generalization of my conclusions, and examine comparatively not only Croatia and 
Slovenia but also key attributes of the situation in other Central European countries. 
 
I have decided to select Croatia and Slovenia as target countries for two principle reasons. On 
the one hand, most of the companies I have been involved with in my professional activities 
come from the region or are local or regional subsidiaries of MNCs. Of that sample, the 
majority are headquartered in Croatia or Slovenia. Thus, in these countries I have been able to 
reach a certain level of understanding of the context, as well as the level of intimacy with 
individual companies required for ethnographic research. 
 
In addition, the two countries present an interesting choice because of their similarities and 
differences. Both spent several centuries as part of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, and almost 
a century as republics within former Yugoslavia and its predecessor the Kingdom of 
Yugoslavia. At the moment of declaring independence from former Yugoslavia they were at 
similar levels of economic and political development (see 2.2). A shared history, together 
with geographic proximity and the same linguistic and cultural roots within the Slavic group 
of nations, implies significant similarities in social and cultural context. Yet, due to a number 
of factors, from 1991 onwards the two countries developed in strikingly different ways, their 
divergence to a large extent reflecting the spectrum of development paths emerging in the rest 
of Central and Eastern Europe. Thus they represent a “universe in small” for the whole region, 
and the situations in their respective companies serve as a potential basis for generalization of 
strategic change theories. 
                                                 
9
 This is especially true for companies in consumer industries, as opposed to those present in industrial markets, 
which are focusing more on EU countries, as discussed in Chapter 5. 
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2.2 Political and economic point of departure (1981-1991) 
In order to better understand the process of economic restructuring that began throughout the 
region in the period from 1989 to 1991 it might be useful to present a short overview of the 
situation in the late 1980s, both in political and economic terms. 
 
Once again, one should be cautioned against regarding Central Europe as one homogeneous 
territory. The differences at the point of departure were obvious on different levels. The 
region at that time comprised former Yugoslavia and “Soviet block” (COMECOM) 
countries10. The differences between the two groups were huge, but the differences within 
each were not insignificant either. 
 
In comparison with former Yugoslavia, the COMECOM countries entered the period of 
political changes with a significantly higher level of political and economic rigidity. The 
communist regimes in most of these countries had resorted to harsh autocratic oppression to 
keep themselves in power. The vast majority of business entities were stated-owned, and 
economies were centrally planned not just at the individual country level but within the whole 
group. Companies from outside the area had no direct access to regional markets, and were 
forced to employ indirect mechanisms such as bartering agreements signed between countries. 
 
Former Yugoslavia was in many ways a unique country. The basic elements of its political 
and economic frame were defined in the Constitution Act of 1974. The hugely charismatic 
Josip Broz Tito was its undisputed autocratic leader until his death in 1981. He left a legacy of 
a failing economic system and a complex mechanism of governance based on consensus 
among the six republics and two autonomous provinces constituting the highly decentralized 
country. Former Yugoslavia was characterized by the political monopoly of the communist 
party (which, in order to soften its image and differentiate itself from the Soviet model of 
communism, presented itself as a Communist League, rather than a party). However, the 
economic system was unique, departing significantly from the planned economies of the 
Soviet type. 
 
The key element differentiating the economic system of former Yugoslavia from the rest of 
the world was the concept of “social ownership”. Social ownership meant that the ownership 
titles to standard business entities (companies) did not reside with private owners or the state, 
but was made abstract and given to the employees. In theory this meant that the employees 
possessed almost all of the ownership rights, such as the authority to appoint the general 
manager, approve major strategic moves including mergers, or to determine the use of profits. 
The decision–making system used by the employees was called “self-management”, with 
“workers councils” playing a role similar to that of supervisory boards. The only right the 
employees did not have was to sell (or renounce / transfer in any other way) their ownership. 
In practice, however, these rights were often curtailed by the influence of the (local) political 
elite, especially in connection with the politically-sponsored management. 
 
Since the concept of social ownership did not allow share capital, there were no capital 
markets in the traditional sense of the word, but only financial markets with very rudimentary 
services, operated by parastatal banks. The banking system was the major instrument of state 
                                                 
10
 For easier reference, as well as for formally correct annotation, Soviet block countries in Central Europe 
(Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary) will be referred to as COMECOM countries, after the formal economic 
cooperation treaty (Council for Mutual Economic Assistance) they signed with the purpose of coordinated 
planning and state controlled counter-trade and resulting financial settling. 
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(political) intervention in the economy, since the banks extended soft loans (sometimes with 
negative real interest rates) or other forms of direct cash infusions into selected companies 
without any credit risk control. The only capital transactions with companies were mergers. 
The workers councils of two companies had the right to merge their companies into a new 
legal entity, with one workers council and one management team overseeing the pooled 
assets.  
 
Another peculiarity was the relationship between divisions and the mother company in a 
corporation. In accordance with the idea of worker ownership, divisions acted as owners of 
the mother company, which created enormous problems in establishing the hierarchical 
authority of mother-company over divisional management. 
 
Although private ownership of companies was not illegal, the law significantly restricted the 
size of private companies (until the late 1980s to less than ten employees; only subsequently 
was the restriction lifted). Also, private companies were often scrutinized by tax authorities 
and the police. As a consequence, the ambition of private owners was typically limited, while 
the few notable exceptions had to snuggle up to the political elite or bribe low-level 
administrators in order to “bend the rules” or relax supervision.  
 
In comparison to the capital markets, labor markets were somewhat more developed, although 
still not fully liberal. All companies were unionized and the state union was under communist 
patronage and part of the political system. Firing an employee was extremely difficult, 
although not impossible. Firings because of breach of discipline had to be procedurally 
correct, since court rulings were strongly biased in favor of employees, but were relatively 
common. The standards of work discipline and ethics were quite uneven; in general, they 
were significantly lower than in western companies, but higher than in their COMECOM 
counterparts. However, there were also quite a few companies with high employee 
commitment levels and little problem with discipline. These companies were often described 
as “most respected”, and typically had a strong management with a clear business orientation 
and vision, as well as a superior relationship with their workers councils.  
 
On the other hand, companies had a formal mechanism through which they could resort to 
downsizing without a formal bankruptcy procedure11, i.e. they could declare that due to 
changed technology or market situation certain employees had become redundant. Although 
seniority had to be respected within groups of employees with the same job description, the 
mechanism in principle generated a level of flexibility higher than in countries with a strong 
union tradition (such as most of Western Europe). However, massive lay-offs due to business 
crisis or bankruptcies were extremely rare, since they were seen as the sign of political failure 
and were usually linked with political shake-ups. 
 
Nurturing of the (artificial) image of the “ideal system” was, as in most autocratic systems, an 
important part of the political agenda. The concept of social ownership meant that economic 
success on the macro level was measured by high employment levels12 and a high level of 
                                                 
11
 The technical term used was “technological surpluses”. 
12
 More developed parts of former Yugoslavia had virtually no unemployment. The same was true for most of 
the COMECOM countries. However, after the change of system the estimated level of “inefficient employment” 
was high. This statement can be illustrated by two pieces of data: on the one hand, lay-offs due to defensive 
restructuring cut employment by 35% to 60% [Prašnikar et al. 1999], and on the other hand, productivity 
measured by revenue per employee lay in many industries significantly below international levels. The 
phenomenon of inefficient employment as an indirect substitute for a social safety network is not restricted to ex-
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social benefits such as free education, healthcare, and housing, generous retirement conditions 
etc. Thus, a high number of employees with a high level of employee benefits was a 
politically more interesting goal on the corporate level than profitability or other traditional 
measures of business performance. Since top managers needed clearance for their 
(re)appointment from their workers council and from the local political elite (in the case of the 
biggest companies, clearance was usually granted on the level of the domicile republic’s 
political leadership), they were careful to keep their employees loyal and have politically 
correct goals visible on their agendas. They tended to avoid innovative and risk-taking 
behavior, nurturing a culture of passing decision-making to higher levels in the hierarchy. 
 
Employee benefits were an extremely important source of motivation. Base salaries were low 
in comparison with Western Europe, and were among the most important causes of the high 
level of brain-drain since the mid-1960s, especially among skilled labor, technical experts and 
scientists13. The low ratio between the highest and lowest salaries in the company (typically 
less than 3:1) was another significant problem, demotivating managers and often driving them 
towards unethical practices (bribery, private companies taking advantage of the business 
relationship with the company they were employed in, etc). However, when the total 
compensation package was taken into consideration and corrected for purchasing parity, the 
earnings of non-managerial employees were more than comparable to those in many West 
European countries, although productivity was significantly lower14. Although some 
employee benefits were granted by the state, many were provided by the companies and were 
related to the financial success of the company. Thus, indirect motivation for superior 
performance existed and was well understood by the management. It should be noted, 
however, that financial performance was not necessarily determined in free market 
competition, but was also generated by skillful creation of monopolies through use of political 
connections or “system aberrations” (e.g., the obtaining of import protection or political 
derailing of local competition, securing of favorable sources of raw materials or cheap 
financing, exploitation of sudden changes in legislation or shortages in product or financial 
markets as anticipated by political insiders, or by the blunt use of corruption or political 
power to secure the funds needed). As a consequence, the most successful managers had to 
develop a specific set of relationship skills and a personal network of relationships which 
allowed them to lobby for their interests. 
 
In contrast to capital and labor markets, products and services markets were relatively well 
developed. Although state intervention in these markets (typically in the form of price control 
as well as import barriers) was higher than would be acceptable in a true market economy, 
companies were nevertheless exposed to significant competition in local markets. In addition, 
they were politically encouraged to export and were often able to reap direct and indirect 
benefits from their export activities. Although official policy promoted economic relations 
with “third-world”15 countries (most of which were, in economic terms, emerging market 
economies), COMECOM countries and especially the free-market countries were much more 
                                                                                                                                                        
communist countries: state bureaucracy in South Korea and some Latin American countries are another perfect 
example. 
13
 The estimate of the number of citizens of former Yugoslavia working abroad, and members of their families, 
was in 1989 close to 2 million (nearly half of it in Germany), almost 10% of the overall population. 
14
 In most industries lower productivity almost cancelled the advantage in direct labor costs, even without taking 
into account indirect benefits and correction for purchasing parity (e.g. average labor costs in the food industry in 
Slovenia in 1990 stood at 40% of the EU average, while productivity was at 48% [EMBA Projects 1992].  
15
 The official designation was “non-aligned” countries, following the foreign policy doctrine of President Tito, 
who was in the early ‘60s one of the creators and political leaders of the Non-aligned movement, i.e. countries 
subscribing neither to NATO nor to Warsaw Pact. 
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important for exports from former Yugoslavia (Table 2.1). Towards the end of the 1980s a 
clear trend towards growing export to free-market countries was visible, as was a rapidly 
growing trade deficit16, both of these the result of the diminishing importance of trade with 
COMECOM countries and the mounting problems there. 
 
 
 1988 1990 
 Exports 
 
Imports Exports/ 
Imports 
Exports 
 
Imports Exports/ 
Imports 
Free market countries 51% 56% 87% 59% 63% 72% 
COMECOM countries 33% 27% 118% 28% 23% 93% 
Third world countries 16% 17% 89% 13% 14% 71% 
 
Source: Yugoslav statistical yearbook [1991] 
Table 2.1 Structure of foreign trade in former Yugoslavia  
 
This economic model had significant shortcomings [Kova 1990, Estrin 1991, Prašnikar and 
Svejnar 1991]. From the system theory perspective, the main problem was the non-existence 
of economic performance feedback. On the macro level, economic system fine-tuning was 
possible only within an extremely limited spectrum of ideologically acceptable cosmetics. 
Also, the political elite made all the key macro-economic decisions, often with very limited 
understanding of the consequences. On the micro level, under the pressure of “maintaining 
face” and avoiding social and political tensions, sub-performing companies were kept alive 
through political intervention, thus fatally compromising overall system performance17. 
Despite its shortcomings, however, the system also had several positive effects when 
compared to other socialist or communist countries. Since the state only expropriated 
company profits partially, employees as quasi-owners did receive tangible benefits from 
superior performance on the part of their companies. In some cases, especially when 
management was competent in business terms and well connected politically, this led to major 
advances in competitiveness in local markets, as well as to increased efforts in export. A part 
of profits was not channeled to employees but was invested in technology, new product 
development or market development (especially within former Yugoslavia and COMECOM 
countries, where several strong brands were built). 
 
After Tito’s death former Yugoslavia quickly lost its international position. On the one hand, 
growing political and economic risk made foreign lenders cautious about extending new 
loans. On the other, the “non-aligned” movement was losing momentum and importance, to 
some degree because of internal squabbles but more so because of the growing evidence of 
the weakness of the Soviet Union and its satellites. As a result, the federal government 
became unable to secure the inflow of foreign loans and FDI, which were needed to keep the 
failing economy afloat. Two immediate consequences became obvious within a couple of 
years. Inflation rose to 2000% in the year 198918, while the significant minus in the country’s 
foreign balance of payments generated in banks a shortage of foreign currency (needed to 
                                                 
16
 The percentage of imports covered by exports fell from 95% in 1988 to 89% in 1989, and to 76.5% in 1990. 
17
 At an even lower level of analysis, poor individual performance also went in most cases unpunished due to the 
high level of employee legal protection, the great influence of workers and unions (through workers councils and 
political pressures) as well as widespread cynicism about work ethics, well-depicted in the slogan “Never mind 
how little you pay me, I can always work less”. 
18
 Inflation was seen by most economists as a direct consequence of state spending and in particular social 
welfare blown up out of all proportion, paired with internal economic inefficiency [Andelman 1980, Bechtold 
and Helfer 1987]. 
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support imports and service the country’s growing foreign debt, mostly involving parastatal 
commercial banks). Net exporters to western markets were able to sell surplus foreign 
currency to the banks, earning attractive premiums in local currency. Although this practice 
stimulated exports, it had major negative effects. The export premiums and profits from 
inflation-related currency speculation distorted the pricing of goods and services in product 
markets both locally and in exports, leading some companies to the wrong conclusions about 
their true competitiveness. Also, access to cheap loan financing due to state-subsidized 
interest rates in the hyperinflation period was a major potential source of advantage exploited 
by many companies.  
 
The effects of hyperinflation are familiar from research carried out in other countries, 
particularly Latin America19. Out of those present at the micro level, three were in my opinion 
particularly important for later managerial behavior. The first was the problem hyperinflation 
created for accounting. Local accounting standards were already outdated by the time 
inflation started to climb, and official financial statements soon became meaningless. In order 
to keep track of true company performance managers had to establish parallel bookkeeping, 
typically recording all their transactions in German Marks 20. While on the one hand the 
transparency of performance decreased, on the other the situation forced the more 
entrepreneurial managers to learn a great deal about accounting, and cash flow management 
in particular. Obviously, tight cash management practices were paramount in solving the 
second problem resulting from hyperinflation, which was the massive lack of liquidity. 
Companies not handling their cash well found it losing value within a few days, since bank 
deposits bore interest far below the inflation rate. However, loan interest rates also did not 
keep pace with inflation, which prompted many companies to acquire significant debt. 
Finally, the situation resulted in a complete loss of confidence in the basic instruments of the 
state, and many companies began to break laws, claiming that otherwise they could not 
survive. 
 
By 1989 the political monopoly of the communist party was fading and the voice of 
reformists within the party itself growing (especially in Slovenia and Croatia), as was pressure 
from other political groups, some of which started to mobilize civil initiatives. Also, by 1989 
the elite had become extremely divided in their views of the proper model for future 
development. Mr. Slobodan Miloševi based his political power on popular nationalistic 
sentiments in Serbia. In promoting the interests of his constituency, he in practice cast a vote 
in favor of conservative communism and a strongly centralized country. At the other extreme 
were Mr. Milan Kuan and Mr. Ivica Raan, trying to balance the power in favor of Slovenia 
and Croatia. They both favored liberal socialism to the extent of readiness to dissolve the 
single-party system, and called for even more decentralization (towards a vision of a 
confederative state). Interestingly enough, although the population in both Croatia and 
Slovenia in general disapproved of socialism (in particular the form built by the communist 
party), Mr. Kuan managed to keep his personal popularity high in Slovenia, while Mr. Raan 
failed to do so in Croatia.  
 
Growing tension between rivals supporting two different models of political and economic 
development was also fueled by the huge regional differences in economic development in 
                                                 
19
 For an excellent review of the broader links between inflation and the political, social and economic 
environment in Latin America see Dornbuch and Edwards (ed.) [1991] 
20
 The DM also became the currency in which population kept its savings, since it was the major stable currency 
the population was exposed to through transfers from relatives working in Germany, and through dealings with 
German tourists visiting former Yugoslavia. 
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former Yugoslavia. The simplest illustration of this is in GDP per capita data for individual 
republics and autonomous provinces (Table 2.2): despite a slowly closing gap (in relative 
terms, but growing in absolute terms), in 1988 Slovenia still had a more than 7 times greater 
GDP per capita than Kosovo. Similar conclusions can be drawn from data on trade among the 
republics (Table 2.3), with Slovenia showing a positive trade balance with all republics and 
Croatia a positive balance with all except Slovenia. 
 
 1980 1988 
Yugoslavia 100 104 
Bosnia and Herzegovina 71 77 
Croatia 135 139 
Macedonia 86 90 
Montenegro 66 66 
Serbia  78 83 
   Serbia without provinces 76 81 
   Kosovo 25 29 
   Vojvodina 134 141 
Slovenia 195 204 
 
Source: Yugoslav statistical yearbook [1990] 
Table 2.2 Relative GDP per capita in former Yugoslavia  
(average GDP per capita for Yugoslavia in 1980 (US$4,840)  = 100) 
 
 Bosnia and 
Herzegovina 
Croatia Macedonia Montenegro Serbia  Slovenia 
Bosnia and Herzegovina - 73% 99% 142% 85% 66% 
Croatia 138% - 103% 366% 107% 78% 
Macedonia 101% 97% - 193% 94% 76% 
Montenegro 70% 27% 52% - 57% 30% 
Serbia  117% 93% 106% 175% - 63% 
Slovenia 151% 129% 131% 332% 159% - 
 
Source: Yugoslav statistical yearbook [1991] 
Table 2.3 Trade balance among the republics of former Yugoslavia in 1987 
(as percentage of purchase from a republic covered by sales to it) 
 
In addition to differences in GDP and the lack of trade balance, two other basic economic 
patterns created significant tensions. Internal migration flows dictated by job availability 
followed the “south to north” pattern, while cross-regional investment patterns took a clear 
“north to south” direction21. The reasons are simple to understand and are mostly familiar 
from studies of similar social phenomena [Fayerweather 1982, Kirschenman and Neckerman 
1991, Bakan and Stasiulis 1997]. More developed regions distrusted the consequences of a 
large inflow of low-skilled labor unwilling to assimilate with local culture, while less-
developed regions objected to the unequal treatment their citizens received when migrating 
internally. Investment-related problems were somewhat more complex. While the argument 
                                                 
21
 It is interesting to compare these two patterns with those on the EU scale or within EU countries with clear 
differences in regional development, such as Italy. While “south to north” (or from less developed to more 
developed countries / regions) labor migration patterns are obvious, “north to south” investment patterns are not 
observable under normal market circumstances (e.g. in 1998 Portugal received 0.1% of cross-country FDI within 
EU, half of it from Spain [Eurostat 1999]) and, if present (as in Italy) are primarily the result of political 
intervention. 
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of “neo-colonization” raised by the less-developed regions is familiar from the experience of 
other countries, complaints on the part of developed regions to a large degree reflected the 
political nature of investment mechanisms. On the one hand, most investments were not made 
directly by business entities, but by the political elite of less-developed regions out of funds 
collected through a specific tax on more developed regions (a compulsory “contribution to 
less developed regions” based on a sophisticated calculation corresponding roughly to 
between 1.8 % and 2.7 % of revenues). Even direct investment was, given the nature of the 
ownership system in former Yugoslavia, not fully under the control of a mother company’s 
management, and the threat of legal separation of subsidiaries from the parent was ever-
present. Needless to say, there were no direct profit transfers to the mother company: profits 
were mostly deployed to support generous employee benefits in the subsidiary. 
 
Rising tensions in former Yugoslavia in the late 1980s started to affect the economic flow 
between republics. This was especially true for sales of Slovenian (and to some degree 
Croatian) goods in Serbia and Montenegro, as they were objects of semi-official boycott22. 
This was a clear source of threat, since the markets of the other republics were important 
targets for both Croatian and Slovenian companies (Although official statistics on trade 
among republics were not precise, an estimated 35% of Croatian and Slovenian GDP was 
based on sales to other republics within former Yugoslavia.) 
2.3 Adaptation to discontinuous (1991-1994) and continuous (1994-2002) change 
Despite the warning signals, many companies in former Yugoslavia were taken by surprise 
when the violent disintegration of former Yugoslavia commenced in 1991. To make matters 
worse, the scenario coincided with the collapse of trade with COMECOM countries. 
Statistically speaking, the average Slovenian company lost about two-thirds of the market 
within a few months. Even without other changes, this would by any definition constitute 
change of a discontinuous nature [Ansoff 1988, Meyer at al. 1990]. However, as described 
below, the political, social and economic environments in the region continued to change at a 
rapid pace. 
 
While the detailed case analysis presented in Chapter 5 depicts the varied spectrum of the 
anticipatory actions which decreased the stress level for some companies, at this point a 
general observation seems to be valid. The turbulent economic and political environment of 
former Yugoslavia in the late 1980s required from companies (and in particular their top 
management) rapid adjustment and the ability to cope with a high level of uncertainty. It also 
offered hugely-rewarding opportunities, linked to risks that at the time appeared primarily 
political. A high level of anticipatory adjustment was simply unlikely, because it was viewed 
as politically incorrect and did not maximize short-term opportunities. 
2.3.1 Changes in the political, economic and social environment 
Under growing public pressure, the political elite of Croatia and Slovenia decided to activate 
the existing constitutional arrangement allowing elections to be held for parliaments within 
the individual republics of former Yugoslavia. While in the past only candidates sponsored by 
the communist party were eligible to stand, in 1989 Croatia and Slovenia decided to allow the 
formation of political parties, who would nominate their own candidates. As a result, the first 
                                                 
22
 The most popular daily newspaper in Serbia, “Politika”, published commentaries and statements by some of 
the more outspoken Serbian politicians (e. g. Rada Anelkovi) almost daily which blamed Slovenia for 
“enslaving” the Serbian economy.  
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free elections were held in 1990. The reformed communist parties lost in both countries. In 
Slovenia, the ruling coalition comprised several parties (in the Slovenian political arena 
centrist or right-wing) with a broad range of political agendas, but united in their opposition to 
the continuation of socialism as a dominant political and economic concept. In Croatia, the 
Hrvatska Demokratska Zajednica (HDZ, Croatian Democratic Alliance) led by Franjo 
Tuman won a majority in parliament on a clear nationalist and populist political platform, 
but it had less clear economic proposals, except for a call to privatize the economy. “Social 
justice” was loudly declared a priority in both countries, despite their denunciation of 
socialism. 
 
In December 1990 Croatia and Slovenia held referendums on whether to stay within former 
Yugoslavia or to declare independence. The vast majority of voters favored independence, 
which both countries proclaimed in June 1991. A short military conflict with the Yugoslav 
army took place in Slovenia after its declaration, but within less than a month the army pulled 
out. However, after doing so it regrouped, and by September had intensified its engagement in 
Croatia, where armed conflict had in the meantime developed between part of the Serb 
minority (primarily those in rural areas) and the Croatian authorities. Military conflict in 
Croatia escalated23, and about one-third of the country’s territory came under the control of a 
self-proclaimed Serb local government backed up by the Yugoslav army. This situation lasted 
until 1995 (the last remaining occupied territories, including the city of Vukovar, returned to 
Croatian control in 1998), producing many casualties and much material damage24, together 
with a high level of indirect damage associated with the severe social effects of war and 
disruption of economic activities throughout Croatia. 
 
Politically, the period between 1991 and 1998 in Croatia was characterized by the 
strengthening of Mr. Tuman’s presidential rule and the growing influence of his party. After 
a short period of broad coalition government (designed to cope with the growing danger of 
Croatia’s loss of the war for independence and sovereignty), HDZ reaffirmed its leading 
position, in the face of growing concern from the opposition and foreign observers that the 
country was not developing its democratic institutions fast enough, even if war conditions and 
the post-war recovery were taken into consideration. Mr. Tuman ruled the country in a 
singularly autocratic manner until his illness and death in 1999. HDZ was defeated in the 
elections in January 2000 and was replaced by a broad coalition of mostly leftist and centrist 
parties led by Mr. Raan’s (reformed communist) Socijalno Demokratska Partija (SDP – 
Socialist Democratic Party). Only following the change of government did the international 
community fully accept Croatia as a democratic country and lift objections to its participation 
in important regional initiatives25. 
 
In Slovenia, the initial broad coalition was replaced in May 1992 by a centrist government led 
by the Liberalna Demokracija Slovenije (LDS - Liberal Democratic Party) and Mr. Janez 
Drnovšek. Mr. Drnovšek and his party stayed in power throughout the period 1992 to 2002 
with the exception of a few months in 2000. However, he frequently changed coalition 
partners, drawing from both the left and the right of the Slovenian political spectrum. Mr. 
                                                 
23
 Formally, the legal question of whether Croatia was engaged in a war with Yugoslavia or was dealing with 
armed civil unrest on its own territory remains a matter of political and legal debate. For this thesis I find the 
question irrelevant, and use the term “war” since it is in everyday use in discussions of that period of Croatian 
history. 
24
 An estimated 12,000 people died in the conflict, 35,000 were wounded, and 500,000 were displaced (more 
than 10% of population); direct material damage was estimated at US$ 27 billion, or almost double the Croatian 
GDP in 1990. 
25
 Before this, for example, Croatia could not participate in EU projects such as TEMPUS. 
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Kuan was another symbol of political stability: he was elected as the first President of the 
Republic of Slovenia and remained in that position until the end of his second mandate in the 
autumn of 2002. Democratic institutions were, by independent accounts, developed fairly 
effectively.  
 
Major reform of the political system and the necessary constitutional reforms were concluded 
in both countries by 1992, but changes in their legal systems, together with legislation of 
significant economic import, although ongoing in this period are still incomplete26. The 
magnitude of legal reform is mind-boggling. Both countries had to revise their entire legal 
frameworks, and most laws needed significant alteration, some being written for the first time. 
In addition, while a major part of legislation was revised during the early period of 
independence, a second round of major change was initiated after 1996 with EU requirements 
in mind. Overall, tens of thousands of changes in laws and regulations have been passed via 
the parliamentary process in these two countries. 
 
The scope and magnitude of changes in the economic systems of the two countries followed 
political developments closely. Interestingly enough, although the economic results differ 
significantly in Croatia and Slovenia, key areas of economic intervention and many interim 
manifestations have been the same.  
 
Croatia and Slovenia, like other countries in the region, shared the first economic 
manifestation of the change process: a significant drop in GDP level occurring in the first 
years after the introduction of true reforms (Fig. 2.1). It is interesting to note that the dip in 
GDP is both deep and wide, and that even the most robust economies in transition have 
needed more than eight years just to return to pre-change GDP levels. Also, many countries 
show a leveling-off of recovery towards the end of the period, this to large extent influenced 
by the Russian crisis of 1998. There were several important consequences. In economic 
policy, governments obviously had to cope with the issues of recession, structural adjustment 
and growth. To complicate things further, the recession began in the period of hyperinflation, 
and suffered the adverse influence of other key factors such as pressure from the international 
community to open local markets fully27. Since none of these issues could be solved in the 
short term, the governments also had to pay the political price of lack of quick fixes for 
problems which were hitting their constituencies hard.  
 
Another major issue for both governments surrounded the respective establishment of national 
currencies and definition of monetary policy. On the one hand, it was obvious that the 
Yugoslav Dinar could not be retained, but it was less clear how and how quickly new 
currencies should be introduced, positioned and managed. Even the names of their currencies 
became a political issue in both countries. The Slovenian government used this as a practical 
argument to introduce its currency in two stages: banknotes without any currency name were 
first introduced as a temporary payment instrument, and only when inflation had subsided and 
trust in the banking system and government competence had been established was the new 
                                                 
26
 E.g., in May 2002 the Slovenian parliament passed a law on privatization of insurance companies, and the 
major current shareholders have already announced that they will challenge it in the Constitutional Court. 
27
 Jeffery Sachs was the leading proponent of “shock therapy”, in favor of which he argued vigorously as 
consultant to numerous governments in the region and through his influence on the policies of the International 
Monetary Fund [Sachs 1992, Sachs 1996]. However, he was only voicing the general sentiment shared by most 
influential political and business circles in the West, which was largely driven by the pragmatism of opening 
untapped markets, rather than by a clear understanding of the benefits of such liberal policies. Some 
academicians did openly criticize the IMF approach and Sachs’s views, but to little effect [Kregel and Matzner 
1992, Hanke and Walters 1993, Slay 1993]. 
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currency (the Slovenian Tolar) introduced. To build the confidence of the general population, 
both governments maintained a consistent policy of slightly overpricing their local currencies, 
which put significant pressure on exporters and the countries’ trade balance28. While the 
Croatian government and its central bank authorities hoped the gap would be closed by 
income from tourism, FDI and money transfers from citizens working abroad, Slovenia 
placed its bets on the vitality of its exporters.  
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Source: EBRD Transition Report [2002], World Development Indicators Database [2002] 
Figure 2.1 GDP per capita (in constant 1995 US$) for selected countries in transition in the 
period 1989 – 2000 
 
The monetary policy in the early days of independence was strict and inflation decreased in a 
relatively short period of time, although both countries avoided the extreme shock therapies 
recommended by the IMF. However, even with relatively soft steering, the real cost of short-
term financing soared. The first reason was both countries’ political decision not to provide 
hidden subsidies to companies through soft loans. The second was the change in the banking 
sector, where banks were required to clean up their lending portfolios as well as their non-
performing assets. They were also supposed to be profitable and manage their cash flow 
without significant central bank intervention. Within months it became clear that most banks 
would go bankrupt under these conditions, so governments intervened and nationalized them 
to keep them afloat. However, tight lending practices and greatly increased interest spread to 
cover costs emerged as the consequences of this state intervention. In real terms, the annual 
interest rate on short-term corporate loans approached 20% and remained above 12% for most 
of the period between 1991 and 1995. For companies dependant on loan financing this was a 
huge shock, since the real interest rate at times of high inflation in former Yugoslavia had 
often been negative, and loan repayment schedules could easily be renegotiated.  
 
The banking system in Croatia suffered severely from political intervention during the 
privatization process, as described below. Several banks collapsed in the late 1990s, but the 
                                                 
28
 A simple calculation shows that the difference between the inflation rate and local currency devaluation 
remained at between 3% and 5% during most of the period, both in Slovenia and Croatia (although numbers 
differ by year and by country). This put high pressure on exporters who accrued most of their costs in the local 
currency. 
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damage was limited and the government encouraged sales of all important banks to foreign-
linked investors. Here the strategy after entry was, up to mid-2002, to maximize local gains, 
without significant restructuring. The banking system in Slovenia was fully restructured and 
rehabilitated by 1997, when the interest spread began to decrease and corporate lending 
became more active. Occasional turbulence resulted from the sub-standard performance of 
several smaller and mid-size banks, and consolidation led by the largest banks in the country. 
By 2002 foreign banks had gained a foothold through “green-field” subsidiaries or via 
acquisition of smaller banks, but this did not develop to significant dimensions. In 2001 the 
state began the privatization of the two largest banks (with a combined market share of more 
than 60%), but this process proved to be highly political, with strong opposition from public 
opinion.  
 
With the exception of the financial sector (banks and insurance companies) and the traditional 
state monopolies, most corporate privatization in Croatia and Slovenia was carried out in the 
period from 1992 to 1996. It was certainly in the privatization process that the economic 
policies of Croatia and Slovenia differed the most; and it had a major impact on the behavior 
of individual companies [Smith et al. 1997, Franievi 1999, Bojnec 1999]. 
 
The new political elite in Croatia designed the privatization process there, and Mr. Tuman 
and his party tightly monitored its implementation. The rationale behind the process was a 
desire to generate FDI and achieve a level of concentrated ownership high enough to drive 
companies towards fast improvement in performance. The privatization process for smaller 
and middle-size companies was typically not transparent, but was decided within the Croatian 
Privatization Agency. In most cases company value was understated, and a company was sold 
to the individual with the closest ties to the political elite29. Instead of generating an inflow of 
fresh capital30, the transaction was covered by a bank loan to that individual, approved by a 
“friendly” government-controlled bank (or, in some cases, foreign loans, when the individual 
had already accumulated enough assets to use as a guarantee against new loans). These 
practices had several significant consequences. In the process of preparing for privatization, 
many companies were literally forced into destroying value, often by their own management, 
who hoped to buy the company at a low price. Some of the new owners were genuinely 
interested in the companies they bought as going concerns, but many saw the purchase as a 
transaction, stripped the company of its assets (often illegally) and let it fail. This weakened 
the banking system due to the resulting substantial number of non-performing loans. Finally, 
the whole process generated a huge degree of opposition and cynicism in the population, and 
eventually contributed to the change of government in 2000. However, not all the cases 
developed according to the above scenario. Respectable foreign owners bought some 
companies (typically in “low risk” industries like cement or brewing), while a number of the 
biggest and best-performing were floated on the local or (in a few cases, like Pliva and 
Zagrebaka banka) international stock exchange, with a significant portion of shares owned 
by institutional investors. 
 
                                                 
29
 The process to large degree resembles privatization in Russia [Buck et al. 1999] and other East European 
countries with authoritarian regimes. 
30
 The Croatian Privatization Fund (CPF) had up to 1997 sold only around US$ 200 million of equity to foreign 
investors, 1/3 of it to Croatian émigrés. The overall cash proceeds from privatization were by that time only 
around US$ 275 million out of an estimated US$ 2.6 billion of the initial value of CPF-held equity [Franievi 
1999]. In comparison, more than US$ 1.5 billion was raised through sales of socially-owned apartments [EBRD 
1997] – citizens obviously preferred to invest their savings in buying housing rather than stock, which was 
perceived as highly risky.  
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The Slovenian privatization process was based on a different set of assumptions: social 
fairness was seen as the most important criterion by far, as was clearly stated by the vast 
majority of the population. Given the fragmentation in parliament, it comes as no surprise that 
no political party wanted to take the risk and openly oppose the privatization concept even if 
some part of the political elite preferred a different model. This is why voucher privatization 
followed31. Also, public opinion was consistent in its strong opposition to sales of Slovenian 
companies to foreign owners, this reflected in fairly closed capital markets and the relatively 
low level of FDI in Slovenia as compared to some other Central European countries (Table 
2.4). In consequence, most of the biggest and best-performing companies in Slovenia are in 
the majority ownership of domestic institutional investors. 
 
 Cumulative FDI per capita 
(US$) 
Croatia 1042 
Czech Republic 2399 
Hungary 976 
Poland 961 
Slovakia 1109 
Slovenia 840 
 
Source: EBRD Transition Report [2002] 
Table 2.4 Foreign Direct Investment in Central Europe, 1993 - 2001 
 
It might be appropriate to conclude this brief overview of economic changes in Croatia and 
Slovenia in the period from 1991 to 2001 with the most recent developments (Table 2.5).  
 
 Croatia Slovenia 
 2000 2001 2000 2001 
GDP (mil. US$) 19 223 20 260 18 146 18 810 
GDP per capita (US$) 4 179 5 354 9 073 11 984 
GDP PPP per capita (US$) 7 960 9 170 17 310 18 233 
GDP growth (%) 3.7 4.1 4.6 3.0 
Inflation (%) 6.2 4.8 8.9 9.4 
% of unemployed 21.1 22.0 10.8 10.8 
 
Source: EBRD Transition Report [2002], World Development Indicators Database [2003] 
 Statistical Bureau of Croatia, Statistical Bureau of Slovenia 
Table 2.5 Key economic indicators for Croatia and Slovenia in 2000 and 2001 
 
Regional markets have in principle fully re-opened to companies from these two countries, 
including those in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia and Montenegro. Of course, the situation 
is significantly different from that ten years ago. Competition throughout Central and Eastern 
Europe is getting stronger by the day, comprising not only the more aggressive global players, 
but also emerging local and regional competitors. The absence of strong local competition in 
some countries is usually linked to their low purchasing power (cf. Serbia, Albania or 
Moldavia). On the other hand, Croatia and even more so Slovenia are becoming increasingly 
more integrated into the European business environment, even before becoming formal 
                                                 
31
 The privatization process in Slovenia largely resembles that in the Czech Republic. 
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members of the EU32. An examination of FDI and foreign trade sources clearly indicates that 
the EU is already the prime economic partner of the two countries, followed by countries of 
former Yugoslavia and former COMECOM countries (Table 2.6). 
 
Croatia Slovenia  
% of FDI % of exports % of imports % of FDI % of exports % of imports 
EU 72 55 65 84 62 69 
Former33 
Yugoslavia 
3 26 10 2 17 5 
Former  
COMECOM 
1 5 16 4 12 11 
North 
America 
18 2 3 4 3 3 
Other 6 12 6 6 5 11 
 
Source: Internal materials of Statistical Bureau of Croatia, Slovenian Chamber of Economy 
Table 2.6 Geographical structure of principle international economic relations in 2001 
 
The situation, however, varies significantly according to industry sector. In general, consumer 
goods industries have found their best markets in the countries of former Yugoslavia, 
followed by the EU, while those for industrial goods are found primarily in the EU, followed 
by countries of former Yugoslavia. As to consumer industries, former COMECOM countries 
represent smaller, but still very promising markets, with the situation varying from one sector 
to another (e.g. for pharmaceuticals this is the leading market). All other markets are 
marginal. An example of the market structure for Slovenian food and car components 
industries is provided in Table 2.7. 
 
 
Food industry Car components 
industry 
 
Mil. US$ % of exports Mil. US$ % of exports 
EU 76 23.6% 234 89.0% 
Former34 
Yugoslavia 
214 66.5% 19 7.2% 
Former  
COMECOM 
19 5.9% 3 1.1% 
North 
America 
11 3.4% 2 0.8% 
Other 2 0.6% 5 1.9% 
 
Source: Internal materials of the Slovenian Chamber of Economy 
Table 2.7 Geographical structure of exports of Slovenian food and car components industries 
in 2001 
 
The social effects of the political and economic changes described are overwhelming. Without 
entering into a detailed analysis of the growing body of social and economic research 
                                                 
32
 Slovenia had by mid-2002 concluded 26 out of 31 chapters in its negotiations for accession to the EU, and was 
among the front-runners for candidacy. 
33
 The data includes numbers for Slovenia in the case of Croatia, and vice-versa. 
34
 The data include numbers for Slovenia in case of Croatia and vice-versa. 
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[Milanovic 1999, Mandi 2000] (which is beyond the scope of this study), one can easily 
identify several phenomena affecting the behavior of stakeholders in companies undergoing 
change. 
 
The early period of the change process (1991-1994) was characterized by high levels of 
uncertainty and disorientation. Social symbols were changing in value overnight, with some 
of the most basic manifestations of culture also metamorphosing and requiring rapid 
adaptation35. This, along with decreased physical and economic safety, generated high stress 
levels. Naturally, Croatia suffered from it more than Slovenia, since it was exposed to a much 
more serious military situation and a much longer economic depression. 
 
While the vast majority of the population welcomed the independence of their countries and 
the change from a socialist to market economy, it also had quite naïve expectations regarding 
the speed of economic turnaround. The short-term results of the changes were a significant 
drop in the standard of living, and, in order to retain at least some voter support, governments 
were tempted to promise that “things would get better soon”. Of course, such promises were 
difficult to keep (Fig. 2.2) and, being suspiciously similar to promises offered for many years 
by the socialist governments, generated a significant amount of popular cynicism. It is worth 
noting that, if we take GDP as the measure of the economic situation, only five of the 
countries in the region have managed to return to where they started in 1989 and are now 
better off (Fig. 2.1). The others are still struggling with the price they must pay for 
restructuring their economies. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.2 Illustration of linear catch-up  
 
To a large degree cynicism was the principal feeling towards the western world. Many felt 
that western countries, after encouraging ex-socialist countries to begin the change, had left 
them out in the cold. Economic integration of countries in transition into the western 
economic space proved to be slow, and they received relatively little assistance (except during 
the reunification of Germany). While one can easily understand that disappointing early 
investment experiences (the inability of the Treuhandanstalt to sell East German companies at 
a profit; the poor performance of acquisitions such as GE Tungsram; the Russian crisis) and 
the region’s lack of political stability led to the second-guessing of the true nature of business 
                                                 
35
 As an example, a mere reference to Yugoslavia, formally the source of collective identity, became a reference 
to an enemy state at war with Croatia and Slovenia. Another example is the everyday use of language as the 
basic manifestation of culture, where people were driven towards “purism”, i.e. strict avoidance of words and 
jargon associated with other cultures, or the Yugoslav (or socialist) past. In Croatia this produced significant 
changes in the language, often with strong political connotations (e.g. a preponderance of words previously 
heard only at the time of nationalistic, pro-Nazi government during World War II). 
GDP per 
capita 
Years 
Country A: $24,000,  
2% annual growth 
 
Country B: $6,000, 
4% annual growth 
 
Catch-up time: 72 years 
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opportunities, it threatened to turn the virtuous circle of economic recovery into a vicious one 
of continuous downturn (Table 2.8, Fig. 2.3). Part of this was a gradual rise in negativity 
towards the presence of foreign investors in both countries (e.g., in a recent poll more than 
50% of Slovenians opposed the sale of Pivovarna Union, the second largest Slovenian 
brewery, to Interbrew)36, further contributing to the vicious circle. 
 
Cynicism was not only the result of adjustment stress and betrayed expectations of improved 
standards of living. Other social factors engendering it included the significant increase in 
wealth concentration (more prevalent in Croatia, due to its privatization model), a relatively 
thin social safety network, and the impoverishment of many who, prior to changes, had 
belonged to the middle class. Furthermore, many of the opportunities created in the transition 
and the relatively weak state of the law solicited corruption. The media reported social 
aberrations much more readily than it did anything positive, thus reinforcing the ordinary 
citizen’s impression of failing societal norms. Increased stress, as well as the impact of 
western social trends on the younger generation, contributed to the rise of drug abuse and 
crime in general. With the legal framework in flux, general environmental uncertainty and 
abundant opportunities for high gain proved particularly challenging for managers, who 
showed massive disrespect for the law, following the trend in other countries in transition 
(e.g. more than 70% of Polish managers admitted breaking the law [Czapisnki 1996]). 
 
On the positive side, both countries witnessed a mushrooming of entrepreneurship, seen in the 
founding of several hundred thousand small new companies, as well as the population’s 
booming interest in active participation in stock markets and other forms of revenue-
generation (such as taking jobs on the side as sales representatives of direct sales 
organizations). 
 
 FDI (in EUR billion) 
Other countries within the EU 329 
USA 174 
Central and Eastern Europe 12 
Other 86 
 
Source: Eurostat [2001] 
Table 2.8 Destination of FDI of EU countries in 2000 
 
Croatia had another specific problem, comparable to the “Vietnam syndrome” in the USA. A 
large number of young men were discharged from the army after military operations 
concluded. Many of them suffered from war-related disorders, which were further intensified 
by poor employment opportunities and quick social marginalization. 
 
Finally, both Croatia and Slovenia witnessed growing individualism and conservatism as 
another form of response to the social problems described above. Especially among the 
younger workforce, this coincided with the effects of “Generation X”, as described in the 
literature [Tulgan 2000, Karp et al. 2002]. 
                                                 
36
 Once again, Croatia and Slovenia are not exceptions in Central Europe. A negative attitude towards foreign 
investors has developed in all its countries, even in those (such as Hungary), where feelings were initially 
positive and where foreign investors reacted with enthusiasm, bringing a significant amount of investment 
[Martin 1999]. 
Nenad Filipovi  Chapter 2 
Strategic Change Management of Medium-Size Companies:   
Insights from Slovenia and Croatia   
 25 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.3 Virtuous circle of economic recovery and vicious circle of continuous downturn in 
countries in transition 
 
2.3.2 Key challenges and responses on the corporate level 
The obvious major challenge for a company at the beginning of the period of change was to 
stay alive in an environment of failing markets and enormous pressures on cash flow. It was 
not uncommon for a company to remain without any significant revenues for months, forcing 
management to devise survival tactics involving possible sources of short-term financing. 
Basic logic indicates two components of the problem: cash-flow management as an 
immediate issue, as well as balancing costs and revenues as a matter of recreating a 
sustainable business. 
 
Economic growth 
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Solving the cash-flow problem was far from trivial. On the one hand, banks were 
experiencing significant problems themselves and loan financing suddenly became very 
expensive, while money from other sources was usually even more expensive. Many 
managers applied the old habit of using political connections, with varying success. In some 
cases, managers were not close enough to the new elite (especially incumbent managers who 
had not switched political sides fast enough), and in others politicians did not wish to expose 
themselves to the risk of public scrutiny for behavior that was no longer to be tolerated. Along 
with seeking out possible sources of extraordinary cash infusion, managers also turned their 
attention to improving cash-flow management practices. They also had to devote great 
attention to reaching agreements with employees and suppliers allowing them to delay salary 
payouts and stretch out account settlements, in order to avoid strikes or stoppages caused by 
lack of raw materials – which would generate that fatal spiral of downturn in operational 
activities (and, consequently, of revenues and cash). 
 
As regards balancing costs and revenues, it soon became clear that cutting costs could be 
achieved faster than building new streams of revenue. Thus, many companies decided on 
cost-cutting exercises. One of the clearer and less painful was to focus on closing down or 
spinning off activities with minimal potential for generating profit, as well as those that could 
be easily subcontracted37. Also, given traditional levels of over-staffing, especially in 
administrative overheads38, many companies when faced with the need to make additional 
savings undertook major personnel reduction39. They also looked at other costs they might 
influence, primarily in the area of purchasing. Finally, they began examining business 
processes, and a number underwent formal re-engineering. Thus, as one might easily see and 
predict from experience elsewhere, a spectrum of approaches and tools were used to optimize 
the cost position. 
 
At this point it should be noted once again that the major incentive for cost-cutting at this 
initial stage of change was not to achieve sustainable cost advantages over competition, but to 
confine costs within downscaled revenues and thus assure short-term survival, which was in 
jeopardy! Labor cost advantage, as will be discussed in Chapters 3 and 5, proved to be an 
elusive issue. While many local managers believed they could sustain and use it on their own 
or as a basis for some form of alliance with foreign partners, the behavior of MNCs [Meyer 
1995, Filipovi 2000], confirmed Porter’s prediction that labor costs alone are a poor attractor 
and that more complex factors influence MNCs in their investment decisions [Porter 1986]. 
 
Some companies were, for various reasons (unwillingness to admit the unpleasant truth; 
internal or community pressure to keep employment level: lack of leadership drive or 
managerial skills and systems), hesitant or slow to reduce costs. As one might expect, there 
were plenty of failures. However, some companies who were relatively successful in initial 
cost cutting did not achieve the further progress of some of their counterparts. Also, some 
other companies who survived the initial adaptation did not initially do so by means of 
                                                 
37
 This typically involved various employee benefit services (e. g., vacation resorts, childcare facilities, cafeterias 
etc.), as well as low-skilled jobs (e. g., security or cleaning staff). 
38
 For example, Žito, one of the largest food companies in Slovenia, in 1991 had headquarter costs equivalent to 
5.8% of sales, while headquarter costs of 22 international food companies on average equalled 1% [EMBA 
Projects 1992]. 
39
 However, due primarily to institutional pressures in almost no case did reduction in labor costs match decrease 
in revenues. The same pattern was observable in all other countries in the region except Hungary. The 
discrepancy between revenue and employment drop stood in direct correlation to the speed of reform [Martin 
1999]. 
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significant cost cutting, but instead focused on building new streams of revenue. However, 
over a period of time virtually all the companies which survived did both, i.e. trimmed costs 
and looked for new sources of revenue. 
 
In seeking new revenue opportunities, many companies behaved opportunistically, and tried 
various avenues. In geographical terms, it became obvious that the newly redefined local 
market (be it Croatia or Slovenia) offered smaller potential than the market of former 
Yugoslavia. With failing COMECOM markets, it seemed to be a natural choice for companies 
to seek new opportunities for existing products in the developed markets of the EU and other 
western European countries. However, very few companies had competitive products, and 
even fewer had developed sales channels. Thus, they chose a variety of strategies (developing 
new products, an attempt to penetrate local markets on wider scale, betting on Central 
European markets, switching to a mix of brand and private label production etc.), with a wide 
variety of outcomes.  
 
It is worth noting that in terms of initial company size the situation in Croatia and Slovenia 
differed from that in COMECOM countries. State-owned giants (Kozminski [1993] refers to 
them as dinosaurs) virtually did not exist in former Yugoslavia. Nevertheless, almost all the 
large companies, excepting state monopolies such as the post office or the railways, 
underwent fragmentation and significant downsizing, some practically ceasing to exist40. This 
process significantly affected the ability of the restructured companies to compete in global 
markets, since they lack the critical mass unless competing in small niches41. 
 
If the major external challenge for companies was to right-size, focus on their core business 
and find an appropriate cost-revenue balance, the major internal challenge was to survive this 
process without suffering collapse from human factors. As described before, cynicism, 
disorientation and lack of motivation were the prevailing attitudes generated by the change in 
the environment. Employees saw no easy answers to the huge problems companies were 
facing, and often responded by choosing “flight” over “fight”. On the other hand, the 
opportunities arising from discontinuous change (as in privatization) frequently stimulated 
unethical behavior, creating additional problems for company morale. Combined with the 
psychological issues in downsizing, all these elements presented a clear leadership challenge 
(i.e. the challenge of leading and managing the transformation effort). 
 
New challenges emerged for companies who had survived the initial period and were 
subsequently privatized. On the one hand, these reflected the objectives of the new owners, 
who in many cases were seeking higher short-term profitability42. On the other hand, although 
the pace of change in the local environment had slowed to some degree, there were still 
                                                 
40
 Good examples are Iskra and Rade Konar, both among the leading companies in former Yugoslavia, jointly 
employing over 55,000 people. Iskra (a Slovenian electronics manufacturer) disintegrated into a myriad of small 
companies, some of which altered their name, while more than 60 still maintain symbolic ties with history. Rade 
Konar changed its name to Konar, went through a turbulent process of downsizing (to about a sixth of its 
initial size), and reemerged as a group consisting of 55 small companies. 
41
 The same effect was observed in other countries of the region, where the disintegration processes were even 
larger in scale [Amsden et al. 1994]. 
42
 This seems just as true for single owners or small groups of owners purchasing a company through an LBO-
type arrangement as for institutional investors, and is in both cases completely logical. The first group was under 
the pressure of debt repayment and in most cases could not employ the asset-stripping tactics typical of 
developed markets, since the asset market was suffering from oversupply due to many failing companies. The 
second group was also dependant on short-term profits rather than capital gains, since the stock markets were not 
liquid and the choice of investment positions was limited. 
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profound new factors increasing pressure on performance. In local, regional and international 
markets companies were faced with growing competition. The local market had more or less 
fully opened to global players who used the less-risky environment to justify their entrance 
(this happened in Slovenia somewhat earlier than in Croatia, but by the late 1990s both 
countries were in a similar position). Also, new local competitors emerged, and some old ones 
significantly improved their performance. The same became true in the regional markets of 
Central Europe, with clear trends in the same direction in the markets of former Yugoslavia’s 
other republics. As regards the developed markets, the global trend of increased competition 
was matched by the penetration of more competitors from countries in transition, who 
followed similar strategies to Croatian and Slovenian companies and approached them in 
performance. This was especially troublesome for local companies competing on the basis of 
low (labor) cost for “reasonable” quality. Competitors from other Central and East European 
countries started to reach Croatian and Slovenian quality levels, but had lower costs (and the 
same physical proximity to West European markets). 
 
This time the threat could not be countered by another round of fast cost-cutting measures 
(since many companies were already close to the industry efficiency curve), or by escaping to 
new markets (since most companies had already tried all close markets and were for obvious 
reasons reluctant to reach beyond Europe). Limited resources made it difficult to keep broad 
portfolios of products and market strategies. The domestic capital shortage did not permit the 
raising of capital for much-needed investment into product innovation43 or market expansion. 
At the same time, pressures from both value-based and cost-based competitors made a 
“middle-of-the-road” position unsustainable. Thus companies were forced to develop a clear 
focus while improving their competitiveness. Psychologically this went against all past 
experience, since in more than a decade of abrupt changes companies had often survived not 
by focusing on one right answer, but by keeping many options open. 
 
Under these circumstances the leadership challenge changed in nature, but did not disappear. 
Major company transformation was still required, as described above. The key challenge for 
leaders, however, was no longer to show that there was light at the end of the tunnel, but to 
convince stakeholders that a new tunnel existed – just after emerging in relief from the first. 
2.4 Influence of the global business environment 
While changes in the environment in Croatia and Slovenia were occurring at a frantic pace, 
the global business environment was not at a standstill, either. Actually, many authors refer to 
the last decade as a period of discontinuous44 change on the global level [Hamel 1996, Nadler 
and Tushman 1999, Bartlett and Ghoshal 2002, Eisenhardt 2002]. Naturally, global trends had 
a strong general influence on the competitive position of Croatian and Slovenian companies. 
 
There is little doubt that in recent years business has became more global than ever. It is the 
rule rather than the exception nowadays for a large multinational company to operate in 150+ 
countries and territories. In many it not only sells and supports its products, but also develops 
them, buys components for them or produces them. Most industries have global players, 
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 A study into the behavior of Hungarian companies showed that only 1 (domestically owned) of 27 firms in 
Hungary developed a new product as a reaction to crisis [Whitley and Czaban 1998]. On the macro level, 
investment in R&D decreased from 2-3% of GDP to less than 1% [Martin 1999] (in some countries, such as 
Poland, it was even worse: R&D expenditure dropped to less than 0.5% [Rapacki 1996]). Similar trends were 
observable in Croatia and Slovenia. 
44
 The change they describe is discontinuous in terms of characteristics, if not in name. 
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including some that until recently were seen as strictly local, typically in services45. Thus, for 
the vast majority of companies facing the competition of global players in any desirable 
market is already a reality. In consequence, companies from Croatia and Slovenia cannot hope 
to remain viable just via the efficiency curve, but need a clear competitive advantage over 
global players in the eyes of their key customers. Thus, a major issue for them is what 
competitive strategies to choose when confronted with such competition. 
 
In parallel with globalization of the competition, an opposite force is also influencing markets. 
Both consumer and business markets are becoming increasingly fragmented, since intensified 
competition has led many companies, understanding that customer segments were in the past 
often too coarsely defined, to refine their niches and shape customer expectations and 
demand. At the same time technological developments, primarily within information 
technology, have facilitated unprecedented developments in micro-marketing [Bessen 1993, 
Nadler and Tushman 1999]. For Croatian and Slovenian companies this trend has been a 
mixed blessing: while positive in generating additional market opportunities, favoring flexible 
(and not just big) players and bringing companies closer to customers and consumers, it has 
also created problems in setting even higher technological and marketing threshold standards. 
 
Another recent phenomenon with a fundamentally influence on business is the breakthrough 
progress in information technology. Without even speculating on its other effects, clearly 
visible is the impact it has had in virtually eliminating the significant barriers of time and 
space in many industries. On the one hand, it contributes to globalization, while on the other it 
increases the speed of the “internal clock” of business. For companies from Croatia and 
Slovenia it provides an opportunity as well as a threat. It is an opportunity in the broad sense 
that emerging technologies allow for radical redefinition of industries, thus eliminating the 
advantages of incumbents46. At the same time, however, local companies suffer relatively low 
levels of cumulative investment in IT, and from that point of view are at disadvantage 
compared to their western counterparts. Also, the increasing speed of business lays on more 
pressure to optimize business processes, already an area requiring their attention over the last 
decade.  
 
The accelerated pace of technological change is another generally-accepted contemporary 
phenomenon. Its consequences are multiple. In some industries, technological change has led 
to significant shortening of product life-cycles and “hypercompetition” [D’Aveni 1994, 
Eisenhardt and Martin 2000], thus increasing the speed of business in a somewhat different 
sense than has IT. In addition, more importance is now placed on the knowledge necessary to 
master technological change and all its associated organizational consequences. In this sense 
many authors claim that we have already entered the “knowledge society”, in which capital is 
abundant and knowledge has become the primary driver of business success [Senge 1990, 
OECD 2000, Drucker 2001]. In organizational terms, novel organizational forms suited for 
creating and managing knowledge in organizations (e. g., learning, metanational and 
networked) have become a research focus [Senge 1990, Chisholm 1998, Doz et al. 2001]. 
There is little obvious evidence of how Croatian and Slovenian companies have reacted to this 
trend in the last decade, as they seem locked into traditional business structures and have 
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 As an example, Service Corporation International by the end of 2001 operated 3,099 funeral service locations, 
475 cemeteries and 177 crematoria located in 11 countries 
46
 Recent research, however, suggests that this statement is only partially true. While “revolutionary strategies” 
are rendered more realizable by new technologies [Hamel 1996], it seems that incumbents are in a position to 
reap most of the benefits from internet technologies [Evans and Wurster 1999, Wise and Byrne 2000, Bigler 
2001] 
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sought other ways to create added value. Nevertheless, every company must find its own 
approach to this issue, since the wrong choice can in the long run undermine viability. 
 
The emphasis on the importance of knowledge has another important side-effect: redefinition 
of the contract between the corporation and the employee. The fact that the corporation owns 
the means of production does not secure its dominant position over the employee, as it used to 
in the past. If we link this to the Generation X effect [Tulgan 2000, Karp et al. 2002], and the 
changing relationship between employer and employee due to decreased job security, we see 
the theoretical underpinning for the observed phenomenon of decreased power of employers 
and the greater need to attract value-adding employees [Sherman and Sookdeo 1993, Pfeffer 
1994, Hitt et al. 1994, Baruch and Hind 1999, Drucker 2001, Rubery 2002]. Croatian and 
Slovenian companies are starting to notice this phenomenon. In their case, the effects are 
magnified by the small local pool of labor, as well as the growing readiness of local talent to 
pursue international careers. 
 
Finally, another universal trend has been reconfirmed over the last decade: in order to survive 
and thrive organizations must be able to institutionalize change, rather than stability. Whether 
this trend is new or has existed for ages and we merely flatter ourselves as “change masters” 
is a matter for discussion47, but organizations are undoubtedly keeping themselves in flux, 
experimenting with new forms and organizational development strategies, and seeking 
specific leadership talent. For regional companies this poses a true challenge, since until 
recently they were seen as key instruments in maintaining the status quo; and some key 
stakeholders still have an interest in opposing change [Kova 1990]. Organizational and 
leadership development were of very secondary interest for the political and business elite, so 
companies have suddenly been faced with absorbing a tremendous amount of new learning in 
this area in a very short period of time. 
2.5 Summary: characteristics of the research context and the resulting research agenda 
As with many similar research efforts, the main goal of this one is a better understanding of 
the patterns of corporate behavior which have led to success or failure in the observed period 
of radical change in Croatia and Slovenia (and which have the potential for general 
applicability to other scenarios of major change in the business environment). The huge 
variety of approaches to change observed, as well as the outcomes of the transformation, 
further stress the lack of simple answers. While such a broad issue may be difficult to address, 
the challenges presented in this chapter may allow more focus. 
 
In terms of the contents of change, the issues point in the direction of competitiveness. 
Competitiveness emerges as central both in the first period of change, when companies 
struggled to adapt fast to the new environment and achieve an efficiency curve allowing them 
to be competitive in the redefined markets, and in the second phase, when companies have 
been trying to adapt to steadily-growing competitive pressures. Thus, competitiveness in a 
highly dynamic environment will present one dimension of the research model; and a 
literature review is presented in the next chapter as an aid to model building in this context. 
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 Almost twenty years ago, Tichy [1983a] wrote in his article on strategic change management: “Organizations 
today face major, discontinuous change that makes strategic management more difficult and more complex than 
ever.” Given his deep understanding of change phenomena, one can only wonder how much more discontinuous 
discontinuous change can become. 
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However, as seen from the above description of change and the resulting challenges, the 
process of change, in particular leadership intervention, seems to be an equally important 
component of the puzzle. With the high level of overall uncertainty, enormous daily pressures 
and significant general stress in society and among employees, managers did not have a 
simple task in designing and leading the change process. Thus, the change process itself will 
present the other dimension of the research model, also based on an appropriate review of the 
literature. 
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3. Literature review and research model 
This chapter provides a literature review and presents a research model. The huge body of 
literature in the areas of competitiveness and strategic change management is a major 
challenge for the researcher. On the one hand, its volume makes any attempt at a systematic, 
detailed review almost futile48; on the other, various schools of thought and theoretical 
frameworks exist within each area. Thus, I decided to limit myself to a brief overview of the 
several major approaches in the literature, followed by a more in-depth analysis and 
discussion of those I find particularly relevant to the research goals specified in Chapter 1. 
 
Based on the thinking presented in Chapters 1 and 2, I have chosen two subject areas for the 
literature review: competitive advantage and strategic change management. As Hirsch and 
Friedman suggested in their provocative article [1986], strategy formulation and 
implementation were traditionally kept as separate disciplines drawing on different underlying 
sciences (competitive advantage: economic theory and, to a lesser degree, military strategy; 
strategic change management: psychology, sociology and political science). While nowadays 
one seldom hears a serious scholar deny the importance of both streams, they are rarely 
present within the same piece of research. As will be discussed later, scholars from the 
“competitive advantage side” rarely address the process of transformation in the factors 
contributing to competitive advantage (i.e. the process through which companies change their 
competitiveness). For some schools of thought the obvious reason for such lack of attention to 
this important topic is the static character of the competitive advantage model. However, even 
schools that employ a dynamic model (e.g. the dynamic capabilities school, or the learning 
school) focus on the what, rather than on the how relative to dynamism. 
 
Scholars from the “strategic change management side”, in particular those dealing with 
organizational transformation, tend to cover a broader range of questions about the nature of 
change, its context, content and process. However, most research focuses on one dimension 
only, and popular strategic change management models typically focus on process rather than 
other dimensions [Kanter 1985a, Kotter 1995]. A few notable exceptions to this rule will 
receive special attention in the review. 
 
This chapter begins by looking at the concept of competitive advantage. First it presents a 
critical overview of the theoretical frameworks dominating recent academic as well as popular 
literature, the latter aimed at management practitioners and often prescriptive in form. 
Although there are implications for the research model in various economic theories, e. g. 
monopoly theory, transaction cost economics theory, organizational ecology and institutional 
theory, special focus is placed on the environmental school (presented in 3.1.8). The main 
reason for this choice is not only the popularity of this theory with practitioners (mostly due to 
the influential work of Michael Porter [Porter 1980, 1985]), but the clarity of the generic 
strategies concept and its applicability to the situation in the region under discussion.  
 
Next, a more in-depth review is performed of the resource-based view approach (3.2.2) and 
the competence approach, which seem to propose a comprehensive set of overlapping 
findings concerning the nature of competitive advantage and can serve as the basis for 
constructing the competitiveness dimension of the research model. Although this approach is 
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 An on-line search of one of the most popular databases in this field resulted in more than 3500 matches for the 
phrase “competitive advantage” and its immediate derivatives, and more than 4500 matches for “strategic change 
management” and its derivatives. 
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significantly more popular with academics than practitioners, the considerations it presents 
are basic to understanding competitiveness and are also highly applicable in the observed 
context.  
 
The review of strategic change management starts with a brief overview of the most common, 
but sometimes confusingly imprecise, terminology and the development of the underlying 
schools of thought. It continues with a more thorough examination of the adaptation 
(contingency and learning), institutional, and evolutionary approaches to change management. 
Then a summary of integrative approaches, with context, content and process dimensions, is 
presented, and a comparison made between several widely-cited models of change 
management with a focus on those aspiring towards practical application. The role of 
leadership and culture in strategic change management is discussed in more detail, with an 
overview of leadership intervention as proposed in various models; also the influence of 
national and organizational culture on change, and the effects of change on individuals. The 
literature review concludes with a brief visit to the field of turnaround management. As 
opposed to the competitiveness area, where two schools of thought were given clear 
precedence over the others, the area of strategic change management appears to be much more 
fragmented and the literature review did not focus on any particular theory. Of somewhat 
greater applicability to the region was inertia theory (3.3.1) and Pettigrew’s work on 
integrative models of strategic change (3.3.2, [Pettigrew 1987]). Among many process-
oriented models more attention is given to Lewin [1947], Tichy [1983b] and Kotter [1995], 
while the work of Kotter and Schlesinger [1979] marks the area of the role of change agents. 
 
Finally, based on the constructs identified in the first two parts of this chapter, a research 
model is presented which proposes an explanation for the ongoing transformation process on 
the company level in Croatia and Slovenia, which is later to be verified through the qualitative 
research presented in Chapter 5. 
 
Throughout the text I have made explicit references to what I find particularly relevant when 
applying a given theory to countries in transition. These comments link the literature review 
with the general observations made in Chapter 2. Their purpose is to clarify a possible 
interpretation of the conclusions from the literature review within the research context, and to 
point out those conclusions which will be used to build the research model. 
3.1 The concept of competitive advantage: a general overview of the literature 
Although their definition of the term competitive advantage may differ in wording, most 
authors agree on the (almost tautological) essence of the significance of its presence (or 
absence) for the firm: a firm must have competitive advantage over its rivals (in the 
marketplace) if it wishes to ensure above-average performance49 over a certain period of time. 
In other words, competitive advantage is seen as a necessary (but not sufficient, some scholars 
note) prerequisite for above-average performance [Porter 1985, Coyne 1985, Barney 1991].  
 
The concept of competitive advantage has its roots in economics, where researchers created 
many theories to explain the possible sources of economic rent [Ricardo 1966, Chamberlin 
1933, Schumpeter 1934]. Since the 1980s the question of how firms achieve and sustain 
competitive advantage has become one of the explicitly fundamental issues in the field of 
strategic management [Rumelt et al. 1994].  While the importance of this topic seems to be a 
matter of general consensus among academics, many approaches developed over time in order 
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 As will be discussed, the commonly-accepted performance measure of a firm is economic rent. 
Nenad Filipovi  Chapter 3 
Strategic Change Management of Medium Size Companies:   
Insights from Slovenia and Croatia   
 34 
to answer the above question. Some resulted in an explicit theory of the firm50, while others 
were less ambitious in scope and restricted themselves to building partial models focused on 
explaining or prescribing elements of the firm’s strategic behavior. 
 
There is no prevailing taxonomy of strategy formation schools51 or theories explaining 
competitive advantage, and even the most popular frameworks are often cited under slightly 
different names (e.g. resource-based theory [Conner 1991], resource-advantage theory [Hunt 
1997] or resource-based view [Barney et al. 2001]52; industrial organization economics 
[Conner 1991] or organizational economics [Combs and Ketchen 1999]; environmental 
perspective [Barney 1991, Cockburn et al. 2000] or positioning school [Mintzberg and 
Lampel 1999]). Also, continuous efforts have been invested in bridging different approaches 
and developing a “unified” theory or integrative model (e.g. [Smith et al. 1996, Oliver 1997, 
Juga 1999, Combs and Ketchen 1999]), a situation which further blurs the borders between 
individual theories (or “views”). Finally, different authors use different criteria when 
classifying individual contributions within various frameworks, resulting in a confusing mix 
of terminology (e.g. work on learning organizations [Senge 1990] being discussed within the 
discipline of organizational learning [Miller 1996], classified as a major organizational 
capability within the dynamic capabilities view [Eisenhardt and Martin 2000], treated as a 
strategic resource in the resource-based theory [Smith et al. 1996, Michalisin et al. 1997], or 
defined as part of complexity logic [Lengnick-Hall and Wolff 1999]; the dynamic capabilities 
view is treated as a framework either different from the resource-based view [Teece et al. 
1997] or forming part of it [Eisenhardt and Martin 2000, Barney et al. 2001]). 
 
As noted above, industrial organization economics is one of the social sciences with the 
closest links to the contemporary concept of competitive advantage. For that reason I shall 
present a brief overview of several schools of thought developed within industrial 
organization economics which have influenced the subsequent development of the strategy 
schools from the 1980s onward. I shall follow this with an overview of another four theories 
of relevance for further discussion and research model building, while deliberately omitting 
many others (e.g. theory of complex adaptive systems, chaos theory, game theory). The main 
criteria for omission was that, based on a brief review, I found a particular theory less fit for 
formulating a coherent research model, relevant and applicable to firms in the region. 
 
The various schools within industrial organization economics theory share an important 
assumption, which seems to be universally accepted by other schools of thought derived from 
economics, but not necessarily by those derived from other social sciences (e.g. the 
institutional theory). The assumption I refer to concerns the purpose of the firm, and it states 
that the ultimate purpose of the firm is to maximize profits [Conner 1991]. This is generally 
accepted as true despite some evidence [Scherer 1970, Pfeffer and Salanick 1978] that 
survival, rather than profit maximization, is the most common goal among organizations. The 
importance of this assumption for firms operating in economies in transition is even higher 
than for those in market economies, since for them it has meant a dramatic change: the goal of 
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 Holmstrom and Tirole [1985] believe that a theory of the firm must address two central questions: why firms 
exist (their purpose), and what determines their scale and scope. Competitive advantage is clearly linked to both 
questions: a) above-average performance (regardless of the unit of measure taken for assessing performance, 
which depends on the particular theory) by definition means that the firm is successful in fulfilling its purpose, 
and b) competitive advantage is ex-post-facto one of the factors determining the firm’s scale and scope. 
51
 See Mintzberg and Lampel [1999] for an interesting attempt to systematize strategy formation schools and 
consolidate different approaches within a single framework. 
52
 This implicitly points to a matter of academic debate – is resource-based view a distinct theory of the firm or 
not [Priem and Butler 2001]?  
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the firm changed overnight from fulfilling broader social goals (e.g. job security) to 
maximizing profits. Therefore it can be expected that management assumptions as to the 
purpose of the firm are an important element in context interpretation. They would, in turn, 
influence both perceptions about the need for change as well as decisions related to the design 
of the change effort. If profit maximization were seen as the main goal, one would expect to 
see more radical measures taken within the change effort to secure profits. On the other hand, 
if broader social goals still dominated because of institutional inertia, one would expect to see 
less radical measures, especially in terms of employment reduction as part of cost-cutting. The 
employment level in most countries in the region in the period from 1991 to 1995 fell 
significantly more slowly than did the volume of economic activity. This indicates that this 
important hypothesis concerning the purpose of the firm and its influence on the managerial 
response to change deserves to be tested through empirical research. 
 
While united around the assumption of profit maximization as the ultimate purpose and thus a 
simple measure of firm performance53, various schools of thought within industrial 
organization economics strongly disagree about which factors affect firm performance the 
most. The definition of these factors is the key attribute differentiating one school from 
another. 
3.1.1 Neoclassical perfect competition theory 
Neoclassical Perfect Competition Theory [Stigler 1957, Stigler 1968, McNulty 1968, Alchian 
and Demsetz 1972] assumes that the main role of the firm is to efficiently combine resources  
(labor and capital) to produce outputs. Inputs are readily available and all resources are 
perfectly mobile. Since all parties have perfect and complete information (including 
information on the marginal contribution of each unit of input), resources flow towards the 
firm where they can be used to create the highest value (i.e. the firm which has the best input 
– output conversion factor and associated cost curve). While this approach is of interest to 
economists, due to its simplification (single product units, perfect information) it is of limited 
relevance to practitioners and will not be further reviewed in this text. 
3.1.2 Monopoly theory 
Monopoly Theory54 [Bain 1948, Bain 1950, Scherer 1970, Weiss 1975] takes the view that 
firms try to limit their productive outputs because of the monopoly they have established or 
through collusion with rivals, thus raising the price level above that which would exist in ideal 
market conditions. This allows firms to achieve higher economic rents. The monopoly theory 
claims that the industry structure, e.g. concentration of competitors and markets, degree of 
vertical integration, entry barriers, or industry-specific cost structure patterns, determines the 
behavior of rivals (e.g. pricing), which in turn determines the economic performance of 
participating firms (the so-called structure – conduct – performance paradigm). 
 
It is interesting to note that such behavior is often related to the relative size of the company, 
logically associated with its potential to exercise monopoly or to be a potentially valuable 
contributor in an oligopoly [Mann 1966, Gale 1972, Shepherd 1972, Weiss 1975]. The major 
limitation to a firm’s growth is found primarily in external factors: government antitrust 
intervention, and the oligopoly tendency to preserve the status quo. As opposed to perfect 
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 In consequence, ROA, ROE and EVA are the most widely accepted firm performance measures in 
contemporary research methodology. 
54
 This theory is also referred to as “Bain-type”, after J. S. Bain, one of its main contributors. 
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competition theory, monopoly theory predicts the long-term heterogeneity of firm 
performance in an industry as well as across industries. 
 
A number of influential economists have criticized several key aspects of monopoly theory 
[Galbraith 1954, Heflebower 1954, Clark 1955, Penrose 1955, Mason 1957]. They claim that 
it does not take into account the influence of the firm’s internal structure and resources on its 
behavior, and that these must not be ignored (this was one of the sources of the later 
development of the resource-based view). Particularly interesting is the concept of market 
position [Heflebower 1954], which linked the firm’s internal resource structure and its 
competitive position in the market. Also, these writers object to collusion as the principle 
element of inter-firm behavior, and emphasize the notion of strategic action and reaction by 
rival firms (e.g. in pricing policies). They also state that buyers and suppliers develop power 
to effectively counter monopolies. Finally, they claim that a firm’s growth is not regulated by 
monopoly / oligopoly considerations, but by other factors, such as opportunities for efficient 
use of productive resources. 
 
The theoretical underpinnings and conclusions as to the influence of industry concentration 
and a firm’s market share on its profitability, although seriously questioned and only weakly 
confirmed by empirical research within monopoly theory [Scherer 1970, Weiss 1975], have 
nevertheless proven very influential not only within academic circles but also among 
practitioners and governments. They are closely associated with the ideas driving PIMS55 
research [Buzzell and Gale 1987], which has had an enormous influence on the strategic 
behavior of companies since the publication of its results. On the other hand, some elements 
of monopoly theory related to industry structure are also clearly present in the environmental 
school of thought, as discussed below. Also, the links between the relative size and 
performance of the firm continue to be interesting in this period of intense globalization and 
massive levels of M&A activity, leading to increased levels of industry concentration56, as 
noted by most prominent scholars. This has been acknowledged by governments – a 
continuous focus on updating and strict enforcement of antitrust legislation is a traditional 
feature of the US government agenda (the legal case against Microsoft is a good example), 
and the antitrust concern has recently made its way to Brussels, despite the evident strong 
opposition of member countries which allow monopoly practices where they see benefits for 
the national interest. 
 
Finally, one of the clear possible applications of this school of thought is to the situation in 
countries in transition before the changes, when markets were dominated by monopolies or 
oligopolies. In the majority of these countries this was due to state intervention, typically in 
the form of central planning. In former Yugoslavia, however, the cause was not direct state 
intervention, but the lack of antitrust legislation and practices, which allowed rival firms to 
maximize profits via collusion. Thus, the behavior of firms to a large degree fulfilled the 
predictions of monopoly theory: even after the formal opening of the market, in the absence 
of effective government antitrust policies companies in a position to establish effective 
oligopolies continue their efforts to maximize the economic rent from that source, and had no 
                                                 
55
 The PIMS (Profit Impact of Market Strategy) database was the result of a 15-year quantitative study of more 
than 3,000 business units. The research group interpreted the results as showing the positive and strong 
relationship between market share and performance, although these findings were empirically questioned and 
reinterpreted in significantly different ways by some other scholars [Baden-Fuller and Stopford 1992]. 
56
 Although found in most of the literature describing current trends in industry structures and management 
priorities, the statement on increased level of concentration should not be taken at face value. There is some 
empirical evidence that the concentration in some major industries, such as the car industry, following the 
consolidation stage in the first half of the 20th century actually decreased after 1980. 
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incentive to organize themselves for true market competition57. In terms of the research 
model, this theory would imply that in interpreting the context and designing their firm’s 
response to it managers would try to maximize the benefits and duration of the monopolistic 
position. As will be shown later, this is in line with the predictions of resource-based theory, 
where monopolistic position is seen as one potential resource. 
3.1.3 Schumpeter’s theory 
The key element of Schumpeter’s Theory is a focus on innovation as the means by which a 
firm can exploit existing and future market opportunities. It thus involves a dynamic view of 
industries, as opposed to the predominantly static (“equilibrium”) character of both the perfect 
competition and monopoly theories. It also takes a different view on the use of the monopoly 
position, claiming it to be a welcome precondition for innovation since it allows for financial 
balance in the inherently risky process of innovation [Schumpeter 1942]. In terms of research, 
the major focus is on the relationship between innovation and industry / market structure, as 
well as between firm size and innovation [Scherer 1970, Kamien and Schwartz 1982]. 
 
Schumpeter’s dynamic view of entrepreneurial opportunities and the need for innovation 
doubtlessly presents an important cornerstone in the body of economic theory. However, I 
shall not specifically discuss its practical applications, but shall treat them within the 
discussion of value creation strategies as related to dynamic capabilities. 
3.1.4 The Chicago school view 
The Chicago School of thought [Stigler 1966, Stigler 1968, Demsetz 1968, Demsetz 1973] is 
based on the view of the firm’s primary role in enhancing efficiency in production and 
distribution. In contrast to the monopoly theory, it strongly advocates the efficacy of market 
mechanisms and the strict application of price theory. The scholars belonging to this school 
have concluded that effective collusion is unlikely due to the high cost of monitoring and 
enforcement, and thus that the above-average returns observed must have other explanations, 
primarily related to the firm’s capability to outperform its rivals in efficiency in production 
and distribution. They have also made the realistic assumption that information has a cost, 
here undermining the basic assumption of perfect competition theory. Also, they have 
attributed some aspects of firm behavior which within monopoly theory are described as 
monopolistic (e. g., advertising, or vertical integration) to a striving towards higher efficiency. 
 
Another interesting implication of the Chicago school view is the explanation that the firm’s 
growth is limited strictly by the efficiency gains (or losses) which growth produces. This is 
directly linked to the way resources are acquired and used (e.g. economies of scale and costs 
of coordination). Also, in this view the value of entry barriers is limited by the ability of new 
entrants to eliminate the efficiency advantage of the incumbents. 
 
                                                 
57
 Although more evidence on individual firm behavior will be provided in Chapter 5, it would be interesting to 
perform a more comprehensive study of the banking sector in Croatia and Slovenia. Despite privatization and the 
entry of international competitors (both in the form of green-field operations and through purchasing of local 
banks) there was no clear sign of an increase in competitive behavior (e.g. significant productivity improvements 
or major changes in product pricing). As a matter of fact, the Slovenian government in the late 1990s allowed 
overt collusion within the Slovenian Bank Association in setting spreads and minimum interest rates. Also, in 
some cases MNCs considering investment in a local company tried to achieve a government-supported 
monopolistic position as a precondition for investment. 
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As regards the application of Chicago school views to the situation in countries in transition, 
it closely approaches the official standpoint of some international institutions, most notably 
that of the International Monetary Fund. This brings us back to my comments in Chapter 2 
regarding IMF policy in these countries: although one may agree with the views on market 
mechanisms forwarded by the Chicago school, the insistence on full reliance solely on these 
mechanisms has created considerable controversy and, it is very likely, also some damage, as 
described by Hanke and Walters [1993]. 
3.1.5 Transaction cost economics theory 
Transaction Cost Economics Theory is based on the assumption of an opportunistic attitude 
and behavior on the part of firms which tries to avoid the transaction costs incurred through 
external contracts [Coase 1937, Williamson 1975, Williamson 1985]. The firm exercises 
(hierarchical) control in order to internally suppress human opportunism, which put it in a 
superior position as compared with markets, which have no such mechanisms for combating 
opportunistic behavior. 
 
Transaction cost economics has had a major influence both on academic research and the 
behavior of practitioners. Among areas covered have been optimal financial structure 
[Balakrishnan and Fox 1993], design of internal incentive systems [Hoskisson and Hitt 1988], 
distribution strategies [John and Weitz 1988], international expansion [Rugman 1981, Teece 
1983], strategic alliances [Balakrsihnan and Koza 1993], and vertical integration [Walker 
1988, Masten et al. 1989], to name a few.  
 
While achieving obvious popularity, transaction cost economics has also attracted significant 
criticism, even from the originator of the theory, who argued that the later development of the 
theory focused too much on the firm as the purchaser of factors of production and neglected 
the running of the business as its main activity [Coase 1988]. Other critics objected to its 
overly ideological approach [Perrow 1986], lack of touch with reality [Simon 1991] and over-
dependence on generalized assumptions concerning the opportunistic character of human 
nature and the efficiency of proposed control mechanisms [Ghoshal and Moran 1996]. 
 
Here let me consider some of the arguments presented by Ghoshal and Moran [1996], which I 
find to be valid in principle (for which reason some postulates of transaction cost economics 
are worth considering in countries in transition), but which deserve additional comment when 
applied to the situation in these countries. 
 
Ghoshal and Moran began their article with a joke about two hikers woken by a tiger. One 
reached for his running shoes, apparently betting his life on his ability to outrun his partner. 
The authors used the joke to point out the need to understand and assess underlying 
assumptions, which, they claim, are wrong both in the joke (running is not the smartest way 
out of that particular situation) and for transaction cost economics theory (hierarchical control 
is not the best way to deal with opportunism). 
 
One of the most popular jokes in Croatia aiming at the narrow views of economics goes like 
this: an American tourist sees a young man sitting idle on the bench next to the sea. He 
approaches him and suggests that he start fishing, instead of being idle. “Why should I do 
that?”, young man answered. “To earn some money.” “And?” “Buy a boat, fish more, get 
more money, buy more, get rich, be able to sit and enjoy life”, the argument goes. “Well, 
that’s what I am doing now!”, is the young man’s final argument. The assumption not 
discussed is how the young man can afford to sit idle on the bench, i.e. what does he live on, 
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if he’s doing nothing? The point goes beyond this particular joke, however good or bad, and 
touches behavior developed during socialism times in former Yugoslavia (and other countries 
in transition). It is also reflected in the famous quote “They can’t give me as low a salary as 
the little I can work” (assuming that in one way or another the person’s everyday needs will 
be taken care of regardless). 
 
Opportunistic behavior of the kind implied by the joke and the quote did become quite a 
pronounced part of everyday life in the region’s firms. As noted by Ghoshal and Moran, 
findings from dissonance theory [e.g. Aronson 1980] suggest that opportunistic behavior 
fosters opportunistic attitudes. Given the environmental conditions prior to the change in 
countries in transition, a significant level of both opportunistic behavior and opportunistic 
attitudes existed in firms there.  
 
Further, the model of “the cycle of self-fulfilling prophecy” presented by Ghoshal and Moran 
implies a self-explanatory statement that the benefits from opportunistic behavior related to 
transaction characteristics have a positive influence on it. While this is true as such for any 
economic environment, that of the countries in transition offered unusually substantial 
benefits as compared with developed markets (which is for at least two reasons true for all 
situations of economic discontinuity: market regulation mechanisms do not function, and 
economic rent tends to be generated from innovation, rather than efficiency [Hoskisson et al. 
2000]). In consequence, it was natural that a significant reinforcement of opportunistic 
behavior in expectation of reward existed in the first period after the changes in countries in 
transition. In terms of its implications for the research model, this articulates the need to 
investigate the motives for change: how was the environment perceived, and what were the 
criteria for deciding between the advantages and disadvantages of starting a change process? 
 
I find the most intriguing proposition of Ghoshal and Moran to be the notion of the superiority 
of social control (e.g. through the “feeling for the entity”) to hierarchical control, the first 
hindering opportunistic behavior and the second actually reinforcing it [Ouchi 1980, Wilkins 
and Ouchi 1983, Eagly and Chaiken 1992, Enzle and Anderson 1993]. This should be put into 
the perspective of the need for control-context fit, i.e. the finding that “certain kinds of control 
mechanisms are more appropriate than others for certain kinds of businesses and activities” 
[Ouchi 1979, Eisenhardt 1985, Ghoshal and Moran 1996]. Ghoshal and Moran refer to Ouchi 
[1979] and suggest: “(w)hen performance can be measured accurately, based on either the 
behavior of the individuals or on the outcomes from those behaviors, rational controls are 
effective. When, however, neither behavior nor outcomes can be measured precisely, rational 
control loses its efficacy, and social controls become preferable.” It is important to notice that 
Ghoshal and Moran do not provide an explanation for their use of the term rational control, 
but from the context it can be assumed that the term is not identical with the term hierarchical 
control, since the latter was used strictly to reinforce the impact on opportunistic behavior, 
while the above wording allows that under certain circumstances rational control can have an 
attenuating impact. 
 
The hidden underlying assumption of the above argument is that social control is aligned with 
firm goals and does not approve of opportunistic behavior. However, as already presented, 
strong arguments exist in favor of the opposite assumption, that this was not the case for firms 
in the first period after the changes in the countries in transition. Thus, I assume that given the 
misalignment between firm goals and social control, rational control had to be established in 
the first period after changes. Therefore, achieving transparency of performance on the level 
of firms and individuals was of the highest priority. The consequence of this for the research 
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model is the need to test whether or not establishing performance transparency and internal 
control systems were a priority among leadership interventions. 
 
A significant part of transaction cost economics theory concerns agency theory, which states 
that managers (as agents) are expected to comply with the interests of external owners of 
private enterprises, but it is difficult for these owners to ensure that managers do comply in 
reality [Williamson 1985]. Asymmetry of information between managers and external 
(especially diffused) investors increases monitoring costs, and allows managers to pursue 
their own goals. In countries in transition this factor is often augmented by the strong 
motivation towards opportunistic behavior, as well as the difficulties in assessing information 
and the associated high transaction costs [Wright et al. 1998].  
 
While this also points in the direction of the above conclusion related to rational control 
mechanisms and transparency of performance, it is worth looking more closely at the 
application of agency theory in countries in transition. I find valid several arguments which 
change the perspective agency theory takes in other environments. The first is related to the 
moral hazard, which is assumed to have negative effects on the firm. In countries in transition 
this is not necessarily true. Although managers might not be under sufficient outside control 
(as predicted by agency theory), motivation based on self-interest may in many cases be under 
strict peer control, and it may also be aligned with the well-being of the company [Earle and 
Rose 1996]. Also, the concept of efficiency of outside control is highly problematic in 
countries in transition for at least two reasons. On the one hand, outside control is a novel 
concept for the region, and thus external supervisors in most cases lack experience and 
knowledge [Brom and Orenstein 1994, Blasi et al. 1997]. On the other hand, external 
controllers are no more likely to act in the public interest than are internal managers, 
especially when privatization patterns drive them towards collusion [Amsden et al. 1994]. 
This concurs with the finding that supervisory board structure does not correlate with firm 
performance [Prašnikar et al. 2000], as well as with the failure of empirical research to find a 
link between privatization and change of management behavior [Whitley and Czaban 1998]. 
In terms of implications for the research model, this confirms the conclusion that the focus of 
leadership intervention is on creating internal (rather than external) control systems. 
3.1.6 Organizational ecology 
Although Organizational Ecology Theory can be clearly linked with the influential article of 
Hannan and Freeman [1977] and their successive work [Hannan and Freeman 1989], it is also 
closely linked with the work of few other scholars who have used evolutionary logic to 
formulate their key proposals [Mintzberg 1978, Quinn 1980]58. The theory makes a parallel 
between the evolutionary framework of variation, selection and retention of species and 
organizations as social and cultural systems [Alchian 1950, Campbell 1969, Nelson and 
Winter 1982]. Burgelman [1994] used the theory in his empirical study of the semiconductor 
industry as a highly dynamic environment, thus proving that organizational ecology can be a 
practically applicable framework for strategy research. 
 
The core belief of the organizational ecologist is the notion that individual firms cannot shape 
developments in the industry. Firms are subject to selection on the basis of variety and those 
most suitable to the environment survive. Since the rules of the game within industry are 
defined outside of the scope of the influence of any firm, the latter have very limited room to 
manoeuver. Hannan and Freeman [1977] suggested that a firm can preserve the capability of 
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 An excellent overview of the organizational ecology literature can be found in [Carroll and Hannan 1995]. 
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surviving change by maintaining organizational slack, but chance plays a crucial role on the 
level of industry, since some firms will have the luck to fit into a changed environment and 
will thus be selected for survival by external factors. Other authors, however, claim that firms 
have some proactive adaptive capacity [Nelson and Winter 1982, Baum and Singh 1994], 
primarily through leadership interventions which define the strategic intent of the firm and 
focus on the development of human and social capital [Lovas and Ghoshal 2000]59. 
 
A more detailed consideration of the notion of specialization and slack makes for a truly 
important implication of organizational ecology theory for companies going through the two-
phase process of change in countries in transition. As opposed to most theories derived from 
the economic thinking which treats slack as inefficient use of resources, therefore implying 
that it should be minimized in order to maximize the economic rents, organizational ecology 
treats slack as a potentially positive element, helping companies to survive in situations of 
(especially discontinuous) change. This difference in views deserves empirical verification, 
since it may dramatically influence the survival rate of firms facing major changes. As regards 
the research questions, it means that they should investigate how the firms observed used 
slack, both in terms of its size and importance for the change process and as related to 
leadership interventions such as resource allocation. 
3.1.7 Institutional theory 
Institutional Theory counters the key assumption of industrial organization economics theory 
that the motives for human behavior can be explained by rationale of economic rent 
optimization. Institutional theory proposes that firms operate within a social network of 
norms, values and underlying assumptions about what constitutes appropriate or acceptable 
economic behavior [Meyer and Rowan 1977, DiMaggio and Powell 1983]. Their role is to 
reduce both transaction and information costs through reducing uncertainty and establishing a 
stable structure that facilitates interaction [North 1990]. Further, this view suggests that the 
motives of human behavior should be extended beyond economic optimization to social 
justification and social obligation [Zukin and DiMaggio 1990, Scott 1995]. Firms are 
rewarded for conforming with social expectations through increased legitimacy, better access 
to resources and increased survival capabilities [Scott 1987, Baum and Oliver 1991]. In 
consequence, pressures towards industry isomorphism are strong [DiMagio and Powell 1983]. 
 
On the level of behavior within a firm, institutional theory suggests that existing culture and 
power structure support existing routines so strongly that it is very difficult to change them. 
Thus this view argues in favor of a very high level of organizational inertia. Obviously, 
organizational change (transformation) is the very focus of institutional theory, which thus 
bridges the fields of sustainable competitive advantage and organizational change. Oliver 
[1997] proposed a simple model describing the potential combination of institutional and 
resource-based views, illustrated in Fig. 3.1. This model is based on the assumption that the 
sustainable advantage of a firm’s heterogeneity is the result of managerial choices in resource 
selection. In that respect, Oliver stays close to the resource-based view, from which the model 
also takes key factors influencing managerial choices, resource selection and firm 
heterogeneity. However, the model is extended to include predictions of institutional theory 
                                                 
59
 The development of human and social capital through leadership intervention in order to prepare the company 
for a new stage of evolutionary selection, as proposed by Lovas and Ghoshal [2000], brings organizational 
ecology theory closer to some aspects of the resource-based view. The principle difference remains, though, in a 
fundamentally different explanation of the underlying nature of forces influencing the firm and their meaning for 
its capability to change. 
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claiming that both groups of factors have a significant influence on the outcome, i.e. the 
sustainable advantage. I find this approach particularly suitable for the analysis of firm and 
individual behavior in countries of transition [Shenkar and von Glinow 1994, Clague 1997, 
Hoskisson et al. 2000], and I suggest that both institutional determinants and resource-based 
determinants as defined by Oliver [1997] played an important role in the observed change. In 
consequence, the research model should include both groups of determinants and verify their 
presence during change. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Oliver [1997] 
Figure 3.1 Sustainable advantage: determinants of the process 
 
One particularly interesting implication of institutional theory for countries in transition is the 
place of management in the network (or hierarchy) of institutions. As described in Chapter 2, 
even in former Yugoslavia, which was among current countries in transition the most 
advanced in terms of application of market mechanisms, the managerial profession did not 
exist in the true sense, since managers were seen as “appointees” supported by social and 
political, rather than economic stakeholders. With the fundamental institutional changes 
management was re-institutionalized, and acquisition of appropriate managerial (professional) 
competence [Soulsby and Clark 1996] received great attention. In practical terms, those in 
managerial positions at the beginning of the changes had to obtain support from other 
stakeholder groups, or their institutional links would lose importance over time, which, 
assuming the importance of institutional determinants, would negatively influence their 
performance. Thus, research should question the conclusion that management saw the 
maintenance of institutional links as a key priority. 
 
3.1.8 Environmental school 
The Environmental School (many authors, including Porter [Porter 1995] refer to it as the 
Positioning School60) made a significant shift from research into the sources of competitive 
advantage which dominated the period from the mid-1960s to the early 1980s, and which 
suggested that firms obtain competitive advantage by implementing strategies that avoid their 
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 Some authors make a distinction between the environmental and positioning schools [e.g. Mintzberg and 
Lampel 1999]. Since I find it of secondary importance to my review, I shall refer to both terms as having the 
same meaning, and denoting the school of thought best represented by the work of Michael Porter. 
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internal weaknesses and use their internal strengths to exploit external opportunities and 
neutralize external threats [Ansoff 1965, Andrews 1971, Hofer and Schendel 1978]. Building 
on insights from industrial organization economics, Porter [1980, 1985] suggested that 
strategy should be built on the basis of structural analysis of the industry, thus shifting the 
focus of strategy research outward, toward the analysis of the firm’s microeconomic 
environment. His work became instantly popular with practitioners, since it proposed simple 
analytical tools that seemed to offer managers the previously-lacking advantage of “making 
the right strategic choices”61. 
 
One of the key tools used by the positioning school is the five-forces structural industry 
analysis, based on assumptions about the determinants of industry attractiveness [Porter 
1980]. It includes analysis of the threat of new entrants (based on an understanding of entry 
and exit barriers), the threat of substitute products, the bargaining power of suppliers, the 
bargaining power of buyers, and the intensity of rivalry among existing competitors. The 
concept itself has several interesting implications. One is that some industries are inherently 
more attractive (i.e. offer higher returns) than others. This notion has proved to be extremely 
influential, leading to further refinement of portfolio analysis tools and to significant 
diversification activities.  
 
The other notion which is a direct result of the positioning perspective concerns the key 
leadership function that managers must carry out within the company: to understand a 
structural analysis and, based on it, make choices about competing in a certain industry. As 
mentioned above, this implies that having the right kind of industry-related information and 
using it properly can generate an advantage over competitors [Shapiro and Varian 1998]. This 
also argues against bottom-up change, since empowered operational managers “often lack the 
vision of the whole and the perspective to recognize trade-offs” [Porter 1996]. 
 
Another influential assumption behind the positioning school is the perfect mobility of 
resources among competitors in the industry [Scherer 1970, Porter 1981, Barney 1986a]. In 
consequence, any advantage built on access to company-specific resources would be merely 
temporary, and in the long term firms choosing the same position within any given industry62 
should demonstrate homogeneous performance, leading to competitive convergence [Barney 
1991, Porter 1996]. As discussed later, this is probably the most controversial assumption of 
the positioning school, drawing significant critique and fueling other directions of research 
such as the resource-based view.  
 
The positioning school did not only offer the analytical tool for looking at industry structure, 
but also proposed possible generic strategies to be followed (or strategic positions to be taken, 
depending on the interpretation of the dynamism) [Porter 1985]. While Porter initially 
proposed three generic strategies – cost leadership, differentiation and focus (which could be 
cost focus or differentiation focus, but Porter treats is as one strategy) – many authors, when 
speaking about competitive advantage, reduce this to two options, cost or value 
differentiation. This reduction is exemplified in one of the most popular strategic positioning 
tools, the High Perceived Value (HPV) – Low Delivered Cost (LDC) diagram.  
 
The concept of cost leadership, as Porter presented it [Porter 1985], implies the existence of 
“the low-cost producer” (italics in original) in an industry, i.e. one company having a cost 
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 However, Cockburn et al. [2000] suggest that there is no research-based quantitative evidence to confirm any 
advantage gained by managers who have used these analytical tools versus those who have not. 
62
 Clusters of such firms are often referred to as “strategic groups” [Porter 1980]. 
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advantage over others. In order to turn that advantage into above-average returns, the cost 
leader should “achieve parity or proximity in the bases of differentiation relative to its 
competitors” [Porter 1985]. This definition seems to be very vague, since it does not define 
more precisely which competitors should be taken as reference group (e.g. those from the 
same strategic group, the industry average, etc.). Nevertheless, it implies that, while the 
company strives to achieve competitive advantage along one dimension, it cannot neglect all 
the other dimensions but must reach a certain “qualifying level” along each of them. 
 
An important consequence of the idea of only two bases of competitive advantage is the 
notion of companies who are stuck in the middle [Porter 1985], because they are not 
effectively pursuing either of the positions. Porter suggests that this position leads to below-
average returns and, eventually, demise. He also suggests that companies trying to pursue cost 
and differentiation positions simultaneously will be successful only if they do so in different 
and well-separated organizational units, or if three conditions are met: competitors are stuck 
in the middle, cost is strongly affected by share or interrelationships, and the firm pioneers a 
major innovation [Porter 1985]. 
 
Finally, Porter also suggested that the best way to look at the firm’s ability to successfully 
implement a chosen strategy of creating and sustaining competitive advantage is through its 
value chain (the discrete activities it performs). The activity-based view of the firm is 
complemented by the notion of strategic fit among its activities, which can be on different 
orders of magnitude with the resulting corresponding levels of competitive advantage [Porter 
1996]63. Porter and many other authors explored various activities as possible sources of 
either cost leadership or differentiation competitive advantage [Day and Wensley 1988]. It 
should be noted that this particular line of research often crossed the line between the 
environmental school and other schools of thought (in particular the resource-based view). 
 
Some of the main criticism of the environmental school is similar to the criticism of most 
“classical”, structurally-oriented frameworks: that it lacks dynamic perspective [Mintzberg 
and Waters 1985], that it wrongly assumes high resource mobility [Barney 1991], that it has 
little empirical justification [Wright 1987] and that it ignores the implementation side of 
strategy [Cockburn et al. 2000]. Despite all criticism, the school has had a great, lasting 
influence both on scholars and (even more so) on practitioners. 
 
This influence is also to large degree present in countries in transition, where the first 
generation of professional managers immediately after the start of reforms mostly adopted as 
useful the tools proposed by the positioning school. The later spread of MBA-type education 
and intervention by international consulting companies only added to their popularity. As a 
result, many companies began to perceive the need for clear positioning on the HPV-LDC 
diagram. As mentioned earlier, this coincided with growing competitive pressures from 
global, regional and local competitors. However, the process was also influenced by the prior 
experience of the firm, which could benefit from diversified activities leading to increased 
probability that performance risks were balanced across the portfolio. Many managers found 
it difficult to accept not so much the need for clear positioning, but the consequences it had on 
portfolio reduction and associated increase in risk. 
 
Based on predictions in the literature, one would expect companies to decide between either 
aiming at a low-cost or a high-perceived-value position, since the theory implies that “stuck in 
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 The concept of strategic fit is an old one in the strategy literature [Van de Ven 1979, Venkatraman and 
Camillus 1984, Venkatramaan 1989], and originated from the population ecology model [Aldrich 1979]. 
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the middle” positions lead to unsatisfactory performance and the economic decline of the 
firm. The position taken would be influenced by the way the management perceived the 
situation in the industry and the markets. As a corollary to this conclusion, the management 
would focus its interventions on establishing the desired position.  
 
Further application of the same logic implies that a management decision on taking the low-
cost or high-perceived-value position would be based on a number of criteria related to its 
perceptions of the industry and markets, which also indirectly involves perceptions of the 
political, social and economic environment. Obvious criteria include an estimate of feasibility 
in terms of timing, as well the needed resources. Both criteria point to the next conclusion: the 
response of the management will depend on whether it perceives the situation in the industry 
and the markets as requiring immediate or long-term reaction, as well as on the assessment of 
the resources needed to achieve a low-cost or high-perceived-value position. I shall analyze 
the second criterion once again within the discussion of the resource-based view, to determine 
whether the low-cost and high-perceived-value positions were equally valid alternatives in all 
circumstances. 
3.2 The resource-based view, core competence and dynamic capabilities 
Although the seminal articles on the resource-based view [Wernerfelt 1984, Dierickx and 
Cool 1989, Barney 1991], on the one hand, and core competence [Prahalad and Hamel 1990] 
and dynamic capabilities [Teece et al. 1997] on the other did not attempt to create an explicit 
link between the two, such a link was later clearly established [Lengnick-Hall and Wolff 
1999, Eisenhardt and Martin 2000, Barney et al. 2001]. With this in mind, in this chapter I 
will review the literature from all of the areas mentioned and, although each concept is 
presented in its own right, it is sometimes difficult to isolate the discussion in one individual 
framework. 
3.2.1 Main concepts of the resource-based view 
The concept of resources as the cornerstone of company competitive advantage is based on 
the old concept of economic rents generated by firm-level efficiency advantages which once 
dominated strategy literature in the form of a focus on corporate strengths and weaknesses 
[Penrose 1958, Ansoff 1965, Uyterhoeven et al. 1973, Hofer and Schendel 1978]. One 
particular cluster of literature within this approach explicitly emphasized firm-specific assets 
and capabilities as well as the mechanisms which limit their mobility as key determinants of 
firm performance [Penrose 1958, Rumelt 1984, Teece 1984], and can rightly be identified as 
preceding the contemporary resource-based view. 
 
Starting from the structure-conduct-performance concept of environmental and monopoly 
theories as presented in the previous chapter, the resource-based view tackles two key 
assumptions of the environmental school: the concept of the homogeneity of firms within an 
industry (or a strategic group) [Scherer 1970, Porter 1981, Rumelt 1984], and the idea of high 
mobility of resources, which can be bought in factor markets [Hirshleifer 1980, Barney 
1986a]. The resource-based view replaces these assumptions with their opposites: a) firms 
within an industry (or group) may be heterogeneous with respect to the strategic resources 
they own or control, and b) resources may not be perfectly mobile across firms, and thus 
heterogeneity can be long-lasting [Barney 1991, Peteraf 1993]. 
 
Since the concept of firm resources is central to the resource-based view, it might be 
interesting to see how it was formulated in the early literature and to investigate one of its 
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serious critiques. Wernerfelt [1984] defines resources as “anything which could be thought of 
as a strength or weakness of a given firm”. Barney [1991] also provides an all-inclusive 
definition of resources, as “all assets, capabilities, organizational processes, firm attributes, 
information, knowledge, etc. controlled by a firm that enable the firm to conceive of and 
implement strategies that improve its efficiency and effectiveness [Daft 1983]”. However, 
Barney argued that sustainable competitive advantage derives only from those assets which 
are valuable, rare, imperfectly imitable, and not capable of substitution [Barney 1991].  
 
Critics of the resource-based view [Priem and Butler 2001] find these definitions too broad, 
tautological in terms of value creation (i.e. that the substitution of definitions leads to a 
definition of the type “value is created if the firm has what is needed to create value”) and 
difficult to measure and manipulate. As a practical consequence of such broadness, 
subsequent research looked at the incredibly wide area of possible sources of competitive 
advantage, conveniently labeling each as a “resource”: from intangibles such as social 
responsibility [Litz 1996], culture [Fiol 1991], and human resource competencies [Lado and 
Wilson 1994], to processes like new product development [Leonard-Barton 1992, Kusonoki et 
al. 1998], strategic human resource management [Wright et al. 2001] and manufacturing 
[Schroeder et al. 2002], or tangible assets such as information technology [Powell and Dent-
Micaleff 1997].  
 
Another implication of the broadness inherent in the resource-based view is the willingness of 
many scholars to use it in researching many different topics. As seen in Table 3.1, the range 
of topics is truly impressive and implies that scholars have used the resource-based view as a 
theory valid in different contexts and applicable to almost all aspects of firm and interfirm 
behavior64. It is also clear from looking at the list of titles that quite a few authors deal with 
several topics in the same text, making the division and attributions presented in Table 3.1 
somewhat artificial. 
                                                 
64
 Priem and Butler [2001] state that according to the taxonomy of research topics proposed by Shendel and 
Hofer [1979], literature belonging to the resource-based view can be found in 13 out of 18 topical areas.  
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Research Topic65 Representative Authors 
Theory of the Firm Barney [1996] 
Conner [1991] 
Conner and Prahalad [1996] 
Culture 
 
Barney [1986b] 
Fiol [1991] 
Li et al. [2001] 
Organizational Behavior Mosakowski [1998] 
Mueller [1994] 
Social Responsibility Litz [1996] 
Russo and Fouts [1997] 
McWilliams and Siegel [2001] 
Corporate Governance Holmstrom and Kaplan [2001] 
Mahoney [2001] 
Short et al. [1999] 
Coff [1999] 
Environmental Analysis Miller and Shamsie [1996] 
Strategy Formulation Wernerfeldt [1984] 
Black and Boal [1994] 
Strategy Implementation Lado and Wilson [1994] 
Formal Planning Systems Michalisin et al. [1997] 
Strategic Control Mata et al. [1995] 
International Strategic Management Moon [1997] 
Collis [1991] 
Emerging Economies Hoskisson et al. [2000] 
Jarvenpaa and Leidner [1998] 
Strategic Alliances Eisenhardt and Schoonhoven [1996] 
Hitt et al. [2000] 
Harrison et al. [2001] 
Mergers, Acquisitions and Diversification Markides and Williamson [1996] 
Ingran and Thompson [1995] 
Harrison et al. [1991] 
Entrepreneurship Alvarez and Busenitz [2001] 
Knowledge Spender and Grant [1996] 
Argote and Ingram [2000] 
Conner and Prahalad [1996] 
Growth and Adaptation Pettus [2001] 
McGee and Thomas [1994] 
Iansiti and Clark [1994] 
 
Source: Adapted from Priem and Butler [2001], Barney et al. [2001] 
Table 3.1 Research topics in strategic management involving the resource-based view 
                                                 
65
 Research topics presented in Table 3.1 only partially follow the taxonomy of Schendel and Hofer [1979]. 
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3.2.2 Resources, capabilities and competence 
Looking more closely at the nature of resources with the potential to create sustainable 
advantage (often called strategic assets [Dierickx and Cool 1989, Amit and Shoemaker 1993, 
Michalisin et al. 1997], it is generally accepted that, with rare exceptions, tangible assets are 
likely to have significantly less potential than intangible assets66. The basic conceptual 
argument supporting this claim in resource-based-view literature relies on strategic resource 
characteristics as defined by Barney [1991]: tangible resources are easily imitated [Miller and  
Shamsie 1996] and in principle are less rare (because they can be bought in factor markets). A 
good example of is the use of financial resources [Pfeffer 1994], but it also applies to other 
tangible resources such as information technology [Barney 1991, Powell and Dent-Micaleff 
1997], technology in general [Zahra and Covin 1993, Pfeffer 1994] or manufacturing plants 
[Schroeder et al. 2002]. All of these assets can have some potential for creating competitive 
advantage, but in order to make that sustainable a typical proposal is that tangible assets 
should be bundled with the associated intangible assets (e.g. the capability of deploying IT for 
use in business [Powell and Dent-Micaleff 1997], or the proprietary technological know-how 
related to the manufacturing process [Schroeder et al. 2002]). 
 
A clarification of the terms “resources”, “capabilities” and “competence” might be 
appropriate at this point. Since the term “resource” is often used in its broader, inclusive 
meaning, the concept it covers is usually subdivided into physical and financial resources, 
human resources and related skills of individuals, as well as organizational resources such as 
reputation or culture [Barney 1997]. The latter is close to the notion of capabilities, which 
refers to a firm’s capacity to deploy, coordinate and exploit strategic resources, often in 
bundles [Stalk et al. 1992, Amit and Shoemaker 1993, Schendel 1994, Barney 1997]. 
Capabilities include complex firm attributes, which are also the most difficult to copy and can 
typically be bought only through the purchase of a firm as a whole67. The notion of core 
competence became hugely popular following publication of the article by Prahalad and 
Hamel [1990] in which the authors warn against the fallacies of unrelated diversification and 
suggest that firms do best of if they “stick to the knitting”, clearly understand what they do 
well (i. e., better than the competition) and build on this as their core competence. While 
Prahalad and Hamel stayed on the relatively broad level of attributes related to core 
competencies (value for the customer, applicability in a wide range of markets, difficult to 
imitate), it is easy to see how the concept of core competence in principle matches the concept 
of complex strategic resources, i.e. capabilities. For this reason some authors suggest using 
the term “capability” as a substitute for (core) “competence”, or limiting the use of the term 
“core competence” to discussions on diversification and corporate level strategy [Barney 
1997]. 
 
There is an important side effect in the conceptual difference between resources in the narrow 
sense of the word, and capabilities as complex resources. These two classes of resource do not 
differ merely in the nature of their complexity, but also in the time dimension of 
accumulation68 [Dierickx and Cool 1989, Barney and Hansen 1994, Collis and Montgomery 
1995], as capabilities require significant time (typically measured in years) to develop. Also, 
                                                 
66
 Exceptions do exist. Good examples might be the locations of retail stores, or wire access to homes owned by 
telephone and cable operators [Collins and Montgomery 1995]. It should be noted, however, that the value of 
such resources may be subject to fast deterioration, typically due to technology change (branch-less banks, 
Internet shopping, wireless communications), often caused by the focused efforts of new entrants to break the 
incumbents’ monopoly of strategic physical resources. 
67
 The same is true for some non-tradable resources, such as reputation [Dierickx and Cool 1989]. 
68
 In economic theory this is referred to as “time compression diseconomies”. 
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while the theory assumes economic rationality in managerial choice of resources (although 
influenced by common cognitive biases, limitations and organizational inertia [Amit and 
Shoemaker 1993]) individual managers have little immediate control over capabilities and the 
pace of their development [Mahoney and Pandian 1992, Amit and Shoeamaker 1993]. This, 
as will be discussed later, has a negative effect on the ability of companies in transition to 
respond to discontinuous change. 
 
Resource imitation is one of the central issues addressed in the resource-based view. 
Referring to the earlier work of Dierickx and Cool [1989], Barney [1991] proposes that limits 
to imitation are found in dependency on unique historical conditions (path dependency), an 
unclear link between resources and performance (causal ambiguity), and social complexity of 
the resource. The imitation issue carries with it an interesting notion: can firms be successful 
if they imitate their competitors? While the resource-based view responds with a clear “no”, 
this is a point where the empirical evidence seems not fully supportive [Medcof 2000]69. 
Furthermore, there is a potential inconsistency between the theoretical claim dismissing 
imitation as a source of value (based on the notion that value can be derived only from 
heterogeneity) and two equally valid observations: path dependency and strategic clusters. If 
we accept the argument that historical development creates unique attributes within complex 
resources and is a source of casual ambiguity [Dierickx and Cool 1989, Barney 1991], in 
other words that complex resources are path-dependent, then imitation (especially of a 
complex resource), even if aimed at copying a certain resource, also produces results which 
are path-dependent and thus different from the original. Also, from empirical evidence it is 
clear that more firms can achieve above-average performance in an industry over time. 
Implicitly, this means that they may do so based on differentiation from other firms in the 
industry, rather than on differentiating from each other. Thus, imitation within such a cluster 
need not necessarily be futile. 
 
Another important consideration emerging from the idea of imitation as a possible tool for 
competitiveness improvement is the perception of the time available for improvement. One 
might expect that imitation would be seen as more appropriate, or even as necessary, if the 
perceived available time is short, thus limiting the ability of the firm to improve through 
experiment and true innovation70.  
 
For firms in countries in transition the question of imitation is of high importance. On the one 
hand, there has been strong institutional pressure to copy the “western model” of firm 
behavior as a superior one. On the other, there have been very strong resource-related 
incentives to imitate competitors from developed markets. At the time of change the firms in 
the region were, by and large, not competitive by global standards. Another important factor 
was the fact that even the best of them had very few free resources to invest in improving 
their competitiveness. Thus, based on literature predictions concerning imitation, one would 
expect these companies to use imitation as an effective tool for relatively fast improvement of 
their overall performance with the goal of arriving at competitive parity, which would in turn 
                                                 
69
 Although Medcof produces convincing evidence that transnational companies successfully follow an imitation 
strategy in international technology research and technology transfer and do not dispose of international units 
with resources which have low value and are not unique, he does not discuss an important aspect: how and to 
what degree do international technology research and technology transfer contribute to the performance of these 
companies? If we take a multidimensional view of the factors contributing to performance, companies might 
optimize their use of resources by following an imitation strategy for factors which they choose to treat as 
“qualifying”, while retaining other factors which are unique compared to their competitors. 
70
 This is consistent with the pattern of response to discontinues change based on the resource-based view, as 
presented later. 
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allow them to use low-cost labor (using the terminology of the positioning school, companies 
could use imitation and low-cost labor to achieve a low-cost position) or some other major 
distinctive resource in order to achieve competitive advantage.  
 
While scholars agree on the advantages of intangible resources in terms of mobility barriers 
and inimitability, they have made surprisingly little effort to systematically explore and 
classify the various groups of intangible assets. One such attempt by Hall [1992] was based 
solely on the opinions of UK company CEOs in different manufacturing and service 
industries. Although the survey lacks the empirical rigor linking the resources identified with 
company performance, its findings were interesting (and supported by additional research 
[Hall 1993]). A summary is presented in Table 3.2, with the most important resources (in the 
opinion of the CEOs surveyed) ranked as 1, and the least important as 13. In line with the 
predictions of the resource-based view, the CEOs consistently identified intangible resources 
as the key ones for the performance of their companies.  
 
Resources 1987 
Ranking 
1990  
Ranking 
Company Reputation   1   1 
Product Reputation   2   2 
Employee Know-how   3   3 
Culture   5   4 
Networks   4   5 
Specialist Physical Resources   6   6 
Databases 10   7 
Supplier Know-how   7   8  
Distributor Know-how   8   9 
Public Knowledge   9 10 
Contacts 11 11 
Intellectual Property Rights 13 12 
Trade Secrets 12 13 
 
Source: Adapted from Hall [1992] 
Table 3.2 Resource rankings based on Hall’s empirical findings 
 
Miller and Shamsie [1996] went a step further and looked not only at tangible versus 
intangible resources, but also at the nature of intangible resources and their fit with the 
environment. Here they followed Amit and Shoemaker [1993], who suggested that the firm 
has to consider the contexts within which various kinds of resources will have the best 
influence on performance. This significant claim extended the resource-based view and 
brought it closer to the environmental school perspective, a fact which Miller and Shamsie 
[1996] recognized by explicitly referring to Porter’s view of the link between resources and 
the environment [Porter 1991]71. Miller and Shamsie [1996] also addressed the tautological 
attribution of the concept of resources to “everything that performed well” [Black and Boal 
1994] and tried to precisely identify the distinctive advantages of different types of resources. 
In their analysis of the performance of Hollywood film studios, Miller and Shamsie [1996] 
classified strategic resources by the source of inimitability and concluded that property-based 
resources (i.e. those protected by ownership, contracts or patents) were critical for 
                                                 
71
 This perspective is also close to the concept of strategic fit as advanced by a number of scholars [Venkatraman 
and Camillus 1984]. 
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performance in periods of stability (predictability) in the environment, while knowledge-
based resources (i.e. those that often take form of technical, creative, collaborative, and 
integrative skills and are hard to imitate because of causal ambiguity) create competitive 
advantage in uncertain environments. This is consistent with the findings of the survey done 
by Hall [1992], if one accepts its implicit assumption of great dynamism in UK industries in 
the observed period: the CEOs evaluated the value of property-based resources as low. 
 
Some authors who have applied the above to emerging economies have come to the 
conclusion that, on the whole, it is also intangible assets which create competitive advantage 
in these countries, although such resources are not necessarily product-market based 
[Hoskisson et al. 2000]. Exceptions are firms competing in global markets of specific 
commodities, which can develop competitive advantage based on natural resources or low 
labor costs [Aulakh et al. 2000]. Given the structure of natural resources and comparative 
labor costs in Croatia and Slovenia, it is easy to conclude that firms from these two countries 
do not fall within the group defined by Aulakh et al. [2000]. However, Croatia and Slovenia 
did not, for historical reasons, have fully-developed factor markets in the first period after the 
initial change. As an example, their financial and labor markets were overly-regulated and had 
a level of development significantly below that assumed by resource-based view theorists72. 
The conclusions from the literature imply that Croatian and Slovenian firms could in the first 
period of changes have relied on some tangible or less complex intangible assets, while that 
would have become more difficult as time progressed.  
 
This concurs with the central conclusion derived from the literature review. If a firm has to 
decide about resources that could contribute to its competitiveness, it does so based on 
perceptions of the firm’s existing and potential resources. The critical factors influencing the 
firm’s decision are the time perceived as available for the transformation of existing resources 
into new ones, and the perceived likelihood of such transformation. If the perceived time is 
short, the firm is likely to try to build future competitiveness based on a set of resources 
which is very close to the existing set (and) or includes additional resources which can be 
acquired or developed under time constraints. If the firm has limited resources available for 
acquisition of new resources, it is likely to develop only a limited set of new resources, which 
are typically not complex. Given the nature of strategic processes, this explains why firms 
under stress react with “defensive” restructuring, aimed at improving cost rather than value 
position. Hence, the first conclusion resulting from these considerations is that Croatian and 
Slovenian firms perceiving the need for fast change of competitive position were likely to 
engage in defensive restructuring.  
 
The second conclusion is a logical extension of the first. Firms unable to base their low-cost 
strategy on sustainable cost advantage gained through valuable, rare, imperfectly imitable, 
and not substitutable resources but have through defensive restructuring changed their 
perception of time pressures, and firms that perceived the need for change as a less immediate 
one, were likely to engage in “strategic” restructuring, aimed at development of the resources 
needed for achieving sustainable advantage (either on a cost or value basis). 
 
                                                 
72
 To illustrate this statement, which is further elaborated in Chapter 5, in the first period of change firms were 
not allowed to borrow money in international markets; they had very limited access to information on the 
functioning of the financial markets; they had no experienced financial executives and there were virtually no 
such executives in the labor market; the banks formed an effective oligopoly to control the prices in local 
financial market, etc. 
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It should be noted that in both cases the perceptions of the firm were influenced by 
institutional determinants, as predicted earlier.  
3.2.3 The resource-based view in a dynamic environment 
The conclusion that strategic resources have to fit the environment, both in terms of the 
bundle structure and, more particularly, in the nature of the resources, not only sounds logical, 
but also directly eliminates one of the major potential arguments against the resource-based 
view as completely inward looking and thus detached from reality. However, the very notion 
of fit with environment unearths another major objection to the resource-based view: its static 
nature. If the environment is changing dynamically, then the resource-based view should 
propose how the company should treat its resources in order to sustain its competitive 
advantage. Some of the early work done in the area identified this problem [Leonard-Barton 
1992], suggesting that specialization of resources, which may generate competitive advantage 
in a static environment, leads to disadvantage where there is environmental change. 
 
The growing concern about the static nature of the resource-based view (e.g. Barney [1997] 
claims that “if a firm’s threats and opportunities change in a rapid and unpredictable manner, 
the firm will often be unable to maintain a sustained competitive advantage”) has been 
addressed by a number of scholars, especially since a major contribution from Teece et al. 
[1997]. They have developed the notion of dynamic capabilities as “the firm’s ability to 
integrate, build, and reconfigure internal and external competences to address rapidly 
changing environments” [Teece et al. 1997]. Although some scholars subsequently questioned 
whether the notion of dynamic capabilities is a truly new addition to the resource-based 
view73, there seems to be some innovation in it. In the traditional view, current firm resources 
and capabilities are matched to the current opportunities in the market. In the dynamic 
capabilities view, the firm needs to develop dynamic capabilities to identify new opportunities 
and react to them. Thus the focus shifted from the Ricardian to the Schumpeterian nature of 
rents, and from resources to capabilities [Teece et al. 1997]. This approach converges with the 
continuing work of Hamel and Prahalad, their proposal that firms should take an active role in 
shaping the future of their industries [Hamel and Prahalad 1994] and their notion of “strategy 
as revolution” [Hamel 1995]. 
 
Work related to dynamic capabilities was further extended by scholars focusing on what 
Eisenhardt called high-velocity markets [Eisenhardt 1989] and others call a turbulent 
environment [Chakravarthy 1997] or the new competitive environment [Bettis and Hitt 1995, 
Hitt et al. 1998]. They share the opinion that resource-based view concepts are only partially 
true because they center on leveraging bundled resources to achieve long-term competitive 
advantage, while the strategy of high-velocity markets concerns the creation of a series of 
unpredictable advantages through timing and loosely-structured organization [Eisenhardt and 
Martin 2000]. While moderately dynamic markets require capabilities in the form of routines 
(stable processes) with predictable outcomes, high-velocity markets require simple, highly-
experiential processes with unpredictable outcomes. In moderately dynamic markets 
competitive advantage is destroyed from the outside, in high-velocity markets both from the 
outside and from the inside (e.g. by losing the structure-level balance required to sustain 
dynamic capabilities). In moderately dynamic markets, causal ambiguity results from 
complexity, while in high-velocity markets it results from simplicity and lack of structure 
[Eisenhardt and Martin 2000]. Eisenhardt and Brown [1999] also extend this view from 
                                                 
73
 Barney et al. [2001] state it simply: “Put differently, ‘dynamic capabilities’ are simply ‘capabilities that are 
dynamic’”, implying that the notion of dynamic capabilities is not new to the resource-based view. 
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business level to corporate level strategy, calling for the continuous remapping of business 
units. 
 
While in some industries Croatia and Slovenia represent high-velocity markets – with 
constant changes in the political, social and economic environment contributing to velocity 
more than technological changes or the inherent nature of competition – other segments have 
been better insulated from change. According to the predictions from the literature review 
above, one would expect firms to judge the importance of the flexibility of resources 
according to the perceived velocity of the markets (or the environment in general). 
 
One conclusion of this stream of research is that the order in which capability-building is 
implemented is important [Henderson 1994, Iansiti and Clark 1994, Eisenhardt and Martin 
2000, Pettus 2001]. Based on his empirical study of the effects of deregulation on the trucking 
industry, Pettus [2001] proposed an interesting model for the optimal sequence of resource 
development and market positions, presented in Fig. 3.2. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Pettus [2001] 
Figure 3.2 Hypothesized resource-based sequential path 
 
Without detailing the theoretical explanation of the growth sequence model, which is well 
presented in the related literature [McGee and Thomas 1994, Chang 1995, Bogner et al. 1996, 
Pettus 2001], I find it of interest to compare the growth sequence path (where growth can also 
have a minus sign, implying a transformation path) of firms in countries in transition with 
that proposed by Pettus. The empirical research could provide evidence as to whether if the 
firms followed the pattern of moves predicted by Pettus, they resorted to some other pattern 
on followed none in particular.  
3.2.4 Role of human resource and organizational culture in the resource-based view 
The importance of human resources and organizational culture for firm performance is a 
permanent source of challenge for researchers and theoreticians. Some of the most popular 
books on management, high on international bestseller lists, address this issue [Peters and 
Waterman 1982, Senge 1990]. Recent text by the most respected scholars often name people 
(employees and management) as the source of competitive advantage [Pfeffer 1994, Bartlett 
and Ghoshal 2002]. 
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The argument concerning the growing importance of human resources goes hand in hand with 
that about the diminishing role of tangible resources [Pfeffer 1994]. If the main assumptions 
of the resource-based view on the importance and character of imitation barriers are true, then 
the tacit nature of people-related issues in organizations certainly has implications for the 
potential value of human resources and culture in competitive advantage [Wright et al. 2001]. 
Also, the resource-based view accords well with work done in the area of strategic human 
resource management [Miles and Snow 1984, Cappelli and Singh 1992, Wright et al. 1994, 
Snell et al. 2001], which claims that a certain type of strategy demands a unique set of 
behaviors and attitudes from employees, and that certain human resource policies produce a 
unique set of employee responses [Cappelli and Singh 1992]74. 
 
Empirical studies of the influence of human resources and organizational culture on firm 
performance seem to confirm this view [Peters and Waterman 1982, Denison 1984, Whipp et 
al. 1989, Cutcher-Gershenfeld 1991, Gordon and DiTomaso 1992, Arthur 1994, Huselid 
1995, MacDuffie 1995, Becker and Huselid 1998]. Research also links negative performance 
outcomes with problems that firms have with human resources and/or culture [Crozier 1964, 
Riley 1983, Tichy 1983b]. However, studies also clearly indicate that it is not easy to deal 
with such complex phenomena empirically (and especially not quantitatively). Thus, while 
many methodological issues concerning research validity remain open [Becker and Gerhart 
1996, Wright et al. 2001], conceptual evidence for the time being supports and supplements 
the somewhat lacking empirical data. 
 
A particularly interesting line of discussion has emerged within the resource-based 
perspective on the role of human resources for company competitive advantage. Most 
scholars make a clear distinction between three key strategic HRM components, as presented 
in Fig. 3.3. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: adapted from Wright et al. [2001] 
Figure 3.3 A model of the basic strategic HRM components 
 
What appears to be unclear is the relative importance of each component in the model for 
company competitive advantage. When applying the concept of value, rarity, inimitability and 
substitutability, Wright et al. [1994] argued that HR practices could not form the basis of 
sustainable competitive advantage, since any individual HR practice can be easily copied by 
competitors. They proposed that the human capital pool (i. e., individuals having specific 
                                                 
74
 From the resource-based view perspective this translates into the fit between resources and environmental 
conditions [Amit and Shoemaker 1993, Teece et al. 1997], and accords with the general claim about the path-
dependent outcomes of resource deployment [Barney 1991, Teece et al. 1997]. 
Human Capital 
Pool 
Organizational 
Culture and Behavior 
People Management 
Practices 
Nenad Filipovi  Chapter 3 
Strategic Change Management of Medium Size Companies:   
Insights from Slovenia and Croatia   
 55 
knowledge, skills, abilities and attitudes75) had greater potential to be a source of sustainable 
competitive advantage. Disagreeing, Lado and Wilson [1994] proposed that HR systems (and 
not individual practices) are socially complex and path-dependent, thus being impossible to 
imitate. This point of view seems to be better accepted within current research [Snell et al. 
1996, Wright et al. 2001]. However, more recent studies suggest the integrative nature of the 
model presented in Fig. 3.3, with all three components providing significant contribution 
potential [Boxall 1998, Lepak and Snell 1999]. They also suggest that a variety of strategies 
may be used within one firm, since some groups of employees, various people management 
practices or some elements of the organizational culture may have a significantly higher 
strategic importance for the firm competitiveness than others [Lepak and Snell 1999, Lepak 
and Snell forthcoming]. 
 
To close this discussion, it is worth underlining the difference between fragmental and 
systemic application of the components presented in Fig. 3.3. Huselid and Becker [1995] 
provide interesting results of an empirical study on the impact of high performance work 
systems76 on company performance. They suggest that firms can obtain some benefit from 
individual best practices such as self-directed work teams, job rotation, problem-solving 
groups, conflict resolution, TQM, contingent pay, training etc., [Huselid 1995, Becker and 
Gerhart 1996], but that the greatest impact can be generated from systemic effects (Fig. 3.4).  
0
10000
20000
30000
40000
50000
60000
70000
80000
90000
100000
0 20 40 60 80 100
 
 
Source: adapted from Huselid and Becker [1995] 
Figure 3.4 Market value of the firm (in US$ per employee) as a result of quantum of adoption 
of high performance work practices 
 
While an analysis of the huge body of literature on organizational culture is outside the scope 
of this work and will only be partially covered in my analysis of the strategic change 
management process, some of the often cited traits of effective cultures include trust, 
teamwork and open relationships, open communications, sharing of resources across 
organizational units, consensus seeking, commitment (from the top), appreciation of 
                                                 
75
 While Wright et al. [1994] in particular discuss the motivation of individuals to work productively, it remains 
open whether to treat this as a part of the human capital pool or of organizational culture. This implies a possible 
imperfection in the model presented in Fig.3.3, in which the arrows suggest a unidirectional influence of people 
management practices on the human capital pool and organizational culture, as well as of the human capital pool 
on organizational culture, while in reality the loop is closed and organizational culture exhibits a strong influence 
on the other two components. 
76
 The work is based on research into High Performance Work Practices, including comprehensive employee 
recruitment and selection procedures, incentive compensation and performance management systems, and 
employee training and development [Jones and Wright 1992, U.S. Department of Labor 1993, Huselid 1995] 
Percentile changes in sophistication of HR architecture 
Firm market 
value per 
employee 
(in US$) 
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flexibility, tolerance of failure as a result of experiment or stretch, support for learning and 
human development, drive for quality, long-term vision and ethical values [Kotter and 
Heskett 1992, Hitt et al. 1997, Powell and Dent-Micaleff 1997]. 
 
I strongly believe that the importance of human resources and culture for the competitiveness 
of companies in Central Europe is tremendous. Not only is this a logical conclusion based on 
the findings presented in the literature review, but it is also founded on the “second-order” 
effects which I assume based on the analysis of the environment presented in Chapter 2. To 
start with, labor costs in the companies in the region were a true problem due to low 
productivity, despite low unit cost. This clearly implies that companies from Croatia and 
Slovenia were likely to focus on managing these costs in the same way as their counterparts 
from developed market economies [Saratoga 1994]. Reduction in employment as a major 
element in the strategy is a lasting temptation [Zook and Rigby 2002] and has significant 
potential long-term consequences for deterioration of competitiveness [Becker and Gerhart 
1996]. On the other hand, in order to effectively use human resources and organizational 
culture as sources of competitive advantage, firms must develop complex capabilities [Barney 
1986, Barney 1991, Amit and Shoemaker 1993, Theece et al. 1997], which requires time – 
one resource of which companies in transition had precious little. Some scholars have 
identified identity issues [Schein 1985, Fiol 1991] as crucially important in achieving 
effective organizational culture, and individuals and firms in the region had faced loss of 
identity.  
 
Another specific issue for consideration was the extremely limited pool of managerial talent 
available during the first stage of change77. The same applies to almost all the employee 
profiles requiring the various “market economy” skills (such as corporate finances, marketing, 
and human resource management). Finally, regardless of the differences in the definition of 
culture among many scholars (e.g. [Schein 1985, Barney 1986]) and the impact of national 
culture on organizational culture [Hofstede 1991, Trompenaars and Hampden-Turner 1997], 
discontinuous change of the magnitude present in countries in transition implies the need for 
major changes in organizational cultures to fit the new environment. This, in turn, means that 
strong but rigid cultures could not be assumed to be a source of competitive advantage.  
 
Following the above observations one easily concludes that management of human talent 
received significant attention and was one of the key elements of all strategic actions in the 
process of change in Croatia and Slovenia. However, empirical research needs to identify the 
common points in the approach and whether they differed from one phase of restructuring to 
another, since the literature provides contradictory predictions on the issue. Another 
assumption may be that a sense of identity was the primary element of the culture used to 
support the change. 
3.2.5 Conclusions concerning the competitive advantage literature review 
Given the characteristics of the transition process, in particular the combination of 
discontinuous change in the first phase and continuous change in the second, plus the specific 
environmental setting as described earlier, I find no single theory of competitive advantage 
                                                 
77
 This fact was clearly identified in research on the need for management development in Slovenia [Filipovi 
and Gudi 1999]. The situation in larger countries was even more dramatic: McKinsey & Co. estimated that not 
only were several hundred thousand managers lacking in Central and Eastern Europe, but the Russian Federation 
alone would need at least 2,000 professors of management-related disciplines to fill the gap in business schools 
and executive development institutions [Kralji 1995]. 
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fully applicable to the firms observed in Croatia and Slovenia. The resource-based view and 
especially the concept of dynamic capabilities come closest, but partly due to the extremely 
broad concepts they present, their translation into concrete, normative implications for 
managers is not easily obvious. I have outlined the assumptions derived from key findings of 
the competitive advantage literature, and how they apply to the firms observed.  
 
In particular, I believe that dynamic, path-dependent development of resources was important 
for the success of these companies undergoing a two-stage process of change in the 
environment. The required resource configurations differed significantly from one phase to 
the other, as did the influence of institutional and industry structure factors. However, I also 
believe that the change management process was important for the outcome, which none of 
the competitive advantage theories address in the necessary detail. Thus, I shall also review 
the literature dealing with the change management process itself, and in particular with 
leadership intervention, before I build the research model in its entirety. 
3.3 Strategic change management 
As noted in the introduction to this chapter, the body of literature and research devoted to 
organizational change is huge and diverse. The broad definition of (organizational) change as 
empirical observation of a difference in the form, quality or state over time [Van de Ven and 
Poole 1995] seems to be well-accepted in academic literature [Rajagopalan and Spreitzer 
1996, Szamosi and Duxbury 2002]. Popular literature typically does not offer this kind of 
definition, but deals with phenomena that can easily be related to the above wording.  
 
The comment on unclear terminology made in 3.1 is equally true for the field of strategic 
change management. One has to be careful with the use of terms, since many authors describe 
essentially the same phenomena in different words. A good example is the use of 
“revolutionary change” [Greiner 1972, Gersick 1991], “radical change” [Tushman and 
Romenelli 1985, Greenwood and Hinings 1996], “transformational change” [Pettigrew 1987, 
Burke and Litwin 1992], “second order change” [Watzlawick 1978, Meyer et al. 1993], and 
“discontinuous change” [Hinings and Greenwood 1988, Nadler and Tushman 1995], which 
sometimes differ minimally in their underlying definitions and often refer to very similar 
manifestations in organizations. Also, identical terms are used with different meanings (e.g. 
discontinuous change in terms of the change in the environment [Ansoff 1965] or 
organizational change [Nadler and Tushman 1995]). 
 
Unfortunately, the gap between theory and practice in the field of strategic change 
management remains relatively wide despite the fact that a significant amount of research is 
based on empirical data and many leading theoreticians act as management consultants 
[Lichtenstein 1997]. One empirical study has confirmed that academics and practitioners 
rarely communicate or use each other’s knowledge [Barley et al. 1988]. This situation to a 
large degree results from the different approach of the two groups to the organizational 
context, and from different motivations [Miller et al. 1997]: popular authors and consultants 
expect senior management to be their principle audience and make them their focus, often 
ignoring the “dark side” of the change and overstating its manageability. On the other hand, 
academics often ignore the context, deal with oversimplified constructs and avoid being 
prescriptive to the extent of having no practical relevance. In the remaining part of the 
literature overview I shall try to bring together both views by reflecting on popular change 
models in respect to underlying theory and by pointing out the practical usefulness of the 
theoretical concepts reviewed. 
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The breadth of the concept of strategic organizational change allows researchers to look at it 
from various perspectives. Some deal with the very nature of change, and often involve 
analysis of the reasons for resistance to it as well as other major factors influencing the way 
changes unfold. Others focus on the integrative nature of change, placing it in a context and 
discussing the links between the outer and inner environment of the organization, the need for 
change, its contents and the process via which it is implemented. Another group of authors 
presents detailed, pragmatic models of change aimed at suggesting the optimal course of 
action for achieving successful change in the organization. Yet another group extends its 
focus to the key actors in change – leaders and employees – as well as to the effects of 
organizational culture on change. Each of these topics is dealt with below. 
3.3.1 The nature of change 
Early work on organizational change emerged from the organizational development tradition 
and stressed techniques for planned transition management [Bennis et al. 1976, Beckhard and 
Harris 1977]. It often focused on relatively low managerial levels within an organization and 
on incremental changes “owned” by employees [Quinn 1980]. This became obviously 
inappropriate in the face of company developments in the 1980s; more coercive approaches to 
change began to dominate, and large-scale (second-order) changes became the principal 
domain of analysis [Tichy 1983b, Kimberly and Quinn 1984, Pettigrew 1985]. Discussion 
aimed at revealing the differences between incremental and strategic change, the latter 
involving changes in the organization’s purpose and/or that of several major organizational 
systems. This was accentuated in some of the popular change models built around Greiner’s 
notion of periods of evolutionary and revolutionary change [Greiner 1972]. Coming from 
another perspective but pointing in the same direction, the notion of discontinuity was further 
developed by Miller and Friesen in their work on the quantum nature of change [Miller and 
Friesen 1980a, Miller 1982, Miller and Friesen 1984], as well as by Tushman and Romanelli 
in their model of punctuated equilibrium [Tushman and Romanelli 1985, Tushman et al. 
1986, Tushman and O’Reilly 1996]. 
 
This opens one avenue of discussion about the nature of organizational change: is it 
continuous or discontinuous in its manifestations in the organization78? Proponents of 
continuous change claim that constant change in the environment demands continuous 
adaptation [Kagono et al. 1985, Nonaka 1988] and that continuous improvement is a more 
effective response than massive change [Stacey 1993]. They focus on continuous learning 
[Argyris 1990, Senge 1990] and unlearning [McCaskey 1982] and promote tools such as 
Kaizen [Imai 1986] and learning organizations [Senge 1990]. They also share the opinion that 
change can be led, but not imposed from the top [Bourgeois and Brodwin 1983]. On the other 
side, proponents of the discontinuous change perspective claim that due to inertia pressure has 
to be built to start change, creating “boom and bust” cycles [Miller and Friesen 1984, 
Tushman et al. 1988] and requiring competence in revolutionary change [D’Aveni 1994, 
Hamel 1996]. A typical change tool proposed is business process reengineering [Hammer 
1990, Hammer and Champy 1993]. Achieved success reinforces stability [Miller 1990], 
which leads to efficiency [Thompson 1967]. However, in periods of stability, barriers to 
change develop because of organizational inertia [Hannan and Freeman 1984, Kelly and 
Amburgey 1991], uncertainty [Argyris 1990], preservation of perceived self-interest 
[Pettigrew 1988], strategic lock-in [Arthur 1996], and many other factors. Eventual crisis is 
unavoidable, due to environmental jolt [Meyer 1982, Meyer et al. 1990] or gradually growing 
lack of fit with the environment [Johnson 1988, Strebel 1992]. Finally, proponents of the 
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 As noted earlier, various authors use different terms to denote this dilemma.  
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discontinuous change perspective often take the view that change should be initiated from the 
top and can be carried out by a handful of change agents [Maidique 1980, Day 1994]. 
 
Another view can be taken of the nature of change: are firms adaptable to the pressures for 
change, or do they resist them? Traditional responses from contingency theory (often called 
the adaptive view) suggest that organizations can control their destinies by actively and 
purposely creating a fit between the structure of the organization and the demands of the 
environment, size and technology [Lawrence and Lorsch 1967, Thompson 1967, Child 1972]. 
Leaders and dominant coalitions in companies have a duty to assess environmental changes 
and decide on the strategies and actions to match them. Organizations achieving this fit are 
more likely to have higher performance levels and better survival chances. Along with the 
concept of adaptation, authors note the dependence on critical resources and propose that 
organizations should take active steps to minimize the related uncertainties [Cyert and March 
1963, Thompson 1967, Pfeffer and Salancik 1978]. Thus, actions may take the form of 
adapting the organization to the environment, but sometimes even act upon the environment 
to alter it.  
 
In parallel to contingency theory, another adaptive view of organizational change was 
presented by the organizational learning perspective [Levinthal and March 1981, Nelson and 
Winter 1982, Senge 1990]. It takes the position that organizational learning consists of 
organizational modifications based on feedback from the organizational environment. If the 
environment has been accurately investigated, organizational change should be adaptive. 
However, this perspective does not imply an intentional character in change as does the 
contingency view, but rather suggests that creating preconditions for adaptability through 
learning is the main task of leaders. 
 
Two different points of view have emerged and gained dominance in the last two decades, 
both claiming that due to a number of factors organizations only rarely make major adaptive 
changes, and that changes are in principle disruptive for organizations. Although sharing these 
assumptions, plus several concepts including structural inertia and the liability of newness, the 
institutional view and the population ecology view differ in their underlying theory.  
 
Institutional theory (DiMaggio and Powell 1983, Meyer and Rowan 1977, Zucker 1987) 
suggests that socially-constructed belief systems become institutionalized in organizations and 
their structures [Scott 1987]. In order to gain legitimacy and increase their stability and 
survival possibilities [Zucker 1987], organizations demonstrate their conformity to the 
institutional environment by incorporating environmentally-embedded [Stinchombe 1965] 
and institutionally rationalized rules into their structures [Ibarra and Andrews 1993]. As seen 
in institutional theory, change is not unlikely per se, but it is of a continuous nature and the 
results of change are under normal circumstances convergent [Greenwood and Hinings 1996]. 
This is due to external institutional pressures enforcing norms of what constitutes appropriate 
organizational goals, structures and processes [DiMaggio and Powel 1991]. However, major 
change in the environment may induce radical organizational change [Greenwood and 
Hinings 1996]. The more embedded the organization is in the environment, the more likely 
organizational change will be revolutionary (radical in pace and size and transformational in 
size and scope) if the institutional context changes dramatically. This happens because a new 
institutional setting demands changed value commitments within the company. That, along 
with the appropriate new capabilities and the power balance within the company among the 
groups sharing a value commitment to the same organizational templates (i.e. set of strategies, 
Nenad Filipovi  Chapter 3 
Strategic Change Management of Medium Size Companies:   
Insights from Slovenia and Croatia   
 60 
organizational designs and systems), allows the company to scan for new organizational 
templates, choose one that is more appropriate, and adopt it79 [Greenwood and Hinings 1996]. 
 
A key barrier to change in the institutional view should be more precisely defined as a key 
barrier to diverging from a dominant model. It is expressed in the form of organizational 
inertia caused by the above-mentioned institutional pressures towards convergence, as well as 
skewed managerial perceptions resulting from these pressures and actions based on them80 
[Weick 1979, Giddens 1984]. Another inertia phenomenon involves the fact that the 
legitimacy of young organizations, as well as those who had recently gone through a major 
change, is low-level. Consequentially, institutional theory implies a higher risk of failure 
[Stinchcombe 1965, Hannan and Freeman 1984, Singh et al. 1986]. This effect is termed 
liability of newness and in the view of institutional theory implicitly presents an additional 
barrier to change, also contributing to the organizational inertia which leads to the model of 
evolution-revolution cycles noted above. Finally, another barrier to change identified by 
institutional theory is an excessive rate of institutional change, resulting in a lack of 
appropriate alternative organizational templates that would be seen by the company as 
functional and institutionally acceptable81. The high rate of change also potentially creates a 
skills and leadership vacuum [Newman 2000]. This means that the likelihood of 
organizational change as a function of institutional change in the environment drops when the 
rate of institutional change becomes excessive, thus following an inverted U curve.  
 
Newman’s analysis was carried out on the basis of the concrete institutional changes in 
Central and Eastern Europe during the period of transition to a market economy [Newman 
2000], which potentially makes it highly applicable to the situation in Croatia and Slovenia. 
She related the search for and adoption of effective new organizational templates with 
organizational learning, and found three principle reasons why a high level of institutional 
change inhibits organizational learning (and, through it, organizational transformation82). 
They are: the diminished or eliminated relevance of existing resources and capabilities as 
sources of competitive advantage83; the diminished or eliminated relevance of existing 
organizational templates; and ambiguous cause-effect relationships which diminish or 
eliminate “learning from experience”. As a result, firms rely excessively on existing routines, 
become strategically confused, and are too dependant on mimetic change. Newman also 
claims that firms less embedded in their previous environment and who possess higher 
absorptive capacity84 are less at a disadvantage.  
                                                 
79
 This process is based on the cognitive or emotional preference within the dominant group. The argument of 
preference was not noticed by Newman [2000] in her critique of the applicability of the concept of articulated 
alternative in a situation of institutional upheaval. When taken into account, it implies that there is no need for 
any realistic alternative to exist in order for the dominant group to accept it. If (having no clear clues) the group 
interprets a chaotic institutional context in a certain way, it can derive non-existing meaning. Furthermore, if this 
happens within a powerful company, it can cause mimetic change in a large group of companies and, according 
to institutional theory, significantly increase the likelihood of a successful change outcome for participants by 
creating new convergence. 
80
 For this reason institutional theory suggests bringing the change leader from outside the organization, since 
this person can bring a new perspective to the organization [Bloodgood and Morrow 2000]. 
81
 This matches Brunsson’s claim, that periods of ideological instability are poor contexts for action [Brunsson 
1982]. 
82
 Newman defined organizational transformation as change that leaves the organization better able to compete 
effectively in its environment; this refers implicitly to successful adoption of new organizational templates which 
prove valid for a firm’s success within the new institutional context. 
83
 This notion is conveniently borrowed from the resource-based view. 
84
 Absorptive capacity is here a concept describing a firm’s ability to learn and innovate [Cohen and Levinthal 
1990, Zahra and George 2002]. 
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The basic assumption in the initial statement of population ecology theory [Hannan and 
Freeman 1977], as noted in 3.1.6, was that organizations usually have a high level of 
structural inertia and are unable to make changes easily due to a variety of internal and 
environmental constraints [Hannan and Freeman 1977, Aldrich and Auster 1986]. 
Organizational adaptation is difficult, and the main mechanisms of population change are 
variation, selection and retention. Subsequently, Hannan and Freeman modified their proposal 
and stated that structural inertia is a result of the selection process, rather than a precursor 
[Hannan and Freeman 1984]. They also suggested that the inertia level for core aspects of the 
organization is much higher than for peripheral ones85. This leads to the interpretation that 
core aspects are best explained by the ecological view (because of the strength of inertia 
pressures), whereas peripheral changes are better explained by the adaptation view [Scott 
1981, Hannan and Freeman 1984, Singh et al. 1986]. 
 
The model of structural inertia brought the ecological and institutional perspective close 
together (Fig. 3.5). However, the evolution perspective still sees the selection process within 
the population as the key driving force, and proposes that organizations with high levels of 
reliability, low variance in performance, and good accountability86 are favored in the selection 
process. However, these same features lead to an increase in inertia. 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Kelly and Amburgey [1991] 
Figure 3.5 A basic view of structural inertia theory 
 
One of the implications of the model presented in Fig 3.5 is that as organizations get older, its 
members learn specific skills and routines [Nelson and Winter 1982] and the organizations 
become better at reproducing their structures [Singh et al. 1986]. This leads to a higher 
survival probability and offers another perspective on the “liability of newness” phenomenon, 
implying higher levels of organizational stability and structural inertia [Hannan and Freeman 
1984, Kelly and Amburgey 1991, Amburgey et al. 1993]. The side-effect of the liability of 
newness phenomenon is what Amburgey and colleagues called “resetting the organizational 
clock” [Freeman and Hannan 1989, Amburgey et al. 1993]. In their study of Finnish 
newspapers they empirically confirmed that older organizations are less likely to experience 
change and are more disturbed by it once it happens. Also, once a change occurs, the 
likelihood of failure increases (despite the effect of organizational age, which becomes 
                                                 
85
 Core aspects of the organization, according to Hannan and Freeman [1984], include stated goals, forms of 
authority, core technology and marketing strategy in the broad sense.  
86
 Accountability is used here as the ability to account rationally for organizational actions. 
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subordinate to the effect of time elapsed since the last change)87. Finally, change increases the 
likelihood of the same type of change in the future88 [Amburgey et al. 1993]. 
 
Many other views of organizational change are feasible, such as random organizational action 
theory [March and Olsen 1976, Starbuck 1983], the integrated perspective [Rajagopalan and 
Spreitzer 1996], power [Pfeffer 1981, Hardy and Clegg 1996, Bradshaw 1998], politics and 
culture [Pettigrew 1973, Johnson 1987], the economic perspective of influence costs 
[Milgrom and Roberts 1988, Schaeffer 1998], and many others. Also, a plethora of authors 
offer combined views, trying to bring together one or more theories (e.g. Bloodgood and 
Morrow [2000] combining institutional and RBV frameworks; Newman [2000] integrating 
institutional theory and organizational learning; Amburgey et al. [1993] combining structural 
inertia and organizational learning; Singh et al. [1986] combining population ecology and 
adaptation views; Bacharac et al. [1996] combining logic of action and cognitive dissonance; 
etc.). Although some of these ideas are interesting, for reasons of brevity and clarity I have 
not commented on them. 
 
While the adaptive and inertia theories deal extensively with issues involving the nature of 
change and in particular the barriers to it, they also directly or indirectly make assumptions 
about pace and magnitude of change. The issue of pace can be further divided into rhythm 
(tempo) of change and its timing, while magnitude can be defined both in terms of amplitude 
and scope [de Wit and Meyer 1998]. These assumptions are not identical for all the authors 
representing a single view, and overlap even more for researchers subscribing to a blended 
view (as described in the previous paragraph). Nevertheless, before summarizing the 
implications of different theoretical frameworks for the change situation in Croatia and 
Slovenia it may be worthwhile to briefly compare the dominant views of major theories in 
respect to pace and magnitude of change, as presented in Table 3.3.  
 
Inertia theory89  Contingency view Learning 
organization Evolution phase Revolution phase 
Amplitude Any Low Low High 
Scope Any Broad Narrow Broad 
Rhythm Fast Slow Slow Fast 
Timing Short-term Long-term Long-term Short-term 
 
Table 3.3 Comparison of assumptions about magnitude and pace of change 
 
I will start with an overview of the applicability of the theoretical concepts described to the 
change situation in Croatia and Slovenia, by looking at the nature of environmental pressures, 
as described in Chapter 2. Without going into detail, one can easily see that both periods of 
external change (described in Chapter 2 as discontinuous and continuous) were characterized 
by an extremely high level of institutional change, although the level in the first phase was 
                                                 
87
 Another consequence of this view is the assumption that organizations undergoing repetitive change without 
periods of recovery may seem adaptable, but have a significantly increased likelihood of failure. 
88
 Again, this can be explained by the inertia theory: once change in an organization is “set in motion”, it tends to 
keep changing since the marginal cost of a certain type of change has decreased. However, this increases the risk 
of the wrong type of change being applied if a different, new problem appears after the first has been 
successfully solved. 
89
 A synthesis of institutional and population ecology views is presented, both according to more recent 
formulations suggesting distinct evolutionary and revolutionary phases in organizational development [Hannan 
and Freeman 1984, Nadler and Tushman 1995] 
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higher than in the second. The structure of stakeholders and their institutional expectations 
changed from one period to another, as well as (to a somewhat lesser degree) within each 
period. Thus, I assume in my interpretation that as the external environment influencing 
management in forming their responses was changing over time, so were these responses. 
However, empirical research should show whether they were homogeneous for all companies 
or – more likely according to the above considerations – were additionally influenced by the 
concrete industry or company setting. 
 
A great increase in organizational mortality, especially during the first period of change, 
clearly indicates that contingency theory cannot be universally applied to the observed 
processes90, since it does not predict significant difference in failure rate based on the change 
undertaken. On the other hand, institutional influences and structural inertia seem to offer 
explanations for the type of change and the observed difference in failure rates. However, 
more detailed analysis is needed to see if the observed phenomena truly match the predictions 
of these theories, and which fine-grain prediction from which of the theory can be treated as 
confirmed. Conceptual considerations such as those proposed by Newman [2000] serve as a 
good starting point. 
 
From the popular view of change as a sequence of evolution-revolution patterns, one can 
easily assume that the first period of change was revolutionary (and that those aspects of 
inertia theory dealing with revolutionary cycles should be taken into account). However, it is 
not intuitively clear whether to treat the second period of change as evolutionary or 
revolutionary. On the one hand, its high level of institutional change suggests it should be 
seen as revolutionary. On the other, mainstream theoretical views suggest that two 
consecutive periods of revolutionary change without an intervening period of stability are 
unlikely, will result in extremely high failure rates, or are even impossible. In the case of 
countries in transition, though, “period of stability” is a relative term, referring to less than 
discontinuous change, rather than stability in the true sense of the word [Breu and Benwell 
1999]. Thus I assume that companies were likely to enter defensive restructuring first and 
then follow it up with strategic restructuring. However, prolonged defensive restructuring was 
possible, based on a interpretation of the environment as requiring immediate change of high 
magnitude. 
 
Theory assumes that managing evolutionary and revolutionary change requires different 
organizational templates. Some authors suggest that organizations should be able to deal with 
both types of change simultaneously in order to be successful91. In accordance with the 
previously stated conclusions, I expect that organizational templates changed from the period 
of defensive to strategic restructuring. 
 
I consider valuable views stating that mimetic change gains in importance during periods of 
institutional upheaval. However, I supplement them with the notion that organizations which 
had high levels of historical legitimacy significantly influenced the way the environment was 
interpreted in Slovenia and Croatia. They served as role models for other firms as well as for 
each other, thus reducing the variety of responses to change92. 
                                                 
90
 As will be shown later, contingency theory can be applied in special circumstances. 
91
 This applies in particular to the work of Tushman, but some authors dealing with change issues from other 
perspectives have come to the same conclusion [Abell 1993, Tushman and O’Reilly 1996]. 
92
 It should be noted that this explanation places historical legitimacy above fit between the chosen template and 
the changing (but still chaotic) environment. This comes close to the contingency view about organizations being 
able to influence the environment. 
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Finally, I find relevant the insight into the limited possibilities for organizational learning in 
periods of institutional upheaval, not only because of the initially-proposed implications of 
institutional theory, but also in view of the evolutionary perspective and in particular the lack 
of slack in the critical resources (including time) needed for learning during these periods. I 
consequently assume that throughout the period of defensive restructuring firms did not base 
their change efforts on the effects of organizational learning. 
3.3.2 Content, context and process of change 
Some authors disagree with the mainstream schools of thought because of one intuitively 
highly appealing objection: it is unrealistic to expect that universally-successful patterns of 
change can exist. In other words, the content, context and process of change are mutually 
dependent. Consequently, any given change effort may be driven by a different set of 
influences, and while certain aspects of that particular change can be explained by one theory, 
other aspects may reflect phenomena predicted or explained by another. While many authors 
make gestures in this direction, typically discussing one particular aspect of change or trying 
to build a more universal theory that would integrate various theoretical perspectives, few 
have explicitly addressed the holistic view of change. While some have remained primarily at 
the conceptual level [Pettigrew 1987], others have tried to build theoretical [Burke and Litwin 
1992] or normative application-oriented [Vollmann 1996], integrative models of change. 
 
In his early work on change, Pettigrew developed the view of organizational change as a 
process determined by politics and culture [Pettigrew 1973, 1979, 1985]. While considering 
the effects of leadership on change, in particular the concept of transformational leadership 
[Burns 1978, Tichy and Ulrich 1984, Bennis and Nanus 1985, Tichy and Devanna 1990], 
Pettigrew concluded that much writing on leadership lacks a thorough analytical background 
[Pettigrew 1987]. He proposed that phenomena related to change should be approached with a 
clear reference to the outer and inner context of the organization, change content and process 
[Pettigrew 1987]. Together with Whipp and Rosenfeld he later refined the context-content-
process model of change (Fig. 3.6). 
 
While the details of the above framework and Pettigrew’s insistence on power and culture as 
underlying phenomena explaining change may be subject to debate93, the framework clearly 
points out the complex character of change and the need to examine it holistically.  
 
Burke and Litwin [1992] built their model of organizational performance and change on the 
basis of their own consulting experience, previous theoretical developments in the area of 
transactional and transformational leadership [Burns 1978], and organizational models linked 
to organizational behavior, climate and culture [Weisbord 1976, Nadler and Tushman 1977, 
Peters and Waterman 1982, Schneider 1985]. The model proposes 12 key variables 
influencing organizational change and organizational performance. According to the 
propositions of the open system theory [Katz and Kahn 1978], variables influence each other 
bi-directionally, but transformational variables have a stronger impact than transactional 
ones94. Although the model (Fig. 3.7) appears complex, it can be seen as a systematic 
                                                 
93
 E.g., the literature suggests that technology should be included as the fifth issue in the outer context, and 
current performance should be included in the inner context. 
94
 Transformational variables are external environment, mission and strategy, leadership, and organizational 
culture. Burke and Litwin referred to the work of Kerr and Slocum on the links between organizational culture 
and reward systems [Kerr and Slocum 1987] as one illustration of the variable hierarchy. 
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extension of the popular McKinsey 7S model [Peters and Waterman 1982], and its value can 
be seen particularly in its attempt to explain transactional and transformational components of 
change holistically, and to associate change with individuals and the organization. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Whipp et al. [1989] 
Figure 3.6 Competitiveness and the management of strategic and operational change 
 
Burke and Litwin made reference to numerous studies supporting choice of variables and 
validity of interdependencies among the variables, but did not try to validate their model 
through their own empirical research. However, their attribution of organizational climate 
change to the set of variables they call transactional, and culture change to the set of variables 
they call transformational falls in line with other research on transactional (referring to 
changes achieved via short-term reciprocity among individuals and groups) versus 
transformational (referring to changes producing new behavior sets and organizational 
templates) change95 [Burns 1978, Peters and Waterman 1982, Bass 1985, Pettigrew 1988, 
Tichy and Devanna 1990]. Burke later reframed the model to point out more clearly the 
various dimensions of change, and to somewhat strengthen the process dimension96 [Burke 
1994, Siegal et al. 1996]. 
 
 
 
                                                 
95
 Burke and Litwin [1992] propose an interesting parallel between transactional change and Zaleznik’s concept 
of a manager, and transformational change and Zaleznik’s concept of a leader [Zaleznik 1977]. 
96
 This is not surprising, given the consulting side of Burke’s background and the prevailing interest of 
practitioners in the process view of change. 
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Source: Burke and Litwin [1992] 
Figure 3.7 A model of organizational performance and change 
 
Vollmann [1996] based his model on the findings of “Manufacturing 2000”, a major 
cooperative research project led by IMD Lausanne. The project had as its primary objective 
identification of the changing requirements for manufacturing excellence and the appropriate 
organizational responses. Vollmann noticed the integral nature of successful transformation 
efforts, as well as the evolution-revolution nature of change revealed by the project [Gould 
1994]. Like most other academic authors of normative literature on change management, his 
implicit starting position sides with contingency theory, since he proposes “a blueprint for 
successful transformation”. However, in this he addresses many concerns shared in the basic 
theoretical models of change. His model of integrated strategic transformation (Fig. 3.8) 
addresses eight key organizational transformation facets and is built around the central 
concept of competencies and capabilities, as defined by the resource-based view [Prahalad 
and Hamer 1990, Stalk et al. 1992, Teece et al. 1997]. This concept is integrated with ideas 
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borrowed from the organizational learning perspective97 [Nelson and Winter 1982, Cohen and 
Levinthal 1990], institutional perspective [DiMaggio and Powel 1983], and in particular with 
the concept of strategic intent [Hamel and Prahalad 1989]. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
Source: Vollmann [1996] 
Figure 3.8 Model for integrated strategic transformation 
 
Vollmann complements the model of eight key organizational transformation facets with the 
idea that each facet can be analyzed along three key organizational dimensions, and should 
consider developing and deploying three key organizational resources. The three 
organizational dimensions as proposed by Vollmann are culture, configuration and 
                                                 
97
 The concept of learning capacity as presented by Vollmann [1996] resembles that of absorptive capacity 
[Cohen and Levinthal 1990]. 
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coordination98, while the key resources are people, information and technology. When 
preparing for transformation, managers should check each of the eight organizational 
transformation facets and try to understand the implications of that transformation facet for 
each organizational dimension and key resource. 
 
Vollmann also suggests that for any transformation effort to be successful, it must be 
integrated, consistent, feasible and desirable. While the first three characteristics are supposed 
to come as a natural product of using his model, the last, critical for dealing with the “people” 
side of the change, is further elaborated through insights in the work of his IMD colleagues, in 
particular Jean-Marie Hiltrop’s work on new psychological contracts [Sparrow and Hiltrop 
1994, Hiltrop 1995]. 
 
The three models of strategic change presented differ in many aspects: from purpose (ranging 
from conceptual to descriptive to normative) and explicit reference to theoretical sources, to 
suggested key organizational constructs and level of detail. Despite these differences, 
however, they share a few important features. 
 
Firstly, all three models clearly indicate, even in their graphic representations, that change is a 
very complex phenomenon. They not only point towards many variables influencing change 
outcomes, but also propose that change occurs at three different levels: external 
(environmental), organizational and individual. This is a step ahead of the “purist” theories of 
change described previously. Also, all three models (in particular the latter two) try to be 
highly realistic in describing change. This has led the authors to assume a pragmatic attitude 
in their use of theoretical concepts, integrating views from different theories in order to 
achieve the level of realism needed. As a result, the level of associated detail allows managers 
to use these models in preparing change-related actions, and not just for ex-post-facto analysis 
and an understanding of observed outcomes. 
 
However, the models also have significant deficiencies. Being complex, they are also quite 
difficult to apply, especially without additional external support, thus in reality reducing their 
value for practitioners. A more fundamental problem, however, is the tendency of the authors 
to treat organizations as inherently adaptive. Although they refer to change as “not easy to 
achieve”99, they are less explicit about the inherently negative aspects of change, the reasons 
for inertia and other change inhibitors, or any possible concrete remedies beyond a call for 
people development and motivation.  
 
From the Central European perspective, one cannot but notice an interesting paradox: the 
more concrete the model is in prescribing change-related action, the more problematic is its 
application. Pettigrew’s model remains fairly conceptual and as such raises no controversy. At 
the other extreme, Vollmann’s model is built on several concepts which are highly 
controversial from the perspective of discontinuous change in the environment. One is 
reliance on organizational learning as the primary change mechanism. As discussed above 
[Newman 2000], organizational learning may be one of the casualties of institutional 
upheaval, and change models in countries in transition should not rely on it heavily. Also, 
                                                 
98
 Vollmann defines culture similarly to Schein [1985], referring to values and beliefs, but states additionally that 
culture includes strategy. He uses the terms configuration and coordination in the traditional sense, referring to 
organizational design and deployment of resources, and to management and control. 
99
 Vollmann writes: “People transformation is not easy. It never was, and it is not getting easier over time. (…) A 
primary implication is that companies need to spend more time improving their change mechanisms 
(transformation engines) instead of focusing exclusively on the next change result.” 
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Vollmann gives much importance to the notion of strategic intent. As originally proposed 
[Hamel and Prahalad 1989], this notion suggests, among other things, a clear understanding of 
“what is needed to win”, an excellent knowledge of competitors, and taking the time to digest 
one challenge before taking on another. While the first two factors were beyond the reach of 
the vast majority of organizations in Croatia and Slovenia during the first period of change, 
the third was universally unacceptable, it being highly unlikely that organizations in Croatia 
and Slovenia could develop strategic intent during defensive restructuring. However, some 
form of strategic intent should have been developed by firms going through strategic 
restructuring in order for them to be successful. 
 
Burke and Liwtin’s model, in terms of level of detail, sits somewhere between the other two. 
Its most interesting contribution to an understanding of the change situation in Croatia and 
Slovenia is in the dominance of transformational over transactional factors. Taken strictly, it 
predicts that top-down change based on leadership intervention, strategy and culture will 
predominate over bottom-up change. This statement, however, contains an inherent, though 
less obvious paradox from the perspective of countries in transition, since exactly those 
variables are likely to be the ones most negatively affected by changes in the environment. 
Thus, in a way Burke and Litwin suggest that leadership and strategy were needed during 
defensive restructuring in order for firms to get through it successfully. This, however, does 
not necessarily imply a need for long-term vision during defensive restructuring. 
3.3.3 Process-oriented models of change 
A major stream of research within the field of organizational development deals with change 
process issues and generally addresses actions taken during an intended change. As noted in 
3.3.2, such actions may be observed at the level of the environment, organizations and 
individuals. Adherents of the process view of change thus inherently accept the assumption 
that managerial action can influence change and produce the desired (planned) outcomes. 
Most explicitly acknowledge the validity of one of the oldest concepts in the notion of 
change: the idea that change develops in stages [Lewin 1947]. They also accept the idea that 
barriers to change (such as inertia) should be identified and dealt with in order for change to 
be successful [Lewin 1947, Drucker 1954, Schein 1965, Watson 1969, Argyris 1970]. They 
not only propose actions aimed at achieving successful change at different stages and against 
different barriers [Tichy 1983b, Kouzes and Posner 1987, Schein 1987, Beer et al. 1990, 
Kotter 1990, Kotter 1995, Tichy 1996], but also conceptualize common patterns and propose 
“standard change paths” [Miller and Friesen 1980b, Strebel 1992, Badden-Fuller and 
Volberda 1997, Beer 2001]. Finally, some propose the “magic bullet”, “the” concept that is 
“absolutely central” for the success of change (be it charismatic leadership [Conger and 
Kanugo 1988], strategic intent [Hamel and Prahalad 1989], mission [Campbell et al. 1992], 
vision [Quigley 1993], or less traditional concepts such as “Big Hairy Audacious Goal” 
(BHAG) [Collins and Porras 1996], or coherence [Lissack and Roos 2001]). 
 
The roots of the process view of change lie in conceptualizing the change as a sequence of 
phases (or steps). While some authors describe change in terms of states (phases) through 
which the organization must pass in the process of change, others refer to actions or 
interventions (steps) change agents have to take in order to achieve the desired change 
outcome. The number of phases (or steps) identified varies from author to author and is 
typically three [Lewin 1947, Beckhard and Harris 1977, Schein 1987] to five [Judson 1991] 
phases and somewhat more steps (Kotter [1995] proposes eight-step change, Galpin [1996] 
speaks of nine wedges in a change wheel, while Gould [1994] identifies twelve wedges in his 
change wheel). It is important to notice, however, that models proposing the steps of change 
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actually refer to overcoming barriers to change and (directly or indirectly) identify different 
barriers at different phases. Thus, a mapping of steps and phases is typically possible 
[Armenakis and Bedeian 1999]. 
 
When such mapping was done based on a representative sample of literature100 (Fig 3.9), it 
became clear that the differences between individual authors within the process view of 
change are not as significant as they might appear on the surface. Once again, different terms 
often denote similar phenomena. It is not surprising, then, that practitioners often follow some 
of the more popular models of change, but amend them by borrowing details from other 
models101. It is also worth noting that mapping offers an obvious possibility to integrate 
individual responses to change within the same change stage pattern (as discussed in 3.3.6). 
 
A central topic in nearly all process-oriented models involves the notion that change targets 
will resist change. The dominant paradigm of change suggests that inertia and other factors 
create barriers to change, and change agents (often referred to as leaders) have to apply a 
combination of push and pull to chivvy change targets through the central (moving, transition) 
stage of change102. The reasons for barriers are multiple. As described earlier, academic 
literature usually ties them more narrowly to the underlying view of the nature of change 
(inertia due to institutional or ecological causes, if the authors come from organizational 
development, or human nature, if they come from organizational behavior). Normative 
literature usually lists a number of factors which the author finds important, often 
accompanied by suggestions as to how to deal with them (many of which are “tautological 
opposites”, i.e. change agents’ action is defined as opposite to behavior that blocks the change 
[Beer et al. 1990, Kotter 1995, Beer and Eisenstat 2000]).  
 
Some of the oft-cited barriers to change include the objective and subjective losses which 
change inflicts on individuals [Kotter and Schlesinger 1979] These include loss of power as 
responsibilities and accountabilities are shifted; loss in relationships as new patterns of 
interaction are demanded; loss of reward, particularly status, money and perquisites as power 
shifts; and loss of identity as the meaning people find in company life is threatened by change 
[Beer 1987]. Individuals perceive that change violates their psychological contract with the 
company [Hiltrop 1995, Baruch and Hind 1999]. On the organizational level, structural 
arrangements are also seen as a source of barriers [Hedberg et al. 1976, Miller 1982], as well 
as are developed core competence [Baden-Fuller and Volberda 1997], shrunken costs 
[Hannan and Freeman 1977], decision-making pathologies [Janis 1983], self-serving 
attributions [Bettman and Weitz 1983], coalition politics [Hanan and Freeman 1978], 
commitment to course of action [Staw et al. 1981], performance feedback misinterpretation 
[Milliken and Land 1991] and strategic uncertainty [Hannan and Freeman 1977, Porter 1980]. 
Cultural lock-in is another generally accepted barrier [Argyris and Schön 1978, Schein 1985, 
Heifetz 1994, Foster and Kaplan 2001]. Finally, change paradoxically resists itself: it needs to 
                                                 
100
 The literature used in Fig. 3.9 is: a. [Lewin 1947], b. [Beckhard and Harris 1977]*, c. Armenakis et al. [1999], 
d. [Kotter 1995], e. [Judson 1991], f. [Galpin 1996], g. [Schein 1987]*, i. [Tichy 1996]*, j. [Beer et al. 1990]*, k. 
[Nonaka 1988]*, l. [Jaffe et al. 1994], m. [Isabella 1990], n. [Schein 1987]*, o. [Bridges 1980]*. Literature 
marked by * is in addition to the original comparison made by Armenakis and Bedeian [1999]. 
101
 A good example is the description of the strategic change in Bethlehem Steel procurement [Rudzki 2001]. 
Authors used Kotter’s eight-step model [Kotter 1995] as a frame for change, but supplemented it with insights 
from Kouzes and Posner [1987], incorporated the BHAG concept [Collins and Porras 1996] to clarify the vision, 
and used process consulting from Carol and Jack Weber (University of Virginia). 
102
 Note that change agents typically experience the same objective (and in many cases even the subjective) 
consequences of the change process, as do the change targets. The difference is in the level of active 
participation in the change process and the level of exhibited influence on the change outcome. 
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be managed, while at the same time management inhibits change; it needs committed leaders 
but excessive commitment may diffuse and dilute change; and it needs effective rhetoric, but 
rhetoric diminishes the chances of successful change [Molinsky 1997]. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Adapted from Armenakis and Bedeian [1999] 
Figure 3.9 Mapping of change phases, change agent interventions and change target responses 
 
The process view of change has built enough supportive arguments for the claim that 
understanding barriers to change in a specific situation is important for their successful 
removal, even though it stops short of proving causal relationships between a certain action 
and the success of change. Thus I find it important for understanding the changes in Croatia 
and Slovenia. Through the literature review I could identify no particular argument against the 
validity of a multi-phase view of the change process in this regional setting. Many of the 
barriers to change described in the literature also seem to exist in countries in transition. 
However, I would like to stress a major change paradox, which, based on the literature 
review, I assume to be particularly strong in Croatia and Slovenia, when compared to change 
efforts in western countries.  
 
Fig. 3.9 clearly shows the importance most change literature attributes to vision. However, as 
pointed out by some authors [Lipton 1996, Hitt et al. 1998, Heifetz and Laurie 1999, Haeckel 
1999, Lissack and Roos 2001], visions are not easily developed and even less easily 
achieved103, especially in turbulent environments. Given the extreme level of unpredictability 
in the environment of Croatia and Slovenia during the first phase of change, I assume that 
clearly articulated vision was not a major driver of change in the initial defensive 
                                                 
103
 Lissack and Roos [2001] quote Russ Ackoff in noting that fewer than 2 percent of strategic plans and their 
incorporated visions succeed. 
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restructuring there, but later became a major driver during strategic restructuring (this being 
consistent with previous conclusions).  
 
Since the literature identifies so many different barriers to change, grouping them may be 
helpful to create a somewhat clearer picture. I propose a combination of Tichy’s classification 
of barriers (political, technical and cultural [Tichy 1983b]) and levels of change occurrence 
(external, organizational, individual [Burke and Litwin 1992]). The resulting summary of 
barriers which I assume to be of particular importance in Croatia and Slovenia in the observed 
period is presented in Table 3.4. Empirical research should indicate whether these barriers 
truly existed, and/or whether others were more important. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 3.4 Critical barriers to change in Croatia and Slovenia 
3.3.4 Role of change agents and change patterns 
Schools of thought which assume that change can be managed place the task in the hands of 
individuals who take the role of change agents. According to the stereotyped division of 
managers and leaders [Zaleznik 1977], individuals whose activities are aimed at creating 
change are labeled “leaders”. While more comprehensive treatment of the subject of 
leadership falls outside of scope of this review, change management literature discusses two 
important aspects of leadership: traits of effective change leaders, and the actions which 
leaders take to facilitate, create, direct, manage and sustain change. Also, while some authors 
discuss individual actions or propose a few related, “most important” actions, others discuss 
patterns of actions and relate them to the context and content of change. 
 
Literature on leadership behavior has traditionally been split between the notion of a universal 
leader who can adapt to any situation [Bass 1985, Bennis and Nanus 1985] and the concept of 
situational leadership [Fiedler 1967, House and Mitchell 1974, Hersey and Blanchard 1977], 
and has included discourses on transactional versus transformational leadership [Burns 1978, 
Bass 1985]. Consistent with the situational approach, many authors have suggested that 
managers should match the strategic needs of the firm [Wissema et al. 1980, Leontiades 1982, 
Gerstein and Reisman 1983]. Most authors place the responsibility for change at the top of the 
organization [Kotter 1982, Hanbrick and Mason 1984] and even suggest that top management 
should be replaced in order to facilitate major change [Friedrickson et al. 1988, Boeker 1992]. 
However, others claim that it is wrong to focus on the leadership acts of individuals, and place 
emphasis on leadership teams as key components of change [Collins and Porras 1994, Emery 
and Purser 1996, Landrum et al. 2000], or go to the extreme of advocating bottom-up change, 
with “diffused” leadership [Clarke and Meldrum 1999]. 
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Poor control 
Strategic uncertainty, 
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Almost independently of the above controversy, the same traits are often attributed to 
individuals who successfully assume the role of change agents. If we examine the list 
emerging from the literature, it is difficult to differentiate between some of these traits and 
underlying assumptions about the tasks of change agents, as implied from the list of steps in 
Fig. 3.9 and discussed in the next paragraphs104. A compilation of traits from the most-cited 
literature [Burns 1978, Bass 1985, Bennis and Nanus 1985, Tichy and Devana 1986, Kotter 
1990] and from other authors who have dealt specifically with that issue [Vandermerwe and 
Birley 1997, Eisenbach et al. 1999, Vansina 1999, Graetz 2000, Landrum et al. 2000] shows 
the groups of personality attributes and skills in effective change agents presented in Table 
3.5. 
 
Personality attributes Skills 
• High energy level, enthusiasm, action bias • Sense of timing, political savvy 
• Competence, intelligence, knowledge of 
organization, holistic view 
• Interpersonal skills 
(communication, influence, team) 
• Need for power, ambition, self confidence • Coordination skills 
• Empathy, care for people • Visioning, sense-making 
• Integrity, congruent set of core values  
 
Table 3.5 Review of personality traits and skills of effective change agents 
 
Building on the literature review presented in Fig. 3.9 and on some additional sources [Wrapp 
1967, Bass 1985, Bennis and Nanus 1985, Burke 1995, Klein 1996, Stewart 1996, Heifetz and 
Laurie 1997, Eisenbach et al. 1999, Floyd and Lane 2000, Beer and Nohria 2000, Graetz 
2000, Landrum et al. 2000] I have compiled an overview of the most frequently suggested 
change agent interventions. They can be divided into two groups: interventions which take a 
clear direction and should be intense in order to produce an impact on change targets; and 
interventions the main purpose of which is to balance (manage) change paradoxes, and which 
therefore change in direction and intensity from time to time, and are more subtle and 
perceptive of intermediate changes in the environment and to organizational responses to 
directional interventions. Although interventions of the first type undoubtedly clear a space 
for change and create major movement in the organization, the second are critical to defining 
wider patterns of change and creating consistency among directional interventions (Table 
3.6). 
 
Investigating “standard” patterns of change has attracted a great deal of interest, and provides 
important insights in how context, content and process of change merge and become 
interdependent. This approach has its roots in the early work of contingency theorists 
[Lawrence and Lorsch 1967], who recognized that different structures are required in different 
environments. Although their studies were often contradictory and progress in the field was 
stymied [Mintzberg 1979], they paved the way for the work of other authors.  
 
                                                 
104
 Interestingly enough, some authors [Kouzes and Posner 1987, Graetz 2000] have proposed common traits 
even in the two seemingly very different types of leaders, transactional and transformational ([Burns 1978]) 
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Directional interventions Balancing interventions 
• Giving sense to external changes / 
Building vision / Giving direction 
• Economic value – organizational 
capabilities / Cost – revenues  
• Building political coalitions  • Narrow interests – Plurality of 
interests 
• Challenging the status quo  
• Communicating / Listening to people 
• Loose – tight control /  
Creativity – discipline 
• Building trust / Providing a role 
model / Setting standards 
• Centralization – decentralization / 
Interdependence – independence 
• Top-down – bottom-up • Deploying resources / Empowering / 
Facilitating experimentation • Time – space distance 
• Long-term – short-term • Creating and using change 
monitoring and control mechanisms • Universal – culture-dependent 
• Linking results and purpose / 
Rewarding 
• Trust – change 
 
Table 3.6 Review of change agent interventions 
 
Kotter and Schlesinger [1979] presented one of the first systematic reviews of standard 
approaches to change, which (to a large degree due to its simplicity and clarity of advice on 
deployment) became very popular among practitioners. It identified six methods of dealing 
with resistance to change and prescribed the fit between an individual method and the change 
context (Table 3.7). Kotter and Schlesinger took an extremely rational (contingent) view of 
change, suggesting that analysis and proper selection of change strategy (among the six 
models) are of key importance to the success of change. On the strategic level, this view is 
clearly too simplistic, since it ignores many dimensions of change (e. g., culture) on all three 
levels: environmental, organizational and individual. Also, some of the proposed approaches 
(such as the use of coercion), are highly controversial from the change target perspective, and 
most contemporary literature warns against the extremely high associated risks (see 3.3.6). 
However, if applied consistently with the other elements of the broader change pattern, the 
different approaches in dealing with resistance to change described in Table 3.7 have tactical 
value and have been repeatedly proven in practice. 
 
Miller and Friesen [1980b], basing their work on prior research, defined 24 change-related 
variables and conducted empirical research on a wide database of organizational transitions. 
As a result, they identified nine archetypes of transition which occur significantly more often 
than predicted by statistical probability. Each was characterized by a different configuration 
of change-related variables and represented internally consistent, but mutually radically 
different approaches to change. Miller and Friesen [1980b] did not intend the linking of 
archetypes with performance outcomes as their primary research goal. However, while 
warning against premature optimism, they pointed out that further research might identify 
valid responses (i.e. those leading to better future performance) to certain types of change in a 
given organizational context.  
 
In one of the most comprehensive analyses of this subject, Strebel [1992] developed the 
argument further and proposed eight change paths105, the choice of the “right one” depending 
                                                 
105
 In comparison with Miller and Friesen [1980b], Strebel [1992] significantly reduced the number of 
descriptors of change paths to scope, pace, motivation, key change agents and approach to closing the 
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on the balance between the forces that resist change and the change forces, as well as on how 
easy it is to identify the resistance forces. He also suggested that a sequence of change 
campaigns, each with its own change path, might be needed to deal with the varying nature of 
change or resistance forces. Several other studies were prepared in a similar spirit, ranging 
from conceptual integration of several change theories (such as research on patterns of 
strategic renewal [Volberda et al. 2001]), to the conceptualization of practitioner observations 
(e. g. change models used by major consulting companies [Denham et al. 1995]).  
 
Approach Commonly used in 
situations 
Advantages Drawbacks 
Education + 
communication 
Where there is a lack of 
information or inaccurate 
information and analysis. 
Once persuaded, people 
will often help to 
implement the change. 
Can be very time-
consuming if lots of 
people are involved. 
Participation + 
involvement 
Where the initiators do 
not have all the 
information they need to 
design the change, and 
where others have 
considerable power to 
resist. 
People who participate 
will be committed to 
implementing change, 
and any relevant 
information they have 
will be integrated into the 
change plan. 
Can be very time-
consuming if participants 
design an inappropriate 
change. 
Facilitation + support Where people are 
resisting because of 
adjustment problems. 
No other approach works 
as well with adjustment 
problems. 
Can be time-consuming, 
expensive, and still fail. 
Negotiation + agreement Where someone or some 
group will clearly lose out 
in a change, and where 
that group has 
considerable power to 
resist. 
Sometimes it is a 
relatively easy way to 
avoid major resistance. 
Can be too expensive in 
many cases if it alerts 
others to negotiate for 
compliance. 
Manipulation + co-
optation 
Where other tactics will 
not work, or are too 
expensive. 
It can be a relatively 
quick and inexpensive 
solution to resistance 
problems. 
Can lead to future 
problems if people feel 
manipulated. 
Explicit + implicit 
coercion 
Where speed is essential, 
and the change initiators 
have considerable power. 
It is speedy, and can 
overcome any kind of 
resistance. 
Can be risky if it leaves 
people mad at the 
initiators. 
 
Source: Kotter and Schlesinger [1979] 
Table 3.7 Methods for dealing with resistance to change 
 
While the proposed standard patterns of change vary significantly from author to author in 
almost every respect, this depending strongly on the approach taken and underlying beliefs 
about the nature of change, they nevertheless demonstrate that patterns do exist and that 
certain organizational templates and types of behavior are invoked in change situations more 
often than others. Although not clearly proven by rigorous research, they also hint at the 
conclusion that a certain pattern can systematically produce (or at least contribute to) a more 
effective response to a given change setting than others. All of the patterns mentioned also 
place a clear emphasis on both directional and balancing interventions, and suggest that while 
consistency and alignment are crucial for directional interventions, flexibility (including 
complete reversals of direction during the same change process) is key to balancing 
interventions. 
                                                                                                                                                        
competence gap (including the organizational structures needed to implement change). Like Miller and Friesen, 
Strebel also suggested that not all combinations of descriptors are equally probable, and that some combinations 
have an advantage over others in a certain (external and internal) change context. 
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Several of the issues discussed above are, in my opinion, of utmost importance for 
understanding the change process in companies in transition. I have already pointed out the 
potential problems the literature sees in vision-driven change in highly turbulent 
environments. This is consistently confirmed in change pattern literature. When applying 
Miller and Friesen’s [1980] archetypes to the local context, by far the most fitting one is T5, 
“Initiation by Fire”106, which clearly predicts a lack of long-term vision as one of the 
consequences of change. 
 
A major research question arises as an immediate corollary of the above conclusion: what 
other directional intervention can be substituted for lack of vision? If vision does not act as a 
pull factor, can some other factor effectively replace it? In my opinion, a suggested answer, 
based on the literature review, is trust. The role of trust as an important, but not easily 
achievable107 facilitator of change and a necessary precursor to reducing resistance to change 
has been well-presented in the literature [Hultman 1979, Odiorne 1981, Beer et al. 1990, 
Judson 1991, Novelli et al. 1995, Strebel 1996]. Thus, I assume that trust was the main pull 
factor during defensive restructuring in Croatia and Slovenia, while vision became equally 
important during strategic restructuring. 
 
On the other hand, when examining the approaches to dealing with resistance suggested by 
Kotter and Schlesinger [1979], it is logical to conclude that time was seen as the first priority 
in defensive restructuring, dominating over uncertainty, while uncertainty, lack of information 
and the growing power of change targets became more important during strategic 
restructuring. This implies that explicit and implicit coercion were preferred tactics in dealing 
with resistance during defensive restructuring, while participation and involvement were 
preferred in dealing with it during strategic restructuring.  
 
As regards balancing interventions, I find six of them particularly interesting for my 
research108. The economic value versus organizational capability balance [Beer 2001] is 
directly related to the content of change and was discussed earlier. Thus the first balance to 
examine is that between narrow interests and plurality of interests, which tilted progressively 
towards plurality. While in the first period of change cultural inertia and institutional 
pressures kept the interest span relatively narrow (and more narrow in Slovenia than in 
Croatia, where early privatization patterns created significant dissonance between new owners 
                                                 
106
 This archetype notes that firms exposed to “great and discontinuous changes in their environments” – firms 
unused to forced change and with management inexperienced in the face of new circumstances – delegate power 
to knowledgeable people; become more innovative, but also short-term-oriented; do not develop conscious and 
integrated strategies; and do not make major improvements in communications and control systems [Miller and 
Friesen 1980b]. It is important to note that, although it is the most likely pattern for the context described, this 
pattern does not produce good results. Miller and Friesen [1980b] found that it yields below-average 
performance and depletes the firm’s resources!  
107
 A study performed by Princeton Survey Research Associates for Richard Freeman and Joel Rogers found that 
a trust gap often exists between employees and managers: while 54% of employees surveyed expressed loyalty 
to their employers, only 38% trusted them to keep their promises. The most mistrustful were minority and blue-
collar workers, as well as employees in highly dynamic industries like communications and transportation 
[Ettore 1995]. 
108
 Although I do not claim that balancing interventions are more important than directional interventions, I find 
it interesting to notice that the choices involved in balancing interventions, although less open-ended than in 
directional interventions, are by no means easier and, as is seen in the observed companies, can actually create 
more controversy (i.e. while very few managers in the region disputed the need for communication during the 
change, endless debates went on about the level of centralization or about top-down or bottom-up tactics in a 
particular period of change). 
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on the one hand, and managers and employees on the other), in the second period the 
pluralism of interests increased. However, the literature predicts that this should lead to less 
effective change efforts [Goodstein et al. 1993, Denis et al. 2001, Golden and Zajac 2001]. 
Thus, I assume that growing pluralism of interest made change more difficult to achieve 
during strategic restructuring.  
 
The next important issue related to balancing interventions is the decision about the level of 
centralization. This issue has a rich and controversial history in former Yugoslavia, and 
presented one of the major institutional and cultural barriers to change in situations where 
change required centralization109. When former Yugoslavia departed from the Soviet model of 
communism in the late 1940s and introduced self-management in the early 1950s, it gradually 
started to alter the dominant (politically prescribed) organizational model from total 
centralization to decentralization. This trend culminated in the Constitution Act of 1974, 
which defined the “Basic Organizations of Associated Labor (BOAL)110” as the titular owners 
of company assets. This created opposing directions in hierarchies: corporate management 
was placed above divisional (BOAL) management, but divisions (BOALs) owned the 
corporation. Decentralization as a dominant philosophy followed as a direct consequence, 
becoming central to the political and social identity of employees and tightly embedded in 
organizational cultures regardless of how cynical the employees were about other aspects of 
the system111. On the other hand, the literature implies that scarcity of resources and the 
decline of the firm result from centralization [D’Aveni 1989, Yasai-Ardekani 1989]. Thus I 
assume that defensive restructuring resulted in centralization. 
 
The question of a top-down versus bottom-up pattern of change is related to, but not identical 
to, the issue of centralization. As noted earlier, the changes in the region created multiple 
problems for top-down change patterns. Many top managers were replaced due to their 
communist past, especially in Croatia. Of those who were not, quite a few had administrative, 
rather than leadership or entrepreneurial experience and personal traits. Managers with 
intimate experience of the market economy were extremely rare, while those with experience 
of similar levels of environmental change were almost nonexistent. Thus, in terms of 
experience even the incumbents were novices, too. On the other hand, the political system 
was based on a strict hierarchy, which means that a strong tradition of top-down style existed. 
The conclusions from the literature review presented above imply that a top-down style is 
seen more often in change processes with the character of defensive restructuring, while a 
bottom-up style appears during strategic restructuring. Empirical research should show 
whether a top-down style was predominant in all circumstances, or just in defensive 
restructuring. 
 
Finally, the balance between a belief in the universal validity of change patterns and a belief 
that change patterns completely depend upon the local (and in particular cultural) context is 
both conceptually and pragmatically difficult. Without assuming where the balance should be, 
a preconceived advantage in local patterns may have been a result of management bias. Very 
few local scholars had a good theoretical overview of the field of change management and 
                                                 
109
 Literature suggests this may be needed as a response to crisis [Miller and Friesen 1980b, Strebel 1992, 
Arogyaswamy et al. 1995], especially when slack is low and crisis threatens survival. 
110
 BOAL corresponds to the smallest organizational unit, which is still a separate legal entity, for convenience 
referred to in this text as “division”. 
111
 As noted in Chapter 2, decentralization also allowed employees to influence the very high level of benefits 
they enjoyed. Thus, a resistance to centralization also formed around perceived future losses in power and 
material benefits. 
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even less practical experience of it. Academics were also traditionally not viewed as sources 
of valuable, practical advice on management. But managers had little insight into global best 
practices in change management. Combined with previous conclusions about lack of learning 
in defensive restructuring, this would imply that managers focused on local specifics during 
defensive restructuring, while being more open to adopting global experience and business 
models during strategic restructuring. 
3.3.5 Influence of culture on change 
Individuals are part of the societal and organizational context and their individual reactions 
are affected by that context. Culture seems to be one of the most important elements in this 
context, and huge research efforts have been devoted to analyzing its impact on companies 
and individuals. The results are highly controversial: while some claim that culture has a 
significant positive impact on performance [Peters and Waterman 1982, Deal and Kennedy 
1982, Kotter and Heskett 1992, Gordon and DiTomaso 1992], others indicate that culture can 
be both an asset and a liability112 [Schein 1985, Hofstede et al. 1990] or that major 
performance improvements can be achieved despite negative cultural reactions to change 
[Lewis 1994]. Most, however, agree that culture does have a major impact on the 
organization, either in terms of competitive advantage (as discussed in 3.2, [Barney 1986, Fiol 
1991], or as an integrating and control mechanism [Lawrence and Lorsch 1967, Argyris and 
Schön 1976, Ouchi 1980, Schein 1984, Pascale 1985, Pettigrew 1985, Weick 1987]. Also, 
many studies revealed direct effects of culture on change, both in a national and cross-national 
environment [Hofstede 1980, Adler 1986, Schneider 1989, Whipp et al. 1989, Hofstede 1991, 
Very et al. 1996]. But here findings are again controversial, some claiming that the national 
culture dominates over the organizational [Adler 1986], and others just the opposite 
[Schneider 1990, Gomez-Mejia and Palich 1997]. Finally, while most studies deal with the 
effects of culture on individuals, some show that organizational cultures can reflect the 
personality of their organizational leaders [Kets de Vries and Miller 1986]. 
 
Of the huge variety of topics briefly indicated above I will at this point focus on two which I 
find particularly interesting for the observed changes. The first is the influence of national 
culture on executive behavior and in particular on its approach to change. Hofstede’s work is 
paramount in this field [Hofstede 1980, 1991, 1993, 1999, Hofstede et al. 1990] and is well-
supplemented by many others [England 1967, Schein 1985, Hambrick and Brandon 1988, 
Schneider 1989, Finkelstein and Hambrick 1996, Geletkanycz 1997, Trompenaars and 
Hampden-Turner 1997, Breu 2001]. One interesting aspect of this influence is the link 
between individualistic culture and a strong (commander) approach to leadership, against that 
between collectivistic culture and the soft (team, clan) approach to leadership [Ouchi 1981, 
Pascale and Athos 1981]. This connects further with the higher level of inertia exhibited by 
command & control cultures [Kanter 1989, Mintzberg 1994] versus that of more adaptive 
clan-like cultures [Nonaka 1988, Stacey 1993], as well as the preference for discontinuous 
change exhibited by strong leaders versus that for continuous change exhibited by soft leaders 
[Hofstede 1993].  
 
The other interesting topic is the tendency of national cultures to resist change even under 
high pressure [Breu 2001] and the problem this creates for “importing change” into 
organizations based on organizational models imported from other cultures or via cross-
                                                 
112
 The belief that culture is a major source of resistance to change is widely spread among practitioners, not just 
academics. A survey carried out by the American Management Association and Deloitte & Touche found that 
close to 75% of respondents saw the culture of their organization as a barrier to change [Romano 1995]. 
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national influences (such as acquisitions). Culture clashes are common, especially where one 
side is expected to renounce its culture in favor of the other’s [Wilkins and Ouchi 1983, Very 
et al. 1996, Breu 2001], and often have a highly negative impact on the organization in terms 
of, for example, reduced employee commitment [Buono et al. 1985], increased executive 
turnover [Hambrick and Cannella 1993] and resistance to necessary change [Lorsch 1986, 
Very et al. 1996]. Thus, an appreciation of local values, style and processes [Schwartz and 
Davies 1981, Lorsch 1986] and the dominant power’s sensitivity to culture in the change 
process [Adler 1986, Bartlett and Goshal 1989] are seen as keys to a successful change of 
culture in cross-national situations. 
 
Breu [2001] provided highly relevant insights into the cultural aspects of the German 
unification process. She not only noted that the consequences of the growing cultural divide 
between East and West Germany [Hessel et al. 1997] were not fully recognized [Dunbar and 
Bresser 1997], but she came to the conclusion through empirical research that a) the blunt 
strategy of forcing the West German management model onto East German companies 
produced extremely poor results; b) the East German companies trying to muddle through the 
change relying on their own forces and not significantly adapting their cultures performed 
somewhat better, but were still mediocre at best; and c) by far the best performance came 
from companies which allowed for the coexistence of both cultures by depending strongly on 
the capital and knowledge resources from the West, while at the same time relying on 
incumbent Eastern executives. 
 
In conclusion, I interpret the predictions of the literature as follows. A high level of 
individualism in local culture113 is likely to be linked to a hierarchical, top-down style of 
management. This would be helpful in the implementation of defensive restructuring in 
Croatia and Slovenia, but may become an obstacle to strategic restructuring. I also assume 
that national and company identity, as well as the pride that individuals associated with that 
identity, influenced both the way individuals perceived their environment, and leadership 
action. In practice this speaks against the use of strategic partnerships as a restructuring tool, 
and in favor of using challenge, rather than material rewards, as a motivator for performance. 
3.3.6 The impact of change on individuals 
While it is intuitively clear that change agents and change targets are both instrumental in the 
ultimate success of change, the conceptual view of change processes from the perspective of 
change targets has until recently received considerably less attention in the change 
management literature than has dealing with change on the organizational level [Nortier 
1995]. Before the emergence of the transition perspective [Bridges 1980, 1986, Nortier 1995] 
the vast majority of research (typically in the field of psychology) involved more or less 
isolated effects of change, such as stress. This was despite the fact that, on the input side, 
individuals significantly increase the complexity of change (e.g., the variation in cultural 
values on the individual level remains high even in the presence of a dominant culture on the 
environmental or organizational level [Kirkman et al. 2000]) and, on the output side, change 
affects individuals within an organization more fundamentally than it does the organization as 
a whole [Bridges 1986, Jick 1990]. 
                                                 
113
 As another proof of the strong resilience of national cultures, a high level of individualism remains 
characteristic of both Slovenia and Croatia despite 50 years of pressure towards collectivism, the dominant 
feature of communist ideology. Croatia and Slovenia are estimated to be less similar in other dimensions of 
Hofstede’s model [Hofstede 1991]: Croatia has a somewhat higher level of masculinity and power distance, 
while Slovenia has a somewhat higher level of uncertainty avoidance and long-term orientation. 
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This, of course, does not mean that the specific effects of change on individuals are 
unimportant. In particular, the threat and its resulting direct and indirect effects influence 
human behavior to such an extent that they deserve separate attention. This is especially 
important given the findings of some researchers that it is the threat associated with change 
that induces negative behavior in individuals, and not the change itself as some research 
suggests [Kanter 1985b, Adams 1986, French and Delahaye 1996, Breu and Benwell 1999]. 
The same is true of the perceived justice of change (especially given the high assumed 
importance of trust, as discussed earlier) [Cobb et al. 1995, Folger and Skarlicki 1999]. 
 
The main psychological effects of threat on an individual are stress, anxiety and arousal114 
[Staw et al. 1981]. Individuals under stress tend to be more hard-driven, but less flexible in 
their choice of problem-solving strategies, and they adhere to previously-used solutions even 
if they do not fit the new situation [Cowen 1952, Spence and Farber 1953]. A high level of 
stress also leads to reduced information processing capabilities [Menninger 1952, Withey 
1962]. On the level of individuals these effects lead to rigidity, while on the group level they 
can decrease cohesiveness if the group perceives the situation as likely failure [Staw et al. 
1981]. Apathy, a natural result of such situations, becomes a more difficult barrier to change 
than active resistance [Siegal et al. 1996]. Individuals also tend to display self-deceiving 
behavior, such as unjustified self-confidence and the illusion of being in control [Staw 1991]. 
It is worth noting that discontinuous change induces threat-related effects by default, because 
individuals cannot escape the paradox of complementary threats: if they decide not to change 
in order to avoid the threats related to change, they expose themselves to a potentially huge 
threat of losses because of not changing, to which threat they are to some degree aware [Breu 
and Benwell 1999]. 
 
Along with threat, perceived unfairness and violation of psychological contract are the main 
sources of negative individual behavior, resulting in apathy, cynicism and active resistance 
[Lewin 1951, Plant 1987, Cobb et al. 1995, Hiltrop 1995, Morrison and Robinson 1997, 
Baruch and Hind 1999]115. Change targets perceive change as unfair if the consequences are 
not equal for all (distributive justice [Adams 1965]); if the procedures are not consistent, free 
of bias, accurate, correctable and ethical (procedural justice [Leventhal et al. 1980]); and if the 
quality of interpersonal treatment they receive is not adequate (interactional justice [Bies 
1986]). According to referent cognitions theory [Folger 1993, Brockner and Wiesenfeld 1996] 
individuals form expectations of standards of behavior based on past events and other sources 
of comparative reference, and judge fairness based on these expectations. Change agents must 
fulfill their moral obligation by providing adequate explanations and clearly articulating the 
reasons for their actions, or otherwise they “add insult to injury” (of change) [Folger and 
Skarlicki 1999]. A consideration of perceived justice implies, among other things, a clear 
need to provide change targets with additional reference points (i.e. how things will be better 
after change and how would they deteriorate without it [Greenberg 1990]); to create realistic 
expectations about change (or clearly acknowledge lack of information, when that is the case) 
[Schweiger and DeNisi 1991], and a need for effective use of rewarding and other HR 
systems [Cummings and Worley 1997]. Finally, according to Folger and Skarlicki [1999] 
balanced caring for all three forms of organizational justice is needed to generate a perceived 
fairness of change. 
                                                 
114
 About 50% of the employees surveyed by the American Management Association and Deloitte & Touche 
reported frustration and stress as among the principle emotions related to the workplace [Romano 1995]. 
115
 Among other causes of negative behavior on the level of individuals, lack of trust in leaders due to 
historically-proven or perceived incompetence in dealing with change [Reichers et al. 1997] is prominent. 
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More comprehensive views of responses to change on the level of individuals propose that 
responses vary depending on the phase of change (Fig. 3.9). Of course, typical responses or 
reactions to threat or perceived injustice can be observed at any stage, but responses such as 
denial, anxiety, exploration or commitment are typical of specific phases [Bridges 1980, 
Schein 1987, Isabella 1990, Jaffe et al. 1994, Nortier 1995, French and Delahaye 1996]. 
Using a modified version of Nortier’s five-stage model of individual transitions (equilibrium, 
separation, crisis, rebirth, and new equilibrium [Nortier 1995]), Breu and Benwell analyzed 
individual transitions on the part of East German managers [Breu and Benwell 1999]. Their 
findings are summarized in Table 3.8.  
 
Stage Disintegration Euphoria Crisis Development Redefinition 
Environmental 
Perception 
Increasing 
instability and 
rigidity of (old) 
system 
Expectation of 
total change 
Deconstruction 
of the total 
change myth 
Recognition of 
incremental 
realization of 
change 
Belief in 
continuity of 
change 
Self-Perception Lack of power 
to initiate 
change 
 
Request for 
change 
Belief in ability 
to achieve rapid 
and fundamental 
change 
 
Support of 
change and 
development 
Incapacity to 
effect change 
due to loss of 
faith in value 
of old skills 
and past 
experiences 
 
Support of 
change and 
development 
Learning of new 
concepts and 
building up of 
judgment of 
new 
environment  
 
Support of 
change and 
development 
Recovery of 
self-confidence 
and trust in own 
capabilities 
 
Support of 
change and 
development 
Behavior Passive Hyperactive & 
erratic 
Insecure & 
hesitant 
Inquisitive Impelling 
 
Source: Breu and Benwell [1999] 
Table 3.8 Transformative transition model 
 
In addition to confirming the validity of the individual transition model, they came to a 
conclusion which speaks against the punctuated equilibrium model [Tushman and Romanelli 
1985] and confirms the view that the revolutionary (discontinuous) phase of change ends not 
in static equilibrium [Nortier 1995], but in continuous change [Morgan 1986, Baruch and 
Hind 1999]. They also found less individual opposition to change than predicted, and 
explained this with the hypothesis that the threat of no change was stronger than threat of 
change. 
 
The implications of the literature review as to the impact of change on individuals seem to be 
clear. In a defensive restructuring situation one might expect individuals on all levels within 
the firm to experience high stress. Their behavior would be primarily influenced by negative 
emotions and in particular by the fear of losing their jobs, making them more ready to accept 
change led by coercion. Here perceived justice and trust in change leaders would also 
significantly reduce resistance to change. 
 
Based on the literature review, the main problem to be expected in strategic restructuring is 
the lack of a sense of urgency and perceived need for change, as well as the stress generated 
by prolonged periods of change. 
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3.3.7 Downsizing and turnaround as a special case of change 
The last part of the literature review is devoted to a topic which in many ways represents the 
very core of the changes that are the subject of this study: firm downsizing and turnaround. 
Many studies have been conducted in this area, dealing both with the contents (in terms of 
chosen strategies) and the process of turnaround (both in terms of distinct stages of 
turnaround and in terms of change management). Many of these studies also specifically deal 
with downsizing as a possible (and often necessary) component of turnaround. 
 
In principle, turnaround116 strategies are needed when the firm has been suffering from an 
extended period of significantly-reduced performance [Schendel et al. 1976], either because it 
has become maladapted to the environment, the environment has become hostile, or both 
[Cameron et al. 1988]. The firm’s existence is typically threatened in the first phase of a 
major turnaround. Thus, a successful turnaround can by definition be divided into two phases: 
decline stemming (retrenchment or defensive restructuring) and recovery (strategic 
restructuring) [Arogyaswamy et al. 1995].  
 
In one of the earliest systematic studies of turnarounds, Schendel and Patton [1976] showed 
that the average period of decline was 6.5 years, followed by a period of recovery lasting 7.5 
years. Although under conditions of increasing speed of change these stages may have 
shortened, they still indicate the long-term nature of both components in the turnaround 
process. In their study of turnaround strategies, Schendel, Patton and Riggs [1976] identified 
eight categories: organizational and management changes, marketing program changes, major 
plant expenditures, product diversification, geographical diversification, efficiency increase, 
divestiture and vertical integration. However, they did not link the use of any of these 
strategies with external or internal conditions, and they indicated that use of a combination of 
strategies might often be more effective than use of only one. Several other authors offered 
similar classifications [O’Neill 1986, Hoffman 1989, Grinyer et al. 1990, Robbins and Pearce 
1992, Pelham 2000]. Also, many authors explicitly proposed that a certain type of turnaround 
strategic or tactical action would produce better results than another, sometimes linking this 
with other conditions [Harrigan 1980, Zammuto and Cameron 1985, Arogyaswami et al. 
1995, Laitinen 2000, Barker et al. 2001].  
 
Although a firm’s financial troubles are often insufficient to generate the perceived need for a 
turnaround strategy [Barker et al. 2001], once such a strategy is in place, its decline-stemming 
phase commonly focuses on increasing the firm’s efficiency and on other forms of coping 
with financial distress [Bibeault 1982, Robbins and Pearce 1992]. Along with balance sheet 
restructuring strategies (such as asset divestiture), firms typically seek short-term efficiency 
improvements (cost reductions)117 and consider downsizing their labor force. Appelbaum, 
Everard and Hung [1999] have presented an excellent review of possible strategies related to 
downsizing. They voiced the common finding that downsizing is all too often a shortsighted 
goal in itself and not part of an overall strategic turnaround plan, thus yielding poor results 
[Bruton et al. 1996]. Appelbaum and colleagues suggested that layoffs should be used as a last 
resort, after alternative measures have been taken e. g. reduction of headcount by attrition, 
early retirement and outplacement, hire freeze, work reduction or work redesign [Cascio 
1993, Feldman and Leana 1994, Mishra and Mishra 1994, Mone 1994, Pfeffer 1998]. Many 
authors have also discussed the high cost of layoffs [Pfeffer 1998, Rigby 2002].  
                                                 
116
 Turnaround is used in a traditional sense, denoting the process of recovery from declining performance. 
117
 Biebault [1982] and some other authors suggest that turnaround managers usually have ninety days or less to 
resolve cash flow problems once the financial crises erupts. 
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Researchers have pointed out the negative psychological effects of layoffs on remaining 
employees (called survivors syndrome), suggesting that negative effects can be reduced by 
fair treatment and support of downsizing victims and survivors, planning for the optimum 
strategic effects of overall turnaround, broad participation, communication, training, and 
reshaping of the psychological contract [Cascio 1993, Mishra et al. 1998, Pfeffer 1998, 
Appelbaum et al. 1999, Baruch and Hind 1999]. The paramount role of trust in building the 
new psychological contract is once again underlined [Bartlett and Ghoshal 1995, Mone 1997, 
Mishra et al. 1998]. Bartlett and Ghoshal [1995] proposed a simple model of factors that can 
support the building of new individual behavior (Fig. 3.10). These factors balance and 
reinforce each other, and in pairs produce the desired organizational effects. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Bartlett and Ghoshal [1995] 
Figure 3.10 Management context and organizational behavior 
 
Replacement of the top management team is often considered one of the actions forming part 
of a turnaround [Slatter 1984, Barker et al. 2001], especially in the case of external control of 
the firm. However, researchers remain divided about its effects. While some suggest that top 
manager replacement may be a form of adaptation, and that benefits will stem from an 
infusion of fresh ideas, a new understanding of the environment, improved competence and 
credibility [Slatter 1984, Barker et al. 2001], others claim that many factors influence the 
effectiveness of replacement [Friedrickson et al. 1988, Breu 2001]. Inconsistent research 
findings on the impact of top management replacement on firm performance [Puffer and 
Weintrop 1991] have also contributed to the lack of clear conclusions in the literature.  
 
Successful implementation of decline-stemming strategy cannot focus merely on issues 
related to balance sheet and cost restructuring, but must serve at least two more purposes 
related to ensuring survival and laying the foundations for revival: renewal of stakeholder 
support, which is likely to deteriorate due to decline and harsh decline stemming measures; 
and stabilization of the internal climate and decision-making processes [Arogyaswamy et al. 
1995]. Once these goals are reached, the recovery stage can begin and recovery strategies can 
be used. Arogyaswamy and his colleagues [1995] claim that the choice of recovery strategies 
depends on the reasons for the decline and on the firm’s competitive position. Particularly 
interesting is their suggestion that firms with a weak competitive position who face declining 
markets should scale back to core customer segments and create new resources and 
capabilities to serve them. This concurs with findings from other studies which suggest that a 
focus on core activities and investment in customers, marketing and new product development 
will increase the chances of successful recovery [Grinyer et al. 1990, Dawley and Hoffman 
2000, Laitinen 2000]. 
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Since the reviewed literature places limited long-term value on asset restructuring, and given 
the low liquidity of asset markets in Croatia and Slovenia in the first period of change, I 
assume that turnaround strategies in Croatia and Slovenia had little benefit from asset 
restructuring.  
 
The literature suggests that downsizing issues are very important, and that the trust associated 
with clear communications and hope in recovery has a significant impact on the success of 
defensive restructuring. 
 
The literature does not resolve the controversy over CEO and top management team 
replacement in a turnaround situation. It implies, however, that the perceived competence of 
and the trust which key stakeholders place in incumbent management takes precedence over 
other factors. This is in line with suggestions concerning the multiple targets of the decline-
stemming phase, as well as being appropriate to the long duration of turnaround processes; 
both of which factors lead to the conclusion that communicating the need for turnaround to 
key stakeholders and maintaining their trust over a prolonged period of time is a necessary 
precondition for successful turnaround. 
 
Finally, based on the literature reviewed, I suggest that a focus on core activities and 
investment in distribution channels, marketing and new product development comprise the 
most effective recovery strategy to be implemented in the strategic restructuring phase. 
3.4 Research model 
The researcher building a research model in the area of strategic change management faces 
several challenges. The first is the size and complexity of the model. If the ambition is to 
create a model that describes multiple dimensions of change, and if it is to be concrete enough 
to be useful in describing or predicting change outcomes without further model refinement, 
complexity is unavoidable. However, complex models are more difficult to verify, and 
practitioners can also find it too difficult to apply normatively.  
 
The next major challenge is the level of reliance on the existing literature. Ideally, the model 
should rely heavily on findings from previous research, and critically integrate key 
components from existing “theoretical building blocks”. However, the results of a fairly broad 
literature review performed in this chapter are often controversial, thus bringing up additional 
questions. In many instances individual theories contradict each other in their fundamental 
views on competitiveness and change phenomena. This becomes even more obvious when 
translating the conceptual views suggested by a theory into a model describing or predicting 
change events and outcomes. Finally, when discussing complex and controversial issues, even 
the most self-evident assumption can be viewed as subjective and requiring verification. 
3.4.1 Main research question 
From the examination of issues related to competitiveness and to strategic change 
management as described in the literature it becomes clear that strategic change is a complex 
phenomenon which can be examined from different perspectives. No dimension of change 
can be ignored if it is to be understood. It is also clear that it is not easy to achieve a positive 
change outcome, since barriers to change exist at different levels. In order to influence the 
change outcome, change agents can intervene in many ways, and success is unlikely if these 
interventions are not coherent, appropriate and comprehensive. 
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There are several general models of strategic change in the literature. Few have endured the 
scrutiny of a number of reviewers or, based on the brief review done in this chapter, seem to 
be acceptable in the observed context. The most notable examples are three concepts, two 
proposed by Pettigrew and one by Burke and Litwin. Pettigrew made a strong case for 
looking at change from political, technical and cultural perspectives [Pettigrew 1973, 1985, 
1988], and also took into consideration the context, content and process of change [Pettigrew 
1987, 1988, Whipp et al. 1989]. Burke and Litwin, in constructing their model of change, 
mirrored the thinking of many other authors and looked at change-related phenomena on the 
level of the environment118, the organization and individuals. Unfortunately, although in 
principle acceptable, none of the general models is detailed enough to offer direct and explicit 
answers to questions asked by practitioners.  
 
As noted before, detailed models of change are either limited in scope, addressing one or a 
few aspects of change-related phenomena (e. g., Kotter [1995]); typically do not propose 
content (i.e. do not discuss strategy and resource-related issues); or do not pass even a basic 
test for applicability in the observed context [Vollmann 1996]. This clearly indicates the need 
to extend one of the existing general models of change, or to construct a new one with both 
the power of treating change as an integral phenomenon, and the necessary level of detail. 
 
In practice, managers must address all aspects of change. They have to make sense of signals 
from the context, and analyze, decide and act in real time, since both the outer and the inner 
context in which they operate are constantly changing. They have to find answers, but are 
often handicapped by a given organizational template which for one reason or another has 
become inappropriate in the context, and sometimes the gap that has opened is huge. While 
closing this gap they must work within the constraints of limited resources, and deal with 
numerous barriers to change. Even within a gradually-changing context the task is not easy; 
and when the scope, amplitude, speed and rhythm of change reach a crescendo, the task 
becomes absolutely formidable. 
 
It is difficult to clearly define a successful outcome of change. The starting positions of 
individual firms or even units within a firm can be very different and, given the relatively 
small size of the economies observed, it is practically impossible to find a significant sample 
of comparable cases to make meaningful comparisons. In the situation of discontinuous 
change even more fundamental performance-related questions arise, such as those regarding 
the true and perceived nature of the firm and its basic objectives. If the institutional pressures 
in one period set the social value the firm generates as the highest goal, while in some other 
period economic rent becomes the only criterion of success, how can one set consistent and 
precise determinants measuring the success of change? Also, if measurement is not carried 
out in a controlled environment and, given deficiencies in infrastructure, strongly depends on 
subjective estimates of the very actors of change, how can one avoid skewed results? Last but 
not least, given the complex nature of change-related phenomena it is close to impossible to 
verify causal relationships among the numerous factors which a complex model assumes to 
influence change. 
 
All these reservations notwithstanding, the central question of this research remains the 
same: can patterns be identified in the change-related phenomena in the observed 
companies in Croatia and Slovenia which would allow the construction of a model of 
                                                 
118
 The environment corresponds to what Pettigrew refers to as “outer context” [Whipp et al. 1989]. 
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strategic change explaining the behavior and change outcomes in the period of 
observation? 
 
Answering this question will enrich our understanding of change-related phenomena in 
general, in countries in transition and situations of discontinuous change in particular. It will 
also help practitioners (managers, consultants and business school faculty) to improve their 
effectiveness in dealing with change. 
3.4.2 General model of strategic change management  
The research model is aimed at studying strategic change management in the observed 
companies in Croatia and Slovenia. Its main purpose is twofold: to propose a universally valid 
model of strategic change management, and to serve as a frame for defining detailed research 
questions. The model presented in Figure 3.11 consists of several basic building blocks, each 
of which will be explained in more detail in the following paragraphs. Although the model is 
presented in a general form, one of its main contributions is that the building blocks can also 
be translated into a context-dependent form to explain the observed change phenomena in 
Croatia and Slovenia. It should be noted, however, that despite the fact that the model 
borrows the phase concept from the models presented in 3.3.3, it brings them closer to the 
models of Pettigrew and Burke and Litwin presented in 3.3.2. The context and content 
considerations of strategic change management are crucial in the trigger and design phase, 
while process considerations dominate the implementation phase. However, all three groups 
of considerations are to some extent present in all three phases. 
 
 
 
Figure 3.11 Model of strategic change management 
3.4.2.1 Trigger phase 
The existence of a trigger phase implies that change agents constantly assess a number of 
factors and, based on their assessment, either engage in designing a new organizational 
template and implementing new design through a set of leadership interventions, or stay in the 
assessment loop without additional activities. The simple model of the trigger phase is 
presented in Figure 3.12. 
 
While this model is not new, it raises the issue of the criteria which change agents use to 
assess the need for and feasibility of change. Based on the literature review, and in particular 
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on the conclusion relating the literature review with the observations from Chapter 2, I have 
identified the following major factors influencing the assessment: 
1. Institutional pressures (chapter 3.1.7), in particular social issues and the question of 
the purpose of the firm (3.1, 3.3.3); industry practices and mimicking (3.1.8, 3.2.2, 
3.3.1); cultural pressures (3.3.5); 
2. Transparency of performance (3.1.5); 
3. Opportunistic behavior (3.1.5), although the research should show whether it led to a 
higher or lower rate of change attempts; 
4. Sufficiency of critical resources (3.1.6), in particular the role of trust-inspiring 
leadership (3.3.4, 3.3.5, 3.3.6, 3.3.7), as well as the unclear role of financial slack 
(3.1.6), the effect of which on a higher or lower rate of change attempts the research 
should indicate. 
 
  
 
Figure 3.12 Model of the trigger phase 
 
Staying in the trigger phase for a prolonged period of time despite a growing lack of fit 
between the context and the organizational template would, according to the literature, lead to 
degradation of performance and eventual demise (3.1.8, 3.2.2, 3.2.4). 
 
It is important to stress once again that the influence of the factors listed above is not and 
should not be based on their measurable, objective and true nature, but on the way they were 
perceived and interpreted by the top management group, who, based on the literature review, 
are identified as the most important stakeholders initiating the change process, since only they 
had the true power to perform the redesign of the organizational template (i.e. set of 
strategies, organizational structures and systems) necessary for the next phase of change. 
3.4.2.2 Design phase 
Once the top management sensed the trigger for change, it engaged in designing the 
organizational response to change. Based on the literature review I propose a model of the 
design phase, presented in Figure 3.13. 
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The literature implies that the new design the top management group was likely to consider as 
the result of their interpretation of the environment would depend on both the perceived 
feasibility of the reaction to change and the perceived time available before the change in the 
environment would bring the firm down (3.1.8, 3.2.2). If the urgency and feasibility perceived 
did not lead to a redesign of the organizational template, the change process would be stalled 
and the firm would stay in the trigger phase of the change (area “1” in Figure 3.13).  
 
The literature also suggests that in cases of great perceived urgency of change, defensive 
restructuring was the firm’s likely response (3.2.2, 3.2.3, area “2” in Figure 3.13). On the 
other hand, in cases of less perceived urgency and greater perceived feasibility of change the 
firm was likely to respond with strategic restructuring (3.2.2, area “3” in Figure 3.13).  
 
In case that the perceived urgency and feasibility of change would be sufficient to start the 
change, but not to invoke defensive or strategic restructuring, the firm’s likely response would 
be non-aligned changes (area “4” in Figure 3.13) 
 
The literature also indicates a likely sequence of events: since defensive restructuring would 
be unlikely to create sustainable competitive advantage, further strategic restructuring would 
be needed (path “A” in Figure 3.13) or else companies would find their change process stalled 
and would gradually return to the trigger phase (3.2.2, 3.1.1, paths “B” and “C” in Figure 
3.13).  
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.13 Model of the design phase 
 
The term “defensive restructuring” is used in the above model to mean the various forms of 
corporate response to performance decline [Sudarsanam and Lai 2001], aimed at stemming it 
[Arogyaswamy et al. 1995], which typically focus on short-term improvements of cash and 
cost position in order to cope with present or potential financial distress. The term “strategic 
restructuring” is used to denote recovery strategies aiming to position the firm to better 
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compete in its industry [Arogyaswamy et al. 1995], which typically focus on long-term 
competence improvement. The term “non-aligned change” is used to denote a set of changes 
which lack a clear common strategic goal. The fact that the concept of non-aligned changes is 
not directly matching restructuring models known from the literature should not be taken 
against it. While literature deals with well defined models of restructuring, it is logical to 
expect that some designs of the organizational templates are not internally consistent. Non-
aligned changes refer to those designs, which were deficient due to weak signals about the 
desired nature of change, and are built without a clear strategic pattern. 
 
The dotted lines in Fig. 3.13 denote the borders between individual areas. The interpretation 
of the conclusions from the literature suggests that the borders are not sharp, but rather 
roughly indicate the zone in which characteristics of change gradually transit from one mode 
of restructuring to another. 
 
The defensive and strategic restructuring referred to in Figure 3.13 should not be confused 
with the two phases of change in Croatia and Slovenia described in Chapter 2, since the latter 
describe events on the level of the national economy, while the former concepts apply at the 
company level. Nevertheless, they are closely connected, since most of the defensive 
restructuring took place during the first phase of change, and most of the strategic 
restructuring during the second phase. The trigger phase of the research model explains why 
some companies were late with defensive restructuring or passed directly to strategic 
restructuring, thus blurring the picture on the macro level. 
3.4.2.3 Design details and the implementation phase of defensive restructuring 
The literature predicts that defensive restructuring was one possible reaction to the change 
trigger. It is worth detailing its predictions concerning the nature of the reaction and in 
particular the characteristics of the firm’s resulting strategy; the key resources to be deployed 
in achieving the results of the change; and the process of change in terms of leadership 
intervention and barriers to change. 
 
One of the key predictions of the literature is the absence of vision and strategic intent in the 
defensive restructuring of firms in Croatia and Slovenia in the observed period (3.3.2, 3.3.3). 
While this statement has no value label attached to it – i.e. it does not imply that firms were 
more or less successful in handling the change process and achieving the goals associated 
with defensive restructuring – it has many important consequences, which will be discussed in 
Chapters 5 and 6.  
 
According to the literature review one would expect the key design elements of the new 
organizational templates involving defensive restructuring to be: 
1. Attempts at asset restructuring (3.3.7) (however, the literature assigns limited effects 
to asset restructuring in the context of defensive restructuring); 
2. A focus on cost reduction and in particular on workforce downsizing (3.1.8, 3.2.2, 
3.3.7); 
3. Centralization (3.3.4); 
4. A focus on local specifics rather than a global perspective (3.3.4). 
 
The literature review implies that the following resources were of major importance for 
defensive restructuring in the companies observed: 
1. Financial slack (3.1.6), as well as other possible extraordinary sources of economic 
rent such as monopolies (3.1.2) or institutional links (3.1.7); 
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2. Rational internal control systems allowing for transparency of performance (3.1.5); 
3. Optimal use of existing human talent, in particular scarce middle management (3.2.4); 
4. Trust in leaders (3.3.4, 3.3.5, 3.3.6, 3.3.7) and the belief that the firm can survive 
(3.3.7), which employees shared; 
5. Leadership (3.3.2) providing interventions as described below. 
 
According to the literature review, the main leadership interventions during defensive 
restructuring were:  
1. Top-down decision-making about new elements of organizational template (3.3.2, 
3.3.4) and aligned deployment of scarce resources (3.2.2); 
2. Communication with employees (3.3.7), primarily aimed at building trust (3.3.4, 3.3.5, 
3.3.6, 3.3.7) and hope (3.3.7), as well as managing fear (3.3.6); 
3. Balancing coercion (3.3.6) and communication to secure fast implementation. 
 
The literature review also implies that the change imposed by defensive restructuring faced 
some barriers, which are summarized in Table 3.4 (3.3.3). Comparing them with the factors 
affecting change during defensive restructuring, as described above, and after eliminating 
tautologies (e.g. lack of trust mentioned as a barrier to change and trust identified as a key 
resource), the literature predicts that strategic uncertainty, poor structures and skills, and fear 
(particularly of unemployment) would have been the main barriers to successful 
implementation of new organizational templates during defensive restructuring. 
 
Finally, closely related to the notion of resources, is another prediction from the literature: 
that the observed companies involved in defensive restructuring were suffering from poor 
organizational learning (3.3.1, 3.3.2, 3.3.4), which limited the development of new strategic 
resources. An important indirect consequence of this consideration is that the absence of 
learning and lack of vision constituted two major barriers to the transition to strategic 
restructuring once the immediate goals of defensive restructuring had been reached. 
3.4.2.4 Design details and the implementation phase of strategic restructuring 
The research model presented in Figure 3.13 proposes strategic restructuring as the alternative 
response to the change trigger. The literature review suggests a critical difference in the nature 
of strategic, as opposed to defensive restructuring. Strategic restructuring by its nature 
requires significant time for completion (3.2.2), which is why it was not a likely alternative in 
cases of perceived urgency of change. The literature also implies that strategic restructuring 
requires a high level of ambition and an articulated vision for the firm (3.3.2, 3.3.3). 
 
Based on the literature review I assume that the key design elements of the new organizational 
templates related to strategic restructuring were: 
1. Clear strategic positioning with regard to low cost or high value as the principle source 
of competitive advantage (3.1.8, 3.2.2, 3.3.7); 
2. Focus on business units, elements (activities) within the value chain and products 
aligned with the strategic position (3.3.7); 
3. Global perspective as a source of learning and, in particular, benchmarking and new 
design ideas (3.3.4). 
 
The literature review implies that all of the resources identified as important for defensive 
restructuring in the companies observed were of equal importance to the strategic 
restructuring, but three new major resources were added to the list: 
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1. Financial slack (3.1.6), and other possible extraordinary sources of economic rent such 
as monopolies (3.1.2) or institutional links (3.1.7); 
2. Rational internal control systems allowing for transparency of performance (3.1.5); 
3. Optimal use of existing human talent (3.2.4); 
4. Trust in leaders (3.3.4, 3.3.5, 3.3.6, 3.3.7) and the belief that the firm can significantly 
excel (3.3.7), which employees shared; 
5. Leadership (3.3.2) providing interventions as described below; 
6. Flexibility in reactions to change (e.g., rapid new product development) (3.2.3, 3.3.7); 
7. Stakeholder (in particular customer) intimacy (3.3.7); 
8. Time (3.2.2, 3.3.4). 
 
According to the literature review, the main leadership interventions during strategic 
restructuring were:  
1. Top-down decision-making on new elements of the organizational template (3.3.2) 
balanced with bottom-up change management (3.3.4); 
2. Communication with employees (3.3.7) primarily aimed at communicating the vision 
(3.3.4) and building trust (3.3.4, 3.3.5, 3.3.6, 3.3.7), as well as managing stress (3.3.6); 
3. Building participation (3.3.4) to secure fast implementation. 
 
Findings from the literature reveal a growing pluralism of interests (3.3.4) and change fatigue 
(3.3.6) as main barriers to successful implementation of new organizational templates during 
strategic restructuring, along with the remainder of the barriers mentioned in defensive 
restructuring. 
3.4.3 Detailed research questions 
While the main research question reflects the principle objective of the research as defined in 
Chapter 1, it clearly requires refinement in order to serve as the basis for field research. The 
most natural way to approach the detailed questions is to follow the structure of the research 
model and investigate how individual building blocks apply in the observed situation. 
 
Q1. Which factors influenced the perceived need to change? In particular, which factors 
influenced the perceived necessary time horizon for action? 
 
Q2. Which factors influenced the perceived feasibility of change? 
 
Q3. What was the pattern of response to the perceived time horizon for action and the 
perceived feasibility of change, if any? What was the sequence of responses? 
 
Q4. If defensive restructuring was one of the responses, what was its nature? What were the 
key elements of the new organizational template? What were the key resources needed? What 
were the main leadership interventions used during implementation, and the barriers to 
successful implementation of the new template? 
 
Q5. If strategic restructuring was one of the responses, what was its nature? What were the 
key elements of the new organizational template? What were the key resources needed? What 
were the main leadership interventions used during implementation, and the barriers to 
successful implementation of the new template? 
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4. Research methodology 
Two phases were instrumental in preparing the field study: the choice of research strategy, 
and the definition of field study protocol. Both are presented in detail, together with some 
considerations as to the limitations of the approach taken. The methodology used to calculate 
the point values in “perceived urgency of change – perceived feasibility of change” diagrams 
is presented in the final part of the chapter. 
4.1 Research strategy 
An appropriate research strategy had to be chosen to find answers to the research questions 
defined at the end of Chapter 3. The subsequent research had to match the nature of the very 
clear research questions, i. e. they had to have a sharply defined focus, and also provide for 
validation of results [Yin 1989].  
4.1.1 Choice of research methodology 
Although the research questions focus on “what”, they also inherently raise the issues of “why 
and how”. The research study had to be designed to answer those questions and verify the 
new research model based on the literature review. However, along with the goal of 
verification, the study had to be of an exploratory nature, since the model is a new construct 
and allows for refinement and extensions. 
 
The focus of the research had to be defined both in terms of time dimension and the subject of 
study. While the research questions as such do not specify the time period, the objectives 
stated in Chapter 1 clearly define the period from 1991 to 2003 as the period of observation. 
The initial choice to focus on companies from Croatia and Slovenia not only defines the 
geography, but also influences another choice of focus: given the fact that even the largest 
companies which were possible research targets had fairly simple, flat structures, focus was 
aimed at the corporate level even for companies with business units. It should be noted, 
however, that such a choice does not omit observations made at lower levels of the hierarchy 
(or structure), but merely defines the top level as equivalent to the management board of the 
corporation. 
 
The research model is built around the notion of interdependence of change context, content 
and process. More specifically, it looks at the organizational template (the set of factors 
including strategy, organizational design, organizational systems and various resources) as the 
content of the change, while leadership interventions (including use of organizational 
systems) mark the process of change. From the nature of the research questions it emerges 
that the observations had to focus on various elements of corporate life, such as events, 
resources, intended and declared strategies, and realized ones, or the observable behavior of 
people. However, observations also had to provide evidence concerning less tangible 
phenomena, such as management assessment of certain situations. Therefore, to yield enough 
information for subsequent analysis, the research methodology had to facilitate the making of 
both categories of observations from a historical perspective. 
 
The case method was chosen as the most appropriate research method for this particular 
situation. There are several reasons for this. A qualitative, rather than a quantitative approach 
was taken, both because of the nature of the questions requiring in-depth observations and 
interpretation, and because of the relatively small sample of companies available for the 
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study. Previous discussions of qualitative research methodology reveal cases as adequate tool 
for research both into topics involving the resource-based view as the starting paradigm for 
analyzing strategy contents, and into topics surrounding organizational behavior and change 
management processes, which come close to traditions of research in the social sciences [Yin 
1989, Zahra and Pearce 1990, Rouse and Daellenbach 1999, Denzin and Lincoln 2000].  
 
The case method as it was incorporated in this research also allowed for the combining of low 
and high intrusion research methodology. Each has its advantages: high intrusion is necessary 
for a more in-depth understanding of the observed phenomena [Schein 1985], but it influences 
the behavior of the subjects under its scrutiny. This can happen both during the course of 
events under observation (e.g. when the researcher acts as consultant to the management 
group being observed), or during the process of reconstruction of events after time has elapsed 
(e.g. when the researcher conducts an interview and asks questions about a particular event). 
Constructing a case study can to a significant extent validate the data through the use of 
triangulation [Stake 2000].  
 
While case studies were the chosen format for presentation of the research material and 
findings in this study, material was collected according to seven different methodologies, as 
described in the research protocol. Once collected, it was checked for consistency, and 
subjective claims not confirmed by at least two methodologies (not just more sources within 
the same methodology) were rejected. This rendered the remaining subjective claims much 
more robust and suitable for analysis along with the factual data.  
 
In the course of this research, case studies have been used in such a way as to combine fact-
based storytelling (the objective approach) with explicit reflections on learning from these 
stories (the assertive approach). This combination of approaches leads to the building up of 
knowledge from the case studies which is in turn used to confirm or reject various elements of 
the research model as well as to add new elements to it. 
4.1.2 Selection of case studies 
Given the exploratory nature and multiple focus of the study, the choice of multiple 
instrumental case studies appears logical [Herriot and Firestone 1983, Yin 1989, Stake 2000]. 
There is an important question here, however: that of which companies to select. Eisenhardt 
[1989a] proposes that the choice can be justified by statistical or theoretical arguments, but 
that random statistical sampling may not be the best approach for cases which aim at theory-
building. Because of the small sample of potential targets and the decision to use a small 
number of in-depth studies, as well as the novelty of the constructed theoretical model, 
theoretical arguments take precedence over statistical in this field study. Therefore criteria had 
to be defined which would provide the best match between the cases selected and their 
intended tasks. 
 
The first criterion to be used to achieve the desired level of depth of observation and 
subsequent analysis is accessibility. Not only should the companies in question agree to 
participate in the study, but also material, collected by different methods, should be available. 
In particular, the researcher should be truly familiar with the company in order to be able to 
interpret the observations made, and he/she should have direct access to all hierarchical levels 
in the company, including the top management and the supervisory board. 
 
The second criterion is the opportunity to learn. All the companies selected should reflect for 
observation as many different phenomena related to the research model as possible. 
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Furthermore, they should present the potential for exploration of causal links as well as 
complexities related to multiple phenomena. This also means that companies undergoing only 
one or two change cycles during the entire time period, and experiencing events which have 
simple causes (e.g., a permanent no-change situation due to extremely poor leadership and the 
influence of one powerful stakeholder) would be less preferred targets than companies with 
richer stories to tell, from which more insights may be gleaned. 
 
The third criterion is that of representation. Selected case studies should have a generalization 
potential, facilitating conclusions that fulfill the research objective not only by validating the 
research model, but which are also useful for practicing managers. They should represent a 
deliberately selected spectrum of variations (e.g. in industry setting, company performance 
etc.), which can be narrow in some dimensions and wide in others. In this particular study it 
was decided to apply the following requirements in this context: research should focus on 
companies regional in their sales, large by local standards but not on the same order of size as 
the leading international companies in their industries, and from various manufacturing 
industries (with both consumer and industrial market-oriented companies represented).  
 
Given the narrow choice, it was also attempted to provide cases with at least some polarity of 
performance. A comment is needed, however, on the use of polar examples (i.e. pairs of 
companies which share all the structural attributes of industry, size, markets etc. but differ one 
from another significantly in terms of performance). This has become a highly popular 
approach in studies using multiple case studies, since, if properly applied, it may lead to a 
theory involving the factors which influence difference in performance [Kotter and Heskett 
1992, Collins and Porras 1996]. While the strict use of polar pairs was considered in the initial 
design phase of this research, it was dropped for two main reasons. First of all, the companies 
in the region that were truly negative performers in the early stage of change went bankrupt 
within a fairly short period. They represent an almost trivial illustration of a limited number of 
factors which negatively influenced the outcome of change, and thus offer fairly limited 
learning potential – plus very low accessibility, since most of their records, except for media 
sources, were subsequently lost. Even tracing witnesses would require huge efforts with 
potentially limited outcomes, since there would be almost no way to validate their statements.  
 
For those companies which survived, it was difficult to make a clear-cut division into high 
performance versus low performance cases. On the one hand, in some periods of observation 
key stakeholders did not necessarily define performance criteria according to traditional 
measures of financial performance, and thus it seemed unreasonable to compare companies by 
financial performance criteria alone. Furthermore, in some periods the financial reporting of 
some companies was so inaccurate that accessible data cannot be used as a reliable basis for 
comparison. On the other hand, almost all the companies within the broader target group 
showed significant oscillations in performance throughout the period of observation. Since no 
point of stability has so far been reached, fixing any time mark for performance comparison 
may cause significant aberrations in conclusions given the difference in change cycles among 
the companies in the sample. 
 
On closer examination one can see clearly that the above criteria are not fully independent of 
one another. Low accessibility has a high likelihood of reducing opportunities to learn, and 
the same is true for low representation. However, the opportunity to learn is not a direct 
consequence of the other two criteria and was for that reason introduced as a separate one. 
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On the basis of the above criteria, twelve companies were selected from a group of about forty 
which had been identified through initial screening as the broader research target group. 
Letters were written to the CEOs of each of the twelve companies describing the study and 
asking for the company’s participation. Follow-up conversations provided further clarification 
and were used to solicit cooperation more actively. One out of the twelve companies refused 
to participate, while another two effectively eliminated themselves by not creating the 
expected level of accessibility. Of the remaining nine companies, two were eliminated after a 
detailed review of the collected material, based on the second criterion. The remaining seven 
companies fulfilled all three main criteria, and case studies were developed describing each of 
them. 
4.2 Field study protocol 
The field study is based on seven principle methods of data acquisition. Two of these are 
based on publicly-available documents: annual reports and other company documents in the 
public domain such as web pages, and newspaper articles (three main collections were used: 
Delo and Gospodarski Vestnik in Slovenia, and Vjesnik in Croatia).  
 
The next two major sources of data came from two different types of consulting activities. 
The first comprised reports on study projects prepared within the framework of various IEDC 
– Bled School of Management courses, in particular the Presidents’ MBA Program, the 
Executive MBA Program and the General Management Program. While project methodology 
differed in its details from one program to another, all shared several conceptual similarities. 
All were prepared by the program participants, and all of the participants were managers with 
7 to 15 years of business experience on average (depending on the program). All the projects 
were prepared under the supervision of IEDC – Bled School of Management senior faculty, 
who worked closely with the researcher. They all followed a sequence of first preparing an 
industry analysis, then a company analysis, while the last part of the project was dedicated to 
analyzing and proposing a solution (including implementation details, qualifying them for the 
category of consulting projects) to a strategic issue facing the company. All the projects were 
presented to the company’s senior management. Out of more than 500 projects prepared in the 
school in the period of the research focus, more than 70 were prepared for the companies 
selected for the study. At least three projects were prepared for each company, with a 
maximum of more than 20 prepared for one company. 
 
The other type of consulting activity comprised personal consulting assignments on the part of 
the researcher, typically in the capacity of personal advisor to a CEO, or in some cases to the 
Supervisory or Management Board or one of their members. The type and timing of 
assignments differed, but again all seven companies were covered. These activities were not 
aimed at generating data for the research, but observations arising from them were extremely 
useful for the field study. 
 
The fifth source of data was the set of teaching cases written at the IEDC – Bled School of 
Management under the supervision of the researcher. A final text with enclosures as well as 
all the materials collected in case preparation were available. 
 
The sixth and the most important source of data was a set of structured interviews carried out 
by the researcher and three research assistants. All interviews consisted of a standard group of 
questions, which closely followed the research questions with minor changes in formulation 
for better clarity. Additional questions were prepared for each interview based on the analysis 
of the previously-collected data and an understanding of the specific situation. These 
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questions were typically aimed at obtaining detailed anecdotes about specific events, detailed 
accounts of the reasoning behind certain decisions, etc. Six to twelve interviews were made 
per company, depending on its size. The total number of interviews was 62. All or at least the 
majority of management board members as well as several representatives from the middle 
management were interviewed in all companies, while in some cases members of the 
Supervisory Board, front-line employees and ex-employees were also interviewed. Use of 
multiple interviewers allowed for creativity and enhanced confidence in converging 
observations. 
 
Finally, the seventh source of data was the feedback received from a number of senior 
managers, who read the draft case studies and provided ample comments. This in turn 
improved the reliability of the research findings. In particular, the following individuals 
helped with a review of the text of the research cases: Gorenje: Mr. Franjo Bobinac, President 
of the Management Board and Mr. Primož Sovi, Director of Logistics; Kolinska: Mr. Miro 
Hrovat, Management Board Member and Mr. Iztok Bricl, Management Board Member; 
Konar: Mr. Darinko Bago, President of the Management Board and Mr. Vlado Pleko, 
Management Board Member; Lek: Mr. Marko Podbevšek, Management Board Member; 
Ljubljanske mlekarne: Mr. Matjaž Vehovec, President of the Management Board and Ms. 
Jana Leni, Executive Director for Strategic Business and Processes; Lura: Ms. Nina Anal, 
Management Board Member; Podravka: Mr. Darko Marinac, President of the Management 
Board and Mr. Damir Polanec, Management Board Member. 
 
It is worth noting that both qualitative and quantitative data were collected. Thus, although the 
study has the attributes of qualitative research, on the data level quantitative data was used to 
validate some qualitative statements, as suggested by Eisenhardt [1989a]. 
 
Another interesting methodological point is the use of the “devil’s advocate”, an independent 
expert with significant experience in the transformation processes in and outside of the region, 
who was asked to go through the preliminary findings and raise issues which he found 
questionable. 
 
The study was conducted according to the following research protocol: 
1. Collection and screening of data from public sources; 
2. Collection and screening of data from consulting reports; 
3. Collection and screening of data from teaching cases; 
4. Preparation of the customized part of the interviews based on prescreened data; 
5. Structured (standard and customized) interviews; 
6. Analysis of findings from the interviews; 
7. Report on findings and conclusions from individual interviews; 
8. Preparation of individual cases; 
9. Cross-analysis of the cases and preparation of draft conclusions; 
10. Presentation of the preliminary findings to the “devil’s advocate” 
11. Presentation of individual cases to the related companies;  
12. Finalization of the cases based on feedback from the companies; 
13. Finalization of the conclusions. 
 
According to Yin [1989], four tests should be applied to a case-based research design to check 
design quality: construct validity, internal validity, external validity and reliability. The 
construct validity check verifies whether the elements of the research model and their mutual 
links have been studied in a correct way and whether their presence has been appropriately 
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measured. The internal validity check looks at the way the conclusions have been derived 
from the observations, and confirms causal relationships. The external validity check is 
concerned with the generalization potential of the results and the appropriateness of research 
conclusions in that respect. Finally, the reliability check verifies that the research results are 
not of an accidental, singular nature, but can be reached again were the study repeated under 
the same circumstances. 
 
Table 4.1 shows the application of the research design quality tests described above to the 
study. It proposes that the chosen research strategy and the research protocol developed 
satisfy the test criteria proposed by Yin [1989]. Although not all of the tactics proposed by 
Yin were used, each of the tests was supported by appropriate research design. 
 
Test Research design choices 
Construct validity • Use of multiple sources of observation 
•  Rich case descriptions organized along 
research lines 
•  Review of findings by the case companies 
Internal validity  • Use of strict / elaborate research protocol 
• Use of four researchers and “devil’s 
advocate”  
• Rich case descriptions organized along 
research lines and supplemented with 
explanation-building 
• Extensive cross-case analysis with pattern-
matching 
External validity • Broad research focus 
• Choice of case studies 
• Use of same protocol for all case studies 
Reliability • Use of strict / elaborate research protocol 
 
Table 4.1 Research design quality tests 
4.3 Calculation of point values for perceived urgency – perceived feasibility diagrams 
One specific methodological problem was the calculation of the pair values associated with 
perceived urgency and perceived feasibility, which, according to the research model, defined 
the character of the design outcome. 
 
First of all, while the observations clearly identified individual factors, they were not 
associated with exact measurements of factor intensity. Therefore, the point values in the 
diagrams were calculated on the basis of relatively rough, rather than exact, estimates. The 
estimates were constructed as follows: each factor identified in Tables 4.2 and 4.3 was, based 
on the interviews and the researcher’s estimate119, assigned a weight of between -3 to +4 (-3 
corresponding to a strong negative influence on perceived urgency or feasibility; +4 
                                                 
119
 The estimate was determined in a fairly simple, straightforward manner: on the one hand, during the 
interviews managers were asked not only to list factors influencing their decisions, but also to rank them. Also, 
the detailed descriptions of the decision-making process indirectly implied which factors were seen as 
particularly important. Since the researchers noted that factors, when present (!), tended to be ranked similarly by 
all the companies, value was assigned in accordance to the estimated level of importance. 
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corresponding to strong positive influence). Weights for contributing factors identified as 
present in the change cycles were assigned for that cycle. Where a factor was only partially 
identified, the associated weight was decreased appropriately. Results varied from -7 to +12.5 
for perceived urgency, and from -8 to +6.5 for perceived feasibility. Negative and positive 
values were grouped into zones (Table 4.4), which were then placed along the axes in the 
diagram (e.g. values of perceived urgency from -7 to -5.5 were placed in the bottom zone of 
the diagram, values from -5.4 to -4 were placed in the next, etc.) An example of the 
calculation is presented in Table 4.4, and a diagram is seen in Fig. 4.1. 
 
Group of factors Individual factor Weight 
Issues related to 
institutional 
pressures 
1. “Must look good” leads to denial and decreased perceived 
urgency of change 
2. Pressures to keep employment up lead to decreased 
perceived urgency of change 
3. Pluralism of interests leads to decreased perceived 
urgency of change  
4. Old ways of doing business are seen as effective, thus 
decreasing perceived urgency of change 
5. Old ways of doing business are seen as ineffective, thus 
increasing perceived urgency of change 
6. Readiness to mimic successful restructuring practices 
increases perceived urgency of change 
7. Privatization leads to decreased perceived urgency of  
change 
8. Owners are happy with status quo, decreased perceived 
urgency of change 
9. Owners are not happy with status quo (including takeover 
threat), increased perceived urgency of change 
-1 
 
-2 
 
-0.5 
 
-2 
 
+2 
 
+1 
 
-1 
 
-2 
 
+2 
 
Financial issues 
including 
transparency of 
performance 
10. Lack of performance clarity and lack of indication of 
future financial difficulties decreased perceived urgency 
of change 
11. Performance clarity and indication of future financial 
difficulties increased perceived urgency of change 
12. Financial crisis created high perceived urgency of change 
13. Financial underperformance detected by top management 
increased perceived urgency of change 
14. Financial slack decreased perceived urgency of change 
-1.5 
 
 
+2.5 
 
+4 
+2 
 
-1 
Issues related to 
opportunities and 
growth 
15. Opportunistic behavior decreases focus and perceived 
urgency of change 
16. Opportunistic acquisitions, alliances or strategic partners 
are used as “silver bullets” and decrease perceived 
urgency of change 
17. Growth is seen as a matter of survival, which increases 
perceived urgency of change 
18. Growth is seen as requiring substantial changes and 
appropriate time, which increases perceived urgency of 
change 
-0.5 
 
-1 
 
 
+2 
 
+2 
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Group of factors Individual factor Weight 
Issues related to 
leadership 
19. Top team wants stability or avoids change, thus 
decreasing perceived urgency of change 
20. Change at the top increased perceived urgency of change 
21. Ineffective leadership in previous period increased 
perceived urgency of change 
22. Top team wants to prove itself, thus increasing perceived 
urgency of change 
-1.5 
 
+1.5 
+1 
 
+1 
 
Table 4.2 Factors influencing the assessment of change urgency and associated weights 
 
Group of factors Individual factor Weight 
Issues related to 
institutional 
pressures 
23. Estimate of not being able to handle stakeholders in 
expected delicate situation decreased perceived feasibility 
of change 
24. Estimate of being able to handle stakeholders in expected 
delicate situation increased perceived feasibility of change 
-2 
 
 
+1 
Issues related to 
industry and 
market dynamics 
25. Estimate of industry and market dynamics as not favorable 
decreased perceived feasibility of change 
26. Estimate of industry and market dynamics as favorable 
increased perceived feasibility of change 
-2 
 
+1 
Issues related to 
resources 
(competence) 
availability 
27. Estimate of insufficient financial resources decreased 
perceived feasibility of change 
28. Estimate of sufficient financial resources increased 
perceived feasibility of change 
29. Estimate of poor current level of competitiveness and 
competences as well as no differentiating resources 
decreased perceived feasibility of change 
30. Estimate of having some competence and differentiating 
resources increased perceived feasibility of change 
31. Estimate that the needed competence and complementary 
resources could be obtained through strategic partner 
increased perceived feasibility of change 
-3 
 
+1 
 
-3 
 
 
+1.5 
 
+1 
Issues related to 
leadership 
32. Estimate of cooperative employees increased perceived 
feasibility of change 
33. Estimate of non-cooperative employees decreased 
perceived feasibility of change 
34. Estimate of strong and trusted leadership increased 
perceived feasibility of change 
+1 
 
-2 
 
+2 
 
Table 4.3 Factors influencing the assessment of change feasibility and associated weights 
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Urgency Feasibility 
Value Zone Value Zone 
> 8.5 +4 > 5.5 +4 
6 to 8.5 +3 3.6 to 5.5 +3 
3 to 5.9 +2 1.6 to 3.5 +2 
0 to 2.9 +1 0 to 1.5 +1 
-1.9 to -0.1 -1 -1.9 to -0.1 -1 
-3.9 to -2.0 -2 -3.9 to -2.0 -2 
-5.5 to -4.0 -3 -6.0 to -4.0 -3 
< -5.5 -4 < -6.0 -4 
 
Table 4.4 Translation of point values into diagram zones 
 
Cycle Urgency 
factors 
Weights Total 
urgency / 
zone 
Feasibility 
factors 
Weights Total 
feasibility / 
zone 
4.1 1, 11, 13, 14 -1+2.5+2-1 +2.5 / +1 25, 27 
(part.), 34  
-2-1+2 -1 / -1 
4.2 5, 7, 18 +2-1+2 +3 / +2 26, 28, 30, 
34 
+1+1+1.5+2 +5.5 / 3 
4.3 3, 4, 19, 
20(part.) 
-0.5-2-
1.5+0.5 
-3.5 / -2 23, 25, 28, 
29  
-2-2+1-3 -6 / -3 
4.4 5, 17, 20, 21 +2+2+1.5+1 +6.5 / +3 24, 26, 28, 
30, 34 
+1+1+1+1.5+2 +6.5 / +4 
 
Table 4.5 Example of calculation for Lek change cycles 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.1 Diagram with design outcomes for Lek 
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5. Strategic Change Management: the cases of seven Croatian and 
Slovenian companies 
 
This chapter presents seven Croatian and Slovenian company cases. All (with the exception of 
Lura, which was formed in 1991) begin with a brief history of the company prior to 1991. 
This is followed by a presentation of company developments in the period from 1991 to 2003, 
organized under headings which indicate in chronological order the change cycles observed. 
Each case concludes with a discussion of the research findings, organized around the elements 
of the research model. Since a detailed cross-case analysis is performed in Chapter 6, the 
discussion of research findings in this chapter focuses on identifying the concrete 
manifestations of phenomena predicted by the research model. 
5.1 Gorenje 
Gorenje is one of Slovenia’s largest companies, with 520 million € of sales and 6,700 
employees in 2002. Its main line of business is major household appliances (refrigerators, 
washing machines and cooking ranges). At the end of 2002 Gorenje ranked as number eight 
among producers of household appliances in Europe. 
5.1.1 Brief overview of company history prior to 1991 
Gorenje was established in 1950, when a group of craftsmen decided to start a workshop 
producing agricultural equipment. Like all companies in former Yugoslavia at that time, 
Gorenje was not private but was collectively-owned and governed by its employees. The 
company enjoyed early success and rapid growth. Within the first decade of its existence it 
began producing solid-fuel cookers and then moved production to a new factory in the nearby 
industrial town of Velenje, famous for its coal mining tradition. 
 
In the early 1960s production was expanded to include washing machines and refrigerators, 
and the first appliances were exported to Germany as early as 1961. Under ambitious 
leadership and with strong local political support, Gorenje continued its fast expansion under 
the motto ‘Everything for the Home’. Diverse business areas such as small household 
appliances, kitchen furniture, ceramic tiles, medical equipment, consumer electronics and 
telecommunications were gradually added to the portfolio and in the 1970s the company had 
20,000 employees.  
 
The company was well-positioned to reap the benefits of the political and economic situation 
in former Yugoslavia. Its domestic markets were practically closed to foreign competition, 
allowing the company to achieve more than comfortable margins. Slovenian products had a 
high reputation in other parts of Yugoslavia, and the company had no problems extending its 
strong brand name to several different product lines. At the same time, it was easy and 
relatively inexpensive to develop its own distribution and service network in all major cities 
throughout the country, thereby maximizing the potential of the broad product range.  
 
While developing its highly diversified portfolio for the local market, Gorenje used the extra 
profits it then generated, as well as state-subsidized loans, to continue its early orientation 
towards exports. Significant investment in the distribution network and brand support in 
Western Europe began to produce results in the 1970s, when exports rose to one-third of total 
revenues and the steep rise in production levels also generated the first effects of economies 
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of scale. This trend was also supported by some clever bartering arrangements with the Soviet 
Union, where Gorenje’s cheapest cookers became the product of choice for state building 
companies furnishing new houses in Siberia. 
 
In 1978 Gorenje decided to buy Körting, a failing Bavarian consumer electronics company. 
While the decision was based on the argument of the increasing importance of electronic 
components in household appliances, it in fact led to Gorenje’s brief excursion into 
entertainment electronics. A lack of international management experience, the inability to 
quickly adapt Körting to Gorenje’s own strategic requirements in household appliances, and a 
reluctance to recognize the need for significant restructuring of Körting’s poorly qualified 
workforce resulted in piling up of losses and Körting’s ultimate sale in 1983. 
 
This failed acquisition drained the company’s financial resources and forced Gorenje’s 
charismatic General Manager Ivan Atelšek, who had led the company for 28 years, to resign. 
On the more positive side, the crisis prompted a re-examination of the company’s 
geographical expansion and diversification strategy. With the help of a major international 
consulting company, Gorenje succeeded in cutting its costs considerably while improving its 
product and service performance. In 1984 alone, the company managed to improve 
productivity by 30%, and towards the end of the decade it expanded the share of its export 
business to 50%. Yet, due to constant deficits in the Yugoslav trade balance and the high price 
of hard currency on the grey financial markets, even the losses made from exports could 
easily be compensated for by the high domestic margins and profits on sales for hard 
currency, thereby reducing pressure towards further productivity improvement.  
 
The new General Manager of Gorenje, Herman Rigelnik, did not significantly change the 
strategy set by Atelšek. He continued to depend on a balance between sales of major 
household appliances in West European markets primarily based on a low-cost position, and 
on sales of a wide assortment of Gorenje goods in the domestic market of former Yugoslavia 
and in East European markets. 
 
In the late 1980s Gorenje was approached by General Electric, and its management 
considered the possibility of selling the company to GE. Initial negotiations led to a due 
diligence process, which GE completed just before the collapse of former Yugoslavia in 1991. 
Anticipating the new market situation, GE offered an extremely low price for the company, 
which led the Gorenje management (in agreement with the Slovenian government) to break 
off negotiations. 
 
Political tensions within former Yugoslavia mounted towards the end of the 1980s, when it 
became obvious to Gorenje’s management that the federal state’s disintegration was 
imminent. Before the war erupted, Gorenje changed the status of its offices in the capitals of 
other republics of former Yugoslavia to that of wholly-owned subsidiaries. It also put a lid on 
stock limits to avoid confiscation of large amounts of stock, and pushed for advance payments 
to avoid problems in collecting receivables.  
 
Asked which legacies from its first forty years of development had the most important 
influence on the way Gorenje changed in the 1990s, the management indicated the following 
six: 
• A strong position in the domestic market, together with the strong support the 
company enjoyed within Slovenian political arena; 
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• Various (on average positive) experiences with diversification, as well as a fairly 
broad conglomerate of product lines in 1990; 
• A strong international presence with a well-established distribution network in 
Western Europe; 
• The company’s negotiations with GE, which allowed the company to learn about 
industry best practices; 
• Excellent labor relations, firm loyalty of employees and strong ties with the local 
community; 
• The long tenures of two strong leaders (Atelšek and Rigelnik). 
 
5.1.2 Changes in the period from 1991 to 1994 
Apart from changes in organizational and trading policies in “risky” parts of former 
Yugoslavia and the appointment of several new young managers, Gorenje made no visible 
changes on either the strategic or tactical level in anticipation of coming changes in the 
environment. According to the company records there were several reasons for this. On the 
one hand, the company did not prepare precise financial simulations of future scenarios. A 
significant part of the management simply refused to believe that the changes would have a 
dramatic impact on Gorenje, and had never engaged in systematic thinking about the future. 
The period prior to 1991 had been plagued by huge accounting problems due to non-
transparent accounting practices and intervals of high inflation. Thus it was difficult to 
estimate the effects of different changes on the overall Group position and on the position of 
individual companies, this in turn rendering it hard for the management to estimate the scope 
of the potential financial crisis. In the absence of a hard financial argument, the management 
was reluctant to start downsizing because of the dire political consequences this would have 
for relationships with the national political elite, the local community and the labor force, and 
for the image of top managers and the company. Given the mature nature of the industry, no 
other strategy apart from downsizing was considered in the search for necessary short term 
results. 
 
The crisis hit hard in 1991, when Gorenje lost 40% of its (most profitable) revenues due to the 
collapse of Yugoslavia. The remaining Slovenian market accounted for just 5% of the 
production of household appliances. The core business was bleeding under the pressure of a 
poor cost position and a significant drop in volume, but at least it was generating some 
revenue. The majority of exports were going to Western Europe, where product positioning 
was poor, but demand was stable. Most other businesses within the Group were practically 
bankrupt, and there was little hope that they could survive the loss of the Yugoslav markets, 
since the products they were carrying were seen as uncompetitive in Western Europe, or as 
requiring different distribution channels from those of Gorenje.  
 
As the result of the crisis, the Gorenje Group followed a strategy previously implemented by 
another leading Slovenian company, the Iskra Group (electronics industry). The latter’s 
management had found legally-acceptable ways to cut the ties among the companies 
belonging to the Group, and in practical terms dissolved it, leaving individual companies to 
find their way out of the problems but ensuring that one major failure would not sink all the 
companies within the Group. Gorenje GA, the household appliance division of Gorenje, was a 
strong proponent of such a solution. Jože Stani, who became the General Manager of 
Gorenje GA in the early days of crisis, believed that becoming independent was the only way 
to secure the necessary discipline, flexibility and speed of reaction. Seeing his company 
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totally cash-starved, he could not afford to waste money on non-related businesses that were 
in an even worse position. He was supported by colleagues from a number of smaller 
divisions, some of whom expected to benefit from the coming privatization of their 
companies. Without other viable solutions, Rigelnik bowed to pressure and left Gorenje, 
opening the way for the changes. 
 
The first reactions of Gorenje GA focused on retaining the liquidity necessary for normal 
operations. The company entered negotiations with its suppliers, trying to maintain its cost 
position while improving payment conditions. It also put pressure on the distribution network 
to increase volumes and margins in Western markets. However, it became evident that the 
volume goal was easier to reach than the margin goal, for which the company lacked up-to-
date products. At the same time, poor operational results made it impossible to finance the 
R&D efforts and production modernization required to produce new products. Stani and his 
team resolved the impasse with two simultaneous actions.  
 
First, they secured employee support for an austerity program. Given full information about 
the situation the company was in and the need for employee support to secure its survival, the 
employees agreed to significant pay concessions which in practice brought wages below the 
minimum level accepted in national union negotiations. In return, the employees received 
certificates guaranteeing them a certain percentage of stock after the company was privatized. 
Although the risk for the employees was substantial, since in the event of bankruptcy they 
would be left with no valid claims towards the company, they unanimously accepted the deal. 
This significantly reduced costs and allowed the company to meet its financial obligations 
more easily. It also allowed the management to avoid a drastic reduction in the headcount, 
thus scoring important points with the political establishment and the local community. With 
that concession in his pocket Stani turned to the banks, which were fully under government 
control. Despite considerable weaknesses of financial performance which would in normal 
circumstances have made Gorenje GA’s request unacceptable, by using his political influence 
Stani secured a major financing package from the largest Slovenian bank, allowing the 
company to secure liquidity and go for rapid product modernization.  
 
The company’s main objective in the whole period from 1991 to 1994 was to consolidate and 
restore profitability, Stani and his team pointed out several resources which were critical to 
that process. As mentioned previously, one was the financial “infusion”, which allowed the 
company to restore liquidity and normal cost structures, as well as providing the starting funds 
for a new cycle of product development and production improvements (after arranging the 
financial package the company was almost solely dependant on internal financing). In this 
context, one of the first investments the company made in the early 1990s was in a financial 
and management accounting and control infrastructure, which allowed the management not 
only to better plan and supervise cash flow but also to make more accurate judgments 
concerning the product portfolio and necessary cost improvements. 
 
Despite the fact that all the principle decisions made in the consolidation period came from 
the top, the top management was ready to recognize the importance of the soft side of the 
company and devoted a significant portion of their efforts to strengthening it. All internal and 
external sources termed the loyalty of Gorenje’s employees, their trust in Stani and his team, 
and their commitment to the company as “fanatic”. Up to 1994 Gorenje’s management did not 
clearly communicate to the employees its developmental vision, but reinforced employee 
loyalty through the ownership certificate program and the intense communication associated 
with it. Trust was clearly reinforced by the mere fact that the company avoided lay-offs 
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despite the obvious problems it had. The management used every opportunity to send dual 
messages to the employees, one lauding recent achievements confirming company viability, 
another warning of the continuing threat. 
 
As a result of trust, but also as a result of the extremely limited job opportunities within the 
region, Gorenje managed to retain practically all of its technical talent during the first change 
cycle. Although overall technological competence was not at the level of the best in the 
industry, it allowed the company to significantly improve product quality while at the same 
time decreasing costs. Stani made it clear that he would not tolerate sloppiness and low 
quality, and personally became the champion of quality-related activities in the company. 
 
The top management identified virtually no external barriers (apart from the standard highly-
competitive environment which characterizes the household appliances industry) and only a 
few internal barriers to implementation of the consolidation strategy. Barriers were to some 
degree found in the scarcity of financial resources, but even more so in inherited internal 
inefficiencies, lack of some skills (in both production and sales and marketing), and in 
inappropriate attitudes (especially in quality and production discipline, and in initiative-taking 
at the middle management level). 
5.1.3 Changes in the period from 1994 to 1996 
At the beginning of 1994 the company’s financial crisis became significantly less acute. Not 
only had operational liquidity been more or less restored through austerity measures and 
significant pressure on the sales network in Western Europe, but the company had secured a 
financial package allowing it to consider its first major investments since 1991. The 
management also had before them clearer indications based on data from the new 
management accounting system, which pointed out that further cost improvements were 
needed, as well as price increases, since margins were still very low. 
 
Since the company had managed throughout the crisis to retain all of its technical talent, once 
the financial resources were available it proceeded swiftly with the necessary technical and 
technological activities. As a result, in 1995 Gorenje GA introduced its Freon-free 
refrigerators at a price considerably above that of the previous product line. In parallel, the 
company also implemented a major re-engineering project with one of the leading global 
consulting companies, further reducing costs. 
 
The major strategic project completed by the management in this period was the privatization 
of Gorenje GA. According to Slovenian privatization law employees could use their 
privatization vouchers as well as their wage compensation certificates to buy stock. However, 
due to the company’s size it was clear that this would amount to only a small percentage of 
the overall company value, which had been determined in negotiations between the company 
and the state Privatization Agency. The management avoided controversy, and readily agreed 
to the high initial book value of the company proposed by the Privatization Agency (most 
experts shared the view of the management that this initial value was overstated by at least 
30%). They also accepted two state-owned funds as the most important owners, with the 
remainder of shares distributed among a large number of shareholders. When privatization 
was concluded Gorenje GA changed its name to Gorenje. 
 
Later developments confirmed that most of the small shareholders were ready to place their 
full trust in Stani and his team: in all shareholder assemblies proxies controlled by the 
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management were the second voting block, almost equal in size to that of the government 
representatives. This shareholder structure has not changed significantly since privatization. 
 
Gorenje’s experience in West European markets and in particular its distribution network 
were seen as vital. Without significant investment in brand support it was able to increase 
volumes above industry growth rates throughout the period of consolidation and, seen as 
equally important, maintain an overall 70:30 ratio between its own brands and private labels. 
 
Gorenje’s technological competence was further developed, allowing the firm to keep 
improving production processes and product quality while decreasing unit costs, as well as 
generating a continuous stream of product alterations and new product developments. To 
facilitate these developments Gorenje encouraged its employees to participate in external 
professional activities; engaged in external benchmarking; and used top-class consultants to 
pinpoint opportunities for improvement and strengthen the ability to utilize them. Consultants 
focused in particular on process analysis, benchmarked cost structure, productivity and 
process flow with world-class competitors. All of this obviously required high-quality 
technical talent, but also high overall workforce quality and the appropriate company culture.  
 
In 1994 the management began to extend the scope and focus of communication from general 
statements about the future which the austerity measures would secure, to concrete elements 
of the business strategy required along with cost-cutting. 
 
After 1994 principle decisions were never formally announced before obtaining feedback 
from some 50 key managers. Stani personally maintained an open door policy and engaged 
in numerous informal meetings with employees and members of the local community. The 
management was direct in discussing the challenges faced by the company, but at all times 
kept stressing the ability of Gorenje and its employees to meet them. Stani also insisted on 
making as few promises to the employees as possible, but kept all of them on without 
exception. Since the management had identified job security as the main employee concern, 
they implemented an explicit policy of no non-voluntary terminations except for major 
disciplinary offences. Also, the company managed to maintain paycheck regularity even 
during the times of the worst liquidity problems. 
 
However, Stani balanced this soft approach with an emphasis on rigorous work discipline, 
adherence to quality standards, relentless cost-cutting and performance in accordance with set 
goals. He was quick to replace poor performers among Gorenje’s middle managers, while at 
the same time insisting on clarity in promotion and demotion criteria and a fairness in the 
process which he expected to be observed at all hierarchical levels. This led to some turmoil 
among the (especially older) managers, but never to an extent creating a negative atmosphere 
in the company. 
 
Since due to austerity measures salaries were not attractive, Gorenje depended on other 
factors to keep their most important employees and attract new high-potential ones. The most 
important was its strong ties with the local community, where Gorenje was the model of a 
successful company even in the time of crisis. It was also among those rare companies 
offering true career growth opportunities and interesting jobs for technical experts. 
 
Gorenje’s management did not see many changes in the barriers to implementing their 
strategy. Although the situation was improving both in terms of financial resources and 
internal competence, it was still far from excellent. Fears concerning personal futures with the 
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company were again identified as a major obstacle, one more easily dealt with on the shop 
floor level than among middle managers. 
5.1.4 Changes in the period from 1997 to 2003 
Towards the end of the second period the management identified several new factors which 
led them to somewhat revise their strategy. The first was the growing potential of the Central 
and East European markets, as well as growing international competition in these markets. 
Although Gorenje had started to penetrate those markets earlier, seeing them as the only ones 
in Europe with significant growth potential, it did not engage in systematic activities either to 
protect its inherited brand position in the countries of former Yugoslavia or to build 
sustainable positions in other countries in the region. Although some Gorenje managers 
believed that the company possessed huge advantages over competition in its long-term 
presence in the region, events proved that the situation in the region had changed, to the 
extent that new distribution networks would have to be built, new products introduced and 
clearly positioned against competition, and investment in intensive brand promotion was 
necessary. In Hungary, Gorenje followed an opportunistic strategy and managed to achieve a 
market share of more than 30% within 3 years, only to see that market share dwindle to a few 
percent over the next 3 years. This experience, among others, persuaded the management that 
more focused action was needed. However, the company was profitable again and had a free 
cash flow which could support the required investment. Thus, the management decided to 
redefine strategic sales territories and place more emphasis on the region. 
 
The second area in which Gorenje’s management saw the need to redefine the company’s 
position was product portfolio strategy. Gorenje had traditionally depended on the fast 
follower strategy, which began to be implemented more consistently in the consolidation 
period. This strategy depended heavily on the flexibility facilitated by technological 
competence. It also created a few problems for the company’s cost position, since it generated 
small series and an increasing number of SKUs. However, the management identified new 
trends in consumer behavior, which the company interpreted as a call for more differentiated 
and ecologically-sound products. Since it was estimated that Gorenje had too limited a 
potential for differentiation on the basis of true technological innovation, the company 
decided to differentiate on the basis of user-friendliness and design. These two concepts were 
incorporated into the systematic product line overhaul started in 1997 and forecast to last until 
2005. A strategic partnership with Pininfarina design studio was forged in order to create a 
strong design brand. To utilize the potential of the new product lines, however, the company 
also started to gradually reorganize its distribution network and invest a significantly larger 
amount of money in various marketing activities, including training of employees and 
distributors. It also invested in the upgrading of production capacities. 
 
While throughout consolidation the company focused completely on major household 
appliances, with increased investment capability Gorenje returned to a diversification 
strategy. Its management again cited its strong brand position in several countries as an 
opportunity; it also saw the need to improve its relatively poor returns from the core business 
by engaging in higher-margin areas such as kitchen furniture. A few companies from the 
former Gorenje Group were bought back, as well as a failed Slovenian furniture manufacturer. 
Gorenje also engaged some parts of its domestic and foreign network in trading activities. 
 
In 1996 the employees reopened discussion of the level of salaries. While the company was 
able to prevent strikes, some good will was lost and labor costs increased somewhat. Gorenje 
also started to invest more in employee education (e.g. every employee on average receiving 
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2.5 days of training, with middle management being the core target of educational efforts), 
introduced more teamwork and management by objectives, and significantly decentralized 
decision-making. The company also intensified its internal competition and selection 
processes and further rejuvenated middle management.  
 
As an example of the benefits from its trust in young talent Gorenje’s management often cited 
the experience of one of the worst disasters to hit the company in the 1990s. The 
galvanization plant, which produced protective coatings for all metal sheets used in the 
production of appliances, was totally destroyed in a fire. In order to avoid complete 
production stoppage, Gorenje had almost immediately to revert to outsourcing. Not only was 
this significantly more expensive than its own production, but it also created enormous 
logistical problems, and it was very difficult to secure the necessary volumes over a longer 
time period. Thus the company immediately launched the rebuilding of the plant. The initial 
estimates of both internal and external experts indicated that close to two years would be 
required for this, Gorenje’s performance seriously jeopardized in the meantime. A team of 
three young engineers was given the task of leading the project, which some industry 
observers questioned as an almost hazardous move. However, they managed to bring 
production into line in less than six months, and two of them were immediately promoted. 
 
Stani continued to play the role of figurehead. His attention was divided among several 
areas. He kept shareholders (in particular the state-related majority) at bay, thus lowering 
pressure for dividend payouts and allowing the company a policy of high investment and 
below-average returns in order to improve its strategic position. He also kept up intensive 
personal communication with a wide circle of employees, further strengthening his popularity. 
At the same time, he continued to push for higher performance and better quality, directly 
engaging in personnel decisions at the middle management level. 
 
The critical resources needed in this period, as identified by the top management, were similar 
to those of the second period. Gorenje still depended on its market competence (including its 
distribution network) in Western Europe, a level of technological competence which allowed 
flexibility, and a committed workforce. It made use of its brand position in countries of 
former Yugoslavia (i. e., redeployed an existing resource), and stretched its technological 
competence further in the area of new product development, augmenting it with design 
competence. New resources included market competence (and an improved distribution 
network) in Central and Eastern Europe, as well as committed and well-educated middle 
managers ready to take initiative. 
 
On the other hand, main internal barriers were identified in employees’ rising frustration with 
poor compensation, especially among those who were above shop floor level, but lacked clear 
career prospects. Also, as it relied almost exclusively on internal promotion, Gorenje began to 
suffer a lack of top-quality people, especially in R&D and sales and marketing. Finally, an 
increasing number of managers felt that too strong a focus on the local environment was 
having negative effects on the company culture. 
5.1.5 Changes in 2003 
From 2001 onwards the top management faced two imminent challenges: Stani had to decide 
whether to go for a third term as President of the Management Board or to retire in 2003; and 
the company had to prepare for the changes presented by Slovenia’s accession to the EU in 
May 2004. Stani decided to retire, and proposed that the Supervisory Board nominate Franjo 
Bobinac, Management Board member in charge of sales and marketing, as his successor. 
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Bobinac brought three new members to the Management Board, two of whom were in their 
thirties and came from outside Gorenje, thus clearly departing from the tradition of internal 
promotions and the seniority required for top positions. 
 
In his first public statement after his appointment Bobinac declared three strategic priorities 
for the company, to be reached by 2006: to become number five in the household appliance 
industry in Europe; to reach consolidated sales of over 1 billion €; and to nearly double the 
ROA. When questioned about the key challenges, he indicated the need to move part of 
production to a non-EU country to compensate for new tariff barriers when Slovenia joined 
the EU; to consolidate brand positions throughout strategic market territories; to protect the 
company from a possible hostile takeover and become more active in growth through 
acquisitions; and to significantly internationalize the company and its culture while 
maintaining both an openness for dialogue and its employee commitment.  
 
Obviously, his goals and stated priorities significantly surpassed expectations, and went 
beyond the changes predicted to follow Slovenia’s accession to EU. Although not explicitly, 
they admitted to some shortcomings in the previous change phase, in particular indicating the 
need for improved clarity of strategic focus, both in terms of the company’s target positioning 
and its means of achieving differentiation. From Gorenje’s sales and marketing side, Bobinac 
had a thorough understanding of the market situation and industry dynamics. He was 
convinced that Gorenje was capable of covering a wide price range, from lower middle to 
high (but not top). The company had already announced its interest in the North American 
market and its first private label deal in US, and was obviously trying to expand beyond 
Europe. Bobinac believed that due to industry dynamics Gorenje needed to achieve high 
growth in order to remain viable, which would require many different activities and could 
show results only over a period of several years. He estimated that the diversification strategy 
had limited potential, but was ready to implement all of it, while securing the rest of the 
growth through the core business. He felt that some of the company’s owners would most 
likely exhibit less patience in the future if returns remained low, and that employees, given the 
changes in the value system of the younger generation, would require new motivations and a 
different reward system. Last but not least, he indicated clearly his ambition to be 
remembered as the fourth in the line of outstanding Gorenje leaders. Discussing (expected) 
barriers, most managers identified the lack of high-potential people, an inert culture, and 
complacency (i.e. lack of true motivation for change) as the most critical internal barriers. 
5.1.6 Summary of research findings from the Gorenje case 
Four change cycles were identified in the period between 1991 and 2003. In the first cycle 
change began late, when the financial situation (and in particular the liquidity) of the company 
became critical. The major factors influencing this late start were institutional pressures (to 
maintain employment, and to retain the positive image of the company and its top 
management); lack of transparency of the consequences of external change for company 
performance; and lack of consensus among top managers. The role of financial slack can be 
seen as negative, since the change was started only after slack had been used up. It is 
interesting to note that the true agents of change were from divisional management, rather 
than the Group level, which can to large extent be explained by the relatively low level of 
synergy within the Group, as well as a heritage from the social ownership system in which the 
Group had no effective ownership control over divisions. 
 
Once the change was initiated, it took on the clear characteristics of defensive restructuring. 
The chosen strategy was heavily influenced by institutional pressures (and, in particular, 
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mimicked another company seen as a role model by the institutional environment). The fact 
that the management of the Group’s core business opted to dissolve the Group can easily be 
interpreted as indirect downsizing, since it caused layoffs in other divisions. Downsizing was 
also carried out in the core division, although strictly via voluntary terminations, including 
retirements. The new organizational template included a significant amount of centralization 
in the first period of change, a focus on cost reduction, and a focus on existing core markets 
(although in the case of Gorenje these, for obvious reasons, were not local). There was no 
evidence of major organizational learning, although there was a clear emphasis on quality 
improvement based on stricter discipline. Critical resources for the success of the strategy in 
this phase were financial infusion, a new accounting and control system, market competence 
(including the distribution network) in Western Europe, and a committed workforce which 
trusted its leaders. Leadership interventions were limited to top-down decision-making and 
intensive communication with employees and other principal stakeholders (the local 
community, the political elite in Slovenia, banks, customers and suppliers). A certain amount 
of coercion was noticeable, in particular in the use of fear of job loss as a tool to discipline the 
workforce and to lower salaries, but this was balanced with promises of no workforce 
reductions and with ownership certificates. 
 
The barriers identified only partially confirm the theoretical predictions. Strategic uncertainty 
(although the cause for the late trigger) was not identified as a barrier. Poor skills and 
inappropriate attitudes were identified in accordance with predictions. Fear did not act as a 
barrier universally, but did create more problems at the middle management level. The 
explanation for this lies in the fact that while use of coercion, management of expectations 
and trust worked when applied to production workers, for middle management insecurity was 
intensified by fear of lacking the needed skills (which was not the case with production 
workers), and by a real lack of experience and competence in the context of new roles and 
behaviors (e.g. taking initiative). 
 
It is also very interesting to note that in the case of Gorenje the second phase continued the 
emphasis on cost-cutting, but with a significant change in its nature: it was used as part of the 
competitive strategy rather than as a reaction to crisis, and was combined with other activities 
to improve added value. In this way the nature of restructuring changed from defensive to 
strategic. The transition from the first phase of purely defensive restructuring was facilitated 
by two factors. The new vision was actually a subset of the vision which existed prior to 1991, 
and it resurfaced when the management estimated that the company had the resources to 
pursue it. The critical resources for beginning strategic restructuring were financial resources 
and technological competence. The former was only to a small extent built over time: most 
financing was secured through leadership intervention as a result of institutional pressures. 
The latter, which normally requires significant efforts, already existed in the company and 
was not lost during defensive restructuring. 
 
Another obvious deviation from the first phase was more reliance on bottom-up processes and 
clear efforts to launch new processes in the company which would facilitate learning. This 
included the use of foreign consultants and a focus on technical education. 
 
The trigger for the third cycle of changes was the top management’s interpretation of the new 
opportunities in Central and Eastern Europe and of competitive dynamics in the industry, as 
well as their reinterpretation of consumer needs and wants in all markets. Again, the trigger 
was reinforced by the estimate that the resources needed to implement the change were 
sufficient. The new organizational template confirms all the predictions of theory: depending 
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on the specific industry, the company decided to combine low cost and higher added value 
positions; it reorganized along main product lines and placed clear emphasis on R&D, 
production and distribution (with somewhat lower-than-expected emphasis on marketing, to 
be corrected in the last cycle of changes); and it turned towards global benchmarking and 
external partnerships for improving critical elements of the value chain. Gorenje continued to 
depend on all the critical resources identified in defensive restructuring, with intensified use 
of technological competence and customer intimacy for new product development. With his 
strong institutional connections, Stani managed to achieve an ownership structure which 
reduced pressure on immediate financial performance and gave the company enough time and 
financial resources to invest in the new strategy. 
 
According to expectations the company started to come up against barriers related to the 
growing pluralism of interests (both at the middle management and production worker level), 
but was capable of neutralizing them, primarily through higher levels of decentralization, 
more grass-root change management and continued intensive communication. The pressure 
on middle management performance is a leadership intervention not predicted by the research 
model. 
 
While the organizational template resulting from the fourth cycle of change has not yet fully 
emerged, it is clear that what triggered this cycle was the interpretation that changes in the 
context (in particular, EU accession combined with industry dynamics) were significant 
enough to require action. It is also likely that the decision was heavily influenced by a 
predicted increase in institutional pressures (especially owners’ demands for higher returns 
and their readiness to accept hostile takeover). Although initial signals indicate that the new 
organizational template departs significantly from the old one, it remains to be seen if and 
how this will be achieved. 
5.2 Kolinska 
Kolinska is a medium-size food company from Slovenia, with 100 million € revenues and 600 
employees in 2002. In the last decade it has consistently ranked among the five financially 
top-performing food companies in Slovenia. 
5.2.1 Brief overview of company history prior to 1991 
Kolinska is a company with almost 100 years of tradition. It was started as a small workshop 
producing a coffee substitute. After World War II it was nationalized and enjoyed slow 
growth until the late 1980s. Following the business practices of many medium-size companies 
in former Yugoslavia, it had built up quite solid manufacturing and distribution capabilities. 
However, the company did not focus on developing its own product portfolio, but instead 
established licensing relationships with two major food companies, Nestlé and CPC 
International (later renamed Bestfoods, which in 2000 merged with Unilever). Through its 
relationships Kolinska had access to a limited number of product lines (such as soups, 
mayonnaise and various spices and dressings), which accounted for the majority of its sales in 
the 1980s. The company was successful in covering the whole territory of former Yugoslavia 
with its distribution network and had particularly strong sales in the eastern part of the 
country. Sales in Belgrade (the capital of former Yugoslavia), for example, were bigger than 
those in the whole of Slovenia. Along with its licensed products Kolinska had a few products 
of its own, typically in lower value added segments. The notable exception was baby food, 
which had not only achieved solid success in the domestic market but was also well-known in 
the former Soviet Union. 
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Kolinska’s top management team in the late 1980s consisted of highly experienced members: 
next to Lojze Deželak, general manager, three team members covered the key functional areas 
of finance, manufacturing and commercial activities. Although the company prided itself on a 
strong market orientation, looking back most of its managers underline the focus on 
production, which was highly flexible due to its semi-automated nature, allowing for small 
batches. Despite being in the fast-moving consumer goods industry the company gave little 
attention to marketing and brand-related issues, since the high demand – low supply pattern of 
the former Yugoslav market did not require much investment there. 
 
As early as in 1989 Kolinska’s top management became concerned about political and 
economic developments in former Yugoslavia. They prepared several scenarios based on the 
assumption of different levels of market collapse. All of these focused on the financial 
implications of the future market situation. They did not consider possible substitution of 
markets as the solution to the revenue decrease in domestic markets, since the management 
was convinced that Kolinska could not effectively compete in western markets and estimated 
that the fast-moving consumer goods markets in Central and Eastern Europe would not offer 
the needed potential in the short term. The justification for this belief was simple and not 
lacking in arguments: the company had no established brand in the west and had too few 
resources to build a major brand from scratch in any sizable national market in the EU; tariff 
barriers would make its products costly; its own product portfolio was limited and did not 
include products which could be easily differentiated; the company had little know-how in 
marketing area and only limited knowledge of western markets; etc. On the other hand, CEE 
countries were clearly heading into transition and it was safe to believe that fast-moving 
consumer goods markets would suffer from a drop in living standards and the collapse of 
distribution systems. That was why Kolinska was getting ready for downsizing. 
5.2.2 Changes in the period from 1991 to 1993 
The first practical change as a reaction to crisis was to reorganize the sales offices in other 
republics of former Yugoslavia and convert them into fully-owned subsidiaries. In doing that, 
Kolinska joined many other Slovenian companies, since it was believed to be the most 
practical solution to the possible problem of losing control over assets in those republics. Loss 
of control was seen as likely due to the uncertain future of socially-owned companies, as well 
as various legal possibilities allowing parts of socially-owned companies to declare 
independence from their mother companies.  
 
The actual events of 1991 and 1992 matched the most pessimistic scenarios. Kolinska lost 
sales in Serbia completely, but it also lost a significant amount in Croatia and Bosnia, which 
were rapidly sliding into armed conflict. The collapse of the former Soviet Union added to the 
problems. Overall, Kolinska lost almost 70% of its sales.  
 
The first round of downsizing was based on the previously developed scenario. Deželak 
managed to keep an open dialogue with the labor unions and convince them of the necessity 
of cuts, promising that the company would implement all the possibilities of soft downsizing. 
The management reasoned that a gradual approach to downsizing was the only realistic 
alternative, since an immediate reduction to the optimal number of employees would be too 
costly, create internal unrest and also create major technological problems. Thus, early 
retirements and voluntary terminations were used at first. 
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Although the financial situation was kept under control and the company operated with 
tolerable losses, it soon became clear that soft reductions would not be sufficient. The 
management prepared the “technological surpluses” program for workforce reduction, which 
in accordance with the law was possible if the company could prove a significant drop in 
demand and production levels. Although the company had to observe many rules in the 
process, the program created some space for the management to selectively downsize, 
targeting employees with poor performance or those unwilling to commit to expected changes 
in behavior. By the end of 1992 this brought the number of employees from 1,200 down to 
850, an action seen by many as only the first round of necessary cuts. 
 
Another measure taken during the first cycle of change was asset restructuring. Kolinska’s 
management examined the possibility of getting rid of non-performing assets, but despite 
clear objectives and a professionally sound approach realized that, due to low demand in real 
estate markets, the benefits would be negligible. 
 
In order to maintain control over the situation, a more elaborate short-term planning and cost 
control system was introduced. Although it did not meet internationally-accepted accounting 
standards, it gave Kolinska’s management a solid insight into the company’s performance and 
allowed it to accurately plan cash flows, thus avoiding liquidity problems even during the 
period of lowest sales. 
 
Although the management’s attention was primarily on cost control, some early attempts were 
made to boost sales outside of the domestic markets. Kolinska tried to penetrate Czech and 
Polish markets with some of its own products, but did not achieve good results. Lack of 
experience, limited product potential and the extremely limited managerial pool available to 
run such projects were seen as the key reasons for the failure. On the other hand, the company 
was successful in its negotiations with Nestlé, which led to a broadening of the product range 
for licensed production as well as distribution. 
 
According to Kolinska’s top management, several elements were vital to the survival of the 
company and the successful completion of the first change cycle. First of all came the ability 
to downsize without engendering strikes or other major disturbances to the business process. 
Deželak could rely on a homogeneous senior management team with clearly-stated objectives 
and a high level of commitment to them. Next, while front-line employees were fairly passive, 
they seemed to accept the management arguments tolerably well, or at least accepted their 
suffering without too much grumbling. Flexibility of manufacturing also proved to be 
important, since market reality had forced batch sizes down. But the company managed it, and 
even though higher costs were incurred these were within an acceptable range. However, this 
also meant that the company focused primarily on small optimizations within the existing 
manufacturing system and did not try to take major steps ahead or alter the concept of semi-
automated production. Finally, pressure on domestic sales and distribution improved 
efficiency and resulted in both increased sales levels and some cost savings. 
 
Kolinska’s management identified several barriers to the implementation of downsizing and 
other cost-cutting measures. Institutional pressures, including paying the costs of downsizing 
as required by the law, as well as negative effects of downsizing on employee morale, were 
seen as a major factor in slowing down its implementation. As noted before, critical obstacles 
to those elements of change which tried to go beyond cost cutting were many. Although the 
company managed to avoid a severe liquidity crisis, it did not have significant spare resources 
to invest into major product portfolio extensions or brand position in a high-potential market. 
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Shop floor employees were not highly motivated and appeared to be loyal to the company 
primarily because of the lack of opportunities elsewhere. The middle management was 
particularly weak, both in terms of numbers and in true managerial capacity. This weakness 
extended to professional experts, especially in the areas of marketing and new product 
development, and slowed down the implementation of cost-cutting measures, particularly 
when it came to process improvements. 
5.2.3 Changes in the period from 1993 to 2003 
The first important project following radical downsizing was the company’s privatization. 
Kolinska’s management considered the option of using privatization as the first step towards 
selling the company to a strategic partner, but decided instead to remain independent. The 
main reason was their estimate that Kolinska was not an attractive proposition for a strategic 
partner, since it had a very limited local market, modest production capacities, and a relatively 
low level of brand equity. Instead, the company’s management orchestrated the privatization 
process with an eye to a fairly dispersed ownership structure, employees to have 30% of 
shares, two parastatal funds being the next important owners and the rest going to a large 
number of private investment funds and farmers cooperatives (a legal requirement for all 
companies in the food processing industry). While lasting, the privatization process did not 
directly affect the company. When it was finished, the top management lobbied the new 
owners to obtain a mutually-acceptable Supervisory Board composition, in the process 
leaving significant power with the management. 
 
This relationship in principle remained the same following privatization, the only important 
change being a significant reduction in the employee ownership share, which dropped from 
30% to 4%. Kolinska’s top management stated clearly that reaching its financial goals as set 
by the company’s owners was a priority for the company, and always managed to deliver the 
results. It was also content with the dispersed ownership structure and did not encourage any 
major consolidation. 
 
While privatization was a legal requirement, all other strategic changes were left to the 
discretion of the management, who regularly assessed the situation in the context of the 
annual planning process, but never returned to the practice of preparing long-term 
development scenarios such as that of 1989. These assessments did not alter the key strategic 
direction during this period. The management did not see any immediate danger to the 
company which required drastic responses, but was constantly aware of certain long-term 
pressures demanding continuous downsizing of the workforce and process improvements. The 
main driver here was the growing cost of labor, plus the industry’s expectations of 
productivity improvement. 
 
Kolinska’s management also focused on the relationship with its two strategic partners, Nestlé 
and CPC International. What the company learned from the relationship, to which the 
management granted much importance, led to further improvements in its manufacturing 
process, including the introduction of the lean manufacturing approach and the further 
refinement of costing systems. Since it was obvious, however, that the growth potential from 
this cooperation was limited, the management discussed various other growth options. 
Although the possibility of obtaining organic growth through investment in Kolinska’s own 
product lines was considered, the management estimated that this, too, had only limited 
potential. Defining Kolinska as a follower with a relatively wide product portfolio, they were 
reluctant to focus, fearing a negative impact on the spread of overhead costs and a possible 
significant short-term drop in profitability. The top management wished to avoid such a 
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development, sensing potential problems with owners satisfaction, and hoping to prevent 
owners interference in the company. 
 
An example of the practical consequences of this approach can be seen in the company’s 
chewing gum line. Prior to 1991 Kolinska had developed its own product, which was sold 
primarily in the local market. Although it was not seen as technologically advanced, it was 
well received and had gained a solid market share and brand recognition. After 1993 Wrigley 
approached the company with a proposal to buy the production plant for its regional purposes. 
Kolinska rejected the proposal, but failed to invest into the product, plant modernization or 
brand support. After several years of uneven battle with Wrigley and other western 
competitors Kolinska was forced to pull out of the chewing gum business. 
 
In 1995 the company had to deal with a major external event with high disruptive potential. 
Licensing contracts with both Nestlé and CPC International were expiring, and the 
management had received indications from Nestlé that it was not willing to renew under the 
same conditions. During the negotiations Nestlé demanded a change of relationship in which 
Kolinska would remain a contractual manufacturing partner, but would sell all Nestlé 
products (those manufactured in Slovenia and those imported) through a joint venture 
company controlled by Nestlé. At the same time, both Nestlé and CPC International were 
increasingly concerned about the exclusivity of their relationships, seeing a potential conflict 
of interest within Kolinska were it to continue producing and distributing the products of both 
companies. In the end, Kolinska decided not to sign the contract with Nestlé, but to expand its 
cooperation with CPC International. A new four-year contract was again based on licensing, 
which allowed Kolinska to get from CPC International all the product lines which it had lost 
from Nestlé. The only Nestlé product kept for distribution was Nescafé, since Nestlé’s new 
distributor had its own strong coffee business. 
 
These negotiations with strategic partners left some cracks within senior management, since 
some felt that the company did not have consistent objectives and that due to poor tactical 
performance had not used all its opportunities well. Nevertheless, the company moved fast to 
deal with the new situation. It used its relationship with Slovenian retailers to push new 
products, and complemented this with strong advertising to create brand awareness. Although 
the impact on product categories where new CPC International replaced Nestlé products was 
negative, as the new products failed to reach the old level of market share, an excellent 
tactical reaction prevented major losses and allowed for growth due to some completely new 
licensed products and more focused work on distribution channels. 
 
Under pressure from owners to secure growth above the rates achieved in the period to 1995, 
Kolinska’s top management decided that the solution would be to acquire smaller or medium-
size Slovenian food companies with reasonable product positions and market potential. 
Kolinska had had a positive experience in 1992, when it bought Talis (a small vinegar 
manufacturer facing bankruptcy), transferred production to its own facilities, closed the Talis 
plant and used its excellent domestic distribution network to push the product (a food 
commodity). However, the management was also aware of the limited possibilities of finding 
good acquisition targets, and decided to react to emerging opportunities rather than engage in 
a systematic search for and development of possible takeover situations.  
 
One such opportunity came in 1996, when a local conglomerate consisting of spa tourism and 
mineral water businesses went bankrupt. Kolinska bought Rogaška Vrelci, the mineral water 
division, and thus added mineral water to its collection of business lines. It decided to re-
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brand the product and extend the line with still mineral water in new packaging, but the 
results were disappointing. However, excellent results, far exceeding expectations, were 
achieved with an existing niche product, a mineral water targeted for health purposes. This 
product also had regional branding in countries of former Yugoslavia, enabling Kolinska to 
increase international sales through its regional network. 
 
Other takeover opportunities emerging in the meantime were not exploited, based on negative 
assessments of the potential offered by the target company. For example, Kolinska decided 
not to diversify into the poultry business, although it could have bought the second-largest 
poultry company in Slovenia on very favorable conditions. 
 
The Russian crisis adversely affected the company, especially its baby food business. 
However, despite a loss of about 1 million €, the management decided not to pull out of 
Russia since it estimated the crisis to be short-term, more than compensated for by the long-
term potential of the market in which Kolinska claimed to have more than 20% of the market 
share. 
 
In 1998 Kolinska also seriously considered a possible merger with another Slovenian food 
company of approximately the same size. The first analysis indicated several potential 
benefits. The main ones involved cost reduction and obtaining a wider, more coherent product 
portfolio. Also, the two companies would complement each others’ strengths, since Kolinska 
was stronger in manufacturing and distribution, the other company in new product 
development and marketing. However, negotiations eventually broke down because of 
differences in the positions of the two management board presidents on post-merger share 
valuation and management structure. This created additional tension among Kolinska’s senior 
management, some managers believing strongly that the company had lost an excellent 
opportunity for more radical change. 
 
Following the expiry of the licensing contract with Bestfoods (formerly CPC International), 
Kolinska had in 1999 to negotiate a new one. Bestfoods announced this to be the last licensing 
contract it was ready to sign, and that within five years Kolinska would have to establish a 
“normal” relationship as a manufacturing outsourcer and distributor. Bestfoods established a 
marketing organization in Slovenia which took full charge of those activities, and hired a 
senior manager from Kolinska to lead it. A new business model significantly cut Kolinska’s 
margins for the licensed products. As a result, Kolinska shifted its focus away from licensed 
products, whose share in overall revenues in the period from 1999 to 2002 fell from 40% to 
22%. 
 
The next successful acquisition came in 2000, when Kolinska bought several brands and 
related formulations, including Cockta, from a bankrupt Slovenian beverages company. 
Cockta was a specialty flavored cola with long tradition, and a surprisingly vital brand in the 
region. Using the experience from the mineral water business Kolinska moved fast to push the 
product through its distribution channels, and achieved superior results. This for the first time 
made the management more articulate about a strategic interest in beverages, which resulted 
in another acquisition, a mineral water company in Serbia. 
 
As well as rising to business challenges, the senior management team had to deal with people-
related issues within the company. The team’s homogeneity had been decreasing since 1996, 
and further disagreements became evident in 1998. Deželak was absent for health reasons for 
the better part of 1997, which contributed to the frustration of some managers about the 
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clarity of Kolinska’s strategic direction. Several members of top management were 
approaching retirement age and this, while the company had good successors in mind, would 
stretch management talent thin. In 1999 Deželak decided to rejuvenate the Management 
Board, promoting two younger middle managers to Management Board members in charge of 
manufacturing and finance. The new members brought with them some changes in strategy. 
Kolinska was still committed to balancing the revenues from its cooperation with CPC 
International with sales of its own brands, but was looking more explicitly for new 
acquisitions, in particular in beverages, as a way to achieve high growth. The style of 
management was clearly top-down, with Deželak delegating tasks to others and selecting 
middle managers based on their ability to deliver results. While the period before 1996 was 
characterized by relatively intensive, albeit top-down communication within the company, 
after 1996 the intensity of communications seemed to reduce significantly. 
 
Since business results for 2002 indicated declining profitability, Kolinska’s management 
decided to cut wages by 8%. This generated significant turmoil with the unions, which for the 
first time since 1991 openly opposed the management. By that time the company had 
downsized to around 600 people, a process which had created constant fear of job losses. The 
management estimated that the power of the unions in this situation would be limited, and 
was able to avoid major disruptions in production without reversing its decision. However, 
some senior managers felt that the company had reached the limits of pressurizing people, and 
the company faced ill-motivated employees who remained only because they couldn’t find 
better jobs. For that reason the management began to advocate more investment in education, 
and the use of more selective HR practices, the result being a pilot project in this area with a 
local university. 
 
As the key resource needed to successfully implement its strategy, the company throughout 
this period relied on its ability to continuously decrease costs and improve productivity 
without compromising its flexible manufacturing process,. It also continued to fine-tune its 
domestic sales and distribution capabilities. Once the wars in the Balkans were over, regional 
distribution in Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina also became more important. Although 
Kolinska lost the distribution rights for licensed products in these markets, it could use the 
network to distribute its own products, which proved extremely beneficial to the growth of 
beverages business line. 
 
Due to constant downsizing throughout the period Kolinska had not been systematically 
hiring new talent, and experienced problems finding the appropriate people in the very tight 
Slovenian management labor market. The middle management situation began to be seen as a 
barrier to successful further restructuring, impeding both the capacity for organic growth and 
the ability to acquire companies without a management pool of the appropriate quality. 
 
While the company was successful on the operational side, the company management was 
critical of performance and ability on the development side. Lack of skills in new product 
development and branding were seen as an obstacle which not only influenced the choice of 
strategy but also the quality of its implementation. 
 
Lately, there have been some indications that the new Management Board is coming close to 
a decision to engage in strategic restructuring. The company has acknowledged that it has 
exhausted the potential of a licensing business model, and has recently approached a global 
consulting company for a project on strategic level. It has also established a partial focus on 
beverages, and seems to be ready to invest in improving the relationship with its workforce 
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(especially middle management), in the aid of restoring the level of trust necessary to attempt 
strategic restructuring. However, there is an obvious divide, which reflects age differences, 
among top management members. 
5.2.4 Summary of research findings from the Kolinska case 
Two cycles of change can be observed at Kolinska in the period from 1991 to 2003, and there 
are some indications that the company may be in transition towards a third cycle. The first 
cycle was clearly characterized by aggressive downsizing and displayed all the features of 
defensive restructuring. The change was initiated based on a management assessment that 
developments in the market matched one of their predefined scenarios. An early start, fast 
downsizing and other cost-cutting measures allowed the company to avoid severe financial 
crisis despite the huge challenges presented by an initial 70% drop in revenues. The fact that 
the company had installed a solid management accounting system augmented the speed and 
accuracy of its reaction. It also limited the potential damage of financial slack, since the 
company could clearly monitor the “slack burning rate” and act while financial reserves were 
still high. Thus, the trigger phase of the first change cycle seems to comply completely with 
the research model’s predictions, Kolinska’s scenario indicating an interesting link between 
industry dynamics, transparency of performance and the role of financial slack in assessing 
the need for and the feasibility of change. 
 
The elements of the defensive restructuring organizational template also follow the 
predictions of the research model. Asset restructuring was attempted, but had no major impact 
on the restructuring process. The full attention of the company was placed on various 
elements of cost reduction, primarily significant downsizing. The fact that company also tried 
to boost revenues does not contradict the research model, since in doing so it did not alter its 
business model (which would imply strategic restructuring), but merely did “more of the 
same”, i.e. deployed existing assets and competences to the fullest extent possible. All major 
decisions were fully centralized at Management Board level. Improvements in quite specific 
manufacturing and distribution processes were pursued primarily on the basis of company 
insights, without benefit of outside support or benchmarking with global competitors. 
 
The resources used in the first cycle also largely match predictions. Along with the specific 
competences of the business model (manufacturing and distribution), successful change was 
brought about primarily through careful use of financial slack and various institutional links 
(relationships with retailers which boosted sales, and political support for downsizing), heavy 
use of the cost-control system, and trust Deželak enjoyed from his employees. The one 
unclear component is Kolinska’s use of human resources: while the scarcity of this resource 
matched predictions, it is not evident whether the company exploited well what it had. 
 
Leadership interventions, which Deželak used in the first cycle, also comply with the 
predictions of the research model. Deželak centralized decision-making on the new strategy 
and made sure that resources were used primarily for cost-cutting and distribution support. 
The acquisition of Talis, which may appear a departure from the focused use of resources, did 
not change company strategy at all. Talis’ product line was close to what Kolinska already 
had, and the acquisition can be seen as part of the company’s effort to use its existing 
distribution network most effectively. 
 
Deželak did engage in a significant communications effort with exactly the goals predicted: 
those of trust building, an explanation of solutions to existing problems, and fear 
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management. He also used coercion, especially in the second phase of downsizing, to exploit 
the relatively weak position of employees and speed up restructuring.  
 
As already noted, Kolinska’s management did not report significant active opposition to 
change, despite some institutional pressures related to the speed of downsizing. They noted, 
however, that lack of skills and knowledge was a major constraint, as well as fear involving 
job security. These factors were also judged to critically limit the ability of the company to 
engage in organizational learning. 
 
Once the immediate threat of financial collapse was removed, the management reassessed the 
need for and the viability of change. It came under the strong influence of industry dynamics: 
while on the one hand enjoying strong relationships with its licensing partners, on the other it 
assessed the maturity of the industry as a significant factor arguing against a radical change of 
strategy. Also, as proposed by the research model, opportunistic behavior did affect the 
readiness to attempt change. In this particular case it decreased readiness, since the 
management seemed to be waiting for a “silver bullet” in the form of a particularly successful 
opportunistic acquisition, without attempting to more thoroughly address the restructuring 
strategy or build up the strategic reliance on acquisition as a systematic part of it. Several 
potential options for strategic restructuring were ruled out because of the assessment that the 
company lacked the resources to implement them (in particular a focus strategy and new 
product development), although in general the management acknowledged the need for 
change. At the same time, despite the available financial resources Kolinska’s top 
management launched no effort to fill gaps in competence, which could have changed the 
situation over time. Finally, decreasing homogeneity at the top and decrease of trust also 
contributed to the mode of change, which retained some elements of defensive restructuring 
combined with non-aligned changes. 
 
As predicted by the research model, this situation led to a deterioration of the strategic 
position. Kolinska is indeed still enjoying a relatively solid financial performance, but it has 
slipped below industry averages and seems unable to make major progress in building the 
competences needed for strategic repositioning. Internal communications are far from good 
and trust in the company leadership is decreasing.  
 
Recent indications of a possible new change cycle show that, for the time being, the two 
groups differ in their assessment of the urgency of change, which in practical terms means 
that the trigger level has not yet been reached. Even if the trigger is reached and strategic 
restructuring attempted, it remains to be seen what course of action will be taken, and whether 
the company will be able to break the barrier presented by lack of the competences required 
for the process. 
5.3 Konar 
Konar is among the largest heavy industry companies in Croatia, with 200 million € of 
revenues and 4,000 employees in 2002. It is primarily focused on electrical equipment for use 
in power systems, transportation and industrial applications. 
5.3.1 Brief overview of company history prior to 1991 
The company was established in 1921 as an electrical repair workshop and was subsequently 
acquired by Siemens. It developed steadily, and became one of the leading European 
companies producing electrical motors, and the first to use lacquered wire in motor 
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production. At the end of World War II it was nationalized and changed its name to Rade 
Konar. The company exploited the growing needs of Yugoslav markets in the 1950s, which 
were driven by post-war rebuilding and the fast industrialization of the country, to widen its 
portfolio of electrical equipment for power and industrial applications ranging from electrical 
motors to large electrical power generators, power switchgear and transformers, and control 
systems. 
 
Based on the political and business philosophy which in those years prevailed in former 
Yugoslavia, Konar tried to develop as many products as possible by itself. Although some of 
these efforts were high-cost and used less than up-to-date technology, the approach 
established an extraordinary base of technical talent, and also influenced the strong 
development of the technical department at the local university. 
 
In the 1960s the company benefited from opening of Yugoslavia and started its first 
partnering agreements with companies such as ASEA (now ABB). It also diversified further 
in industrial electronics, transportation systems (locomotives and elevators) and household 
appliances, where it formed a joint venture with Zanussi. It also started to penetrate 
international markets more actively, where it positioned itself primarily as a low-cost 
equipment provider. Up until the late 1980s the product portfolio became progressively more 
sophisticated, including complex power and industrial control systems, and turnkey solutions 
for hydropower and large transformer stations. Rade Konar had a number of production sites 
in Croatia, as well as one in Serbia and two in Macedonia, employing close to 25,000 people. 
It reached close to half a billion $ of annual sales and was very successful in winning major 
contracts on international tenders, where it could offer technical solutions of reasonable 
quality at a highly competitive price. Overall, the company was successfully balancing 
domestic and international sales, but some of its product lines were strictly domestic, while 
others were heavily international, focusing primarily on the fast-growing markets of 
developing countries, which lacked electrical industries at international levels of competence. 
The markets of developed countries like the EU or the USA were regarded as closed and fully 
controlled by strong domestic producers. 
 
The formal organization of the company clearly indicated a desire to deploy synergies across 
different product lines. The central R&D institute had more than 1,200 employees, 200 of 
whom had MSc and PhD titles. Trade services were also centralized, with representative 
offices in more than 20 countries and a focus on selling commodity-type products. The 
engineering division with 1,500 employees was in charge of designing, contracting and 
delivering complex systems such as power stations, and it integrated equipment from some 30 
production divisions and bought the rest in global markets. However, significant tensions 
existed between production divisions and central services, the latter being accused of having a 
privileged status and of pricing manipulation, which allowed them to live comfortably at the 
expense of others. The influence of the corporate management had been declining over time, 
and towards the end of the 1980s practically all power was concentrated in the hands of 
division managers. At the same time competitiveness in the international markets was being 
eroded somewhat by the high-speed technological advancement dictated by giants such as 
GE, ABB and Siemens, as well as by performance problems generated by decreasing levels of 
employee motivation.  
 
At the beginning of 1990 the company began to experience acute financial problems. 
Although there had been some indications of deterioration in the previous period, most of the 
top managers were caught by surprise. Several elements contributed to the problems, but the 
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most important were the effects of the Gulf War. Rade Konar had traditionally been very 
active in high-risk countries including Iraq and Iran. In the 1980s the company had 
experienced problems when it was unable to collect debts in Egypt and Nigeria, but this time 
the amount of money lost in Iraq was simply too great: $300 million in equipment and 
services had to be written off, and 300 people and $10 million in equipment were blocked on 
several sites in Iraq. This crisis came just at the time when the Yugoslav banking system 
crumbled, which not only meant that the company had no access to short-term financing to 
help it weather the crisis, but also that it could not count on the financing of potential new 
international contracts. With an escalating political and economic crisis in the country 
stopping all investments, and country risk growing to intolerable levels for any success in 
international bidding procedures, the company was also left without a stream of new large 
contracts. In May 1990 the President of the Management Board died, which left the company 
floating amid rising turbulence. 
 
The newly-elected right-wing government in Croatia at first showed little willingness to come 
to the rescue. When the management finally started modest attempts at restructuring, it faced 
the vigorous opposition of the labor unions, which were backed by the government. With the 
company facing bankruptcy, a change in top management was agreed on as a precondition for 
government intervention. 
5.3.2 Changes in the period from 1991 to 1994 
After a short and damaging period of interim top management, characterized by lack of 
professionalism and complete confusion on the divisional level, the approach to restructuring 
dictated by the government became clear. A new holding company was created under the 
name Konar (to exploit the value of the internationally recognized brand name) and 
Vjekoslav Srb was appointed new President of Management Board. Srb was an industry 
veteran, with a long tenure in the top management of a large trading company close to Rade 
Konar, and was experienced in international trade and large projects. He had known most of 
the senior managers of Rade Konar personally, and invited a few of them to join him on the 
Management Board of the newly-formed company. Two had been members of the 
Management Board of Rade Konar in 1990, but others were also representatives of the 
previous senior management. 
 
Following the model first used in the restructuring of the Slovenian electronic giant Iskra, the 
Croatian government through its operating agency the Croatian Development Fund 
established a new legal entity. Physical assets and contracts were then transferred from the 
technically bankrupt Rade Konar to the new company. Most Rade Konar divisions declared 
bankruptcy and dismissed all their employees. The management of their “mirror images” in 
the newly-created company then invited some of these ex-employees to join the new 
company. Selection criteria primarily involved anticipated levels of individual performance, 
but were in some cases obscured by candidates’ seniority or personal and political 
relationships. In some cases divisions felt that bankruptcy was not the best solution and, using 
the local legislation (which was in state of flux), found ways to transfer ownership from Rade 
Konar to Konar. Divisions in Serbia and Macedonia were claimed by their employees and 
did not become part of the new system. 
 
An intentional consequence of the whole process was additional fragmentation of the 
company, with 55 divisions created within Konar, as opposed to less than 30 before 
restructuring. Each division was a separate legal entity with a Supervisory and Management 
Board, and was initially fully-owned by Konar. The company downsized to 10,000 
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employees, or 40% of its initial size, but in 1991 it also had less than 50% of the revenues it 
had seen in 1989. The logic behind fragmentation was simple, although questionable. It was 
assumed that smaller units would show the higher flexibility needed to survive, and that any 
failures would cause only minor overall damage to the system. 
 
While centralizing the financial area, Srb decided to set up the new company as a financial 
holding and leave full strategic and operational autonomy to the divisional managers, who 
were held responsible only for the financial performance of their division. Srb on several 
occasions publicly refused to create a vision or a more precise strategy on the corporate level, 
claiming that such an approach would not be effective and that entrepreneurship at the 
divisional level should be given enough space to produce results. He encouraged further 
diversification and facilitated the creation of a number of tiny units in new business areas, 
even though the effects of these efforts continued to be negligible at best. 
 
Several problems resulted from this policy. Lacking a robust management accounting and 
control system, corporate headquarters were dependant on the information prepared by the 
divisional management. In practice this allowed for significant distortions, and many 
divisional heads were tempted to pursue their own interests in total disregard of corporate 
priorities, and/or to protect their positions by presenting the situation as better than it actually 
was. Such practices proliferated after the first stage of privatization in 1995, when state funds 
sold part of the equity to private investment funds and individual investors. Privatization was 
carried out at divisional level, i.e. investors were invited to become minority shareholders in 
individual divisions. Apart from a few cases (which included the sale to Siemens of a majority 
stake in one of the best divisions), Konar retained majority control of the divisions. 
Divisional managers were encouraged to buy shares, in the hope that ownership would have a 
positive effect on their performance. In some cases, however, this created significant conflicts 
of interest. The prices of controlling shares were set high and managers who bought them had 
problems repaying them out of regular profits. This led to some cases of unethical behavior, 
which were mostly ignored by the top management.  
 
The totally depressed situation in the local market and poor backing for international 
expansion, plus the crisis in CEE, all contributed to a miserable sales performance. Since in 
the past most divisions had sold their products through “common services” (trade and 
engineering), they lacked the business functions needed by a stand-alone company, most 
notably in sales and marketing, R&D, and accounting. This made the struggle even more 
difficult. In most cases divisions could rely only on sales of repair services. In searching for 
additional markets many divisions started to compete with each other, which was tolerated at 
the corporate level. Divisions also had to cope with a legacy of declining work quality and 
low adherence to technical standards. This – less a problem of technical incompetence than of 
attitude – was gradually resolved when employees became aware of the link between the 
quality of their work and the security of their jobs. Investment in R&D was minimal, and the 
research institute was downsized from 1,200 to 96 employees, who were expected to sell their 
services on the internal and external market and make the unit fully self-financed, like all the 
others in the system. 
 
The market situation persisted until the end of 1993. In the meantime Konar suffered small 
losses and continued downsizing, to 7,800 employees.  
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5.3.3 Changes in the period from 1994 to 1998 
In 1994 Konar’s top management began to understand the negative influence of the 
company’s non-transparent financial holding organization. At the same time it identified some 
market opportunities arising in the region. However, it had no resources available at the 
corporate level and retained the concept of a strictly financial holding. More focused 
controlling was introduced and the holding started to prepare for privatization, with the initial 
goal of going public in 1997. A leading global management consulting company was hired to 
perform a thorough portfolio analysis of more than 50 divisions. While better sales 
performance and the decreased number of employees had improved some of the financial 
parameters, they were still far away from international benchmarks, ROE remaining below 
3% even in the best years (the target was set at 5%, while the best companies in the industry 
showed figures of 6% to 14%). The results of the analysis indicated a poorly balanced 
portfolio, and in 1997 led to the spinning off of several divisions and the merger of others, 
although the overall result was not regarded as good enough for proceeding with the public 
offering. The consultants, however, refrained from advice implying the need for corporate-led 
strategic restructuring and the use of synergies across divisions. Instead, they looked at the 
performance and potential of individual businesses. 
 
Even when the market situation slightly improved, downsizing continued and by 1998 
Konar’s workforce had been reduced to 4,400 employees. Many of its small units went 
bankrupt during this period, some more than once. 
 
Throughout his tenure Srb maintained his soft, non-confrontational personal style. He praised 
a conservative approach to risk-taking and believed in achieving change through a sequence 
of small steps. He practically never changed the composition of the top management, but the 
Management Board replaced a number of divisional managers because of the poor financial 
performance of their units. Srb allowed divisional managers positions of power in dealing 
with the mother company in all matters except financial performance. He met with them once 
or twice per year and provided general information about the situation in the holding 
company, but according to his policy did not enter into more focused discussions with regard 
to divisional strategies. 
 
Thus, divisional managers were left to themselves to lead change within their territories. 
Despite differences in personal style, they were all heavily influenced by the company’s 
culture, which for decades had been based around recognition of technical competence, strict 
hierarchy within smaller units, but relative disobedience with regard to central authority. It is 
not surprising that took some time for divisional mangers and their subordinates to get used to 
the reporting requirements set by the mother company, and poor communication at top levels 
also characterized the whole period. However, given the extremely limited financial and other 
resources, the divisional management soon realized how dependant they were on the 
motivation and technical competence of their employees, as the only advantage they had in 
the marketplace. Thus, against seemingly insurmountable obstacles, and despite low salaries 
and continuous pressures to reduce costs, they used pride and challenge as the main 
motivators to achieve results. This required intensive communication within divisions, which 
was seen especially in those that did not go bankrupt and still had active labor unions. 
Divisions that went through bankruptcy had the advantage of a fresh start, which many used 
to install more transparent performance monitoring systems for personnel selection and 
rewards. 
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5.3.4 Changes in the period from 1999 to 2003 
In 1998 Srb and the other members of the Management Board were approaching the end of 
their second term. Konar was still primarily state-owned, although 18% of its equity had 
been sold to different private investors on the holding level and an additional 10% to buyers 
on the divisional level (most of the latter lacking control rights). The results of eight years of 
restructuring were mixed. On the one hand, Srb was happy that he had succeeded in keeping 
the company alive and in bringing it to marginal profitability. Some of the divisions were 
showing signs of true consolidation, had achieved growth above the industry average and had 
started to work on new, more complex products. On the other hand, the overall number of 
employees was still decreasing, overall growth of revenues was sluggish, and productivity 
was still significantly below the levels achieved by global players. Konar was managing to 
use opportunities for new business arising in the local environment, but had not stabilized its 
presence in markets outside of Croatia. The Croatian market then experienced a major 
downturn in 1998, which created new worries about the company’s prospects. At the same 
time, major competitors such as ABB and Siemens were signaling that the industry was 
entering a very difficult period, mainly caused by the global trend towards deregulation of the 
power industry and lower levels of investment in emerging countries. 
 
Srb decided to retire at the end of his term, and the government looked for a new Management 
Board President. The job was offered to Darinko Bago, at that time a member of the 
Supervisory Board. After graduating in electrical engineering he had joined “Rade Konar” in 
1976, where he held various positions until 1991, when he was offered a diplomatic posting 
and spent the next 7 years as Croatian ambassador to Switzerland, Bulgaria and Bosnia and 
Herzegovina. Since 1993 he had been a member of the Supervisory Board, and was well 
aware of the situation in the company. His previous career was marked by high achievement 
and notable personal integrity, but had also featured his direct, sometimes abrasive style. 
 
Except for the CFO Bago replaced the entire Management Board, mostly with people who 
had worked with him in his days with the company. He never openly criticized Srb, but made 
it clear to his colleagues that the previous team had not performed well, mainly because they 
had no vision and had showed no initiative on the strategic level. He thoroughly analyzed the 
consulting report prepared two years previously, and came to the conclusion that the 
consultants, while making a solid analysis of individual divisions, had missed the important 
synergetic potential across divisions. That became the driving force behind his next actions, 
which focused on transforming Konar from a financial holding company into a more tightly-
run corporate. He declared clearly his opinion that – instead of fostering entrepreneurship and 
leading to bottom-up driven transformation – allowing further fragmentation and failing to 
deploy possible synergies would lead to the gradual demise of the whole company. He used 
several recent examples of large Croatian and Slovenian companies which had disappeared 
after taking a similar road to persuade his colleagues of the need for a strategy more 
coordinated from the top. 
 
Among the first moves made by the new team was an audit of divisional results. Significant 
problems were found in the quality of reporting, and strict measures were taken not to allow 
this in future, including the improvement of the controlling system and IT support. The audit 
also showed that the company possessed a significant amount of non-performing assets, and 
measures were taken to sell them off. The top management did not expect fast results from 
this, due to problems in the Croatian real-estate markets and the negative reaction of the 
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government which, as the most influential owner, was afraid of possible wrongdoing and the 
poor public impression the asset sales would create. 
 
After reexamining the position of all the divisions, Konar’s top management came to the 
conclusion that the firm had the potential to become the leading electrical equipment company 
in Central Europe. They felt that the strategy which the company had used in its best days in 
the mid-1980s would again be the best choice. This strategy had assumed that Konar’s 
competitive advantage lay in its high level of technical competence, its flexibility, and its cost 
advantage due to efficient and low-paid labor. According to the top management, this 
assumption matched the industry trend towards the growing proportion of low-cost producers, 
caused by power sector deregulation. Thus the company focused on selling equipment that 
was produced in individual pieces (e.g. generators) or low-quantity batches (e.g. high power 
transformers and switchgears), and customized turn-key projects, both requiring a high input 
of professional expertise and excellent customer relationships, but not state-of-the-art 
technology. Geographical focus was placed on Central Europe and a few other countries 
lacking their own strong electrical equipment producers. Privatization of the power industry 
and other large potential customers (e. g., railways or the petrochemical industry) was seen as 
an opportunity for Konar to break into markets previously held tightly by multinational 
companies through their influence at the government level. Those divisions unable to become 
leaders within their target geographies were to be sold. 
 
To support their argument and to gain better acceptance for it among the divisional 
management, Konar’s top management commissioned global consulting companies to carry 
out several consulting and market research projects. Based on the experience of the first 
project, Bago requested very tight coordination of these and personally approved their results, 
in one case forcing the consulting company in question to repeat a project with a new, more 
qualified team. The projects confirmed that Konar had a surprisingly strong brand in the 
whole region of Central and South East Europe, and that some divisions had lately developed 
new products which approached the technological level of industry leaders. Bago, in order to 
update the company’s know-how in the area and prepare it for several crucial tenders in 
Croatia, had also requested that the company engage in several bids, although it lacked 
realistic chances of winning them. Double-digit growth was achieved from 2001 onward, and 
Konar’s share of exports increased to close to 50%. 
 
The top management used their power of influence through the divisional Supervisory Boards 
to push the creation of larger units, which in their opinion would be more competitive. 
Through mergers among divisions their number was gradually reduced to 27. However, 
despite these mergers and the resulting cost reductions, the decade-long downsizing trend was 
stopped in 1999 and since then the company workforce has remained stable at around 4,000 
employees, although its structure has been gradually improved. In addition, the government 
permitted a reduction in the percentage of state ownership in Konar, which for the first time 
came down below 50%. Bago prepared a plan to grant more stock options to employees, 
based on the American experience where ESOP plans contributed to employee loyalty and 
motivation. 
 
To foster cooperation among Konar’s divisions Bago introduced a mediation committee, 
which was assigned the role of resolving interdivisional disputes. This had become a true 
problem for the company, even resulting in legal action and 17 cases where individual 
divisions sued each other. Bago radically cut this practice by deciding that divisional 
managers who were involved in two unsuccessful internal mediation processes would be 
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fired. Within three years about 40% of divisional managers were replaced on the grounds of 
poor performance or unsatisfactory cooperation. At the same time, the company was 
becoming increasingly concerned about the limited pool of managerial talent, and stimulated 
the divisions to invest in management development. Given its specific industry, but also the 
relatively poor image Konar had until recently had as an employer, the company depended 
mostly on internal promotions or the rehiring of previously laid-off employees, but after 
almost a decade this practice had reached its obvious limits. Many middle managers, as well 
as the employees, were showing clear frustration with the duration of the crisis. Rumors 
circulated about the high personal gains of some divisional managers through either the 
privatization process or misuse of nontransparent business practices. This situation somewhat 
decreased the usefulness of challenge as a key motivator, and increased pressures for material 
rewards. The top management acknowledged these pressures by proposing higher 
performance-based bonuses for divisional management, indicating clearly that they expected 
the practice to extend to low levels of the hierarchy as well. 
 
Despite his image as an authoritarian leader, Bago nurtured closer relationship with all the 
Management Board members. It became an unofficial rule that all Management Board 
decisions be the result of consensus. Bago also engaged heavily in communication with the 
unions, which resulted in their placing a high level of trust in the top management. A good 
example was an occasion when the unions had to enforce a nationwide strike, but consulted 
with the management and advised union members of a strike schedule which would be least 
disruptive for the company. 
 
On the other hand, Bago met some resistance from the middle management. Many of these 
feared his direct style and found his new policies in direct collision with their interests. This 
was particularly the case in some of the divisions with higher levels of management 
ownership. While the top management still did not intervene directly in decisions lacking 
repercussions across divisional boundaries, some autonomy had been lost and it was assumed 
that this trend would continue. In addition, most of the division managers retained memories 
of powerful central services, and were convinced that despite its theoretical advantages the 
approach would not work well at Konar any time soon. 
5.3.5 Summary of research findings from the Konar case 
Three stages of change can be observed in the case of Konar, with the border between the 
first two somewhat blurred. The trigger for the first phase was the company’s deteriorating 
financial situation. This was noticed late, since Konar’s reporting systems were inadequate 
and it was difficult to gain a full up-to-date view of overall company performance. 
Management assessment of the situation was also heavily influenced by the nature of the 
industry, as well as by the political and economic changes in the environment. Finally, the 
company had just entered a leadership vacuum due to the sudden death of its previous leader. 
All of these factors were interpreted as highly negative for the likelihood of change, which 
blocked the management and forced external forces (the government) to take control.  
 
This assessment of the situation, and the mimicking of Iskra as a role model, also influenced 
Konar’s choice of a restructuring model. Its characteristics clearly categorize it as defensive. 
Bankruptcy on the divisional level (as well as the technical bankruptcy of “Rade Konar”, the 
former mother company) was chosen as the preferred short-term restructuring vehicle. 
Interestingly, it seems that those divisions choosing not to enter bankruptcy suffered more and 
needed more time to return to former performance levels, without much difference in the 
number of jobs saved. 
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Along with downsizing, most of the other elements of the organizational template match 
predictions from the research model. Heavy focus was placed on costs and financial liquidity. 
Asset disposal through the bankruptcy procedure was used as a one-off source of financing to 
start new activities, although due to the country’s poor economic situation and other 
unfavorable conditions its financial effects were very limited. The divisions focused on the 
use of available scarce resources and on much-reduced market goals, without any investment 
in new learning. 
 
The one element of the organizational template which did not match the predictions of the 
research model was the role of centralization. Although Konar’s financial management was 
completely centralized, in all other aspects the company remained highly decentralized. 
Several factors had contributed to this state of affairs. First of all, the new top management 
had no vision for the company, and was thus dependent on the divisional management to 
come up with visions for their own individual businesses. Secondly, the top management was 
heavily influenced by legal and financial interpretations of the previous ownership system, in 
which the major financial problems of single divisions could sink the whole company, even if 
that division was a separate legal entity. Thus a system was created with minimum 
dependency among its entities, in the hope that problems would not be propagated from one 
to another. Thirdly, Konar had a culture of mistrust towards central services and a great 
desire for divisional autonomy. A strong but incapable center was blamed for past problems, 
and the divisional management had no trust in any other solution offered. 
 
While the analysis of the trigger and the initial reaction in terms of the new organizational 
template mostly accord with the research model’s predictions, it is also obvious that none of 
the critical resources identified in the research model was present. According to the research 
model, this should imply an unsuccessful change effort. Due to the late reaction and the 
totally non-professional interim management, financial resources had been depleted before the 
change was even started. Internal control systems were poor. High levels of divisional 
autonomy reduced the transparency of performance for top management, and the 
simultaneous lack of company-wide management accounting and control systems and the lack 
of experienced managers also meant that divisions were left in the dark about their own 
performance. Given the radical downsizing measures it was difficult to optimize the use of 
human resources. The shock of the first downsizing phase eliminated nearly all trust in top 
management and significantly reduced trust in divisional management, but the latter at least 
had an opportunity to earn it from scratch, especially in the case of bankrupted divisions. 
Obviously, the top management faced difficult choices in selecting new divisional 
management: while most candidates with prior experience of leading the business lacked 
employee trust because they were regarded as partially responsible for the disaster, those with 
none were more likely to make mistakes, which were difficult to tolerate given the fragile 
financial situation. 
 
Finally, Konar’s top management failed to intervene as predicted by the research model. 
They chose bottom-up changes; did not engage intensively in communication and trust-
building; and were left with coercion as the only way to influence divisional management. 
The barriers they faced – apart from an extremely hostile business environment – were lack of 
trust, fear and confusion, and grossly inadequate non-technical business competence.  
 
Most of the components described above were very apparent throughout the period between 
1991 and 1998. However, from 1994 the external environment became somewhat less hostile. 
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In the meantime, the divisional and middle management had accumulated a bit of business 
experience under the new conditions, and the divisions had improved their business 
competence. Despite the observation of the top management in 1994 that the new 
organization was inadequate, no major interventions were attempted and the organizational 
template did not change significantly. Downsizing continued and most of the attributes of 
defensive restructuring remained, although this restructuring was carried out without a clear 
orientation. In this sense it can be argued that a second phase of change had begun which 
shared characteristics of defensive restructuring and of non-aligned change, defensive 
restructuring being present in the philosophy of the top management and non-aligned change 
in divisional management initiatives. One more major barrier to change meanwhile appeared 
in the context of privatization and poor control systems: an increasing misalignment of 
interests among divisional managers (especially those with significant ownership interests 
and/or loan repayment obligations) and other interest groups.  
 
The trigger for the third phase of change was directly related to the change in Konar’s top 
management. It is not clear whether the change in top management itself had resulted from 
the owners’ assessment that more radical change was required, but once it happened it 
produced a new evaluation of the need for and possibility of change. This evaluation was 
strongly influenced by industry dynamics and the increased transparency of company 
performance, but also by the profile of the new leader and his team. This time the assessment 
was positive, generating a more focused drive towards a different type of restructuring. 
 
The new organizational template was more unique than may be apparent at first glance. It was 
not created overnight; it included clear strategic positioning of the whole company and 
required individual divisions to align with it. Although the mother company still lacked 
resources, it began pushing the divisions to focus on critical success factors, from 
technological competence and new products to the building of closer contacts with customers 
and management development. Konar also started to engage more actively in organizational 
learning surrounding the best global practices, through consulting projects, systematic 
involvement in bidding processes, and international training programs. 
 
Because Konar still had a very limited financial potential at the start of the new development 
cycle, the top management capitalized on its quasi-monopoly position in the domestic market 
and secured several lucrative contracts allowing for learning, gaining access to the new 
generation of technical solutions, and building financial reserves. Although all of these were 
won in direct competition with multinational companies and according to regular bidding 
procedures, a close understanding of, and links with, the customers, plus the high levels of 
commitment displayed in government lobbying proved extremely important factors. 
 
Significant improvement in the transparency of performance of both individual divisions and 
the system as a whole was achieved. Use of international consultants as well as investment 
into IT and strict auditing procedures were all important here. Together with intensified 
communication, this generated more trust on the part of front line employees and most middle 
managers. Bago did not shy away from a leadership role, but he kept other members of the top 
management team involved and allowed the divisional management much initiative. In this 
way he avoided complete centralization and further resistance from the divisions. 
 
If anything departs from the predictions made on the basis of the research model, it is the 
higher level of coercion used (primarily through replacement of divisional managers). This 
can be explained by the growing pluralism of interests and the persistent culture of non-
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alignment with the center. Also, Bago was characterized as a stubborn and relatively poor 
listener, which certainly dampened two-way communication and slowed buy-in of the 
divisional and middle management, but seemed not to inflict immediate damage on either the 
trust and support he enjoyed from front-line employees, or company reaction to change. 
Nevertheless, it put both in potential jeopardy and required Bago to use his personal charisma 
to push ahead, which eventually made him highly dependent on good company results to buy 
the necessary time to make changes. 
5.4 Lek 
Lek is among the four largest pharmaceutical companies in Central and Eastern Europe and 
among the leading generic drug producers worldwide. In 2002 it had 370 million € of 
revenues, 2,350 employees in Slovenia, and 1,360 employees abroad. Since 2003 it has been 
part of Novartis. 
5.4.1 Brief overview of company history prior to 1991 
In the early period of development after its founding in 1946, Lek used the protected markets 
of former Yugoslavia to sell its own generic products and gain licensing rights from 
pharmaceutical multinational companies for production and sales of their products in local 
markets. After initial success in the domestic market, the company extended its licensing 
contracts to Central and East European countries, using the agreements allowing for barter 
trade between former Yugoslavia and COMECOM countries. At the same time Lek invested 
in improving and extending its production capacities, and started its own R&D department, 
which focused mainly on pharmaceutical products derived from the company’s own active 
pharmaceutical substances plus a few lower added value generic drugs. Patent legislation in 
former Yugoslavia and the Soviet block countries was process-oriented, which allowed for 
somewhat less restrictive patent protection and rapid expansion of product portfolio. 
 
By the late 1980s the company was enjoying stable growth and 50% of its sales were in 
exports. It continued to extend its product portfolio despite attempts by the federal 
government to impose a strict division of therapeutic classes on the country’s six 
pharmaceutical companies. Along with its core pharmaceutical business Lek developed highly 
profitable cosmetics, dental and veterinarian businesses, almost exclusively targeting 
Yugoslav markets. 
 
One key development from the organizational standpoint was the introduction of a long-term 
planning process. This allowed the company to formulate a strategy for the period up to 2000, 
which focused on further international growth and balanced development of its own and the 
licensed product portfolio. In accordance with this strategy, Lek paid substantial attention to 
hiring pharmaceutical experts and developing close cooperation with Slovenian universities, 
thus building up its R&D potential. 
 
According to the company documents and statements made by its top management, Lek was 
aware of the deteriorating situation in former Yugoslavia. In the regular strategy review of 
1990 the management estimated that the new situation would require a marketing network of 
fully-owned subsidiaries (as opposed to sales offices) in other republics of former Yugoslavia, 
and more emphasis on international sales. For the first time Lek committed itself to entering 
the US market, and to obtain FDA approval was required to make significant improvements 
throughout the company, in particular within R&D and production. In addition, Lek decided 
to change the balance in developed countries between sales of active substances and finished 
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drugs in favor of the latter. Both moves were to result in higher company margins, as prices 
on the domestic market were kept far below international levels, while the prices of raw 
materials corresponded to between 2% and 30% of the drug prices, making raw materials 
sales a low-margin business. 
 
In the course of initial growth and development the company developed a tight, hierarchical 
culture focused on achieving planned goals. In 1988 Lev Premru, who was seen by many as 
the visionary leader and careful architect of Lek’s past success, stepped down and passed the 
company to the financial director, Metod Dragonja. Dragonja was at that time 34 years old, 
and had spent his whole career in Lek, in various positions within finance. 
5.4.2 Changes in the period from 1991 to 1993 
By 1992 it became obvious that the management had underestimated the effects of the crisis 
and changes in former Yugoslavia and the Soviet block. Sales dropped by almost 30%, 
prompting the decision to reorganize and downsize the company. A global management 
consulting company was hired in 1992 to help with the process, with two main purposes. First 
of all, it helped Lek’s management to legitimize the need for change and in particular 
downsizing. Secondly, it brought in additional expertise and the benchmarking data needed 
for process improvements and reengineering projects. However, the consultants themselves 
were not expected to devise a new strategy for the company, since the top management 
strongly believed this would be inappropriate. Thus, they only advised on process efficiencies 
and optimal new organizational size and structure. 
 
After reviewing Lek’s strategy, the company management decided that no major change of 
strategy was needed in its core pharmaceutical business. Focus was on development of 
products for the USA and on intensifying efforts to build a sales and distribution network in 
Central and Eastern Europe, where Lek had to replace previous channels (primarily state-
owned importers) with new partners, typically small private distribution companies 
coordinated by Lek’s local sales office. At the same time, Lek also decided to establish its 
core business as a separate division, to facilitate better focus and more transparent results. 
 
The non-core businesses formed the other division. They had suffered from the loss of the 
large domestic market and had been forced to turn towards international markets for 
sustainability. This proved difficult, and results were very slow. However, since the share of 
non-core business in overall revenues was small, the problem never became a true priority for 
the company. Non-core businesses were managed at arms’ length, and interventions from the 
top were typically limited to the occasional replacement of business unit managers when 
results were poor, this often accompanied with small cash infusions from the core business. 
The ultimate goal was stated clearly: to help the non-core units to become self-sustainable, 
and then spin them off. 
 
Although Lek underwent significant reengineering and cost cutting processes, it did not 
decrease its commitment to R&D. The company managed to trim its workforce by 10% by 
relying strictly on soft measures such as early retirement and voluntary departures supported 
by severance pay. Comments on how well the downsizing process was managed, and how 
effective it was differ, with some remarks indicating inferior selectivity. Nevertheless, the 
general consensus was that it did not significantly hurt the company. Some managers claimed 
that it had positive effects, since it created awareness among employees that change was 
required and that job security was not guaranteed. Despite the fear that this engendered, it was 
regarded as supportive of change, since it reinforced the desired performance-oriented culture. 
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In introducing the changes described, Lek’s management intensified communication with its 
employees somewhat, but maintained a strict top-down approach, which it regarded as the 
most suitable for achieving fast reactions and which was obviously in line with company 
culture. 
 
According to Lek’s management, the most important resource in that period was the 
company’s ability to rapidly execute decisions made at the top. Part of this ability was 
attributed to the hierarchical, top-down culture, while another major factor was the 
employees’ trust in top management and in Dragonja in particular. This trust was based on the 
historical ability of these to deliver good results and keep promises, and was greatly 
reinforced by the positive image of the company in the local environment. Also important was 
the ability of the top management to achieve consensus on critical decisions, and to base them 
on a solid understanding of the environment, the industry, and the company’s current 
performance and future potential. This ability was the result of the strategic planning process, 
continuity in the top management, and the role Dragonja had in integrating the process and 
bridging individual differences within the Management Board. Lek’s solid level of 
professional competence as compared to its major regional competitors in key markets of 
former Yugoslavia and Central and Eastern Europe was also seen as highly important. 
Benchmarks were less clear in comparison with other pharmaceutical companies, this to some 
degree due to lack of information but also to the small sample of comparable generics 
companies of similar size and specific regional environment. 
 
External obstacles to change included the unfavorable macroeconomic situation, which put 
pressure on the company through severe market conditions and indirectly deflected its 
attention from important long-term issues, especially knowledge creation. Also, the first signs 
appeared of industry pressures related to intellectual property rights protection used as a 
competitive weapon. Internally, the biggest barriers were identified in the lack of knowledge 
and in related process inefficiencies. Fear of job loss appeared at all levels in the company and 
persisted despite the soft approach to downsizing, explicit communication and systemic HR 
action (such as making clear what qualified an employee to be “technological surplus”, i.e. to 
be made redundant). 
5.4.3 Changes in the period from 1993 to 1996 
After a period of intense defensive change Lek entered a period of more pronounced focus on 
growth. The management saw no need for major readjustment of the strategy throughout this 
period, although it acknowledged the existence of two new major factors influencing the 
company. 
 
The first was the privatization process. Like all other large Slovenian companies, Lek had 
entered the transition period as a socially-owned company. Its management showed clearly 
early on that it would fully respect the new legal provisions governing the privatization 
process. With Dragonja’s financial background and close links with both financial and 
political circles, the privatization process was handled by a small group of experts and 
managers from within the company and resulted in an ownership structure fairly typical of 
large Slovenian companies. Two parastatal funds were the largest shareholders, and the rest of 
the shares were divided among a small number of private investment funds and a large 
number of individual investors (which included virtually all Lek’s current and former 
employees). 50% of the newly-appointed Supervisory Board by law comprised employee 
representatives, which further strengthened internal influences. However, the influence of its 
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new owners and the Supervisory Board on Lek’s company strategy was not obvious in the 
initial period, since they never interfered with the strategic decisions made by the 
Management Board. 
 
The second important external factor which Lek’s management decided to consider was a 
change in regional policy on the part of the major pharmaceutical multinationals. After the 
initial changes in Central and Eastern Europe, almost all of these had decided to start dealing 
in the region directly, eliminating intermediaries such as Lek had been. To do this they 
gradually revoked licenses for production and sales of their products. This in turn forced Lek 
to further intensify its own R&D efforts – which resulted in the first ever USA approvals of 
finished pharmaceutical products to be awarded to any pharmaceutical company from Central 
and Eastern Europe. Given its limited resources, part of Lek’s reaction was to focus on 
strategic product groups and markets (primarily CEE, but also US). The company also 
furthered its process improvement efforts, intended to secure a better cost position and 
improved flexibility and time-to-market capabilities.  
 
Lek’s general orientation towards generics was not questioned, since the management 
interpreted global trends in the industry as favorable to the growth of generic business. They 
noted, however, the difference between US/UK markets, where generics prices depend very 
much on an exclusivity level, which after patent expiration generates very low prices in more 
competitive situations, and other markets (including CEE), where it was possible to brand 
generics and charge somewhat higher prices. 
 
The management understood that, given the nature of the industry, many concurrent activities 
were required to secure long-term growth based on predicted industry dynamics. They felt 
confident to pursue the course, and to wait at least three to five years for results. 
 
Lek continued to rely on top-down communication and the strong support which Dragonja 
enjoyed among employees. The management prepared for a new strategy review in 1996 
determined to maintain detailed five-year planning despite the intensity of change in the 
environment. To facilitate adaptive implementation and fast reaction to changes requiring 
strategy readjustment, and to cope with the numerous improvement activities, they focused on 
project management as a tool to operationalize decisions made at the top. Management Board 
members were made responsible for key projects, with project groups then staffed with 
middle managers and professionals. While the top management set clear and measurable 
project objectives, it was left to project teams to come up with solutions to the problems they 
encountered during project implementation. If they needed human, financial and other 
resources, they were expected to produce detailed arguments and convince top management to 
allocate them. Pressure on performance increased, and more middle managers lost their 
positions. Although they were not hurt in any other way (e.g. they were even allowed to retain 
their salary levels after demotion), these people typically had to wait a long time for another 
opportunity. This increased the level of internal competition, further stimulated by renewed 
hiring and development of young talent, both in technical and commercial areas. 
 
The 1996 strategy review confirmed the validity of the general direction the company was 
taking. It also indicated that significant growth opportunities existed, including options for 
external growth, but that the company might need a strategic partner to exploit some of them. 
If it relied on its own resources, the company had in principle to deploy the same set of 
competences identified in the previous period. More focus was placed on the quality of the 
distribution network in Central and Eastern Europe, as well as on R&D capability. 
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Additionally, project management competence gained in importance as project management 
had been selected as the primary tool for strategy implementation and change management. 
 
Barriers to change also did not significantly change in this period. Increasing pressures from 
multinational companies acted as a major external constraint, while lack of knowledge 
remained an important obstacle, although major progress was made in terms of organizational 
learning (more basic levels were mastered and new areas opened, especially in R&D, 
international management etc.). Finally, it became clear that middle management was a 
potentially greater barrier to change than were front-line employees. This was mainly due to 
Lek’s performance-oriented company culture, which left little room for mistakes, thus 
generating great fear of non-performance and, accordingly, a few deviant behavior patterns. 
5.4.4 Changes in the period from 1997 to 1998 
Having announced no major change in strategy in 1996, Dragonja left Lek to become Minister 
of Economic Affairs. He was succeeded by Vojmir Urleb, previously in charge of 
pharmaceuticals sales and marketing. Although initially supported by the Supervisory Board, 
Urleb soon came under pressure from various internal and external stakeholders fighting for 
influence over the company. He failed to homogenize the Management Board and maintain a 
good relationship with Supervisory Board, and was eventually forced to step down. He was 
replaced by Andrej Ocvirk, a former minister and senior executive of the national oil 
company.  
 
Although an experienced manager, Ocvirk was at the same time a complete outsider to the 
pharmaceutical industry and to Lek. Therefore he did not try to make any significant changes 
to the strategy in the short run. He managed to retain the staunch support of the Supervisory 
Board, but failed to win the trust of the senior and middle management, especially when it 
became obvious that he intended to change the company’s value system by, among other 
things, deploying the power of employee Supervisory Board delegates and of the workers 
council. He allowed them high informal influence, which created a leadership dichotomy. 
 
Along with the growing leadership crisis, Lek was in 1998 hit by three relatively unexpected 
external events which forced the company to react. The Russian crisis had an immediate, 
negative impact on Lek’s cash flow and projected profits, necessitating a decision: whether to 
emulate the majority of pharmaceutical multinationals and significantly reduce risk exposure 
in Russia; or to remain, do business as usual and hope to collect the receivables at some later 
date, with the increasing probability of bankruptcy for some partners. 
 
Another blow came from Japan, where Lek was dragged into a lawsuit over alleged patent 
violation and had to decide whether to fight the case or opt for a relatively costly settlement 
(Lek eventually decided for the latter, through fear that the company lacked enough legal 
expertise in the intellectual property area to enter the battle; the settlement caused a major 
write-off against 1998 results). Finally, the FDA questioned the quality of Lek’s clinical 
testing and revoked already-issued approvals for products sold in the US market, resulting in a 
costly recall of the products already in distribution channels, and stop of the sale. 
 
The senior management did not agree with the way Ocvirk handled the crisis. Arguing the 
poor 1998 results, they pressured the Supervisory Board to oust Ocvirk, and Dragonja was 
asked to return to the company.  
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Looking at this period it is fairly obvious that the company lost internal trust as its critical 
resource, as well as the ability to reach consensus at the top and orchestrate fast execution. 
Lack of alignment at the top also led to growing diversity of stakeholder interests, and the 
resulting power struggle became a major obstacle to change. 
5.4.5 Changes in the period from 1999 to 2003 
Dragonja and his team claimed that the 1998 crisis demanded no major departure from the 
previously-set strategy. Nevertheless, the company did make several important changes in its 
approach to strategy execution.  
 
While the company decided not to pull out of Russia, it acknowledged the need to run CEE 
operations more tightly than before. This led to further strengthening of Lek’s subsidiaries 
throughout the region, including new acquisitions and an increase in manufacturing capacity 
outside of Slovenia (a move partially in anticipation of Slovenia’s accession to the EU). The 
governance of subsidiaries was centralized and formalized, thus decreasing the risk of 
surprises. 
 
Taking a more cooperative stance with the FDA, Lek soon provided enough information to 
eliminate doubts and regain its product approvals. Then it decided to avoid intermediaries and 
build its own sales organization in the US, justifying the move with extremely tight margins. 
However, this demanded a build-up in volumes, plus further improvements to process 
efficiency within the company. ABC costing was introduced to facilitate process 
improvement and tighter cost control. 
 
The Management Board felt comfortable with project management as the key tool pushing the 
ownership of strategy implementation down to middle management level. In addition, they 
introduced the balanced scorecard and annual interviews for the top three levels of 
management. Although feedback indicated a certain lack of skills at all levels in setting 
concrete goals, the new systems were generally regarded as reinforcing communication 
between Lek’s top management and the rest of the company. 
 
Finally, the top management began to pay considerably more attention to risk management. 
This was seen as especially critical, since the company had returned to high annual growth 
rates of 20–30%, which threatened to deplete the available resources. Human resources were 
stretched thin despite the intensive hiring and development of young talent, some employees 
being offered managerial positions early on in their careers. Financial resources were regarded 
as even more critical. Assessing growth potential and its associated risks, the Management 
Board concluded that Lek had serious resource constraints, hindering the company from fully 
utilizing the potential of its product portfolio, especially in US and European Union markets. 
They also felt that the strong sales and distribution network in CEE might benefit from a 
wider product portfolio than Lek could provide in the near future. Finally, they observed that 
new technologies were demanding further specialization in R&D, and that this would 
eventually increase risks for companies in the area. At the same time, Lek’s owners stated 
clearly that they expected Lek to continue growing at high rates and with improving returns. 
 
This analysis prompted Lek’s top management to commence an active search for a strategic 
partner. Although this was fully in line with the strategy articulated back in 1996 and 
approved by the Supervisory Board, it was decided to prepare the project in full detail before 
making it public. A small team worked on it, eventually concluding that Novartis would be an 
ideal partner. All the details were worked out with Novartis’ management, the deal heavily 
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influenced by Dragonja’s confidence that he could persuade key stakeholders to accept 
Novartis, provided that Novartis and Lek acted responsibly in their partnership and observed 
vital stakeholder interests. Then the top management made a public announcement of Lek’s 
intentions and on the same day mounted a major internal communication campaign focusing 
on the benefits for Lek, and addressing the predictable concerns of the employees. The latter’s 
main concerns were in the areas of job security and loss of identity. According to the 
interviews, some doubts remained despite the campaign, but employees granted their support 
to the deal because of their trust in Dragonja and in the sound judgment of the Management 
Board. As a result, the association of employee shareholders issued the recommendation to its 
members to sell their shares to Novartis. 
 
The media and Slovenia’s general public reacted very negatively to the announcement, 
questioning the need to sell the company and voicing concerns about the consequences of 
foreign ownership, both for the company and the local community. Major shareholders also 
had reservations. To great surprise, despite Dragonja’s excellent links with the political elite, 
both parastatal funds declined to sell their shares to Novartis at the conditions offered, thus 
effectively blocking the takeover. However, Lek’s management persisted and, after additional 
lobbying and a price increase Novartis managed to acquire the company and start the 
integration process. 
 
Once again, Lek’s top management relied on proven tools to manage the change. It engaged 
in heavy internal top-down communications, explaining the set goals related to the integration 
process, which was limited to two years. Joint project teams were established with Sandoz, 
the generics unit of Novartis. These were charged with operationalizing the integration 
strategy. Since Lek was of a size similar to the biggest Sandoz companies, its integration 
resembled a merger much more than a takeover. After identifying the quick wins possible 
over the first six months, the focus shifted to realizing growth synergies, the prime motive for 
the partnership. Establishing a joint business plan for 2004 was the main target, with work on 
a joint mid-term strategy to begin immediately afterwards. It was made explicit that 
convergence of cultures was not an objective of integration. 
 
Examining the key resources in this period of Lek’s development, the top management was 
unanimous in identifying several complex competences: R&D capability in the generics area 
(including intellectual property rights know-how), process efficiencies (including 
performance transparency and various areas of process know-how), a high-potential product 
portfolio, brand and distribution strength in Central and Eastern Europe, and a significant 
level of self-confidence combined with the readiness to learn. Homogeneity at the top and the 
ability to orchestrate fast execution despite fast growth in size were also indicated as critical 
organizational competences. 
 
At the same time, most of the senior managers agreed that some of the competences had 
negative sides, too, in increasing barriers to change. In particular, the result-oriented culture 
limited readiness for true experimentation and innovation in business terms. Bottom-up 
communication was not of the same quality as top-down, and there were high stress levels 
among middle managers related to fear of non-performance. Lack of specialized knowledge 
and experience, especially as to global business within a large multinational, was also seen as 
a potential barrier to successful strategy implementation. 
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5.4.6 Summary of research findings from the Lek case 
Four cycles of change can be identified in the recent history of Lek, one of them having the 
attributes of defensive restructuring, two those of strategic restructuring, and one the 
prevailing characteristics of non-aligned change. It is worth noting that the company nurtures 
a strong culture of evolutionary change and had already begun the strategic restructuring 
process in the 1980s. Thus, Lek’s defensive restructuring can be seen as a reaction to specific 
circumstances, after which the company returned to the strategic restructuring mode. Because 
of the nature of the industry, which is – even for generic companies – driven by long product 
development cycles and characterized by relatively high returns, none of the change cycles 
incurred dramatic shifts in the strategy. Both non-strategic restructuring periods were 
relatively short, and during them the company managed not to undermine its strategic market 
position severely or compromise its core competence. Although both periods stemmed from 
deteriorating financial performance and generated redundancies (in the first period they took 
place mostly at the bottom of the company, while in the second period they affected the very 
top), Lek maintained enough financial strength to continue investing in R&D. However, it is 
noticeable that R&D performance and the company’s overall learning capacity were impaired 
during these periods. 
 
The trigger for the first phase was the top management’s interpretation of Lek’s ability to 
sustain business despite its relatively solid initial financial position. The assessment was 
influenced by the nature of the industry as well as by lack of transparency as to performance 
of core versus non-core activities. A trusted leadership contributed positively to the start of 
the change, while financial slack slowed down the initial reaction but supported the change 
once it began. 
 
The organizational template was altered in terms of strategic focus (which was placed more 
clearly on core business and Central and East European markets), organizational design 
(divisional organization to facilitate performance transparency, but a high level of 
centralization within it) and tactical implications (cost reduction through reengineering and 
downsizing). 
 
The evidence from the first change period fully confirms the predictions of the research model 
as regards critical resources and leadership interventions. As regards resources, it is worth 
noting that the nature of the industry and the soft approach to restructuring also left room for 
use of resources aimed at adding value, not just reducing costs. As in some previous cases, 
strategic uncertainty was not observed as constituting a barrier to change, although other 
predicted barriers were present. 
 
The third cycle of change is particularly interesting from the research model perspective. It 
shows the company passing from a strategic restructuring mode of change into a non-aligned 
change mode. The top management itself was changed, thus producing alterations in the 
organizational template despite the assessment that no major changes in the strategy were 
necessary. With differing assessments among top managers as to the meaning of external 
events and the company’s ability to cope with them, Lek was left without a consensus 
regarding the need and direction of change. Only once the middle and some of the senior 
managers had assessed the need for change as urgent was the next cycle of change triggered, 
despite its seemingly meager chances of success (lack of Supervisory Board support and the 
resistance of the public media). This cycle also confirms the importance of trust as a critical 
resource: the faction within the top management who managed to build the trust of key 
Nenad Filipovi  Chapter 5 
Strategic Change Management of Medium-Size Companies:   
Insights from Slovenia and Croatia   
 137 
stakeholders (including middle management and front-line employees) not only won the 
power struggle, but was able to proceed with the desired changes. 
 
As implied above, the transition to strategic restructuring between the first and the second as 
well as the third and the fourth cycles of change was triggered primarily by management 
assessment that there was no immediate need for defensive reaction, but that, at the same 
time, the environment required changes. Although a vision of the future was not stated in a 
particularly powerful, dramatic way, it was clear enough to serve as a frame for the strategy. It 
also allowed for changing interpretation of priorities. For example, in the second phase the 
scope of business was obviously defined as international with a focus on CEE and the USA, 
while in the fourth phase it took on a more global character.  
 
All three elements of the organizational template predicted by the research model are clearly 
identifiable in Lek’s strategic restructuring. Along with clear strategic positioning (as a global 
generic company with value adding capacity), explicit references were made within the 
company to elements of the value chain supporting the position from the cost and value 
adding perspective. Learning from the benchmarking carried out by the hired consultants as 
well as learning from Novartis confirm the (least obvious) third prediction. All the critical 
resources needed to successfully implement change as predicted by the model can also be 
identified as important in Lek’s case. Naturally, they are complemented by a few specific 
competences related to the industry and the business model. 
 
As regards leadership interventions, project management as used by Lek can be interpreted as 
a form of bottom-up change management and a participation-building mechanism. This 
confirms the presence of all three interventions. It is interesting to note that Lek also 
demonstrated an intervention not foreseen by the research model: the removal of non-
performing middle managers. 
 
Finally, barriers for change during the strategic restructuring phases in essence accord with 
the predictions of the research model, with the exception of a growing pluralism of interests 
which, although present, was not seen as a major barrier to change. Change fatigue was 
noticeable, but was to a large degree eliminated as a barrier by the high implicit reward 
potential of the “merger” with Sandoz, as well as through the relatively high frequency of 
changes in middle management positions. 
5.5 Ljubljanske mlekarne 
Ljubljanske mlekarne is Slovenia’s largest dairy company and is among the country’s largest 
food business. In 2002 it had 180 million € of sales and around 1,000 employees.  
5.5.1 Brief overview of the company history prior to 1991 
Ljubljanske mlekarne was established in 1956 as a small dairy serving the needs of the 
farmers’ cooperative in the Ljubljana region. It was started as a milk bottling facility, but soon 
extended its product portfolio to yogurts, creams, cheese and ice-cream, adding the necessary 
simple production technology.  
 
After about a decade of non-ambitious development the company decided on its first major 
technology overhaul, introducing long-life (UHT) milk based on up-to-date western 
production technology. This allowed the company to extend its geographic reach and enter 
markets throughout former Yugoslavia more aggressively. It soon launched the Alpine milk 
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brand for its UHT milk, which became one of the best-recognized brands in former 
Yugoslavia. In 1969 Ljubljanske mlekarne continued its expansion by merging with two small 
regional dairies in Slovenia, while in 1970 it merged with two mid-sized dairies in northern 
Serbia and created its own retail network. In accordance with former Yugoslavia’s dominant 
economic policy in the early 1970s, Ljubljanske mlekarne became part of a larger system 
under the name of KIT, created with the idea of vertical integration and including farms, 
dairies and retail. 
 
The demand for dairy products was growing and the company continued its slow expansion 
until the end of the 1980s. Although present in markets outside of Slovenia, a significant 
majority of its sales were still local. It was the largest dairy in Slovenia and was well 
recognized for the quality of its products. While the purchasing price of raw milk and the 
market prices of fresh and UHT milk were dictated by the state, the prices of other products 
were not regulated, which allowed the company to achieve reasonable margins.  
 
Since the markets were protected by highly restrictive import regulations which banned 
imports of many dairy products, as well as by high customs tariffs for the others, Ljubljanske 
mlekarne had to compete only with other local dairies. By and large, these were 
technologically far behind Ljubljanske mlekarne and could not match its product quality, 
making the latter a major differentiating factor in the markets. Thus, throughout the growth 
period the company’s main focus was on maintaining the production technology advantage, 
while marketing was significantly less developed. Both purchasing and sales logistics were 
also quite rudimentary, since the achieved margins did not require true focus on cost 
optimization and retail was relatively dispersed. While the performance of individual parts 
within the KIT system was not very transparent, by the mid-1980s it became fairly obvious 
that the dairy was not achieving good financial results. The KIT system fell apart in 1985 and 
the dairy remained part of Merkator, the retail chain that had been formed within the former 
KIT system and to which the company also contributed its own retail network. 
 
Under the influence of the local political elite, Merkators’ top management appointed Mihael 
Urbanija as general manager of the dairy. His background was in finance, and before coming 
to the dairy he had served as the manager of the internal bank which was part of KIT and later 
Merkator. Using a conservative approach to financial issues, he soon consolidated the 
company’s financial situation and became the undisputed leader of the company despite his 
autocratic style. 
 
In 1987 the political situation in former Yugoslavia had already deteriorated significantly and 
tensions appeared between Serbia and Slovenia. The Serbian units decided to split off from 
the dairy and regain independence, which was not a problem under the legal system of the 
time. Since the units in question were operated in a fairly autonomous way in any case, the 
split did not significantly hurt the dairy’s performance. Despite political problems, sales of 
UHT milk and other products in other republics of former Yugoslavia remained relatively 
strong, making up about 30% of overall revenues. 
5.5.2 Changes in the period from 1991 to 1998 
In 1990 and 1991 Urbanija and his team analyzed the changes in the environment devastating 
many Slovenian companies. They foresaw two different principle outcomes. On the one hand, 
it was already clear that Ljubljanske mlekarne would lose its market position in Serbia and 
suffer from smaller sales in other republics of former Yugoslavia. This would create some 
problems for the company, because the portion of revenues coming from those markets was 
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expected to shrink by some 10%, which would negatively impact capacity utilization of the 
production plants in Slovenia.  
 
On the other hand, Slovenia was to become a separate country with its own farming policy 
and import regulations. This was regarded as a major opportunity to increase sales in the local 
market, especially in the cheese segment. Also, the EU’s relatively liberal import policy, still 
valid in the early 1990s, allowed the company to export fresh milk to Italy. The management 
estimated that the overall balance of external factors would, at least in the short run, be rather 
unfavorable for the company, but would also not require major change to the business model. 
Being part of the retail chain also guaranteed a safe (although limited) distribution network 
and no liquidity problems. Thus, while proclaiming a hiring freeze and some other minor 
cost-cutting measures, the management kept its focus on production and local sales as the key 
areas for the company.  
 
In 1992 Urbanija started discussions with Merkator’s top management, which led to 
agreement that both companies would be better off if the dairy became independent. Thus on 
October 1, 1992 Ljubljanske mlekarne was established as a fully independent legal entity. 
 
Urbanija believed that size mattered, a conviction aligned with his strong ego, so he began 
another round of investments in technology improvement and capacity upgrades, as well as an 
intense quality improvement program which resulted in an ISO 9001 certificate. Because of 
the strong influence of the farmers, an increase in capacity was also seen as the only possible 
reaction to the increasing production of raw milk in Slovenia, despite the fact that demand for 
dairy products in local markets did not match this increase and that exports were mostly of 
commodity products like fresh and powdered milk, at relatively low prices which generated 
losses even after government export subsidies. 
 
The increase in capacity was not matched with product portfolio improvements. Brand and 
product management were virtually nonexistent, which led to a poorly-balanced product 
portfolio and gradual loss of market share in some important categories, especially in higher 
added value products like ice-cream and yogurt. Markets began to open up but the company 
did not react to increasing competition, even after 1995, when foreign rivals became quite 
aggressive. The company’s top management proclaimed the need to bring new products to the 
market, but did little to truly improve the performance in that area. Marketing and R&D had 
little organizational weight, as opposed to production and domestic sales organization, while a 
totally restrictive hiring policy did not allow the company to develop competence in those 
areas.  
 
The gradual concentration of retail, especially after 1996, required improvements in 
distribution. These were implemented relatively successfully, which enabled the company to 
keep distribution of the whole range of products in its hands, earning additional margins. 
Ljubljanske mlekarne even used the situation to start distributing non-competitive products 
for foreign dairies and other food companies. 
 
Urbanija requested his subordinates to prepare worked-out feasibility studies for every single 
improvement project, in production as well as in other areas of the company. He had an 
excellent understanding of the industry, an eye for detail and the willingness to spend a 
significant amount of time checking the plans. His detailed questioning generated resentment 
from the middle management, hampering the latter’s willingness to take initiative. In the end 
it had a negative impact on the speed of the projects, but also ensured that no major mistakes 
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were made. Urbanija was aware of some problems at the middle management level, but 
mostly blamed them on the incompetence of individuals. 
 
In 1998 the company completed the privatization process. As opposed to the situation in most 
other industries, the privatization of dairy companies was highly regulated and gave priority 
to farmers’ cooperatives, allowing them to obtain significant shares in Ljubljanske mlekarne. 
Thus, milk producers became the single most important group of company shareholders, 
followed by the state, investment funds and small shareholders (mostly employees and 
company retirees). 
 
During the 1990s Urbanija drifted into a more autocratic style of management, which was 
pushed to an extreme when he developed an illness that greatly impaired his management 
capabilities. The company’s middle management began to fear his volcanic reactions and 
avoided communicating with him unless he demanded it, which soon created a pattern of 
strict top-down communication throughout the company. Relations between departments 
worsened and teamwork practically disappeared, since most of the managers were concerned 
only with protecting themselves from accusations of poor performance. It did not mean much 
that the accusations were not followed by sanctions; Urbanija’s intimidating style was seen as 
punishment enough. Erratic promotions, mostly based on Urbanija’s personal preferences, 
contributed to the further weakening of top and middle management, and only a few 
individuals had the appropriate professional competence and were willing to take initiative 
within their own areas. 
5.5.3 Changes in the period from 1999 to 2001 
Ljubljanske mlekarne became a joint stock company but was not listed on the stock exchange, 
and trading of its shares went on only through brokerages. This relieved the company of 
short-term worries about its share price. Urbanija successfully lobbied the company’s owners 
to appoint a friendly Supervisory Board and subsequently made considerable efforts to 
manage the relationship with it. Detailed planning procedures, already developed in the 
previous period, were used to prepare the company’s annual as well as its mid-term plans. 
However, the focus seemed to be more on extrapolative than strategic planning. 
 
Urbanija soon discovered that not all the owners had the same interests or willingness to 
engage with the company. He managed to keep under control those Supervisory Board 
members who were employee representatives, and did not see much of the initiative taken by 
the representatives of the government and municipality. On the other hand, pressures began 
from the farmers and the investment funds, but each in a slightly different direction. 
 
The farmers were primarily concerned with the quantity and price of the raw milk Ljubljanske 
mlekarne was purchasing, and pushed for more production. They used their political influence 
well: the party representing the farmers was, after all, throughout the 1990s the most active 
player on the political scene in Slovenia, often changing sides and skillfully securing the 
interests of its constituency in political bargains. With Slovenia’s imminent accession to the 
EU it was clear that the country quota for milk production would be assigned at or below the 
level of production at the time of accession. Therefore the farmers increased production to 
significantly above what the Slovenian market needed. While Ljubljanske mlekarne had 
already been forced to accept this game by the mid-1990s, it escalated towards the end of the 
decade. 
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The investment funds saw their position in Ljubljanske mlekarne as safe, but felt that it 
brought relatively low rates of return. They did not push to increase their shares, nor did they 
show a desire to sell over a short period of time. They did signal, however, that they would be 
happier if the company did something to improve returns, primarily through using economies 
of scale or by diversifying into more profitable lines of business within the food industry. 
Although previous experiences with diversification into water and ice tea had not been 
financially successful, the idea was kept alive. 
 
Urbanija saw an opportunity to satisfy both groups of owners in taking over smaller regional 
competitors. He targeted two out of the five largest dairy companies in Slovenia and 
orchestrated mergers. Although attempts of this nature in Slovenia were highly sensitive 
politically, as there was great anti-Ljubljana sentiment in the regions, Urbanija skillfully 
played on the threat that EU accession posed for small dairies, as well as on the financial 
weakness of the companies targeted, and convinced them of the advantages of consolidating 
under Ljubljanske mlekarne’s wing. The company’s excellent image and good political 
connections, supported by the influence of the farmer-owners, helped to complete the process 
smoothly in 2001. 
 
Additional capacity significantly increased the company’s operating costs. Given low 
utilization rates in the newly-added plants it was completely obvious that the company should 
consolidate production and close the smaller ones, but also take other cost-cutting measures. 
One was to decrease the price of raw milk, which was substantially above the EU average. 
This was bitterly opposed by the Slovenian farmers association, which claimed that the dairies 
had profits high enough not to require price decreases but to actually support increases. 
Thwarted, they took to the streets with heavy tractors and blocked all the access roads to 
Ljubljanske mlekarne, generating estimated company losses of 2 million €. Despite negative 
public opinion and considerable media pressure, the farmers used coercion and skillful 
lobbying of the government to obtain concessions from the dairies. 
 
In 2000 the main production plant of Ljubljanske mlekarne temporarily lost its export permit 
for the EU. Although this did not significantly affect the company’s immediate financial 
position, it provided another signal that further efforts in the purchasing logistics and 
production areas were needed, and that the competences existing in the company were not 
producing results because of poor climate and inappropriate management. Urbanija continued 
to exercise his highly autocratic style without making any strategically-important decisions. 
His health deteriorating, and in the face of major challenges involving the consolidation of the 
company and its integration into the EU, as well as poor cooperation with the middle 
management, he decided not to renew his term when it expired in May 2001. However, to 
secure his future influence on the company he named Matjaž Vehovec, a member of the 
middle management team, as his successor. 
5.5.4 Changes in the period from 2001 to 2003 
The Supervisory Board duly appointed Vehovec to succeed Urbanija, and asked him to 
prepare a mid-term strategy for the company. Vehovec had spent 13 years with Ljubljanske 
mlekarne in various capacities: expert in food technology, head of farm production and 
marketing director. He did not belong to the top management, but was the only member of a 
wider group with both a degree in and significant experience surrounding food technology, 
and an advanced degree in business and solid experience in all the company’s major business 
processes except finance. 
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Vehovec decided to sideline all the members of the previous top management team, including 
Urbanija, who stayed on as advisor. This created some tensions, especially when Urbanija 
realized that he was losing his influence, but Vehovec firmly concluded the process within a 
few months of taking over the company. He replaced the “old guard” with two colleagues 
from middle management and hired a new executive director for sales and marketing. The 
new team engaged in extensive discussions of new company strategy, and tried to make a 
realistic assessment of strategic challenges. At the same time, they were aware of the different 
interests of the various groups of owners and tried to find solutions which would not provoke 
direct confrontation. 
 
Vehovec and his colleagues identified several key external forces that, in their opinion, 
required immediate reaction by the company. Looking at what had happened to Austrian 
dairies after accession to the EU, they concluded that there would be significant pressure on 
domestic market share, probably resulting in a 15-20% decrease in domestic sales. They also 
concluded that a major consolidation of farmers was likely, which would result in a 
significantly lower number of milk producers but also in increased quantities per producer. 
This development would have a positive impact on purchasing logistics, but would also 
increase the negotiating power of the remaining farmers. 
 
Another important prediction concerned growing pressure from retail chains. Ljubljanske 
mlekarne observed rising pressure from this quarter, and especially from substantial 
consolidation within Slovenian retail, where the largest customer already accounted for close 
to 40% of domestic sales. It was probable that the company would have to become more 
active in brand and category management, and show more readiness to introduce private 
labels. Also, the largest retailer began to consolidate its logistics, and the top management 
estimated it was only the matter of time before Ljubljanske mlekarne would be forced to give 
up its own logistics (except perhaps the cold chain). This would also mean that the profitable 
business of distribution for other food companies would be lost. 
 
The next area of expected changes concerned Ljubljanske mlekarne’s position in the region. 
This topic provoked the most controversial debate and it took the management almost two 
years to reach a consensus. On the one hand, the company had had significant experience in 
the markets of other countries of former Yugoslavia. In the 1990s it had maintained an 
indirect presence in Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina, working through agents and 
distributors in order to minimize risk. Vehovec concluded that it was time for the company to 
establish its own subsidiaries in these countries, but also that it should consider buying a local 
dairy or even starting greenfield production. The management forecast major trade barriers 
between Slovenia and countries of former Yugoslavia once Slovenia joined the EU, making 
local production the only feasible strategic means of staying in the market with low margin, 
price-sensitive products such as milk. Although this preliminary conclusion was arrived at in 
late 2001, by mid-2003 Ljubljanske mlekarne had still not yet set up its own production 
facility, since the company was seeking the optimal way of doing so and was suffering a 
severe management bottleneck in moving forward. 
 
Another factor influencing this discussion was a scandal resulting from inappropriate use of 
antibiotics by a small group of Slovenian farmers. Although the quantities found in raw milk 
never presented a health hazard and the company managed to keep all of its products free of 
antibiotics, media reporting of the scandal was out of all proportion and badly damaged sales 
throughout the region. While domestic sales returned to normal levels after a while, exports 
suffered to the extent that the management had to consider dropping the Alpine milk brand in 
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Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina. The incident confirmed the vulnerability and potentially 
high cost of brand support in those countries; and combined with extreme price sensitivity, 
relatively low demand for certain product groups and increasing competition, the management 
concluded that the two markets had only limited potential. Therefore, they looked for another 
able to absorb some of the necessary quantities dictated by the high raw milk production 
levels in Slovenia, and decided to enter the neighboring market of north-east Italy. However, 
as of mid-2003 no concrete actions had been taken in that direction. 
 
Another major strategic issue under discussion by the top management was whether to build 
the future strategic position around a strategic partnership or to try to remain independent. 
Obviously, a decision would also have an impact on the future ownership structure. Various 
possibilities were discussed, especially since Lura, a Croatian competitor of similar size, had 
made a public approach to Ljubljanske mlekarne in 2003, stating its interest in buying the 
company. Several other companies, including a major multinational, had showed similar 
interest. Although no decision had been made as of mid-2003, the management had clearly 
indicated that a top priority was to select and present to the Supervisory Board the optimal 
model for future development. 
 
The demands of increasing competition and pressures in the domestic and export markets 
made the management move fast in its efforts to optimize internal business processes and 
achieve a better cost position. Consolidation included downsizing through retirements and 
voluntary departures, but also several business optimization projects, such as consolidation of 
production into three out of its initial six locations. For the first time the company addressed 
marketing issues systematically, among other things reshaping its visual identity and 
consolidating its brand and product portfolio. More focus was placed on new product 
development, but with limited short term results. Detailed analyses of the market situation 
were prepared for all product groups, with the aim of creating mid-term strategies per product 
group. However, these analyses suffered from too much extrapolation and lack of clarity in 
the implementation of new regional strategy. All the projects were supervised from the top, 
but required the intense involvement of the middle management, although some of the latter 
complained that they had little influence over key elements of the strategy they were 
preparing. External consultants were brought in for more demanding projects, with those of a 
global management consultancy focusing on improvements in logistics, the most complex 
process within the company.  
 
In parallel with consolidation efforts and the preparation of first drafts of new strategic plans, 
the company began a project to introduce a new ERP system. Vehovec and his team believed 
that the detailed reporting formats introduced by Urbanija had obscured the true performance 
of individual business lines, and wanted to improve the use of information in decision-making 
(and possibly rewarding, although that was not the immediate goal), as well as generally 
improve internal business processes through heavier use of IT. 
 
In the initial phases of intense project work it became clear that some middle managers had 
problems adapting to the new style of work, which placed more emphasis on teamwork and 
initiative-taking. Vehovec decided to invest further in management development, but also 
engaged in redesigning the organizational structure and finding the best people for different 
positions. This proved to be a major challenge, since a decade of restrictive hiring and 
inconsistent HR decisions had significantly depleted the talent pool, while attracting new 
talent was difficult in the small Slovenian labor market and in view of the company’s not-
overly-competitive offering. 
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Vehovec seemed to truly believe in teamwork, and despite his excellent understanding of the 
business on both strategic and tactical levels and the fact that Ljubljanske mlekarne was one 
of the rare large Slovenian companies with a one-man Management Board, he depended fully 
on the other members of the top team in making all the critical decisions. He communicated 
assiduously with the Supervisory Board, and lobbied externally, but also increased the time he 
spent with middle management. However, some managers regarded his non-confrontational 
style and cautious decision-making as a probable cause of the relatively slow implementation 
of some key projects. Vehovec, on the other hand, saw two critical obstacles to faster change: 
strong and diverging owners’ interests, including a potential conflict of interest on the part of 
the farmers with their influence in Slovenian politics; and lack of talent in the middle, which 
he found difficult to change fast. Although he believed that top management had to produce 
answers to these problems, he also believed that pushing against the will of major 
stakeholders would eventually damage the company rather than generate change. 
5.5.5 Summary of research findings from the Ljubljanske mlekarne case 
Three different phases can be observed in the case of Ljubljanske mlekarne, and there are 
indications that a fourth phase is just being entered. The first phase was clearly in the period 
from 1991 to 1998, when the company modified its organizational template from that of the 
previous period, but only to a minor extent. In Urbanija’s assessment, the changes in the 
environment did not demand any immediate reaction beyond a bit of cost focus and an 
informal hiring freeze. He was influenced by mixed signals concerning industry dynamics and 
the financial situation of the company, by problems with the middle management, and by his 
aspirations to be the industry leader in Slovenia. Thus the company engaged in some 
improvements but did not depart from its production orientation and the fairly local business 
model. It is interesting to note that the amount of organizational learning during this period 
seem to have been extremely limited, to a large degree as a result of Urbanija’s intimidating 
leadership style. 
 
The second phase was triggered by privatization, the assessment Urbanija made of the future 
of the Slovenian dairy industry, and his continuing desire to be the industry leader. He 
believed that the company had limited but sufficient resources, although he obviously 
concentrated primarily on financial and production resources, as opposed to human resources 
and market related competence. Although there was a potential for strategic restructuring, the 
opportunity was lost even in the design phase. No clear vision was established and no 
resource synergy optimization or other changes to the organizational template were attempted. 
Thus there was an immediate shift to non-aligned change, rather than strategic restructuring. 
 
The third phase was triggered by the new assessment prepared by Vehovec and his team. 
They had arrived at a much more critical view of the situation and estimated that urgent action 
was required, despite unfavorable forces in and around the company reducing the chances of 
its success. First of all, they regarded industry dynamics as highly negative, seeing many more 
threats than immediate opportunities in EU accession. They also estimated that continuing 
institutional pressures could play a negative role for the company. Although lacking 
transparent performance data, they estimated that the company’s financial stability would not 
last more than a few years. Vehovec was also concerned about a legacy of distorted company 
culture, and about the very limited number of high-potential managers. This prompted 
defensive restructuring, with a clear focus on cost improvements and in particular the 
consolidation of production facilities. However, strong institutional pressures and a relatively 
solid short-term financial position allowed the management to avoid drastic action. 
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The new organizational template in late 2001 and 2002 leaned clearly towards defensive 
restructuring. Centralization was high, since Vehovec and his team made all the strategic 
decisions and most of the tactical ones. Some asset restructuring related to production 
consolidation took place, but without much impact on the financial situation. Most projects 
focused on cost improvements, from purchasing logistics and negotiations with farmers to 
production and distribution. All the critical resources predicted by the research model were 
deployed, with the addition of the technological competence the company could count on. The 
most delicate resources proved to be trust in the leadership, and the competent middle 
management. While Vehovec was not closely associated with Urbanija, he had still been part 
of the previous senior management team. This required him to show a clear commitment to 
change without at the same time reverting to an autocratic style. In addition, he was forced to 
deal with a significant managerial bottleneck in the company, which threatened to create a 
large body of opposition from disgruntled “losers”. 
 
As noted above, in 2003 Vehovec and his team, prompted by the challenges related to EU 
accession and several indications of a possible hostile takeover, seemed committed to the next 
phase of strategic restructuring. They considered a new strategic position for the company 
which depended more on adding value with an excellent product portfolio, regional 
distribution competence, and improved brand position. They also considered a strategic 
partnership to protect themselves against hostile takeover and gain fast access to missing 
resources, gaps in which were increasingly obvious due to the companies new, numerous 
improvement projects. The details were still relatively vague and only the first steps, such as 
new product development initiatives or the brand consolidation project, had been taken in the 
new direction. Nevertheless, more bottom-up support for change was generated via strategic 
projects, which would inevitably also result in a new round of selection at the middle 
management level. A global perspective was assumed, accompanied by a significant amount 
of benchmarking and learning from other companies outside the immediate region. However, 
all their considerations were heavily influenced by the argument that the management would 
have to build the new organizational template extremely carefully if it were to retain the 
support of key owners. It remains to be seen whether the management will be able to succeed 
against major obstacles, primarily the pluralism of key stakeholder interests and limited 
competence in some business areas. 
5.6 Lura  
Lura is the largest dairy company and is among the largest food companies in Croatia. In 2002 
it had 235 million € of consolidated sales and around 3,000 employees. As well as its strong 
dairy business it is active in soft drinks, confectionery products and transportation. Lura was 
established in 1991, and Mr. Luka Rai holds 91% of the company shares. 
5.6.1 Brief overview of events prior to 1993  
In 1990 Luka Rai, a young Croatian entrepreneur, used the changes in the Croatian political 
and economic system to expand his business. He started his first company, Ralu, bought a 
number of trucks and started a successful international trucking business. At the same time he 
sought other business opportunities, which he sensed would arise from the new privatization 
process in Croatia. With this in mind he established another company, Lura, and in 1993 used 
the profits from his trucking business, plus bank loans, to enable Lura to buy Dukat, the 
largest Croatian dairy. His main reasoning was that the dairy market in Croatia was tightly 
closed and that Dukat had practically no international competition. In addition, Dukat had not 
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suffered much from the collapse of former Yugoslavia or from military operations in Croatia, 
since its market was mostly in and around the Croatian capital, Zagreb. Rai stated his 
expectation of consolidating the company and improving its performance prior to major 
changes in the markets. 
5.6.2 Changes from 1993 to 1998 
After the acquisition Lura maintained its financial holding role and Dukat remained 
operationally independent, except that Rai became its general manager. Closed domestic 
markets, the very great fragmentation of Croatian retail in the early 1990s (not a single chain 
had a national presence, and the total market share of the top five retail chains was below 
30%), low salaries and the low price of raw milk created a favorable cost situation for Dukat. 
Thus, although the company suffered from low productivity by international standards and 
was under the obvious pressure of market crisis due to the war in Croatia, Rai decided not to 
reduce the workforce. This allowed him to maintain a good relationship with the unions and 
improve his personal image, distancing himself from the “tycoon” label slapped on him by the 
Croatian media (the expression was used for individuals who used the privatization process to 
buy companies under favorable conditions, by which they amassed personal wealth and 
sometimes engaging in unscrupulous activities, often at the expense of employees and small 
shareholders). 
 
Most other Croatian dairies were in a state of disarray, caused by the war, ongoing 
privatization and poor management. Lack of strong competition allowed Dukat to solidify its 
leadership position in the market and in particular its reach beyond the Zagreb area. Retail 
fragmentation and poor road and rail connections due to the war required significant 
improvements in logistics. Despite limited financial resources, Dukat also began investing in 
improvements in its outdated production technology.  
 
Rai estimated that Dukat’s brand name was strong enough to be retained in the major 
product lines: fresh and UHT milk, yogurts and cream. In the years following its acquisition 
Dukat made only a few product changes, involving primarily quality improvement and more 
modern packaging. Although the company did a lot of advertising, it never prepared an 
elaborated marketing strategy and mostly used external resources for marketing activities. 
 
As early as 1994 Lura purchased a smaller competitor from Zadar, and in 1996 it bought 
Sirela, the second-largest cheese producer in Croatia. It applied the same approach, which had 
worked well with Dukat. These firms were left to operate independently and no systematic 
downsizing was attempted. The brand portfolio was not optimized across the companies, and 
their brands were kept mostly as bought. Sales and logistics were the only areas in which 
potential synergies were understood early on and to some degree achieved. 
 
Rai managed the whole group of companies using a very distinctive personal style. Although 
he avoided the media, he was good at internal communications, using them very persuasively 
to convince the employees of their company’s bright future. At the same time he made it clear 
that all the power was concentrated in his hands. He made all the major decisions for the 
companies he owned, insisting on a hierarchical chain of command.  
 
Although it seemed from the outside that individual companies did not depart significantly 
from their usual way of doing business and did not create any particularly innovative 
strategies, entering the Lura group and having Rai as new owner-manager did generate a 
major change in their behavior. Not only was power removed from their previously most 
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influential employees, but everyone was expected to implement the decisions made at the top, 
and Rai insisted on thorough follow-up. No immediate dismissals for poor individual 
performance occurred, but fear of potential sanctions appeared and managers were tempted to 
please Rai by telling him what they thought he wanted to hear. 
5.6.3 Changes in the period from 1998 to 2000 
In early 1998 the market situation in Croatia started to change. Although far from dramatic, 
Rai sensed that the changes were indications of what the future would bring to Lura: opened 
markets with intense international competition, very slow or zero growth in overall 
consumption of dairy products, consolidation of retail and pressure for higher raw milk prices. 
 
Because of the external changes, but also as a result of his observation that as an owner he 
could not be fully effective as a manager, Rai decided to consolidate the group, fully 
integrate all the daughter companies into Lura, and bring in professional management to take 
care of daily business. He hired several key managers, including a new general manager, Mr. 
Želimir Vukina. Vukina came from Pliva, the largest regional pharmaceutical company, 
where he had been Member of the Management Board in charge of sales and marketing. Of 
five executive directors, one (production) was promoted from within Lura, two more 
(distribution, marketing and sales) came from Pliva, one (HR) came from Coca Cola, and one 
(finance) came from INA, the national oil company. Rai remained close to the company, 
acting as the Chairman of the Supervisory Board. 
 
The team’s first priority was to consolidate various operational systems, including purchasing, 
production, sales and distribution. As a result, the workforce was decreased by more than 600, 
almost 25%, but only a soft approach was used, mostly early retirement and severance 
packages for voluntary departures. The management engaged in intensive internal 
communication directed at front-line employees and unions. This allowed the process to be 
completed without union counter-reaction, despite Croatia’s very high unemployment rate and 
the otherwise explosive social situation. 
 
No other priorities were pursued explicitly in that period, although the top management 
communicated to the rest of the company and the external audience that downsizing was not 
the result of company crisis but a deliberate preparation for the next growth phase, which 
would require the company to be better fit to function in tough market conditions. 
5.6.4 Changes in the period from 2000 to 2002 
The positive financial impact of the consolidation was visible almost immediately, and 
allowed Vukina to focus on another priority set by the owner: growth strategy. Several 
important external factors were considered, leading Rai and the management to conclude that 
the future of Lura was in becoming strong regional food company.  
 
The military conflicts in the countries of former Yugoslavia were more or less over, and 
Lura’s management estimated that these countries presented the most natural expansion 
target, despite their very low standards of living and purchasing power. The management 
favored entering these markets by acquiring local companies, believing strongly in Lura’s 
ability to rapidly integrate the acquired companies. 
 
The next factor, regarded as very important, was consolidation of retail. Not only did this 
affect Croatian retail companies, but with the improvement in the country’s risk rating large 
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foreign chains were indicating their interest in the Croatian market. Lura’s management 
estimated that the result of this trend would be seen within a couple of years, and would 
significantly reduce margins for the company. However, they also saw an opportunity in 
product portfolio diversification, which would allow Lura to deploy its distribution strengths, 
gain negotiating power with respect to the retail and use synergies in sales and logistics to 
drive down costs. 
 
Along with diversification, Lura’s management looked at new product development within 
the dairy business as a possible opportunity for rapid growth. Initial market reactions to the 
imported high value added products offered by competitors were extremely positive, which 
indicated to the management that Lura should rejuvenate its existing product portfolio, 
especially in yogurts, and bring some new product lines to the market. This would also 
include further improvements in packaging technology, estimated as important for better 
competitive positioning. 
 
Changes in the political situation in Croatia, which for the first time in eight years indicated a 
change of government and improvement in the country’s international position, were 
interpreted as both an opportunity and a threat. In order to enter the EU market the company 
had to make significant improvements in its purchasing and production processes. Despite 
some problems with the farmers which were beyond the direct control of the company, Lura’s 
management decided to obtain export permits, since the improvements required would 
generally improve the company’s competitiveness and it would sooner or later be forced to 
make them anyhow. 
 
On the other hand, a local market open to international competition was seen as a significant 
threat. While it was approaching relatively quickly in some specialty product areas and having 
an impact in value added products (where high product prices could decrease the influence of 
import barriers), in the longer run it was predicted that Croatia would abolish all barriers for 
its accession to the EU. Lura’s management estimated that this would lead to a decrease in 
sales and possibly outweigh the positive impacts of diversification.  
 
Overall, the management concluded that the company would face a number of challenges 
which, although other alternatives were not completely dismissed, would be best met if Lura 
could find a strong strategic partner. Rai agreed, and considered selling his stake in the 
company and investing in some other line of business. Danone exhibited a clear interest, and 
discussions soon resulted in an agreement to perform due diligence.  
 
During the negotiations with Danone Lura’s top management decided to postpone the start of 
several important projects, such as the introduction of the new ERP system, reasoning that an 
agreement with Danone would significantly change the boundary conditions for these projects 
and lead to different decisions from those to be taken if Lura remained independent. While 
timing was not critical for some decisions, those concerning international expansion were 
seen as a priority, since the window of opportunity for acquisitions in the region was not 
expected to stay open for long. The delays incurred caused some friction within the 
management.  
 
Towards the end of 2001 it became obvious that Lura was not making much progress with its 
regional expansion strategy. A small dairy was acquired in Bosnia and Herzegovina, which 
allowed Lura to position itself well in that market despite occasional problems with import 
restrictions. However, no progress was achieved in Serbia, potentially the biggest market in 
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the region, mainly due to political barriers which were difficult to overcome. Efforts to export 
Lura’s products to regional and other European markets were less than successful. While here 
trade restrictions played a certain role, some managers blamed the failure on lack of focus, 
lack of people experienced in international sales and marketing, and non-allocation of the 
resources necessary to build brands outside of Croatian and Bosnian markets. All in all, the 
contribution of foreign sales to consolidated growth was below expectations. 
 
More progress was made in non-related diversification. In 2001 Lura acquired Badel-Bap, a 
Croatian manufacturer of soft drinks, which had just entered bankruptcy. Along with its own 
line of fruit juices and carbonated drinks, Badel-Bap had the exclusive bottling license for the 
Croatian market from Pepsi. Rai felt that the company had been mismanaged by its previous 
owner and had enough synergetic potential in distribution to justify the purchase. 
 
In parallel with the Badel-Bap decision, Rai also had to decide on the relationship with 
Danone. On completion of the due diligence procedure Danone prepared a concrete purchase 
offer, but Rai decided to reject it. Immediately thereafter, Vukina opened discussion about a 
possible merger with the leading regional tobacco company. 
 
While carefully coordinating all his major decisions with Rai, Vukina maintained his top-
down style. He often made the decisions on various business issues, such as the names of new 
products or the details of distribution tactics. He insisted on improving internal 
communications, but limited discussions with middle management to sessions on setting the 
annual plan and checking its fulfillment. As a result, the company had achieved a good record 
in the fast execution of straightforward tasks, but was not performing well in the area of new 
product development, or in business development in general. 
 
The middle management reacted to Vukina’s style with some reservations. While Vukina 
enjoyed owner support, he did not seem to invite the level of trust and influence Rai had 
from Lura’s management and employees, many of whom still addressed their concerns 
directly to him (although he always directed them back to the top management). In private, 
the middle managers complained about lack of clarity in company strategy, especially when it 
came to regional growth. They also seemed frustrated with the delays accompanying the 
Danone negotiations. Although no radical decisions were made about people not performing 
to expectation, the middle managers also expressed more fear about the future than did front-
line employees. This had a negative impact on initiative-taking and problem-solving below 
the top management level. Towards the end of 1991 the atmosphere was increasingly tense, 
with some managers looking for opportunities outside of the company. 
 
Despite these problems, Lura kept its reputation as an excellent employer. However, the 
Croatian labor market remained unbalanced: even though unemployment was at a historical 
high, it was extremely difficult to find highly-qualified professionals, especially in the area of 
sales and marketing, but also in IT, finance, logistics and modern production technology. 
Thus, when considering promotions into middle management Lura faced a limited pool of 
internal and external talent. The company continued to hire very young people and began to 
make more concentrated efforts towards their development, and – regarding the managerial 
bottleneck as a potential threat to further expansion – for the first time introduced systematic 
managerial training. 
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5.6.5 Changes in the period from 2002 to 2003 
Reconsidering the development strategy, Rai decided that a merger with the tobacco 
company would not be a desirable move. Vukina and one of his closest associates left, which 
prompted some reshuffling at the top. A Management Board was created for the first time in 
the company’s short history. This time the only new person in top management was the new 
President of the Management Board, Željko Peri. He came from Pliva, where he was a 
Management Board member and CFO, facts indicating to observers that Rai was still 
dedicated to growth through acquisition. Rai officially renounced any intention of selling the 
company in the near future, vigorously reinstating his aim to make Lura a regional food 
company and announcing that the first acquisition targets would be various food businesses 
within Croatia. Lura was to continue its international expansion after solidifying its position at 
home. 
 
Soon after the changes at the top, Lura entered a new line of business through the acquisition 
of Sloboda, the second-largest confectionery company in Croatia. Lura used its experience 
from previous acquisitions and its strong distribution network in Croatia and Bosnia and 
Herzegovina to boost Sloboda’s sales, while gradually consolidating it and reducing its 
operational costs. 
 
According to the new strategy Lura was split into divisions along four main lines of business. 
Efforts continued to fully consolidate them and utilize all potential synergies, especially in the 
areas of marketing and distribution. A breakthrough was achieved in new product launches, 
which more than doubled in comparison with the previous period. This was accompanied by 
significant investments in brands, but also in new design, production and packaging 
technologies. At the same time, the product portfolio was pruned to better utilize the available 
resources. Distribution flexibility and the ability to adjust to local tastes were seen as key 
competitive advantages over similar products from multinational companies.  
 
Pressure on costs from retail consolidation, EU-subsidized dairy product exports (especially 
cheese) and a major increase in raw milk prices (up to EU levels) prompted continuous 
internal efforts to decrease the number of employees and improve productivity, which still 
lagged behind all of the best-performing regional competitors from Austria, the Czech 
Republic and Slovenia. However, Lura continued to take only a soft approach to downsizing, 
not willing to jeopardize its excellent relations with the unions and front-line employees. 
 
As a part of the effort to improve its cost position Lura made significant investments in new 
IT systems, including handheld terminals for sales people, which facilitated much better 
control over receivables. Two global consulting companies worked in parallel on process and 
logistics improvements. 
 
Lura continued to gradually expand its sales in the region, but the management reopened 
discussion about target geography for its expansion. Although Serbia was still seen as a 
potentially interesting market, Peri admitted that Lura should not bet its expansion on the 
uncertain prospects of acquiring a good local company and through it a market position in 
Serbia. Lura turned to examining possibilities in other countries of South East Europe and 
their surroundings. A public statement was made about the interest in acquiring Ljubljanske 
mlekarne, the largest dairy in Slovenia (see 5.5). To secure financial strength for the company 
and facing increasing levels of short-term debt, Peri started discussions with the European 
Bank for Reconstruction and Development. EBRD was identified not only as a possible 
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source of long-term financing, but also as a credible financial partner which could prepare the 
company for an eventual initial public offering on an international stock exchange, the 
process Peri had undergone with Pliva. 
 
While instrumental in forcing out Vukina and reshaping the top management team, Rai 
stayed within the limits of his new role as Chairman of the Supervisory Board. He limited his 
involvement to occasional discussions with Peri on the company’s key strategic objectives, 
consistently refusing to mix in daily matters or make decisions which would undermine the 
authority of the company management. 
 
In contrast to Vukina, Peri immediately announced his full commitment to teamwork and the 
substantial involvement of middle management. All the decisions of the Management Board 
were based on consensus among its members. This required better preparation for meetings, 
but did not significantly slow the company down. During the Management Board’s first year, 
only one decision was delayed because of lack of consensus. Peri decided not to chair all the 
meetings, but asked the respective member whose area of responsibility was the meeting’s 
focus to do so. 
 
Immediately after the first Management Board meeting Peri commenced the reevaluation of 
strategy. He first engaged just the members of the top management team, but after 
establishing a broad framework expanded the group to twenty people. After a while the 
Management Board reviewed progress and, finding it satisfactory, involved thirty people in 
the next level of refinement. After nearly a year of work on the new strategy, a final two-day 
workshop was organized for seventy participants. Peri used it to set a highly interactive tone, 
which allowed many previously undiscussed issues to surface, as well as facilitating better 
understanding for all present of the company’s true potential and the critical issues to be 
resolved. 
 
Something else which Peri initiated early on was the holding of one-on-one conversations 
with thirty key company people. He found this necessary to restore morale and to prevent 
potential defections, but also to personally assess the competence of these people and their 
readiness to accept new business targets and styles of work. He also introduced individual 
performance targets as a basis for determining the annual bonus of members of the middle and 
top management teams. All were given a full insight into the performance criteria by which 
they were being evaluated, and the results they were achieving. Based on the conversations 
and more strict performance monitoring, he decided to replace several middle managers. Most 
of those replaced were offered other positions within the company, since Peri felt that layoffs 
should be made only in extreme cases.  
 
Peri made it clear that he expected honesty and ambition to be core values within the team. 
He used the consulting projects, as well as internal improvement projects started by the top 
management, to convince his managers that the company had not yet attained the required 
level of performance. To reinforce the message and facilitate learning from the best 
international practices, and to bypass the constraints of the local labor market, Lura hired an 
experienced Austrian production manager and committed himself to further such steps. 
Ensuring good matches with the target culture became an important part of the selection 
process in all new hiring. At the same time more emphasis was placed on education, in 
particular for middle management.  
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Despite a clear drive from the top towards building a new company culture, some middle 
managers still lacked initiative and the readiness to adapt to new circumstances. Age seemed 
to make a difference, with younger managers displaying a more proactive attitude. However, 
the company also identified growing problems with the attitude of fresh graduates, who while 
entering their first job with very limited knowledge at the same time felt that they “deserved a 
lot”. Fear of job loss was present among both middle managers and front-line employees, 
despite soft approaches to personnel issues and the very high level of employee legal 
protection, which prevented disciplinary action even in clear cases of abuse. 
5.6.6 Summary of research findings from the Lura case 
Four distinct periods can be observed in the history of Lura, if one disregards the inactive 
period at the very beginning while Rai waited for the right acquisition opportunity to arise. 
From the acquisition of Dukat to mid-1998 the company did not change its strategy or the 
basic elements of its organizational template. No true restructuring of the acquired companies 
was attempted. The production orientation of the companies inherited from the previous 
period was left to dominate, although some improvements in production and distribution were 
made. 
 
Several factors appear to have influenced Rai in assessing the situation and the need for 
change. First among these was the nature of the privatization process in Croatia, which 
created a window of opportunity for entrepreneurs like Rai to acquire companies under 
relatively favorable conditions. The process favored those in good standing with the political 
elite, as well as those who obtained considerable assets early, since they could use them to 
secure more loans to acquire yet more assets. However, since no fresh capital was injected 
into the company, the process typically created cash-flow pressures. 
 
Secondly, the war in Croatia actually worked in Lura’s favor. High risk deterred multinational 
competitors from entering Croatia on a larger scale. Problems caused by the war, in particular 
the low liquidity of retail and the need to import raw milk, had a very negative impact on 
small local competitors. Logistical problems caused by the war required excellent logistical 
capabilities, exactly the area where Rai possessed an advantage due to his extensive 
experience in the trucking business. All of this created a situation in which conflicting forces 
were at work: while the market situation was in principle unfavorable, Lura seemed to be in a 
less difficult position than its competitors. At the same time institutional pressures 
discouraged change, even were it perceived as necessary. First came direct media pressure on 
“tycoons”, generating strong public sentiment against the kind of behavior Rai realized he 
must avoid, even though it might have business merit and justification. Secondly, there was 
general pressure against downsizing, given the high employment and huge social problems 
caused by the war. 
 
Another factor influencing the assessment of the need for change and its viability was Lura’s 
financial situation. Any investment in restructuring would decrease the funds available for 
opportunistic acquisitions, which were, given the limited duration of the window of 
opportunity, obviously of highest priority. On the other hand, due to its relatively strong 
market position Lura’s financial situation was not critical, and did not require immediate 
responses to improve it. 
 
Finally, Rai, while gathering managerial experience, was still acting more as an entrepreneur 
than a manager. He lacked a larger team of trusted associates and preferred to minimize his 
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risks by controlling operational issues directly. This limited his capacity for dealing with 
strategic issues apart from the acquisition process. 
 
All the evidence indicates that Rai altered his assessment of risks and opportunities in 1998. 
The trigger was the assessment that the company’s financial situation would deteriorate due to 
changes in industry dynamics, primarily accompanying the entry of global competitors and 
retail consolidation. Institutional pressures did not halt the change, but influenced the speed 
and mode of its execution. Sufficient financial resources acted positively once the decision 
was made that change was needed. Rai also could count on his position as a trusted leader, 
which he had built up during the first period.  
 
The nature of change was clearly defensive, since the company focused on decreasing costs 
and in particular on downsizing. Despite change at the top, decision-making was still highly 
centralized and top-down. More attention was paid to the ability of the company to track its 
performance. Communication with labor unions and employees (including middle 
management) was intensified, but focused on the need for change as well as on operational 
planning.  
 
This defensive reaction met very little opposition and even that only in passive form. What 
there was came mostly from middle managers, who feared for their positions. But a relatively 
poor organizational setting and a low level of skills slowed down the change and prevented 
the company from making all the cost improvements possible. 
 
The trigger for the next phase came less from the assessment of the need for strategic 
restructuring than from the assessment of its feasibility. Rai had relatively clearly defined 
ideas about expansion, but only when management resources had been built up and the 
looming financial crisis resolved could the company focus on pursuing new strategic 
opportunities. 
 
However, while the trigger for strategic restructuring was obviously influenced by the 
assessment of industry dynamics and the availability of resources, after a very brief initial 
period restructuring became blurred and the pattern of change began to resemble weakly 
aligned change, which gradually degraded to non-aligned change. Strategy swerved from 
regional diversification to strategic partnership, without clarity of reasoning and without a 
convincing plan of action. Trust in Vukina as a leader was lost (or better said, on the 
employee side never fully developed) in the process. He never established bottom-up 
commitment to change. Lura’s management also reversed its optimistic view regarding the 
success of strategic restructuring, and practically blocked the change by concluding that it 
would be impossible without a strategic partner. 
 
The trigger for the final cycle of change was clearly the disappointing takeover offer made by 
Danone. It convinced Rai that strategic partnership might not be a feasible strategy after all, 
and caused him to reattempt strategic restructuring. This time all the missing elements were 
deployed: more focused vision, use of consultants, foreign managers and global 
benchmarking as sources of learning and drivers of a new culture, reorganization into 
business units and heavy use of IT for performance optimization and monitoring, focus on 
customer intimacy, new product development and marketing as strategic differentiating 
factors, a continuous focus on process improvement in aid of a better cost position. The 
commitment of middle management was secured through project work and joint strategy 
development, but also through the direct communication initiated by Peri. However, pressure 
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on performance was increased, the only major leadership intervention not forecast by the 
research model. 
 
Resistance to change came primarily from middle managers who felt threatened and ill-
equipped for adjustments. Lack of appropriate skills and knowledge, as well as problems in 
securing an inflow of managerial talent, can be identified as further major barriers to change. 
Some change fatigue became obvious and was intensified by the lack of change leaders at the 
middle level, which put great pressure on the small group of existing leaders, stretching them 
thin over a number of change initiatives and potentially decreasing the positive effects of the 
otherwise high level of organizational learning during the last phase of change. 
5.7 Podravka 
The Croatian company Podravka is among the largest food processing companies in Central 
Europe, with 350 million € of revenues and 6,500 employees in 2002. 
5.7.1 Brief overview of company history prior to 1991 
The company was founded in 1934 as a fruit-processing plant in the small town of 
Koprivnica, the centre of a Croatian rural area. After two decades of slow growth, interrupted 
by the war, the company used the period of state-led industrialization in former Yugoslavia to 
build new plants and significantly diversify its product portfolio. In the mid-1950s it 
introduced some of its “evergreen” products (such as traditional chicken and beef soups), 
which for decades provided an extremely important source of revenue. Finally, in 1959 the 
company struck gold: it launched “Vegeta”, a universal food seasoning that became an instant 
hit in Yugoslavia and soon became extremely popular across Central and Eastern Europe. 
 
The closed markets of former Yugoslavia, as well as those of the former Soviet bloc, did not 
require much sales and marketing effort. High-quality products were rare and would literally 
sell themselves, and strong brands were established by word of mouth. While the distribution 
network had to be built in Yugoslavia (this carried out extensively through the 1960s), 
Podravka did not have to worry about distribution within the Soviet bloc countries. It was 
enough to get goods on the barter list, and then state importers in those countries did the rest. 
 
Podravka used its opportunities well and by the end of the 1980s had grown to more than 
10,000 employees. It followed regional practice and developed a wide business portfolio. On 
one side, it integrated backwards and owned farms and meat business that operated as internal 
sources of raw material and sold their products in the markets of former Yugoslavia. On 
another, the company built up a number of different food processing businesses, some of 
which were modestly active in international markets. The exception was Vegeta, which was 
already present in some 30 countries, although it had a clear brand position primarily in the 
countries of Central and Eastern Europe. Podravka also used its financial strength, strong 
manufacturing experience and good political connections to start a small cosmetics division, 
which soon diversified further into pharmaceuticals, both selling almost exclusively in former 
Yugoslavia. Finally, in line with the dominant socialist philosophy, the company provided a 
number of infrastructure components, from security, catering, health and recreation services 
for its employees to a local hotel and a printing house. 
 
Asked about the most important legacy of the period prior to 1991, most of Podravka’s 
managers agreed that it consisted of both valuable assets and a few liabilities: 
• Vegeta, one of the strongest brands in all of Central and Eastern Europe; 
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• Other excellent brands, e.g. soups, in former Yugoslavia; 
• Extensive, although somewhat outdated, manufacturing capacities; 
• (Too many) highly loyal employees; 
• Excellent relationships with the local community and the business and political elite in 
Croatia. 
5.7.2 Changes in the period from 1991 to 1995 
With the commencement of hostilities in former Yugoslavia the situation for Podravka 
deteriorated fast. Not only did the company for political reasons lose the markets of Serbia 
and Montenegro, but due to war in Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina the demand in those 
countries declined to a fraction of pre-war levels and logistics suffered greatly. Furthermore, 
the company was requested to produce food for the Croatian army at extremely low prices, 
while payment was delayed for years. 
 
Sales in Central and Eastern Europe also suffered, partly because of the huge economic 
downturn in the region, but also due to the increased competition of Western food companies 
which were making inroads into the region’s markets. New, heavily-advertised brands 
appeared at a frenetic pace, putting Podravka’s pricing strategies under pressure and eroding 
its market shares. Distribution and retail in the region were also changing in structure, the old 
state wholesale companies losing importance against international retail chains and local start-
ups. 
 
Podravka was slow to recognize the new situation. Since the company was practically 
nationalized in 1991, its newly-established Supervisory Board featured mostly government 
representatives, including a few army generals, who lacked any business background but were 
eager to get involved in daily decision-making. The top management succumbed to pressure 
and refrained from making any major decisions without the full agreement of Supervisory 
Board members, which meant that practically no significant strategic decisions were made. At 
the same time, social crisis, the lack of transparency in controlling and poor internal discipline 
led to a surge in improper practices, from the acceptance of bribes in making purchasing 
decisions to outright theft from production and finished goods warehouses. 
 
The relative passivity of Podravka’s top management was utilized by some of the more 
entrepreneurial sales managers to make more systematic sales efforts in Central Europe. 
However, due to lack of financial and human resources, they mostly worked by exporting 
through new local distributors. Because of the deteriorating financial situation only very 
minor investments were made in new product development and brand support in foreign 
markets. Although financial performance was suffering, the top management was primarily 
concerned with maintaining maximum employment and social stability in the local 
community, which was under great pressure due to the war. Obvious gaps in competence 
between Podravka and its growing competition in regional markets received little attention 
from the top, although they created frustration among more agile middle managers. 
 
After the start of the privatization process in Croatia, Podravka’s management used every 
opportunity to advocate keeping the company conglomerate together. At the same time they 
clearly preferred the state to have a significant say in its possible break-up and piece-meal, 
government-orchestrated privatization. However, some external observers and many 
employees felt that a few executive team members were discretely hoping for the further 
downfall of the company, which would render their purchase of parts of it affordable.  
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In early 1996 it became obvious that Podravka would, despite the end of the war in Croatia, 
go bankrupt unless some urgent measures were taken. The government, having huge problems 
with its massive post-war budget deficit, was reluctant to invest in strengthening its balance 
sheet. Instead, the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) was asked to 
take an equity position in the company. After basic due diligence procedures, EBRD agreed 
on condition that the company start restructuring immediately under the guidance of a leading 
international management consulting company. Also, a seasoned international consultant was 
put in the role of personal advisor to the CEO, spending two weeks a month “shadowing” him 
and acting as the bridge between the consulting team and the top management. 
5.7.3 Changes in the period from 1996 to 1997 
After taking a first snapshot of the situation and the company’s activities, the consultants 
initiated a number of projects, some aimed at a rapid improvement in performance and others 
pursuing more substantial restructuring. All projects were staffed by mixed teams involving 
foreign consultants and over 100 middle managers and technical experts from the company. 
Most of the employees involved in the projects demonstrated considerable willingness to 
learn, and a solid dose of enthusiasm. Almost all felt that the projects were a much-needed 
opportunity to start changes after a frustratingly long lack of response to mounting problems. 
 
The consultants made it very clear that the company had too many employees and many small 
businesses that had nothing to do with food or pharmaceuticals. Some of the latter were 
subsequently spun off; the same went for some of the food-related businesses, e. g. farming 
and spirits production, which suffered from poor performance and were, in the opinion of the 
consultants, either unlikely to be highly profitable in the future or did not represent part of the 
true core food business. At the same time, the company offered early retirement as well as 
relatively generous (at least by local standards) outplacement packages to part of its 
workforce, gradually reducing the number of employees to 6,500. The vast majority of 
reductions were among production personnel. 
 
In facing the crisis the company completely centralized decision-making and reinforced its 
top-down culture, which had been somewhat diluted since 1993. These measures were 
accompanied by a tightening in the amount of information passed from the top. Plans were 
not discussed across the different levels of the hierarchy, and the middle management was 
often surprised by the way top management interpreted the suggestions of the project teams. 
Members of the top management engaged in frequent power battles, which increased the 
atmosphere of secrecy surrounding their decisions and actions. 
 
One of the decisions made early on based on suggestions from the consultants was to establish 
a more transparent planning and control system, which was supposed to finally allow the 
management a clearer understanding of which product lines were money-makers and which 
losers. This proved to be more than a mere technical exercise, generating plenty of heated 
discussions about the role of overheads and their contribution to the business results of 
individual segments within the company. As an almost natural consequence, the debate 
spilled over into the organizational design area. Some managers believed that Podravka 
should have been split into at least two parts: a core food business with satellite non-core food 
companies (e. g. meat or beverages), and the pharmaceutical business (Belupo). Their main 
arguments included the lack of synergy between the businesses, the poor efficiency of 
corporate services, and the danger that subsidizing poor performers would kill off potentially 
successful units. 
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Others claimed the company should remain tightly integrated. They pointed out the benefits 
of centralization in a crisis period, and claimed that performance monitoring was a matter of 
political will and had little to do with organizational structure. They also warned that some of 
the supporters of disintegration were actually those hoping to split the company into pieces 
and then glean huge personal benefits from privatization of the part over which they had 
particular influence. In the end, two divisions were created and placed under the direct control 
of two Management Board members. Both of the latter were undisputedly industry experts, 
but they polarized rather than unified their subordinates and often found themselves involved 
in controversial situations. 
 
Another area of dispute provoked by the restructuring projects was the definition of core 
businesses within food. The consultants took a fairly conservative approach, based on their 
understanding of the company’s core competences. In their opinion, the company needed to 
focus on branded goods in small packaging with a long shelf-life and high added value per 
unit. Strict application of this definition would give the company a significant focus and 
require the divestment of beverages, meat, and the processed food and vegetables businesses. 
Although the top management never publicly rejected this advice, it initiated several projects 
to investigate whether these businesses could become feasible despite the large losses which 
all of them generated in 1996 and 1997. Some of these projects were prepared under the 
auspices of a newly-created management development program, aimed at the top 200 
managers as well as some high-potential young employees. 
 
By 1997 the Supervisory Board had come under pressure from the EBRD to support more 
energetic changes. As a result, it finally arranged for a change at the top. Zvonko Majdani, 
CEO since 1990, became a member of the Supervisory Board. He was succeeded by Ante 
Babi, one of the most experienced people at headquarters and widely admired for his 
personal integrity and commitment to the company. Most other senior managers remained in 
their positions, while more changes were almost immediately made at the middle management 
level. 
5.7.4 Changes in the period from 1998 to 1999 
Noting that major downsizing and other cost cutting measures had improved the financial 
situation of the company, Babi decided it was time to focus on the next steps of 
restructuring, and in particular on strengthening Podravka’s market position. Podravka also 
launched investment projects totalling almost 200 million €, building several new factories in 
Koprivnica, Hungary and Poland. This was in disregard of the market situation: in a few worst 
cases, plants were running at less than 40% of capacity. In many cases tensions were triggered 
among production, R&D, marketing and sales, these functions blaming each other for poor 
performance. 
 
Significant attention was paid to the reorganization and strengthening of domestic and foreign 
sales and the distribution network, which gradually took over as the most powerful internal 
entity, a position once held by production. Podravka’s managers felt that improvement of 
operational sales had contributed significantly to the growth in revenues seen in 1997 and 
1998. However, the company still lacked a detailed marketing strategy, and in many cases 
local sales executives reported that Podravka’s products were not cost-competitive. When 
investigating the problem the management discovered that production costs still exceeded the 
industry average, but also that the quality of goods was above the average. 
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More advanced customers saw the company’s packaging as somewhat outdated, and pushed 
Podravka for changes. Consumer surveys conducted in Croatia did not support this need: most 
consumers felt comfortable with the packaging and especially with the traditional design 
Podravka had used for its core products since the day they were launched. Surveys in other 
countries produced less clear results and the management started to seriously consider 
whether changes were required. A final decision was held up by strong disagreements about 
branding: should the “Vegeta” brand be extended to other products (such as soups) and, if so, 
which ones?; should “Podravka” be used as an umbrella brand?; and should the brand strategy 
be homogeneous across all countries or adjusted to reflect current realities? 
 
Despite the fact that it had two strong regional brands, Podravka did not have much 
experience in branding. The newly-formed strategic marketing department was preparing to 
introduce the posts of brand and product managers, but most insiders felt that the move 
simply reflected a desire to match commonly-accepted practices in the industry rather than to 
create a competence within the company. 
 
Babi initiated a heated debate about the efficiency of Podravka’s R&D. The company had 
not launched any new products for quite some time, but was introducing many new varieties 
of existing products, some with more, some with less market success. The R&D people felt 
that they had not been treated fairly in these discussions. Given the mature nature of the 
industry, they cautioned against hopes of developing a new product which would repeat the 
success of Vegeta. 
 
In an attempt to more accurately monitor the company’s performance and the benefits of the 
many projects introduced since the start of change, Podravka decided to completely refurbish 
its management information system. However, implementation was not as rapid as expected. 
Most managers agreed that controlling had become more formal at the tactical level, but that 
it simply reinforced the internal focus, did not deal with the crucial issues (including 
wrongdoing) and did not link rewards to strategic performance issues. 
 
While some operational improvements were obvious, disagreements among top management 
and power struggles continued. Babi was very concerned about the company’s long-term 
viability. He tried to push for faster changes but avoided direct confrontation with colleagues 
from the Management Board. He strongly supported the management development program 
started under Majdani, hoping that it would increase the pool of high-performing middle 
managers. He felt that the company needed more of these, both to increase initiative-taking 
below Management Board level and as a possible pool of replacements for those members of 
the top management team with whom he did not feel comfortable.  
 
Babi felt under constant pressure from the Supervisory Board, which still used its political 
clout to keep the top management under full control and promote the interests of the local 
community and the country’s political elite. In order not to stir up too much disagreement 
with members of the Supervisory Board, whom he felt were not supportive of more 
aggressive change, he tried to change existing practices only gradually. In this context, many 
senior and middle managers complained about a lack of clear vision and strategic direction 
from the top. 
 
Attitude surveys conducted in the company indicated clearly that Podravka had very loyal 
employees. However, the surveys also showed that loyalty was based on an image of 
Podravka as a successful company, offering social security to its employees and satisfying the 
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various needs of the local community, i.e. the image of what Podravka used to be. The 
employees focused on the well-being of Koprivnica and cared less about what was happening 
elsewhere. Job security was the key motivating factor for the great majority of employees. In 
addition, the level of readiness to travel, take initiative and assume personal risk was very 
low, except for the youngest group of employees (below 30 years of age). 
 
In his efforts to speed up change, Babi approached a Western European food company 
somewhat larger than Podravka which seemed to be a good candidate for a possible merger. 
Discrete talks started in 1998 but the Supervisory Board did not show much interest in 
pushing for any faster results and no progress was reported after 2001. 
 
The 1999 business results were particularly disappointing. Despite the somewhat improved 
general situation in all export markets, some of which had began to recover from the 1998 
Russian crisis, Podravka consistently performed below expectations in almost all product 
categories and key markets. The situation was particularly bad in Poland, Russia and Croatia. 
The management mostly blamed external factors, such as the liquidity problems of most retail 
chains in Croatia, for these poor results. However, some industry observers believed that poor 
performance was the result of the company’s defensive management style, and the lack of a 
coherent and aggressive sales strategy in the domestic market which would fully utilize the 
company’s sales and distribution strengths. 
 
Financial analysts warned of the potentially big financial problems the company faced over a 
two-year period unless it recovered fast and resumed high growth. This news reduced the 
value of shares to a record low and prompted Babi to consider other options. His health 
deteriorated and, in February 2000, he decided to retire. 
 
During the short period under Babi it became obvious that the restructuring projects started 
by the consulting company had run out of steam. More and more of the employees who had 
participated in those projects were openly frustrated by the way the top management had 
interpreted their results, which they felt simply preserved the status quo. Although Babi 
claimed that Podravka was decentralizing, most middle managers disagreed and felt that they 
still lacked influence. At the same time, a significant portion of the employees refused to take 
initiative and regarded the past fondly. These people were worried about the prospect of 
further change, fearing that the company would lose touch with the local community and 
would disregard what they felt were its social obligations.  
5.7.5 Changes in the period from 1999 to 2003 
Just before Babi retired, the Supervisory Board finally decided to deal with indications of 
wrongdoing at the top and commenced a major shake-up of the Management Board. Several 
people were asked to leave the company; three new members were appointed from the middle 
management ranks. The new CEO, Darko Marinac, supported these appointments and added 
his own external choice of CFO. Marinac had 25 years of experience in the pharmaceutical 
industry, and prior to coming to Podravka had been responsible for the international 
expansion of Pliva, the largest Central European pharmaceutical company. 
 
Marinac decided that his first priorities would be to establish good communications within the 
Management Board and to identify the key issues facing the company. He was told by the 
Supervisory Board to produce rapid financial recovery. In his own mind the only way to do 
this was to increase revenues, since further cost-cutting would completely destroy the already 
poor morale of the employees. Not from the region, he was met with suspicion by some 
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members of the local establishment. They feared Marinac would try to cut the strong ties the 
company had with the local community and move many activities out of Koprivnica, thereby 
reducing the employment opportunities on which the town critically depended. The prospect 
of selling Podravka to a multinational company was also a highly delicate issue, since many 
believed it would lead to drastic cuts in employment. 
 
Marinac and his team reviewed the advice which Podravka had received from the consultants, 
but found it too focused on short-term issues, primarily aimed at downsizing and cost-cutting. 
The new Management Board members also confirmed that the middle management felt 
disempowered and had not bought into previous decisions from the top.  
 
Marinac had to make a difficult choice between starting the new vision process from the 
bottom up – which could lead to much wasted time and effort without some prior direction 
from the top – or risking the strategy being rejected again as being forced on people. He 
decided to devote some time to discussion within the Management Board before approaching 
the middle management with a proposal for a broad vision for Podravka and asking for their 
feedback. Only then would the first two layers of management engage in defining a medium-
term strategy for the company. 
 
The discussions within the Management Board proved to be more demanding than expected, 
and took up a good part of Marinac’s first year. Even within his team, there was some 
reluctance to push ahead due to the possible consequences of change for the local 
environment. Finally, the Board came out with a clear statement on one of the most sensitive 
issues: Podravka’s core business. They intentionally kept the definition broad, including both 
food and pharmaceuticals and focusing on all the business lines with the potential to be 
leaders in their core markets. This in practical terms implied that some of the less successful 
businesses, like meat, would stay in the company only if they could regain a leading position 
in the Croatian market, which seemed a reasonable target. Overall, Podravka confirmed its 
ambition to be the largest food company domiciled in Central and Eastern Europe. 
 
In accordance with this statement, Podravka was reorganized into ten business units. At the 
same time, several new corporate services were introduced, with the business development 
department being the most important. The introduction of SAP was finalized, fully integrating 
company IT support. Podravka then carried out a major benchmarking exercise, comparing 
itself with the best Croatian companies and then with 14 successful international food 
companies of similar size to Podravka. The key purpose of this exercise was give managers a 
picture of true company reality, and to challenge them to start thinking “outside of the box”, 
without being obsessed with a “Podravka way” of doing things. 
 
Once consensus was reached on these issues, the Management Board began a strong 
communications campaign within the company. It also engaged all the business unit 
managers, people from the business development department and, ultimately, a broader group 
of line managers, in a series of workshops which had the goal of producing detailed three-year 
strategic plans for the company. 
 
Through the discussions it became obvious that Podravka should not try to achieve the 
position of a global innovator, but be content with the role of a follower. Yet the management 
felt that the company should build a premium position in the markets it covered, based on the 
notion of traditional, high-quality food it stood for under the slogan “the joy of eating”. Heavy 
advertising support should be used to support this brand image for both Vegeta and Podravka. 
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It was felt that having strong brands should allow the company to more systematically explore 
opportunities for brand extension in existing markets. More focus was placed on new product 
development, producing good results in a relatively short period of time. In addition, 
Podravka’s management felt that the company should explore the possibility of entering new 
markets in order to achieve higher sales volumes for its mature products. 
 
In order to reach its ambitious growth targets of 10% annual growth in revenues and 15% 
growth of EBIT, Podravka decided not just to depend on organic growth, but to undertake 
more intensive M&A activities in the region. With a strong record in this field from his days 
at Pliva, Marinac felt comfortable in leading these activities personally. As a result, in 2002 
Podravka acquired Lagris, the largest independent food company in the Czech Republic, as 
well as a number of smaller companies in other countries, in particular in South East Europe. 
These acquisitions also allowed Podravka to prepare for 2004, when most Central European 
countries which were the company’s core markets would join the European Union. It was 
expected that additional barriers would be created to Croatian exports and that the company’s 
cost position would come under further pressure. Thus, access to cheaper labor and raw 
material was secured, plus additional production capacity within the enlarged EU. 
 
Along with M&A activities, Podravka decided to pursue strategic partnerships in the 
distribution area. Among other things it took over distribution of Unilever ice cream in 
Croatia, Heinz products in Hungary and, in a potentially significant agreement, Nestlé 
products in all the countries of former Yugoslavia except Slovenia. 
 
While its focus remained clearly on South East and Central Europe, Podravka intensified its 
activities in both east and west. It actively reviewed its strategies in Russia, including the 
possibility of acquiring some of the companies that already had a strong presence in that 
market. It also tried to forge alliances allowing it to use its free production capacities to 
manufacture under license for Western European partners, for their needs in Western 
European markets.  
 
Finally, Podravka’s pharmaceutical division was floated on the local stock exchange in 2002, 
as a sign that Podravka was ready to consider optimizing its position in the pharmaceutical 
business. By early 2003 the company was enjoying strong growth in all businesses and had 
achieved results above the plan’s expectations.  
 
Marinac spent a considerable amount of time on people-related issues. He pushed for more 
internal communications and middle manager initiative-taking. He gave special attention to 
building a highly professional HR service within the company. One of its priorities was to 
help the Management Board assess the potential of the top 50 people in the company, as well 
as the top 25 people in the talent pool. Several BU managers were replaced within one or two 
years, the period Marinac felt sufficient to clearly reveal true performance levels. 
Benchmarking and strategic alliances were seen as great learning opportunities (Nestlé, for 
example, agreed to provide access to its executive education program as part of the 
distribution partnership), and the company hoped to gain some additional talent through its 
acquisitions. Lack of managerial talent was seen by top management as one of the key factors 
limiting faster growth, the other being the slowness of the change to a true culture of 
international orientation and entrepreneurship. Some senior managers also indicated problems 
stemming from an insufficient level of professional know-how, especially in marketing and 
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new product development, under-functioning cost management, and some lack of cohesion in 
top management, which caused relatively slow decision-making. 
5.7.6 Summary of research findings from the Podravka case 
Four cycles of change can be observed in Podravka in the period from 1991 to 2003. The first 
was the period to 1996, during which there was no change or some occasional non-aligned 
change (privatization, the commencement of non-systematic sales expansion in Central and 
Eastern Europe). Institutional pressures and lack of trustworthy leadership seem to be the 
most important factors influencing the apparent lack of trigger, which accords well with the 
research model. The purpose of the company was perceived similarly by all key stakeholders 
(management, employees, the local community and the state as key owner): to provide jobs 
and act as a source of funding for the needs of the local community, rather than to secure 
profits or the long-term strategic sustainability of the company. A lack of performance 
transparency was obvious, although in the case of Podravka it is not very clear to what degree 
poor control systems significantly caused the trigger delay. However, once it became evident 
that the company was not financially viable, its owners moved and the second cycle was 
initiated. Again it is interesting to note that owners, not managers, provided the trigger. This 
can be easily explained by the balance of power within the company, where management did 
not act overtly but rather through political lobbying, leaving the front of the stage to the 
Supervisory Board and its political heavyweights.  
 
The pattern of events before and during the second change cycle seems to be fairly typical. Its 
late response to sweeping changes in the environment not only brought the company to the 
brink of financial disaster, but also created all the typical behavior patterns of “losers”, 
including frustration, a mixture of denial and helplessness, the blaming of others, and 
unethical behavior. These added to the factors influencing the assessment of the need and 
possibility of change, which eventually brought in EBRD as the change catalyst. 
 
With no powerful internal change agents, consultants were brought in as external change 
agents. Under the direct pressure of the owners defensive restructuring was started. Here all 
the elements of the new organizational template predicted by the research model were present. 
Asset restructuring seemed to be more effective than expected, but that was due to the fact 
that in Podravka’s case it represented a method to decrease employment rather than to benefit 
financially from asset disposal. It is interesting to note that the research model’s suggestion of 
a focus on a local rather than a global perspective is confirmed here despite a global 
consulting company being the change agent. Almost all the advice which the consultants 
offered on the basis of their global perspective was met with suspicion. Virtually all the 
sources confirm that anything not conforming to local habits, “the way things are done”, was 
treated as going against the interests of the local community, regardless of whether this was 
true or not. This generated significant resistance and halted designed changes the moment the 
consultants passed them to the management for execution. 
 
Looking at the resources needed for successful implementation and the expected leadership 
interventions, it becomes obvious why the change (downsizing and some cost-cutting) was 
only partially successful, and why it created a lot of frustration. Active leadership from the top 
of the organization was missing, as was trust from the middle managers and front-line 
employees. Communication was extremely limited, allowing the circulation of rumors and 
producing more resistance to change. Boosted by fear at all levels of management and 
institutional pressures from the local community, change was stalled. 
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The trigger for the next two change cycles was the same: the company’s poor financial 
performance and the owners’ assessment that change was necessary and possible under new 
leadership. In the third cycle of change, this resembled more non-aligned change than either 
defensive or strategic restructuring. Although initially triggered by the owners, it seems that 
the assessment of the need for change suffered from diverging interests within the top 
management group. While Babi wanted it, the rest opposed it, and he did not exercise 
enough power to create change. He did not offer a clear vision, which kept the middle 
management confused and lost him their trust (which he had initially held because of his 
reputation). He also did not make the necessary changes in terms of business focus and 
transparency of performance. Particularly troublesome was the way the company expended its 
scarce financial resources on upgrading its manufacturing capacity. While some of this 
seemed justified (new pharmaceutical production facilitating higher value) some seemed 
unaligned with either the cost or value position of the company. Thus Babi’s attempts to 
achieve strategic change were not consistent enough and left too many blank spaces. 
 
In contrast to Babi, Marinac created a new organizational template, one which comes close 
to the research model’s predictions on strategic restructuring. He made the target strategic 
position of the company clear: added value based on high quality, local taste, strong brand and 
excellent distribution. He reorganized the company along business lines and introduced the 
necessary infrastructure support units. The company also took on a global perspective 
(through the benchmarking exercise and by learning from its strategic alliances). 
 
Of the key resources predicted by the research model, several deserve more comment. 
Financial slack definitely influenced the speed of change. Podravka had little available, as a 
result of the late start and slow progress of the initial stages, as well as its poorly-aligned use 
of resources in the past. The company was burdened with debt, so it had to improve its 
operational performance before it could allow itself major new investment in critical areas. 
This is another reason why the time available for changes becomes highly important. Marinac 
had to manage the expectations of the Supervisory Board to gain that time. 
 
Trust is another of the resources predicted by the research model. Marinac was in an 
interesting situation regarding trust. On the one hand, as an outsider with an excellent 
professional reputation he could hope for the initial level of trust needed to start the change. 
However, given the extremely closed nature of the local environment and the high level of 
perceived threat he presented to it, he had to make some initial compromises, accept the 
position of the local community as legitimate, and earn its trust by improving company 
performance without taking measures damaging to local interests. This balancing act proved 
to be time-consuming and potentially damaging in the short term, but Marinac explicitly 
acknowledged the need for it and seems to have been successful in performing it without 
stalling the change. To a large degree this is because he managed to establish a dialogue with 
the middle management, as predicted by the research model. The time available for the 
change again appeared to be critical, plus the overall consistency of change design and 
implementation. 
 
Finally, it is interesting to see how much attention Marinac paid to the issue of optimal use of 
human talent. As opposed to Babi, who fully supported the management development 
program but made very few interventions in selecting the talent pool, Marinac paid less 
attention to education (it was almost assumed that individuals would take care of it and much 
would come from learning by doing), but was much more active in managing the talent pool, 
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sending clear signals on expected performance and the consequences of both positive and 
negative results. 
 
While in Babi’s case strategic uncertainty appeared to be a barrier to change, this was not at 
all obvious in the case of Marinac. One logical interpretation may be that the objective high 
level of uncertainty plays a more important role in the absence of vision. Other barriers, in 
particular the various forms of fear, poor structures and (especially) lack of skills and 
knowledge, were all easily observable.  
 
Finally, it is possible to see that very little organizational learning occurred in the first two 
phases. Even though some good business practices were occasionally introduced, poor 
communications prevented them from being widely accepted. The same applies to the 
management development program. More than 150 managers attended it, but their selection 
seemed to be random and often politically influenced. The application of learning from the 
program was sporadic and not systematically required or supported by the top management. 
Also, the high level of frustration with the slow pace of change and the high personal risk 
involved (especially on middle management level) decreased willingness to fully engage in 
spreading the benefits of the program. In the last phase learning appears to be slightly more 
extensive, although there are indications that the level of teamwork and initiative-taking 
necessary for organizational learning are still not at the desired level. 
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6. Cross-case analysis and integration of research findings 
The purpose of the following text is to build on the individual case analyses presented in the 
previous part of this dissertation. To do so, research findings from individual cases will be 
compared for their similarities and differences. The research model will be used as a 
framework for this comparison, and the main research question presented on page 84, plus the 
detailed research questions presented on page 90, will be answered based on the conclusions 
from the cases. The answers given will then provide the starting point for a discussion of the 
consequences of the field study for the research model and its refinement. 
6.1 General characteristics of the strategic changes observed 
All seven cases indicate a substantial amount of change in the observed companies, as well as 
several distinctive periods (cycles) of change for each of them (Table 6.1). The nature and the 
sequence of individual change cycles will be discussed in more detail later. One company 
underwent only two different change cycles, one underwent three, and the remaining five 
companies four change cycles each. At this point it is interesting to note that out of 25 cycles, 
only six had somewhat blurred features and were therefore characterized as non-aligned 
changes, while in two cases companies did not react to initial changes in the environment in 
1991. Of the remaining 17 cycles, seven were characterized as defensive restructuring and ten 
as strategic restructuring. In two cases the last cycle has been initiated, but the company is 
still in the design phase and the new organizational template is not yet completely clear. 
 
Case Period 1 Period 2 Period 3 Period 4 
Gorenje Defensive Strategic Strategic Strategic120 
Kolinska Defensive Non-aligned    
Konar Defensive Non-aligned Strategic  
Lek Defensive Strategic Non-aligned Strategic 
Ljubljanske 
mlekarne 
Non-aligned Non-aligned Defensive Strategic1 
Lura No change Defensive Strategic Strategic 
Podravka No change Defensive Non-aligned Strategic 
 
Table 6.1 Nature of change in seven observed cases  
 
Only Kolinska kept the same general manager throughout the whole period of observation. 
Interestingly enough, this company also underwent the fewest change cycles and achieved the 
least strategic restructuring. Gorenje, Konar and Ljubljanske mlekarne had two general 
managers, and Lek, Lura and Podravka had three (in the case of Lek, however, Dragonja 
initiated the period, left, and then returned after the company experienced significant 
difficulties in his absence). 
 
The ability to clearly define the trigger for change prior to every new cycle is of capital 
importance for the research model, since the trigger phase is one of its three principal building 
blocks. The observations from the cases fully confirm the predictions of the research model. 
All the cycles with a clearly defined nature (defensive or strategic) also had a clearly defined 
trigger. It is worth noting, however, that the word “trigger” may be somewhat inappropriate, 
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 Cycle is just starting and all elements of organizational template are still not clear. 
Nenad Filipovi  Chapter 6 
Strategic Change Management of Medium Size Companies:   
Insights from Slovenia and Croatia   
 166 
since its standard semantic meaning implies a brief event involving a one-time assessment of 
a situation and produces a discontinuity between “before” and “after”. In reality, triggers here 
often consisted of a sequence of events that were individually assessed and which 
cumulatively generated a certain perception. While this perception changed continuously, at 
some point it changed enough in nature to prompt the management to initiate a new cycle of 
change.  
 
Triggers preceding the periods of non-aligned change were also present, i.e. the management 
did assess the changing external and internal context. However, the result of the assessment 
was either an estimated low urgency of change, or an estimated low probability of success in 
instituting change, or both.  
 
An important observation, however, is that in all cases the change course set after the trigger 
was deliberate and not “emerging”. This is true even in the case of non-aligned change. In 
several change cycles, as discussed below, the goals of change were not achieved, but initial 
principal decisions regarding the new organizational template were nevertheless made prior to 
attempting the change. In several cases the elements of the organizational template were 
modified during the same change cycle, but this never fundamentally influenced the nature of 
that cycle’s change. 
6.2 Analysis of the factors influencing the trigger phase  
The first two research questions concerned the trigger phase: 
 
Q1. What factors influenced the perceived need for change? In particular, what factors 
influenced the perceived time horizon required for action? 
Q2. What factors influenced the perceived feasibility of change? 
 
Although the research model did not suggest a separate set of factors influencing the 
perceived urgency and the perceived feasibility of change, the field study attempted to 
provide explicit answers to the above questions. It yielded detailed enough observations to 
facilitate a separate analysis of the two groups of factors. 
6.2.1 Summary of observations from individual cases 
Tables 6.2 to 6.8 present an overview of the factors influencing the perceived need for and the 
perceived feasibility of change for all 7 companies and 25 change cycles. Since all of these 
items were discussed in the individual case analyses, no additional discussion is provided 
here.  
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Change cycle Perceived need & time horizon Perceived feasibility 
Gorenje.1121 • Running out of financial slack  
• Lack of performance transparency 
• “Want to look good” 
• Restructuring model used by Iskra 
worked 
• Must maintain employment 
• Change at the top 
• Mature industry implies difficulty 
to increase volume 
• Low-value products 
• Non-core products not competitive 
outside Slovenia, which is too 
small 
• No financial resources to invest in 
new markets and products 
• People trust company and are loyal 
• Stani is proven and committed 
leader 
Gorenje.2 • No immediate liquidity crisis but 
still underperforming 
• Reasons for poor performance 
more transparent: need lower costs 
and higher margins 
• Privatization is not related to 
changes 
• Must maintain employment  
• Secured financial resources for 
investment in R&D 
• Kept technical talent 
• Maintained distribution in Western 
Europe 
• Have committed people who trust 
Stani 
Gorenje.3 • Need to grow and use 
opportunities 
• Owners are happy with returns 
• Growth opportunities exist in CEE 
• Changes in consumer behavior 
create space for new value adding 
products 
• Opportunities for diversification 
• Growing availability of resources 
• Strong brand in some markets 
• Have committed people who trust 
Stani 
Gorenje.4 • No crisis, but financial 
performance below industry 
average 
• Owners may require higher 
returns, potential threat of hostile 
takeover 
• High growth is matter of survival 
• EU-related threats and 
opportunities approach 
• Growth may require change of 
culture  
• New top team wants to prove it is 
at least at the level of previous one  
• Industry and market dynamics 
create opportunity for growth and 
differentiation, but also pose 
threats 
• More needed skills in place 
• Continuity in trust and leadership 
despite new top team 
 
Table 6.2 The most important factors influencing the context assessment for Gorenje 
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 Throughout this chapter “Company.n” stands for the nth change cycle in the respective company (e.g. 
Gorenje.1 stands for the first change cycle at Gorenje). 
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Change cycle Perceived need & time horizon Perceived feasibility 
Kolinska.1 • Scenario predicted severe and 
immediate financial crisis 
• Had some financial slack and 
reasonable insight into financial 
performance 
• New licensed products can create 
opportunity for growth 
• Mature industry limits 
opportunities 
• No differentiating resources and no 
financial strength to build them 
• Have solid manufacturing 
competence 
• Employees will cooperate if soft 
approach to downsizing is used 
Kolinska.2 • No immediate crisis if short-term  
profitability acceptable for the 
owners 
• Licensing model works 
• Acquisition opportunities will 
solve growth problem 
• Older executives prefer status quo 
• Some financial resources and 
excellent domestic sales and 
distribution 
• No differentiating resources and no 
financial strength to build them, 
thus limited organic growth 
• Not attractive for strategic partners 
beyond current model 
• Younger executives frustrated 
 
Table 6.3 The most important factors influencing the context assessment for Kolinska 
 
 
Change cycle Perceived need & time horizon Perceived feasibility 
Konar.1 • No transparency of performance 
• Financial collapse 
• Restructuring model used by Iskra 
worked 
• Change at the top 
• Extremely hostile market situation 
• No resources to build competence 
needed to access markets, which 
would provide needed volume 
• Easier if everyone fights alone 
 
Konar.2 • No transparency of performance 
• Survived, but still in immediate 
jeopardy 
• Slow pace is better choice than 
high risk 
• Holding company has no financial 
resources 
• Market in the region has regained 
some potential 
• Diversification can help exploit 
entrepreneurial opportunities 
•  Divisions may see clearer picture 
• Kept core technical talent 
Konar.3 • More transparent divisional 
performance 
• Change at the top 
• Problems due to lack of leadership 
in the past 
• Bago believes that no growth 
equals slow death  
 
• Divisions are more powerful than 
the holding company 
• Industry and market dynamics are 
favorable 
• Have core technical talent 
• Have good regional brand 
• Potential synergies exist, they are 
key for growth 
• Bago has reputation as successful, 
strong leader 
 
Table 6.4 The most important factors influencing the context assessment for Konar 
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Change cycle Perceived need & time horizon Perceived feasibility 
Lek.1 • Financial situation worse than 
expected 
• Strategy in principle good for core 
business, not good for the rest 
• Performance relatively transparent 
• Have to keep image of successful 
company 
• Should avoid stringent downsizing 
• Industry and market dynamics not 
favorable 
• Have limited financial resources 
• Dragonja is proven and committed 
leader  
 
Lek.2 • Privatization requires no change 
• Licensing policy will not work 
• Competing in USA requires 
significant changes 
• Although not in abundance, have 
all critical resources  
• Window of opportunity in CEE for 
branded generics 
• In long run all big generic 
companies must compete in USA 
• Trust and leadership continuity 
Lek.3 • No need for major strategy change 
• New leader unfamiliar with the 
industry 
• Growing pluralism of interests 
among stakeholders 
• Crisis situation in the market with 
potential dire consequences 
• Do not have all critical resources 
• Stakeholders are powerful 
Lek.4 • Previous leadership was weak 
• Must achieve strong growth to 
remain successful 
• New technologies will increase 
R&D-related risks 
• Huge growth opportunities exist, 
both in short and long run  
• Dragonja is proven and committed 
leader  
• Clear performance benchmark 
• Have excellent resources but need 
complementary resources from 
strategic partner to use all growth 
potential  
• Can influence stakeholders and 
change ownership if acting 
responsibly 
 
Table 6.5 The most important factors influencing the context assessment for Lek 
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Change cycle Perceived need & time horizon Perceived feasibility 
LM.1 • No need to change the way of 
doing business 
• Non-clarity of true financial 
situation 
• Market pressures 
• Have needed financial resources 
but limited competence 
• Middle managers do not cooperate 
LM.2 • Opportunity to grow through 
acquisition 
• Want to “look good” 
• Owners have conflicting priorities 
• Market pressures 
• Have limited financial resources 
• Have limited competence 
• Middle managers do not cooperate 
• Must please key owners 
LM.3 • Urbanija’s leadership was 
ineffective and led to crisis 
• Poor transparency of performance 
but estimated mid-term financial 
problems 
• Growing plurality of key 
stakeholder interests 
• Have less competence than 
believed 
• Must please key stakeholders 
• Opportunity to grow in the region 
• Vehovec is trusted leader 
 
LM.4 • Better clarity of performance 
• Expansion into new markets is 
needed to remain viable 
• New industry and market dynamics 
due to EU, including threat of 
hostile takeover, require substantial 
improvements 
• Have some competence  
• Might need strategic partner 
• Must keep key stakeholders happy 
• Vehovec is trusted leader 
 
Table 6.6 The most important factors influencing the context assessment for Ljubljanske 
mlekarne 
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Change cycle Perceived need & time horizon Perceived feasibility 
Lura.1 • Opportunity to grow by acquisition 
• Have advantage over competition 
• Want to “look good” 
• Should maintain employment 
• Difficult market  
• Limited financial resources 
• Limited competence in some key 
areas 
• Rai has power of owner-manager 
Lura.2 • Potential financial crisis due to 
opening of the local market 
• Local markets offer low growth 
potential for dairy products 
• Need outside management talent 
• Have solid technical competence 
• Must be ethically sound in making 
changes 
Lura.3 • Growth is a priority 
• Market pressures increase 
• Window of opportunity for finding 
acquisition targets and strategic 
partner 
• Unfavorable industry and local 
market dynamics 
• Acquisition opportunities in the 
region  
• Diversification opportunities in 
Croatian food industry  
• Have limited resources, might 
benefit from strategic partner 
• Vukina is strong leader 
Lura.4 • Limited window of growth 
opportunities in wider region  
• Risky to depend on opportunistic 
acquisitions or reaching agreement 
with strategic partner 
• EU enlargement requires profound 
changes 
• Better transparency of performance 
• Vukina’s leadership was 
ineffective and led to potential 
crisis 
• Have most of the key resources 
needed, bottleneck in middle 
management 
• Diversification opportunities in 
Croatian food industry  
• Stronger new top management 
team 
 
 
Table 6.7 The most important factors influencing the context assessment for Lura 
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Change cycle Perceived need & time horizon Perceived feasibility 
Podravka.1 • Non-transparent performance 
• Market and industry dynamics 
imply need for some improvement, 
but not major change 
• Strong but non-professional 
supervisory board 
• Strong pressures to maintain 
employment 
• Conflict of (private) interest on 
part of senior executives  
• Worsening market situation 
• Limited resources 
• Poor competence in key areas 
when benchmarked with new 
competitors 
• Political support 
 
Podravka.2 • Financial crisis 
• Must comply with EBRD 
conditions 
• Pressures to keep supporting local 
community 
• Conflict of (private) interest on 
part of senior executives 
• Have conditional access to 
sufficient financial resources 
• Have limited competence, 
especially in non-core businesses 
• Loyal employees but frustrated and 
have low trust in leadership 
Podravka.3 • No immediate financial danger, but 
still underperforming  
• Poor transparency of results 
• Pressures to keep supporting local 
community 
• Conflict of (private) interest on 
part of senior executives 
 
• Industry and market dynamics are 
negative 
• Have access to sufficient financial 
resources 
• Have limited competence, 
especially in management 
• Could benefit from strategic 
partner 
• Strong stakeholders desire only 
gradual changes  
• New leader has integrity but is not 
forceful 
Podravka.4 • Ethical crisis due to poor 
leadership 
• Improving transparency of 
performance 
• Impact of EU enlargement requires 
profound changes 
• Marinac believes that growth is 
crucial for survival 
• Opportunities for growth exist in 
wider region 
• Have limited resources but capable 
of increasing key ones 
• Could benefit from strategic 
alliances 
• Fresh top management team 
• Can handle key stakeholders 
 
Table 6.8 The most important factors influencing the context assessment for Podravka 
 
 
Grouping the line items identified in the above tables produces a clearer overview of the key 
factors identified to have influenced the trigger phases of the observed 25 change cycles. 
According to the research model, the following factors should have influenced management 
assessment of the perceived urgency and feasibility of change: 
 
1. Institutional pressures, in particular social issues and the question of the firm’s purpose; 
industry practices and mimicking; and cultural pressures; 
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2. Transparency of performance; 
3. Opportunistic behavior (the research model did not predict whether this would lead to a 
higher or lower rate of change attempts); 
4. Sufficiency of critical resources, in particular the role of trusted leadership and financial 
slack (the research model did not predict whether financial slack would lead to a higher 
or lower rate of change attempts). 
 
As noted above, the research model did not distinguish between factors influencing the 
perceived urgency of change and those influencing the perceived feasibility of change. 
Observations from the field study established a certain correlation between the perceived 
urgency and the perceived feasibility of change, since in many cases management interpreted 
the factors contributing to a perceived low feasibility of change as negatively influencing the 
perceived need for change (below a certain threshold). This is because several factors (e.g. 
financial slack or unfavorable market situation) influenced both perceived urgency and 
feasibility, but in the opposite direction. Nevertheless, the decision to use these two variables, 
although not fully independent, as valid predictors of triggers seems justified, since similar 
pairs of values produced the same results in terms of change trigger existence or non-
existence. Furthermore, as discussed later, the same variables proved valid in predicting the 
type of response once change was initiated. 
 
Since the observations from the field study allowed the separate identification of factors 
influencing the perceived urgency of change and those influencing the assessment of change 
feasibility, they will be presented separately. 
 
6.2.2 Summary of factors influencing perceived change urgency 
 
Table 6.9 groups the factors in accordance with the predictions of the research model, 
eliminates duplications, but keeps count of repetitions. Cycles marked with * demonstrate 
only limited presence of the factor. 
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Group of factors Individual factor Change cycles in which 
the factor was present 
Issues related to 
institutional 
pressures 
• “Must look good” leads to denial and 
decreased perceived urgency of change 
• Pressures to maintain employment lead to 
decreased perceived urgency of change 
 
• Pluralism of interests leads to decreased 
perceived urgency of change  
 
• Old ways of doing business are seen as 
effective, thus decreasing perceived 
urgency of change 
• Old ways of doing business are seen as 
ineffective, thus increasing perceived 
urgency of change 
• Readiness to mimic successful 
restructuring practices increases perceived 
urgency of change 
• Privatization leads to decreased perceived 
urgency of change 
• Owners are happy with status quo, 
decreased perceived urgency of change 
• Owners are not happy with status quo 
(including takeover threat), increased 
perceived urgency of change 
• Gorenje.1, Lek.1, LM.2, 
Lura.1 
• Gorenje.1, Gorenje.2, 
Lura.1, Podravka.1, 
Podravka.2 
• Lek.3, LM.2, LM.3, 
Podravka.1, Podravka.2, 
Podravka.3 
• Kolinska.2, Lek.3, LM.1, 
Lura.1, Podravka.1 
 
• Gorenje.4, Lek.2, Lek.4, 
LM.4, Lura.3, Lura.4, 
Podravka.4 
• Gorenje.1, Konar.1 
 
 
• Gorenje.2, Lek.2, 
Podravka.1 
• Gorenje.3, Kolinska.2, 
Lura.1 
• Gorenje.4, LM.4, Lura.2, 
Lura.4, Podravka.2 
 
Financial issues 
including 
transparency of 
performance 
• Lack of performance clarity and lack of 
indication of future financial difficulties 
decreased perceived urgency of change 
• Performance clarity and indication of 
future financial difficulties increased 
perceived urgency of change 
 
• Financial crisis created high perceived 
urgency of change 
• Financial underperformance detected by 
top management increased perceived 
urgency of change 
• Financial slack decreased perceived 
urgency of change 
• Kolinska.2, Konar.2, 
LM.1, Lura.1, 
Podravka.1, Podravka.3 
• Gorenje.2, Kolinska.1, 
Konar.3, Lek.1, LM.3, 
Lura.2, Lura.4, 
Podravka.4 
Gorenje.1, Konar.1, 
Podravka.2 
• Gorenje.2, Gorenje.4, 
Konar.3, Lek.1, 
Podravka.3 
• Kolinska.1, Lek.1 
 
Table 6.9 Factors influencing the assessment of change urgency 
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Group of factors Individual factor Change cycles in which 
the factor was present 
Issues related to 
opportunities and 
growth 
• Opportunistic behavior decreases focus 
and perceived urgency of change 
 
• Opportunistic acquisitions, alliances or 
strategic partners are used as “silver 
bullets” and decrease perceived urgency of 
change 
• Growth is seen as matter of survival, 
which increases perceived urgency of 
change 
•  Growth is seen as requiring substantial 
changes and appropriate time, which 
increases perceived urgency of change 
• Gorenje.2, Gorenje.3, 
Kolinska.1, LM.2, 
Lura.1, Lura.3 
• Kolinska.2, Lura.3 
 
 
 
• Gorenje.4, Konar.3, 
Lek.4, LM.4, Lura.4, 
Podravka.4 
• Gorenje.4, Lek.2, LM.4 
 
Issues related to 
leadership 
• Top team wants stability or avoids change, 
thus decreasing perceived urgency of 
change 
• Change at the top increased perceived 
urgency of change 
 
 
 
• Ineffective leadership in previous period 
increased perceived urgency of change 
• Top team wants to prove itself, thus 
increasing perceived urgency of change 
• Kolinska.2, Konar.2, 
Lek.3, LM.2, Podravka.1, 
Podravka.3 
• Gorenje.1, Gorenje.4, 
Konar.1, Konar.3, 
Lek.3*, Lek.4, LM.3, 
Lura.1, Lura.3, Lura.4, 
Podravka.3, Podravka.4 
• Konar.3, Lek.4, LM.3, 
Lura.4, Podravka.4 
• Gorenje.4, Lura.4 
 
Table 6.9 Factors influencing the assessment of change urgency (continued) 
 
Although there are certain differences between the factors identified in the research model and 
those identified in the field study and summarized in Table 6.9, they are not of fundamental 
importance. While the findings from the field study suggest that some refinements to the 
research model should be made, they also confirm that the research model of the trigger phase 
was in principle correct and in its improved form can remain part of the overall model. 
 
First among the research model’s proposed factors influencing the assessment of change 
urgency were various institutional pressures, in particular social issues and the question of the 
firm’s purpose, industry practices and mimicking, plus cultural pressures. The field study 
confirmed the importance of institutional pressures, although with a somewhat differently-
detailed structure. Social pressures as an important institutional factor were primarily 
manifested in the pressure to maintain employment, pressure to “look good”, and pressure to 
maintain a high level of support for the local community and other important stakeholders, 
even if this meant a potential conflict of interest with other company priorities. All of these 
pressures influenced management in the same way, by decreasing the perceived urgency of 
change. 
 
Observing industry practices and comparing them with the company’s own practices was a 
highly influential institutional factor, seen as having a major impact on the final assessment in 
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more than half of change cycles. This is not surprising, especially when linked with the 
observed pattern. Assessments leading to a lower perceived urgency of change were typically 
seen in early change cycles, when the company in question had no access to global 
benchmarks and the assessment simply reinforced an otherwise negative attitude towards 
learning and the feasibility of change. On the other hand, assessments of industry practices 
leading to a higher perceived urgency of change typically appeared in more recent change 
cycles, were accompanied by greater openness to learning, and resulted in strategic 
restructuring.  
 
Mimicking successful change practices was also identified as a factor influencing assessment. 
A particularly interesting example is the influence of the restructuring model developed by the 
large and previously very successful Slovenian electronics conglomerate, Iskra. Two of the 
companies observed utilised Iskra’s experience in assessing their own situations and change 
urgency, deciding that they should interpret the environment in the same way as Iskra’s 
management and make the same response. In Iskra’s case the chosen approach to change led 
eventually to the decline of the corporation, which lost its value adding capabilities almost 
entirely. Less vital units went bankrupt, while the most vital survived as independent entities. 
It seems that this result was acceptable to the companies observed, primarily as their 
leaderships at the time of the trigger estimated that the only other alternative was collective 
collapse. 
 
The effect of privatization as a factor leading to a decreased perceived urgency of change may 
sound surprising, but has a simple and logical explanation. It was not, as one might expect, 
that managers hesitated to initiate major changes just before privatization, preferring to wait 
for their owners’ blessing. Quite the contrary: management felt that the likely ownership 
structure after privatization would set up a situation where owners would be unwilling to 
decide major issues against the recommendations of management. It should be noted that this 
was not universally true, since in some of the observed companies management showed an 
early concern with the interests of the owners. The difference in perception may be primarily 
due to a management self-assessment, whereby managers with more self-confidence and a 
firm belief that they could cope with change paid less attention to the privatization process 
and the new owners. However, the influence of owners seemed to grow over time for all the 
companies observed. 
 
While transparency of performance was identified in the research model as a factor separate 
from financial resources (which were grouped with other resources), the field study showed 
that it is more convenient to group these two factors together. Performance transparency 
affected the urgency assessment as predicted, low transparency decreasing perceived urgency. 
As expected, high transparency led to higher perceived urgency only when it was coupled 
with a prediction of future financial difficulties. The important consequence of the 
transparency issue is the observation that low transparency led in several cases to financial 
collapse before the company had clearly identified the scale of the threat, and in several other 
cases delayed change and resulted in more pronounced defensive reactions. Financial 
underperformance was, generally speaking, an important factor increasing the perceived 
urgency of change. 
 
The question left open by the research model was the role of financial slack. In terms of its 
influence on urgency assessment, it is clear that the existence of slack had a negative impact 
and decreased perceived urgency. 
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The next factor predicted by the research model was the influence of opportunistic behavior, 
although the research model did not predict the direction of influence. The field study clearly 
showed that in cases when management exhibited opportunistic behavior this decreased the 
perceived urgency of change. It was interesting in particular to observe how some top 
management teams “waited for the right opportunity”. Although it is difficult to assess 
completely objectively the process they engaged in, from external manifestations and the 
testimonials collected it seems that they did not define the nature of “opportunity” clearly, 
failed to search consistently for it, and did not support their strategy with other activities 
which would aid the company in finding and taking advantage of it. On the other hand, in 
several cases companies acted in exactly the opposite manner, firstly defining their strategic 
ambition and following this up with a search for appropriate opportunities. Since the first 
pattern better matches the definition of opportunistic behavior, the conclusion from the 
research is that it decreases the perceived urgency of change. 
 
Another factor to some degree related to the notion of opportunity – one not identified in the 
research model based on theory review – cropped up in the field study as important. This is 
the influence of how top management perceived growth. In all the cases observed where top 
management perceived growth as vital for company viability, the perception increased the 
perceived urgency of change. It is interesting to note that in several cases the influence of this 
factor was amplified by the assessment that growth required substantial changes, and these in 
turn a significant amount of time. In these cases management was not paralyzed by the 
“immensity of the task”, but was actually stimulated to move at a quicker pace. 
 
Resource availability, in particular trusted leadership, was the last factor predicted by the 
research model as potentially influencing the perceived urgency of change. While other 
resources were identified as influencing the perceived feasibility of change and will be 
discussed later, an influence of leadership-related issues on perceived change urgency was 
observed in the field study. In several cases, where the members of top management clearly 
regarded the status quo as a personal priority and for various reasons did not want to engage 
in change, this influence was obviously negative. In these cases a negative attitude towards 
change was rationalized through a one-sided interpretation of context, even where other 
members of their organizations and other players in the industry interpreted the same context 
as requiring change. 
 
Change at the top almost always coincided with an increase in perceived urgency. The 
exceptions were situations where this effect was attenuated by a new leader who showed clear 
weaknesses (and was not pushed by external factors into radical defensive restructuring). In 
six observed change cycles poor leadership in the previous period was seen as so detrimental 
to the company that it provoked an assessment of urgent need for change. In several other 
cases perceived urgency of change was increased by the desire of the top management team to 
establish itself as successful and to make its mark on company history, this rationalized with 
by an interpretation of the context as requiring urgent change.  
6.2.3 Summary of factors influencing perceived change feasibility 
Table 6.10 groups these factors in accordance with the predictions from the research model. 
Once again, factors with a slightly different description but of essentially the same nature 
were pooled together, and change cycle numbers are given for the cycles in which the factors 
significantly influenced the assessment of change feasibility. Cycles marked with * 
demonstrate only limited presence of the factor. 
 
Nenad Filipovi  Chapter 6 
Strategic Change Management of Medium Size Companies:   
Insights from Slovenia and Croatia   
 178 
Group of factors Individual factor Change cycles in which 
the factor was present 
Issues related to 
institutional 
pressures 
• Estimate of not being able to handle 
stakeholders in expected delicate situation 
decreased perceived feasibility of change 
• Estimate of being able to handle 
stakeholders in expected delicate situation 
increased perceived feasibility of change 
• Konar.2, Konar.3, 
Lek.3, LM.3, LM.4, 
Lura.2, Podravka.3 
• Lek.4, Podravka.4 
Issues related to 
industry and 
market dynamics 
• Estimate of industry and market dynamics 
as unfavorable decreased perceived 
feasibility of change 
 
 
 
• Estimate of industry and market dynamics 
as favorable increased perceived feasibility 
of change 
• Gorenje.1, Kolinska.1, 
Kolinska.2, Konar.1, 
Lek.1, Lek.3, LM.1, 
LM.4, Lura.1, Lura.2, 
Lura.3, Podravka.1, 
Podravka.3 
• Gorenje.4, Konar.2, 
Konar.3, Lek.2, Lek.4, 
LM.3, Lura.3, Lura.4, 
Podravka.4 
Issues related to 
resource 
(competence) 
availability 
• Estimate of insufficient financial resources 
decreased perceived feasibility of change 
 
 
• Estimate of sufficient financial resources 
increased perceived feasibility of change 
 
 
• Estimate of poor current level of 
competitiveness and competence and of no 
differentiating resources decreased 
perceived feasibility of change 
 
• Estimate of having some competence and 
differentiating resources increased 
perceived feasibility of change 
 
 
• Estimate that the needed competence and 
complementary resources could be 
obtained through strategic partner 
increased perceived feasibility of change 
• Gorenje.1, Kolinska.1, 
Konar.1, Konar.2, 
Lek.1*, Lura.1, 
Podravka.1* 
• Gorenje.2, Gorenje.3, 
Lek.2, Lek.3, Lek.4, 
LM.1, LM.2*, 
Podravka.2, Podravka.3 
• Gorenje.1*, Kolinska.1, 
Kolinska.2, Konar.1, 
Lek.3*, LM.3, Lura.1*, 
Podravka.1*, Podravka.2, 
Podravka.3 
• Gorenje.2, Gorenje.3, 
Kolinska.1, Kolinska.2, 
Konar.3, Lek.2,  Lek.4, 
LM.2*, LM.4, Lura.2, 
Lura.4, Podravka.4 
• LM.4, Lura.3, 
Podravka.3, Podravka.4 
 
Table 6.10 Factors influencing the assessment of change feasibility 
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Group of factors Individual factor Change cycles in which 
the factor was present 
Issues related to 
leadership 
• Estimate of cooperative employees 
increased perceived feasibility of change 
• Estimate of uncooperative employees 
decreased perceived feasibility of change 
• Estimate of strong and trusted leadership 
increased perceived feasibility of change 
• Gorenje.1, Gorenje.2, 
Gorenje.3, Kolinska.1 
• Kolinska.2, LM.1, LM.2, 
Podravka.2, Podravka.3 
• Gorenje.1, Gorenje.2, 
Gorenje.3, Gorenje.4, 
Konar.3, Lek.1, Lek.2, 
Lek.4, LM.3, LM.4, 
Lura.1, Lura.2, Lura.4, 
Podravka.4 
 
Table 6.10 Factors influencing the assessment of change feasibility (continued) 
 
Institutional pressures, as the first factor suggested by the research model, according to the 
findings from the field study significantly influenced the perceived feasibility of change in a 
very simple way. In a large number of change cycles observed, where the potential outcome 
of change was regarded as sensitive and against the interests of some key stakeholders, top 
management made an explicit assessment of their ability to handle the stakeholders. Where 
the assessment was negative, top management designed the change around the notion of low 
feasibility, while a positive assessment resulted in increased perceived feasibility of change. 
 
A similarly simple but powerful factor influencing the perceived feasibility of change was the 
assessment of industry and market dynamics. It is interesting to note that this assessment was 
made explicit and non-neutral in nearly 75% of the change cycles observed. In all of these 
cases top management directly linked the assessment of the industry and market situation 
facing the company with the perceived feasibility of change, a positive assessment increasing 
perceived feasibility.  
 
A similar level of straightforward influence was observed for the assessment of available 
financial resources and business competence. Sufficiency of resources increased the perceived 
feasibility of change, while an estimated insufficiency decreased it. It is also unsurprising that 
the estimated possibility of obtaining needed resources through a strategic partner influenced 
the perceived feasibility of change positively. 
 
People-related factors were also observed to act according to the predictions of the research 
model. In particular, in more than half of the observed change cycles a high level of top 
management self-confidence (i.e. when top managers viewed themselves as trusted leaders) 
positively influenced the assessment of change feasibility. 
6.3 Analysis of the design phase outcomes 
The third research question concerned the outcome of the design phase: 
 
Q3. What was the pattern of response to the perceived time horizon for action and the 
perceived feasibility of change, if any? What was the sequence of responses? 
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Before presenting a graphic illustration of the sequence of observed change cycles it is worth 
reminding the reader of the methodology by which the diagram values presented in Chapter 4 
were calculated. Despite rough calculation, in no case was there a mismatch between the 
predicted change cycle characteristics based on an estimated position in the diagram and the 
observed change cycle characteristics identified in the field study. 
 
It is also important to note that in all cycles several factors influenced management 
assessment of change urgency and feasibility. In many cases some factors had contrasting 
influences and the net direction of influence was a balance among them. The fact that the field 
study did not identify any single factor as being generally present in all change cycles does 
not come as a surprise. The diversity of the observed situations suggests that complete 
homogeneity of the factors influencing the assessment would be unlikely. 
 
Finally, as previously noted, the trigger phases of most change cycles stretched over a period 
of time. However, the boundaries between trigger and design phases were relatively clear. On 
the other hand, while the design phases were typically shorter than the trigger phases, the 
boundaries between the design phases and the implementation phases were less clear. 
Companies often began implementing some elements of design before coming up with a full 
complement, but in all the change cycles observed the principle change outcomes of the 
design phase (or their positioning in the diagrams presented in Figures 6.1 through 6.7) were 
determined early on. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6.1 Sequence of change at Gorenje 
 
Due to low perceived feasibility, the research model predicted that the first change cycle at 
Gorenje would be defensive. As a result of a big increase in perceived feasibility, the next 
three should have been strategic. It is interesting to note a drop in perceived urgency for the 
third cycle and then an increase in the fourth. However, while modification of some of the 
change manifestations was expected, the nature of change should have remained the same. 
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Figure 6.2 Sequence of change at Kolinska 
 
Due to low perceived feasibility and high perceived urgency, the first cycle of change at 
Kolinska was expected to be defensive. However, since perceived urgency in the second cycle 
decreased and perceived feasibility remained the same, the research model predicted that 
Kolinska would enter a period of non-aligned change. 
 
 
 
Figure 6.3 Sequence of change at Konar 
 
The first change cycle at Konar was expected to be clearly defensive, since perceived 
urgency there was high and perceived feasibility extremely low. When perceived urgency 
decreased and perceived feasibility only slightly increased, the research model predicted that 
the company would enter a period of non-aligned change. In the last period perceived urgency 
again increased, but since perceived feasibility also significantly increased, the model 
predicted that the nature of change would become strategic. 
 
Short-term 
 
 
 
 
Perceived 
time horizon 
required for 
reaction 
 
 
 
 
Long-term 
Perceived 
feasibility 
Low High 
1 
2 
3 
Short-term 
 
 
 
 
Perceived 
time horizon 
required for 
reaction 
 
 
 
 
Long-term 
Perceived 
feasibility 
Low High 
1 
2 
Nenad Filipovi  Chapter 6 
Strategic Change Management of Medium Size Companies:   
Insights from Slovenia and Croatia   
 182 
 
Figure 6.4 Sequence of change at Lek 
 
The first change cycle at Lek was marked by relatively high perceived urgency and low-to-
medium perceived feasibility. Therefore the research model predicted that the cycle would 
contain some characteristics of strategic restructuring, although its predominant nature would 
be defensive. After seeing increased feasibility in the second cycle, both perceived urgency 
and feasibility were decreased, which should have resulted in non-aligned change in the third 
cycle. Due to high perceived urgency and feasibility the fourth cycle again was expected to 
assume all the characteristics of strategic restructuring. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6.5 Sequence of change at Ljubljanske mlekarne 
 
Due primarily to low perceived urgency, it was expected that the first two change cycles at 
Ljubljanske mlekarne would be dominated by the attributes of non-aligned change, although 
the second cycle should also have had some attributes of strategic change. Since perceived 
urgency increased in the third cycle, the latter was expected to be predominantly defensive, 
although also to have some attributes of strategic change. The research model predicted that 
only the fourth cycle would possess more clear attributes of strategic restructuring. 
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Figure 6.6 Sequence of change at Lura 
 
Due to both very low perceived urgency and low perceived feasibility, the research model 
predicted no major changes in the first change cycle at Lura. A significant increase in 
perceived urgency was matched by only a minor increase in perceived feasibility, and thus the 
second cycle was expected to be primarily defensive, but also to possess some of the 
attributes of strategic restructuring. The model predicted that the last two cycles would clearly 
have the nature of strategic restructuring. 
 
 
 
Figure 6.7 Sequence of change at Podravka 
 
The research model predicted that due to low perceived urgency and low perceived feasibility 
only minor changes would be attempted in the first change cycle at Podravka. A major 
increase in perceived urgency and a minor increase in perceived feasibility should according 
to the model have led to defensive restructuring in the second cycle, while the drop in 
perceived feasibility was expected to produce non-aligned change in the third. Finally, a 
major increase in perceived feasibility in the fourth cycle should have produced strategic 
restructuring. 
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Several observations concerning the outcomes of design phases and the sequence of change 
cycles merit more detailed discussion. 
 
The main conclusion of the field research is that the observed nature of the new organizational 
templates fully matched the predictions of the research model. As discussed later, not only did 
the observations confirm that individual cycles possessed the expected dominant 
characteristics (e.g. defensive or strategic restructuring), but they also held true for the cycles, 
for which the research model predicted that the design phase would produce a new 
organizational template with somewhat mixed characteristics (the first change cycle at Lek, 
for example, indeed had the predominant attributes of defensive restructuring mixed with 
attributes which are otherwise typical of strategic restructuring). 
 
As predicted by the research model, cycles in which the management saw no need for change 
were always followed by defensive restructuring (in one case after an intermediate cycle of 
non-aligned change). This may indicate that in an environment marked by abrupt and 
threatening changes companies cannot afford to follow a “business as usual” philosophy, 
since it will inevitably lead them into difficulties. 
 
On the other hand, all the cycles of non-aligned change that were preceded by defensive 
restructuring were followed by strategic restructuring (early indications of the next cycle of 
change at Kolinska also point in the direction of strategic restructuring). This goes against 
logic, since one would expect non-aligned change to have the same detrimental effect, or 
worse, as absence of change (e.g. energy and resources wasted, credibility lost). However, it 
is important to note that all observed cases of non-aligned change were linked to weak 
leadership. When an appropriate leader appeared and a new cycle began, the same basic 
context was interpreted differently and strategic restructuring suddenly became feasible. This 
reminds us of the old saying that “there is no easy or difficult golf course, just good and bad 
golf players”. 
 
Another group of observations from the field study involve the length of individual cycles and 
the overall restructuring process. The longest cycle was the second cycle at Kolinska, 
characterized as non-aligned change and lasting for more than ten years (with indications of a 
new trigger phase appearing soon). Otherwise, the duration of concluded change cycles varied 
from two to seven years.  
 
It is interesting to note that the cycles characterized as defensive restructuring lasted from two 
to three years. The two defensive restructuring cycles lasting three years were associated with 
a late reaction to context change and significant financial crisis (in one case this amounted to 
near-bankruptcy). The two years needed for the shorter defensive restructuring cycles seemed 
to be the minimum period required for systematic change. 
 
Not surprisingly, the defensive change cycles had, as a group, the shortest average duration. 
The longest average duration belonged to the group of cycles characterized as “no change”. 
However, one should be cautious in making generalizations here, not only because the sample 
is very small but also because the findings may be highly influenced by the context (e. g. a 
food industry with fairly closed local markets). 
 
The conclusions that seem much more appropriate for generalization are those which concern 
the length of strategic restructuring. On the one hand, the concluded change cycles 
characterized as strategic restructuring lasted a minimum of three and a maximum of six 
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years. The only exception was the third change cycle at Lura, which lasted for only two years, 
but was then terminated as unsuccessful. On the other hand, all the companies undergoing 
strategic restructuring are still in the process. Only one (Lek) has attained a performance level 
approaching the leading companies in its industry, but even here the top management has 
clearly indicated that further restructuring is needed. Obviously, four to nine years spent on 
strategic restructuring have not been enough, even for those companies acting systematically, 
with clear commitment from the top and without major mistakes. This might present an 
interesting topic for future research, investigating whether such long duration stems from the 
regional context and the poor starting point of change, or whether it is also present in 
companies with more advantageous starting points, less hostile contexts and more resources to 
deploy during restructuring.  
 
My final comments are devoted to the clarity of positioning in the diagrams in Figures 6.1 to 
6.7. As noted earlier, the values for variable pairs were not determined through exact 
measurements. A similarly loose methodology was applied to determining the boundaries of 
regions with the same change characteristics. However, the resulting groupings, presented in 
Figure 6.8, seem to be consistent and are robustly supported by observations from the field 
study. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6.8 Mapping of the observed change cycle trigger values and the resulting design 
characteristics 
 
As noted above, those change cycles that are markedly close to the region boundary (circled 
in Figure 6.8; from Figures 6.1 to 6.7 they can be identified as the first cycle at Lek, the 
second and third change cycles at Ljubljanske mlekarne, the second cycle at Lura, and the 
second cycle at Podravka) seem to indicate gradual, rather than sudden transitions between 
the regions. While for all of these cycles the region determined the main characteristics of the 
change cycle, some characteristics from the neighboring region were also present. This 
implies another counter-intuitive phenomenon observed during the field study: some change 
cycles possessed the dominant characteristics of defensive restructuring with some traces of 
strategic restructuring, and vice-versa.   
 
Once again, it should be stressed that the above positioning reflects the design choices and 
does not necessarily imply the successful or unsuccessful outcome of the attempted change. 
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As suggested by the research model and discussed in the next two sections, change outcomes 
were related to the chosen organizational template, available resources, leadership 
interventions and barriers to change. 
6.4 Characteristics of defensive restructuring 
The fourth research question focused on the nature and characteristics of defensive 
restructuring: 
 
Q4. If defensive restructuring was one of the responses, what was its nature? What were the 
key elements of the new organizational template? What were the key resources needed? What 
were the main leadership interventions during implementation, and the barriers to successful 
implementation of the new template? 
 
Out of the seven defensive restructuring cycles observed, five produced the desired results 
(Gorenje.1, Kolinska.1, Lek.1, LM.3, Lura.2): company financial performance was stabilized 
and the cost position improved, leading to immediate improvement in competitiveness. At the 
same time value adding competence was not destroyed, thus allowing the company in 
question to proceed with strategic restructuring. In the two remaining cases (Konar.1, 
Podravka.2) some improvements were achieved, but in both cases they proved insufficient for 
sustainable operations, thus prompting further financial crisis.  
6.4.1 Organizational templates in defensive restructuring 
Table 6.11 presents a summary of the organizational template characteristics observed in the 
seven defensive restructuring cycles. 
 
Change cycle Observed organizational template characteristics 
Gorenje.1 • Soft downsizing 
• Focus on liquidity and costs 
• Centralization 
• Reorganization into completely independent divisions, core business kept 
intact in one of them 
• Focus on core markets but no change of product portfolio or sales 
strategy 
• Quality improvements through technological discipline 
Kolinska.1 • Asset restructuring 
• Soft and hard downsizing 
• Focus on liquidity and costs 
• Centralization 
• Focus on production improvements and domestic sales, including 
products based on licensing 
• Unsuccessful attempt to expand exports 
 
Table 6.11 Observed organizational template characteristics in defensive restructuring cycles 
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Change cycle Observed organizational template characteristics 
Konar.1 • Bankruptcies on divisional level 
• Radical downsizing through bankruptcies and bypass companies 
• Centralized liquidity management 
• Focus on costs 
• Reorganization into smaller and more independent divisions 
• Focus on keeping existing business partners, particularly in domestic 
market 
• Improvements in technological discipline 
Lek.1 • Focus on core business 
• Moderate, soft downsizing 
• Focus on costs through systematic process reengineering  
• Divisional organization with core business as division 
• Focus on sales of existing products in core markets 
LM.3 • Asset restructuring through plant closures 
• Soft downsizing 
• Focus on costs through numerous improvement projects 
• Centralization 
• Reorganizations within functional organization 
• Focus on existing products, domestic sales and distribution, in particular 
relations with retail chains (introduction of private labels) 
Lura.2 • Consolidation of three companies into one 
• Soft downsizing 
• Focus on cost improvements through restructuring projects 
• Centralization 
• Reorganization into functional organization 
• Focus on domestic sales and distribution with existing products 
Podravka.2 • Some spin-offs of non-core activities 
• Soft downsizing 
• Centralization 
• Reorganization along unclear lines 
• Focus on sales and distribution in core markets 
 
Table 6.11 Observed organizational template characteristics in defensive restructuring cycles 
(continued) 
 
It is obvious that all seven cycles share most characteristics of the new organizational 
templates. According to the predictions of the research model, asset restructuring was used in 
all cases except one (Lek.1). However, the observations from the field study indicate that the 
primary motive for its use was not to achieve one-off financial gains to serve as part of 
financial consolidation or balance sheet improvements, as would be suggested by the theory. 
In the cases observed asset restructuring was primarily used as part of a focus on core 
activities and a shedding of unsustainable lines of business, and therefore also served as a 
form of downsizing.  
 
All seven cycles included downsizing, although of different intensities, confirming the 
predictions of the research model. It is interesting to note, though, that in only two cases was a 
“hard” approach to downsizing used: in one case layoffs via divisional bankruptcies 
(Konar.1) and in the other the mechanism of technological surpluses (Kolinska.1). In both 
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cases aggressive downsizing had negative side effects, primarily in the form of fear and 
declining trust. 
 
Other forms of cost-cutting were present in all of the successful defensive restructuring 
cycles. Actually, the most successful (Gorenje.1, Lek.1, LM.3, Lura.2) included systematic 
projects aimed at cost-cutting through process improvement. This led not only to cost 
reduction, but also to the improvement of the cost structure. Systematic cost-cutting was less 
pronounced in one cycle, which also resulted in the least convincing improvements 
(Kolinska.1), and it was practically absent in the two which were labeled as failures 
(Konar.1, Podravka.2). 
 
As predicted by the research model, centralization was also heavily used. Major centralization 
was observed in all cases except one (Konar.1), where only a few areas were centralized, 
including liquidity management and the appointing of divisional managers. It is worth noting 
that this particular change cycle was unsuccessful. 
 
The final element of the defensive restructuring organizational template according to the 
research model was a focus on local specifics, rather than a global perspective. While this 
prediction was to a large degree confirmed by the field study, its observations can also be 
interpreted in a way linking that statement to the one concerning lack of organizational 
learning (another observation from the study). The two can serve to explain an observation 
from all seven cases: none of the companies observed made significant changes to their 
business models (the way they compete) during defensive restructuring, regardless of all other 
changes. Almost all increased their focus on (existing) core products and markets, using 
existing competences. The only attempt to generate major change was observed in Kolinska.1, 
where the company tried to enter new Central European markets, but the attempt failed and 
was abandoned. 
 
One element of the new organizational template which was not explicitly predicted by the 
research model but was observed in all cases except Kolinska.1 was the use of reorganization. 
In the more successful cases the motivation for reorganization was clear: to achieve better 
transparency of performance and greater focus on the core business. In both cases perceived 
as failures, reorganization was carried out without a clear business rationale: in one of them 
(Konar.1) it was driven by financial and legal considerations, which actually decreased the 
business viability of the newly-created units by making them smaller and destroying potential 
synergies; while in the other (Podravka.2) it was primarily driven by political and personal 
interests, which kept one of the newly-created divisions (food) as a non-transparent 
conglomerate and created an unhealthy situation in which divisional managers were 
simultaneously members of the management board. 
6.4.2 Key resources in defensive restructuring 
Table 6.12 presents a summary of the key resources observed in the seven defensive 
restructuring cycles. 
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Change cycle Observed key resources 
Gorenje.1 • Excellent relationship with government, banks and local community 
• Use of ownership certificates to decrease financial pressure  
• Secured financial infusion towards the end of the cycle 
• New accounting system 
• Technically competent and committed employees 
• Trust in Stani 
• Distribution network in Western Europe 
Kolinska.1 • Minimal financial reserves 
• Good long-term relations with licensing partners 
• Very solid planning and control system 
• Cooperative unions trusted Deželak, especially in the initial part of the 
cycle 
• Solid manufacturing competence 
• Distribution capabilities in Slovenia 
Konar.1 • Good relations with local political elite and state-owned customers 
• Basic technical competence of employees 
• Some entrepreneurial divisional managers 
Lek.1 • Solid level of financial slack 
• Good relations with local market regulators 
• Strategic planning system 
• Ability to achieve fast execution 
• Employees with solid technical competence 
• Brand and basic sales network in CEE 
• Trust in Dragonja 
LM.3 • Solid level of financial slack 
• Detailed operational planning and reporting 
• Solid level of manufacturing and logistics competence 
• Relatively solid brand position in Slovenia and countries of former 
Yugoslavia 
• Very good sales and distribution network in Slovenia 
• Vehovec as a non-autocratic leader, well-accepted new top management 
team 
Lura.2 • Solid level of financial slack 
• Solid brands, excellent sales and distribution network in Croatia 
• Rai as trusted leader, Vukina and his team with excellent track record 
from companies with high reputation 
Podravka.2 • Financial injection from EBRD 
• Excellent regional brand (Vegeta), solid other local brands 
• Relatively solid sales and distribution network in Croatia 
• Relatively solid technological competence 
• Extremely loyal employees 
 
Table 6.12 Key resources observed in defensive restructuring cycles 
 
The key resources observed were less homogeneous across the seven cases than the 
organizational templates. Nevertheless, it is worth noting that for the cases with successful 
defensive restructuring cycles they come closer to the predictions of the research model. 
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All the observed companies except Konar.1, Kolinska.1 and the very first part of Gorenje.1 
could count on reasonable financial resources allowing them to undergo defensive 
restructuring without an acute financial crisis. Creative use of ownership certificates allowed 
for less drastic measures in the case of Gorenje.1, which in turn supported the high level of 
trust and commitment of employees. In contrast, a lower level of financial slack in Kolinska.1 
combined with a relatively weak competitive position led to more aggressive downsizing, 
which eventually had a negative effect on the trust in leadership. 
 
The next resource predicted by the research model was a controlling system to facilitate 
transparent performance. This in some form was observed in four cases, but was absent in the 
two unsuccessful cycles (Konar.1, Podravka.2), which confirms the research model’s 
prediction regarding the elements needed for successful defensive restructuring. An efficient 
control system was also not seen clearly in Lura.2, this being contrary to the predictions of the 
research model. One explanation may lie in the specific situation of Rai’s position as owner-
manager up to 1998, where he had an intimate insight into the performance of individual parts 
of the company, which, together with relatively high level of financial slack and heavy use of 
consultants, allowed the company to successfully complete the consolidation phase. However, 
as illustrated in section 6.5, deficiencies in this area continued to affect the company 
negatively in the first cycle of strategic restructuring. 
 
The next suggestion from the research model identifies optimal use of human talent (noting in 
particular scarce middle management) as a key resource. This formulation proved poorly 
chosen, since it did not provide the field study with a reference to the definition of “optimal” 
as opposed to sub-optimal. A related factor was observed in the field study, however: the 
importance of a company’s having competent employees, but also other key competences 
needed for successful implementation of the business model chosen as part of the 
organizational template. As noted above, all the observed companies chose to continue with 
the model existing immediately prior to the start of defensive restructuring, with a pronounced 
focus on core lines of business and core markets. All the companies displayed solid levels of 
technological competence (clearly a legacy from the past, when emphasis had been placed on 
manufacturing and access to solid manufacturing technologies was possible). Some 
companies (in particular in Konar.1 and to some degree in Podravka.2) had problems with 
sales and distribution competence in core markets, while almost all had difficulties with 
marketing-related competences, but did not see these as vital in the defensive restructuring 
cycle.  
 
Finally, the research model’s prediction concerning trust in leadership and the company’s 
survival capability is to a large degree matched by the observations of the field study. In both 
examples of failed change cycles (Konar.1 and Podravka.2) it was clear that the employees 
lacked trust in top management, while in the case of Konar.1 there was very little trust in the 
survival of the company, riddled as it was with a wave of divisional bankruptcies. Also, in 
Kolinska.1 trust in top management had been eroded by aggressive downsizing. In successful 
cases (Gorenje.1, Lek.1, LM.3, Lura.2) trust was not only clearly present across the spectrum, 
from frontline employees to top management and back (top managers trusted in the ability of 
employees to bring the company through the crisis, even though they admitted that 
competences could be improved), but also between top management and key stakeholders. 
6.4.3 Leadership interventions in defensive restructuring 
Table 6.13 presents a summary of the leadership interventions observed in the seven 
defensive restructuring cycles. 
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Change cycle Observed leadership interventions 
Gorenje.1 • Top-down decision making 
• Focused investments (manufacturing and quality improvements, control 
system) 
• Intensive communication with employees (including use of ownership 
certificates, explicit promises of no layoffs, quality issues) 
• Intensive communications with banks, local community and political 
elite 
• Putting pressure on middle management to achieve planned goals 
• Indirect use of fear for job to strengthen technological discipline 
Kolinska.1 • Top-down decision-making 
• Intensive communication with unions 
• Explicit pressure of layoffs to instill discipline and improve productivity 
Konar.1 • Limited communication with divisional management 
• Interventions reduced to appointing / firing of divisional managers 
Lek.1 • Top-down decision-making 
• Focused investments (manufacturing and quality improvements, sales 
and distribution network in CEE, R&D) 
• Intensive communication with middle management and unions 
• Tactical use of consultants as change agents in restructuring projects 
• Putting pressure on middle management to achieve planned goals 
LM.3 • Top-down decision-making 
• Intensive communication with middle management, unions and 
supervisory board 
• Changes in middle management 
• Tactical use of consultants as change agents in restructuring projects 
Lura.2 • Top-down decision-making 
• Intensive communication with frontline employees 
• Tactical use of consultants as change agents in restructuring projects 
Podravka.2 • Top management dominated by supervisory board 
• Surprising middle managers with unexpected and conflicting decisions 
• Bypassing middle management with direct interventions 
• Tactical use of consultants as change agents in restructuring projects 
 
Table 6.13 Observed leadership interventions in defensive restructuring cycles 
 
The observed leadership interventions in successful cycles of defensive restructuring 
(Gorenje.1, Lek.1, LM.3, Lura.2, to some degree Kolinska.1) included all three of the 
interventions predicted by the research model: top-down decision-making, intensive 
communication aimed at building trust, and use of coercion to speed up execution and in 
particular to introduce stricter technological (process) discipline. 
 
The unsuccessful cycles (Konar.1 and Podravka.2) lacked most of the predicted elements. In 
Konar.1, top management left all the strategic decision-making to divisional managers. At 
the same time communication between the management board and division managers was 
significantly limited, while communication between the management board and frontline 
employees was practically eliminated. In Podravka.2, the top management left most of the 
strategic decision-making to the supervisory board. Communication with middle management 
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was poor and the top management often made tactical decisions which directly eroded the 
authority of middle managers and each other. 
 
Two interventions were observed in addition to those predicted by the research model. The 
first was intensive communication with other stakeholders, and not only employees or 
employee representatives (Gorenje.1, Lek.1, LM.3, Lura.2, Podravka.2). This was used to 
justify austerity measures, as well as to secure additional resources or at least buy time for 
changes. 
 
The second additional intervention, present in the majority of the cases observed (Lek.1, 
LM.3, Lura.2, Podravka.2), was the use of global consulting companies to support the change 
process and in particular to serve as a bridge between top and middle management. In all of 
the observed engagements the consultants were used at a tactical level, primarily to secure 
cost-cutting and process improvements within the existing business model. 
6.4.4 Barriers to change in defensive restructuring 
Table 6.14 presents a summary of the major internal barriers to change observed in the seven 
defensive restructuring cycles. 
 
Change cycle Observed major internal barriers to change 
Gorenje.1 • Poor skills and inappropriate attitudes (e.g. lack of initiative, poor 
technological discipline leading to low quality) 
• Fear, especially on the part of middle managers 
• Loyalty based on lack of mobility 
Kolinska.1 • High cost of downsizing 
• Fear, especially on the part of frontline employees 
• Lack of resources and strategic competences 
• Limited number of high-potential middle managers and professionals 
• Loyalty based on lack of mobility 
Konar.1 • Strategic uncertainty and lack of trust in future 
• Frustration and feeling of helplessness among employees and middle 
managers 
• Complete lack of resources 
• Significant lack of not-technical competences 
• Weak divisional and middle management 
• Poor transparence of results 
• Lack of trust in top management 
• Loyalty based on lack of mobility 
Lek.1 • Limited resources 
• Improvable non-technical competence 
• Fear for job among frontline employees 
• Fear of incompetence among middle management 
 
Table 6.14 Observed major internal barriers to change in defensive restructuring cycles 
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Change cycle Observed major internal barriers to change 
LM.3 • Poor non-technical competence 
• Lack of initiative among middle managers and frontline employees 
• Limited number of high potential middle managers and professionals, 
passive or negative “old guard”  
• Fear for job among frontline employees 
• Fear of incompetence among middle management 
Lura.2 • Poor non-technical competence 
• Lack of initiative among middle managers and frontline employees 
• Limited number of high potential middle managers and professionals  
• Fear for job among frontline employees 
• Fear of incompetence among middle management 
• Loyalty based on lack of mobility 
Podravka.2 • Frustration and feeling of helplessness among employees and middle 
managers 
• Claims of non-ethical behavior and lack of trust in top management 
• Lack of competence, commitment and alignment among top managers 
• Significant lack of non-technical competence 
• Fear for job / position 
• Loyalty based on lack of mobility 
 
Table 6.14 Observed major internal barriers to change in defensive restructuring cycles 
(continued) 
 
The first of the barriers predicted by the research model was strategic uncertainty. The only 
cycle in which this barrier was clearly observed was Konar.1; and the quality of the various 
strategic scenarios prepared in several companies (Kolinska.1, Lek.1, LM.3) shows that 
management could understand complex and swift changes as well as act despite uncertainty. 
Therefore it is reasonable to assume that this research model prediction is wrong, provided 
that the top management has a reasonable understanding of its business and trusts in the future 
of the company. 
 
Problems with skills and attitudes, or in more general terms with various competences, were 
present in all the observed cases as predicted by the research model. In particular, companies 
had difficulties with legacies from the past: lack of initiative-taking (additionally influenced 
in Slovenia and some parts of Croatia by the national or regional culture) and poor market-
related and line management competences. 
 
Fear was also a well-predicted barrier. In some cases it applied to frontline employees afraid 
of layoffs, even when soft downsizing was applied by the company. In extreme cases 
(Konar.1, Podravka.2) fear was combined with feelings of denial, frustration and 
helplessness, as predicted in the literature for situations of deep stress and unethical behavior. 
Another type of fear observed in all cases and present among middle managers involved 
possible incompetence in new circumstances leading to potential loss of position. This fear 
was obviously magnified because of increased pressure on middle management performance 
and was stronger among older managers. 
 
Loyalty based on lack of mobility was present in almost all cases. This presented a major 
problem since it reinforced weak employee structures and often distorted perceptions held by 
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top managers as to the commitment and quality of their workforce. It is not surprising that 
most top managers quoted loyal employees as an advantage, while at the same time pointing 
out problems with poor skills and attitudes. This group of employees was also the most vocal 
in pointing out the need to support the interests of the local community, this statement 
constituting an effective barrier to change. 
 
Finally, another major barrier not clearly predicted by the research model was insufficient 
resources for investment in competence building. This problem is related to a lack of 
organizational learning and a lack of understanding as to which competences are critical, plus 
no clear commitment from the top to build them even to the extent possible with limited 
resources. These problems were most clearly present in the change cycles with poor or below-
average results (Kolinska.1, Konar.1, Podravka.2). In successful change cycles some 
learning was observed, but was limited almost exclusively to “routine” process improvements 
related to the existing business model. 
6.5 Characteristics of strategic restructuring 
The fifth research question focused on the nature and characteristics of strategic restructuring: 
 
Q5. Where strategic restructuring was one of the responses, what was its nature? What were 
the key elements of the new organizational template? What were the key resources needed? 
What were the main leadership interventions used during implementation, and the barriers to 
successful implementation of the new template? 
 
Of the ten strategic restructuring change cycles observed, two (Gorenje.4, LM.4) have 
undergone the trigger phase only very recently and are still in the design phase. As noted in 
6.3, although not all elements of the design are clear, there are several early indications of the 
nature of these phases. Some main design elements are already clear, as well as the resources 
deployed, as are the initial leadership interventions and barriers. Therefore both cycles have 
been included in the analysis presented below. 
 
Four more strategic restructuring change cycles (Konar.3, Lek.4, Lura.4, Podravka.4) are 
still to be completed, although three of these have already lasted for four years. Final 
conclusions are not yet possible, but all four seem to be successful in term of obvious 
improvements in company strategic position, competitiveness, and financial results.  
 
Of the four concluded strategic restructuring cycles, three (Gorenje.2, Gorenje.3, Lek.2) led to 
improvements in competitiveness and were regarded by top management as successful, while 
one (Lura.3) was seen as only partially successful and led to the replacement of the top 
management team, a revision of company strategy, and other changes. 
6.5.1 Organizational templates in strategic restructuring 
Table 6.15 presents a summary of the organizational template characteristics observed in the 
ten strategic restructuring cycles. 
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Change cycle Observed organizational template characteristics 
Gorenje.2 • Focus on extending from lower to mid-price range in existing markets 
• Focus on achieving growth through a balance between the company’s 
own and private labels 
• Improvements in production processes leading to cost-cutting 
• Focus on new product development with higher added value 
• Intensive technical education 
• Use of benchmarking and global consultants to improve processes 
Gorenje.3 • Continued attempt to stretch the offering and move towards a higher 
price range, but remaining fast follower 
• Pan-European market player 
• Opportunistic strategy within individual markets 
• Diversification to use brand potential 
• Focus on design, user-friendly products, and sales and distribution 
flexibility as factors of differentiation 
• Global benchmarking 
• Decentralization 
• Education of middle management 
Gorenje.4 • Focus on growth (including acquisitions), primarily in core business 
• Combined focus on Europe and North America  
• Focus on improving financial performance 
• Brand consolidation across markets 
Konar.3 • Clear statement on strategic positioning and differentiation factors  
• Focus on Central and South East Europe  
• Use of synergies  
• Focus on low cost 
• Focus on flexible, middle to high (but not state-of-the-art) technology 
and single unit or small batch products 
• Benchmarking and learning through dummy tendering procedures 
• Reorganization 
Lek.2 • Clear statement on strategic positioning and differentiation factors based 
on thorough review of global industry trends 
• Focus on growth in core business 
• Focus on Central and East European branded generics market 
• Key processes: manufacturing, new product development and 
registration, time to market, sales and distribution in CEE 
• Systematic professional education at all levels 
Lek.4 • Clear statement on strategic positioning and differentiation factors based 
on thorough review of global industry trends 
• Global focus 
• Systematic competence building  
• Learning from integration with Sandoz 
LM.4 • Focus on regional expansion, but mode of execution still undefined  
• Focus on new product development, brand consolidation, new ERP 
system 
• Benchmarking (especially with Austrian dairies undergoing similar 
experience), learning from consultants, systematic executive education  
 
Table 6.15 Observed organizational template characteristics in strategic restructuring cycles 
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Change cycle Observed organizational template characteristics 
Lura.3 • Focus shifting from regional expansion to local diversification to 
strategic partnership 
• Focus on process optimization and new product development 
• Use of global consultants for process optimization 
• Centralization 
Lura.4 • Focus on organic growth and growth through acquisitions, 
diversifications in local market and core business in Central and South 
East Europe 
• Focus on process improvements, new product development, marketing 
and brand consolidation 
• Learning from benchmarking and global consultants 
• Systematic professional education 
• Decentralization 
Podravka.4 • Clear strategic positioning (high quality, local taste, brand) 
• Focus on organic growth and growth through acquisitions 
• Focus on new product development, marketing and brand extensions, 
sales and distribution 
• Decentralization, reorganization along business lines 
• Benchmarking 
• Learning from strategic partners 
 
Table 6.15 Observed organizational template characteristics in strategic restructuring cycles 
(continued) 
 
The research model predicts that companies which are successful in their strategic 
restructuring attempts should clearly define their strategic positions and sources of 
competitive advantage. In the companies observed, clear positioning and explicit 
identification of sources of competitive advantage were observed in five out of eight 
completed cycles (Gorenje.2, Konar.3, Lek.2, Lek.4, Podravka.4). Only in Lura.3 did the 
company in question lack a clear statement on strategic positioning: it altered it three times 
during the cycle, then changed its top team and defined its strategy more consistently. In other 
cases it is either too early to say (Gorenje.4, LM.4) or statements were only partially clear or 
somewhat inconsistent (Gorenje.3, Lura.4). 
 
The next prediction from the research model is the ability of successful companies to focus on 
building critical competences. Observations from the field study seem to confirm that this was 
indeed part of strategic restructuring. A clear focus on building the competences identified as 
the most important for improved competitiveness was observed in seven cycles (Gorenje.2, 
Konar.3, Lek.2, Lek.4, LM.4, Lura.4, Podravka.4). While it is too early to make a qualified 
statement for the cycle Gorenje.4, it seems that in cycles Gorenje.3 and Lura.3 this focus was 
somewhat less clear than in the others. These two also lacked clear strategic statements, this 
being the most probable reason for the effect, as indicated in interviews with the top and 
middle managers participating in those cycles. 
 
The final prediction from the research model concerns the significant presence of 
organizational learning, and global rather than local sources of learning. This prediction 
seems to be confirmed by observations in virtually all the strategic restructuring cycles, with 
the exception of Lura.3 where the learning effects were somewhat diminished by an 
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intimidating leadership style and lack of strategic clarity. The most common sources of 
learning were benchmarking exercises targeting global or regional competitors (with 
particular focus on Western European companies of similar size and profile, as observed in 
the cases of Gorenje.3, Gorenje.4, Konar.3, Lek.2, Lek.4, LM.4, Lura.4 and Podravka.4). 
Formal management and other professional education programs including exposure to 
international experience were also used heavily, as was systematic cooperation with global 
management consulting companies. It is interesting to note, however, that the use of 
consultants, while indicating a readiness on the part of the companies observed to seek and 
accept recommendations based on global best practices, was still confined to process 
improvements. In several cases top management explicitly stated that the company, rather 
than the consultants, must define answers to strategic issues (Lek.4, Lura.4, Podravka.4). 
 
Finally, one organizational template characteristic which was only implied by the research 
model was observed in several strategic restructuring cycles. The research model predicted a 
balancing of top-down and bottom-up change initiatives, instead of a strictly top-down 
defensive restructuring mode. One possible related effect to be expected as part of the 
organizational template is more decentralization. The observations from the field study are 
interesting, although they come from a very small sample. While a clear trend towards 
decentralization was observed in Gorenje.2, Gorenje.3, Lura.4 and Podravka.4, and in the 
initial signals from LM.4, the trend is less clear in Gorenje.4 and is obviously the opposite in 
Konar.3. This may be because the balance in the two cases leaned the “wrong way” (i.e. 
towards too much decentralization) in the past, this very clear in Konar.3 and indicated in 
interviews concerning Gorenje.4. At the same time Lura.3 stands out as an example of an 
inappropriate organizational template where no decentralization at all was detected in a 
heavily centralized environment. This seems to have had negative effects on the change 
outcome and was confirmed through interviews as one of the major obstacles to change. 
6.5.2 Key resources in strategic restructuring 
Table 6.16 presents a summary of the key resources observed in the ten strategic restructuring 
cycles. 
 
Change cycle Observed key resources 
Gorenje.2 • (Limited) financial resources 
• Solid management accounting system 
• Technically-competent and loyal employees 
• Commitment to improvements 
• Trust in Stani 
• Distribution network in Western Europe 
• “Value for money” products 
Gorenje.3 • (Limited) financial resources 
• Solid management accounting system 
• Technically- competent and loyal employees 
• Commitment to improvements 
• Trust in Stani 
• Flexible but not state-of-the-art production  
• Distribution network throughout Europe 
• Wide range of products, some with high-end user-friendliness / design 
• Patient and friendly supervisory board 
Table 6.16 Observed key resources in strategic restructuring cycles 
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Change cycle Observed key resources 
Gorenje.4 • Initially same as Gorenje.3, except that Bobinac replaced Stani and was 
seen by employees as a leader respecting continuity 
Konar.3 • Solid controlling system 
• Technical competence 
• Regional brand 
• Low cost 
• Good relations and understanding of key customers 
• Bago commands respect and is trusted by key stakeholders 
• Patient and friendly supervisory board 
Lek.2 • Solid level of financial resources 
• Good relations with local market regulators 
• Strategic planning system 
• Ability to achieve rapid execution through project management 
• Employees with solid technical competence 
• Brand and basic sales network in CEE 
• Trust in Dragonja 
Lek.4 • Solid level of financial resources 
• Strategic planning and risk management system 
• Ability to achieve rapid execution through project management 
• Employees with solid technical competence 
• Brand and excellent sales and distribution network in CEE 
• Solid R&D competence 
• Wide product portfolio, some products with high global potential 
• Trust in Dragonja 
• Supportive supervisory board and long-term strategic partner 
LM.4 • Solid level of financial resources 
• Solid strategic planning system 
• Detailed operational planning and reporting 
• Solid level of manufacturing and logistics competence 
• Very good sales and distribution network in Slovenia 
• Trust in Vehovec 
Lura.3 • Solid level of financial resources 
• Solid reporting system 
• Solid level of technological competence 
• Solid brands, excellent sales and distribution network in Croatia 
Lura.4 • Solid level of financial resources 
• Very good planning and reporting system 
• Solid level of technological competence 
• Improved market- related competence in Croatia, Bosnia and 
Herzegovina and Slovenia 
• Very good processes related to new product development  
• Trust in Peri and his team 
• Supportive owner 
 
Table 6.16 Observed key resources in strategic restructuring cycles (continued) 
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Change cycle Observed key resources 
Podravka.4 • Some financial resources 
• Excellent transparency of results for all business lines 
• Solid level of technological competence 
• Improved market-related competence throughout Central and South East 
Europe 
• Improved new product development processes 
• Excellent HR systems at the executive level 
• Trust in Marinac and his team 
• Supportive supervisory board 
 
Table 6.16 Observed key resources in strategic restructuring cycles (continued) 
 
The observations from the field study confirm the first two predictions of the research model. 
In all the observed strategic restructuring cycles companies managed to amass some financial 
resources committed to restructuring, typically in the form of investment in selected 
competences. The only exception was to some degree Konar.3, where financial resources 
were not fully centralized but mostly generated and held at divisional level. However, better 
alignment of investment and increased centralization of resources were observed. At the same 
time, good to excellent transparency of results was achieved by all the companies observed. 
 
The third prediction from the research model concerns optimal use of human resources. As 
discussed in 6.5.2, the definition of this resource is poor and should be substituted by 
“sufficiency of competences needed for the implementation of the chosen business model”. 
Matching the observations from the field study with the modified formulation of the 
prediction from the research model yields interesting results. As noted in 6.5.1, in all cases 
except Gorenje.3 and Lura.3 companies focused on building critical competence. Indeed, one 
can observe a clear improvement in the level of non-technical competence, in particular in 
relation to markets and customer intimacy (this falls in line with the sixth prediction of the 
research model). 
 
Trust in leadership, and certain leadership interventions, were another two critical resources 
suggested by the research model. Together with lack of strategic clarity, these two were 
further factors missing in the case of Lura.3, which is the only cycle where no significant 
level of trust in top management was observed and the only one in which leadership did not 
intervene as predicted (as described in 6.5.3). Since Lura.3 featured as the only unsuccessful 
change cycle, its unique combination of missing factors deserves special attention. 
 
The next three critical resources predicted by the research model differentiate the resources 
needed in strategic from those needed in defensive restructuring. The first of these is flexible 
reaction to changes, in particular rapid new product development. This factor was clearly 
observed in nine out of ten cycles, the partial exception being Konar.3, where a clear focus 
on new product development was observed only in the best divisions. Possible explanations 
for this are an uneven level of restructuring across divisions linked with scarce financial and 
leadership resources in some, the mature nature of the industry, and its long technological 
cycles.  
 
Flexibility of reaction in some of the cases observed deserves additional comment. In the case 
of Gorenje, it was observed that the company changed course and repositioned itself with 
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respect to competition. It is also relatively clear that in the third change cycle (Gorenje.3) 
Gorenje lost its clarity of positioning while reacting to opportunities. The same is true for 
cycle Lura.3, where the company was “too flexible”. Thus, overly opportunistic behavior 
again proved to be potentially disruptive, as also indicated in the analysis of the trigger phase 
(see 6.2.2). However, while in Gorenje.3 this was compensated by strong leadership and the 
phase was successfully completed, in Lura.3 the leadership was unable to compensate for the 
weakness. 
 
The next research model prediction concerned stakeholder intimacy. While this is partially 
covered in the discussion of employee trust and market-related competences above, other 
important stakeholders requiring mention include the local community, suppliers and (above 
all) owners. In all of the observed cases there were good to excellent relations with the local 
community, despite potential problems (e.g. in Lek.4 with acquisition by a foreign strategic 
partner, or in Podravka.4 with a new general manager from outside the local community). 
Relations with suppliers ranged from tense (e.g. Gorenje.4, LM.4) to excellent (e.g. Lek.4, 
Podravka.4), but in all cases companies displayed a good understanding of their suppliers and 
careful supply chain management. Relations with owners were in eight out of ten cycles 
excellent, giving the management the needed clout to push for changes. The exception was 
the second part of Lura.3, where the majority owner became impatient and finally removed 
the top management team. Another potential problem may be observed in LM.4 in the 
conflicting interests of major groups of owners, which may jeopardize strategic restructuring 
in the future. 
 
Finally, the question of time as the last critical resource suggested by the research model 
remains only partially answered by the field study, since six out of ten cycles have not yet 
been completed and two are in the initial phase. In the remaining four cycles, management has 
already spent from one to four years on this. Of the four completed cycles it is clear that in the 
one marked as unsuccessful the owner refused the management team further time, while in the 
three successfully completed cycles management had from three to six years to make changes. 
As noted in 6.3, strategic restructuring seems to require substantial time, which by default 
becomes a prerequisite for its success. 
6.5.3 Leadership interventions in strategic restructuring 
Table 6.17 presents a summary of the leadership interventions observed in the ten strategic 
restructuring cycles. 
 
Change cycle Observed leadership interventions 
Gorenje.2 • All key elements of the organizational template designed at the top 
• Strategic positioning clearly communicated to middle management 
• Strong hierarchy but heavy involvement of top 50 managers in leading 
change 
• Intensive direct communication with frontline employees 
• Putting pressure on middle management (including demotions) to 
achieve planned goals 
• Using consultants for achieving process improvements and as source of 
learning about European best practices 
 
Table 6.17 Observed leadership interventions in strategic restructuring cycles 
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Change cycle Observed leadership interventions 
Gorenje.3 • Key elements of the organizational template designed at the top, but with 
heavy involvement of senior management 
• Intensive direct communication with frontline employees and all major 
stakeholders 
• Putting pressure on middle management (including demotions) to 
achieve planned goals 
• Opportunities for young managers and initiative-taking 
• Using consultants for achieving process improvements and as source of 
learning about European best practices 
Gorenje.4 • Significant rejuvenation of top management team, departure from 
philosophy of internal promotion 
• All key elements of the organizational template designed at the top 
• New set of strategic goals clearly communicated to middle management 
• Promoting values of international culture 
• Combining challenge and material stimulation 
• Using consultants as agents of change and source of learning about 
global best practices 
Konar.3 • Replacing top management team 
• All key elements of the organizational template designed at the top 
• Top management team decides by consensus 
• New set of strategic goals clearly communicated to divisional 
management 
• Intensive direct communication with all major stakeholders 
• Putting pressure on divisional management (including demotions) to 
achieve alignment with corporate goals and change the way they work 
• Using consultants as agents of change and source of learning about 
global best practices 
Lek.2 • All key elements of the organizational template designed at the top 
• Top management team in principle decides by consensus 
• Strategic goals communicated to middle management 
• Putting pressure on middle management (including loss of position but 
with compensation) to achieve planned goals and change the way they 
work 
• Stimulating initiative-taking through projects 
• Hiring, developing and giving opportunities to young talent 
• Using consultants as agents of change and source of learning about 
global best practices 
 
Table 6.17 Observed leadership interventions in strategic restructuring cycles (continued) 
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Change cycle Observed leadership interventions 
Lek.4 • All key elements of the organizational template designed at the top 
• Top management team decides by consensus 
• Strategic goals communicated to middle management 
• Putting pressure on middle management (including loss of position but 
with compensation) to achieve planned goals and change the way they 
work 
• Stimulating initiative-taking through projects 
• Hiring, developing and giving opportunities to young talent 
• Intensive communication with all stakeholders about the benefits of 
strategic partnership and the acceptability of acquisition 
• Using consultants as source of learning about global best practices 
LM.4 • Top-down decision making 
• Top management team decides by consensus 
• Involvement of middle managers through improvement projects 
• Putting pressure on middle management (including demotions) to 
achieve planned goals and change the way they work 
• Hiring and developing young talent (although with mixed results) 
• Intensive communication with key stakeholders, in particular the 
supervisory board 
• Building trust through “winning” well-selected conflicts with some key 
stakeholders 
• Using consultants as change agents, for achieving process improvements 
and as source of learning about European best practices 
Lura.3 • Strictly top-down decision making (including tactical level) 
• Putting pressure on middle management (including demotions) to 
achieve planned goals 
• Hiring and developing young talent 
Lura.4 • Key elements of the organizational template designed at the top, but with 
heavy involvement of senior management 
• Top management team decides by consensus 
• Intensive communication with middle management, clear indication of 
vision and strategic goals 
• Putting pressure on middle management (including demotions) to 
achieve planned goals and change the way they work 
• Hiring and developing young talent combined with hiring experienced 
international managers  
• Using consultants to achieve process improvements and as source of 
learning about European best practices 
 
Table 6.17 Observed leadership interventions in strategic restructuring cycles (continued) 
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Change cycle Observed leadership interventions 
Podravka.4 • Key elements of the organizational template designed at the top, but with 
heavy involvement of senior management 
• Top management team decides by consensus 
• Intensive communication with middle management, clear indication of 
vision and strategic goals 
• Putting pressure on middle management (including demotions) to 
achieve planned goals and change the way they work 
• Hiring and developing young talent 
• Using consultants t achieve process improvements and as source of 
learning about European best practices 
 
Table 6.17 Observed leadership interventions in strategic restructuring cycles (continued) 
 
The most frequently observed characteristic of leadership interventions, present in all change 
cycles, was a heavy inclination towards top-down decision-making, which accords with the 
prediction of the research model. As an interesting specific, decision-making at the top was in 
many cases (Konar.3, Lek.4, LM.4, Lura.4, Podravka.4, to a large degree Gorenje.3 and 
Lek.2) based on consensus. This was seen as highly important and worth sacrificing speed for. 
The other part of the prediction was that this should be balanced by bottom-up change 
management. This was only partially confirmed by the field study, however, since it was 
clearly present only in Gorenje.3 and Lura.4, and to some degree in Lek.2, Lek.4, LM.4 and 
Podravka.4.  
 
Similarly, communication patterns indicate a clear top-down dominance, with bottom-up 
communication completely absent in Lura.3 and significantly reduced in Konar.3. Direct 
bottom-up communication was also reduced in Lek.2, Lek.4 and LM.4, but was to some 
degree compensated by communication through projects. The emphases of communication 
were, in practically in all cases, strategic goals, trust-building (except in Lura.3 and, so far, 
Gorenje.4) and communication of elements of the vision, in particular the strategic 
positioning of the company (except in Gorenje.3 and Lura.3, for reasons described in 6.5.1). It 
is worth noting that in half of the cycles (Gorenje.3, Konar.3, Lek.4, LM.4, to some degree 
Podravka.4) top management engaged in heavy communication with a broader group of 
stakeholders, effectively securing their support for restructuring, in particular for the time 
needed to make major changes.  
 
The research model predicted that top management would try to build participation to secure 
rapid implementation of the new organizational template. This was observed in a fairly 
specific way, not fully in line with traditional views inviting voluntary participation. On the 
one hand, in practically all cases top management used formalized improvement projects as a 
vehicle to achieve changes. This was supported by heavy use of external consultants, although 
their mandate was typically on the tactical level. In not a single case did consultants formulate 
or make significant contributions to implementing the key elements of the new organizational 
template. On the other hand, participation was secured through coercion. Not only were the 
middle managers in all cases expected to realize set business objectives and could expect 
demotion if they failed to do so, but in many cases (Gorenje.4, Konar.3, Lek.2, Lek.4, LM.4, 
Lura.4, Podravka.4) they were explicitly expected to change the way they worked. Top 
management did not show much patience and in most cases reacted within 6 to 18 months. 
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Finally, in the majority of cases (Gorenje.4, Lek.2, Lek.4, LM.4, Lura.4, Podravka.4) top 
management made an explicit commitment to changing the culture of the company, primarily 
by making it more international and by supporting initiative-taking at all levels. To support 
this goal, the tactic of bringing in young talent, developing it and offering early opportunities 
to take more responsibility was combined with bringing in experienced international 
executives. 
6.5.4 Barriers to change in strategic restructuring 
Table 6.18 presents a summary of the major internal barriers to change observed in the ten 
strategic restructuring cycles. 
 
Change cycle Observed major internal barriers to change 
Gorenje.2 • Limited number of employees with business (rather than technical) 
orientation 
• Fear, especially on the part of middle managers 
• Loyalty based on lack of mobility 
Gorenje.3 • Limited number of high-potential employees  
• Raising expectations of better reward / career prospects 
• Fear, especially on the part of middle managers 
• Overly local culture 
Gorenje.4 • Limited number of high-potential employees  
• Inert culture  
• Complacency 
Konar.3 • Poor skills 
• Limited talent pool 
• Very limited financial resources 
• Conflict of interest between top and middle management 
Lek.2 • Complex competences (e.g. R&D) requiring improvement 
• Fear of incompetence and poor performance among middle management 
• Lack of initiative 
Lek.4 • Change fatigue 
• Limited initiative and experimentation 
• Fear of incompetence and poor performance among middle management 
LM.4 • Poor non-technical competence 
• Lack of initiative on the part of middle managers and frontline employees 
• Small number of high-potential middle managers and professionals  
• Fear of incompetence on the part of middle management 
Lura.3 • Poor non-technical competence 
• Lack of initiative on the part of middle managers and frontline employees 
• Small number of high-potential middle managers and professionals  
• Fear of incompetence on the part of middle management 
• Friction in top management 
• Poor timing of the strategy 
Lura.4 • Lack of initiative on the part of middle managers 
• Small number of high-potential middle managers and professionals 
• Young high-potential employees expect too much too soon 
 
Table 6.18 Observed major internal barriers to change in strategic restructuring cycles 
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Change cycle Observed major internal barriers to change 
Podravka.4 • Conflict of interest with local community 
• Lack of initiative on the part of middle managers 
• Small number of high-potential middle managers and professionals 
 
Table 6.18 Observed major internal barriers to change in strategic restructuring cycles 
(continued) 
 
One clear observation from the field study is an oft-repeated remark by top management 
about the relatively low level of barriers to change encountered. This is almost paradoxical, 
since the evidence regarding the speed of change indicates that change required substantial 
time and that achieved was often less successful than planned or desired. One possible 
interpretation of this observation may be that in discussing barriers executives ignored factors 
which they believed inherent to all organizations (e.g. scarcity of high-potential employees). 
 
As in the case of defensive restructuring, the key internal barriers to change seem to involve 
middle management, primarily in terms of their insufficient competence, lack of an initiative-
taking attitude and fear of job loss. Although most of the other barriers suggested by the 
research model (except strategic uncertainty) were occasionally observed, none was 
systematically present. 
6.6 Conclusions and consequences for the research model 
The observations from the field study answered all the research questions formulated on the 
basis of the literature review.  
 
The existence of three phases of strategic change management as proposed in the research 
model and presented in Figure 3.11 was confirmed by the observations.  
 
All trigger phases included a number of events that created a cumulative perception of the 
need for and feasibility of change. In each case, once the management assessed either (or 
both) of these factors as great enough, it moved to the design stage. The observations from the 
field study allowed identification of the key factors influencing the assessment, and the 
direction of their influence, and confirmed most of the predictions made by the research 
model, while stimulating revision of a few. The revised detailed lists of factors have been 
presented in Tables 6.9 and 6.10. In summary, the revised groups of factors influencing the 
assessment are: 
1. Issues related to institutional pressures (urgency and feasibility);  
2. Financial issues including transparency of performance (urgency); 
3. Issues related to industry and market dynamics (feasibility); 
4. Issues related to opportunities and growth (urgency); 
5. Issues related to resource (competence) availability (feasibility); 
6. Issues related to leadership (urgency and feasibility). 
 
In all of the observed cycles the design phases generated deliberate design decisions about the 
organizational templates to be used, although some of these were neither clear nor consistent 
enough, or were not well supported by other factors, thus generating failures which in turn 
served as new triggers. The observations from the field study confirmed that the nature of the 
design depended on the perceived urgency and feasibility of change (Figure 6.8), as predicted 
by the research model (Figure 3.13). 
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In all of the observed cycles management progressed gradually from the design to the 
implementation phase via various leadership interventions, while relying on certain resources 
and facing barriers to the implementation of new organizational templates. The observations 
from the field study allowed identification of the main common characteristics of the 
organizational templates, key resources, leadership interventions and barriers to change in 
defensive and strategic restructuring across the studied cases. While the majority of the 
predictions from the research model were confirmed, some were not confirmed or were 
revised. A summary of the characteristics of defensive and strategic restructuring proposed by 
the revised research model are presented in Tables 6.19 and 6.20. 
 
Dimension Characteristics  
• Organizational template • Asset restructuring used as downsizing tool 
• Focus on downsizing, soft downsizing gives 
better results than hard 
• Focus on various forms of cost-cutting 
• Centralization 
• Reorganization to achieve better 
transparency of performance and focus on 
core business 
• No significant change in business model of 
core business 
• Key resources • Available financial resources used for 
restructuring 
• Efficient control system 
• Basic competence needed within existing 
business model, including competent 
employees 
• Trust in leader and in survival of the 
company 
• Leadership interventions • Top-down decision making 
• Intensive communication with major 
stakeholders and in particular employees, 
aimed at building trust 
• Use of coercion to speed up execution and 
introduce process discipline 
• Use of external consultants to secure cost-
cutting and process improvements 
• Barriers to change • Poor knowledge, skills and attitudes, in 
particular those associated with market-
related competences and initiative-taking 
• Fear, in particular of incompetence and 
layoffs, displayed by middle management  
• Rigid employee structure 
• Very limited organizational learning, as 
well as insufficient resources to be invested 
in competence building 
 
Table 6.19 Characteristics of defensive restructuring 
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Dimension Characteristics  
• Organizational template • Clear definition of strategic position and 
sources of competitive advantage 
• Focus on building critical competences 
• Organizational learning from global sources 
• (Appropriate level of) Decentralization 
• Key resources • Financial resources committed to 
restructuring, in particular competence-
building 
• Focus on market- and customer-intimacy-
related competences 
• Trust in leader 
• Flexible reaction to changes and in 
particular new product development 
• Avoidance of opportunistic behavior 
• Active stakeholder relationship 
management 
• Substantial time available for restructuring 
• Leadership interventions • Top-down decision making 
• Top-down communication focused on 
strategic positioning and trust-building 
• Use of external consultants and formal 
improvement projects to build bottom-up 
support for change 
• Pressure on middle management to perform 
and change the way they work 
• Commitment to culture change, in 
particular to becoming more international 
and initiative-taking 
• Barriers to change • Lack of competent and initiative-taking 
middle management 
• Fear of job loss displayed by middle 
management 
 
Table 6.20 Characteristics of strategic restructuring 
 
 
While the duration of individual phases and whole cycles varied, it seems that the 
implementation phase is on average the longest and the design phase the shortest. Also, it 
seems that strategic restructuring takes longer on average than defensive restructuring, with 
the overall duration of turn-around processes exceeding a decade. 
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7. Conclusions 
The final chapter provides a summary of the study’s conclusions and in particular addresses 
its contribution to management theory and practice. To do this, it summarizes the study’s 
answers to the main research question and outlines its limitations, its implications for further 
research, and its contribution to management theory, as well as considering its implications 
for practicing managers. 
7.1 Answers to the main research questions 
The study investigated transformation processes in medium-size companies in Croatia and 
Slovenia. Although a vital part of the regional economy, these companies have received little 
attention in management literature. Also, nearly all the literature dealing with transformation 
processes, which fall under a number of traditional academic categories within the broad 
disciplines of strategic management and organizational behavior, is based on evidence from 
large companies in Western Europe and North America and shun an integrative approach, 
preferring a one-dimensional view of strategic change management confined to a particular 
academic area. 
 
The objective of the study was to provide an integrative explanation of the transformation 
processes observed and to support companies in their further transformation efforts. To 
achieve it, I tried to identify a number of organizational factors which may explain the content 
and the process of strategic change, relate them to the context in which the change was taking 
place, and suggest reasons for differences in the outcomes of particular strategic change 
efforts.  
 
After summarizing the characteristics of the context in which the transformation processes 
were anchored, I searched for answers to the main research questions via two different 
avenues. I first performed a thorough review of the relevant literature, both in the area of 
competitiveness (as change content) and strategic change management (as change process). 
Based on the literature review I constructed a research model, which I focused on the 
observations of the subsequent multiple-case field study. These observations, in turn, were 
used to fine-tune the research model and derive conceptual implications both for management 
theory and for practicing managers. 
7.1.1 Literature review 
The literature review I performed confirmed that the content and the process of strategic 
change management have rarely been addressed within one piece of research. Also, in many 
cases the context has been ignored, and theoretical concepts presented as universally valid.  
 
The strong influence of various industrial organization economics theories was noted, as a 
starting point for considerations of sustainable competitive advantage (defining the change 
content), while the sciences of psychology and sociology seem to have had the most influence 
on considerations of strategic change management as a change process. 
 
The review of the literature dealing with sustainable competitive advantage suggests that two 
possible approaches exist, each possessing certain merits and disadvantages. One approach, 
with the environmental school as its most established representative, takes the outside-in 
perspective, looking for sources of competitive advantage through interpretation of the 
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external environment. The other, with the resource-based view as its dominant representative, 
takes an inside-out perspective, attributing competitive advantage to internal factors. At the 
same time, the review of the literature on strategic change brings into focus issues related to 
the nature of change and integrative change management. It clearly suggests that change 
should be viewed as a process which evolves in phases. 
 
The literature review covered a fairly wide range of theories, and concepts based on them. 
Twenty different concepts were identified through the literature review as particularly 
relevant in the observed context. In one way or another, all provided the foundations upon 
which the research model was built. Almost paradoxically, the aim of building a reasonably 
simple research model of strategic change management which would provide an 
understanding of the observed strategic transformation of companies in Croatia and Slovenia 
was achieved, despite the fact that it was derived from numerous, often complex concepts and 
far-reaching underlying theories. 
 
The research model described strategic change as occurring in three phases: trigger, design 
and implementation, in which feature barriers to change and leadership interventions (Fig. 
7.1). It also defined the key elements of individual phases. In the trigger and design phases 
these comprise the perceived urgency and feasibility of change, which influence not only the 
decision to initiate change but also the design outcome: the intended organizational template 
(strategies, systems, structures).  
 
 
 
Figure 7.1 Model of strategic change management 
 
 
The research model established a link between the perceived urgency and feasibility of 
change on the one hand and the choice of the restructuring approach on the other, with 
defensive and strategic restructuring identified as alternative forms of restructuring (Fig. 7.2). 
 
Trigger 
phase 
Design 
phase 
Leadership 
interventions 
Barriers  
to change 
Implementation 
phase 
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Figure 7.2 Outcomes of the design phase 
 
Finally, the literature review yielded a set of attributes of the defensive and strategic 
restructuring processes, allowing conceptualization of observations made in the 
implementation phase, concerning in particular the characteristics of new organizational 
templates, the critical resources needed for their successful implementation, barriers to 
change, and leadership interventions. 
7.1.2 Field study 
The field study was designed to validate the developed concept of three phases of strategic 
change management through field observations. The decision to use case studies as the most 
appropriate research form provided a clear framework for all the research activities. Seven 
manufacturing companies were selected for the field study: Konar, Lura and Podravka from 
Croatia, and Gorenje, Kolinska, Lek and Ljubljanske mlekarne from Slovenia. These 
companies were prepared to provide access to all the necessary information and had the 
potential to be representative and rich enough examples of the phenomena studied. Data and 
observations were gathered from seven groups of sources, and included the systematic review 
of media clippings, annual reports, consulting projects prepared for the companies, teaching 
cases concerning the companies, structured interviews with selected managers, and 
managerial feedback on the draft research findings. Data and observations focused on the 
period from 1991 to 2003. 
 
Observations from the field study were analyzed separately for each case and across all seven 
cases. The findings were refined with the help of an independent expert, who played the role 
of devil’s advocate and challenged the draft conclusions. The refined draft of cases was sent 
to the companies and feedback from top management was solicited. All seven companies 
confirmed that the cases truly represented and properly interpreted the period of observation. 
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of change 
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Defensive restructuring 
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Looking back at the field study process, one notes the richness of the observations it provided. 
The research model proved valuable in systematically interpreting the observations. It allowed 
identification of 25 distinctive periods of strategic change, or close to 4 periods per company 
during the 12 years observed. While some of these periods had blurred characteristics and 
were, following the research model, labeled as non-aligned changes, the majority had 
characteristics which according to the research model were attributable to defensive or 
strategic restructuring. This made it possible to base the conclusions on a sample, which 
despite its smallness provided numerous relevant insights into the nature and mechanisms of 
the observed change phenomena across all the elements contained in the research model. In 
this way the field study confirmed the main predictions of the research model, and stimulated 
some corrections and more precise elaborations on the level of detail.  
7.1.3 Conclusions 
The following are the main conclusions from the field study valid for the companies 
observed: 
• Strategic change in a company begins when top management perceives that change is 
urgent, or highly feasible, or both. The trigger phase may last for a prolonged period of 
time and perceptions are formed cumulatively. 
• The perception of urgency is based on context interpretation and is in particular driven by: 
o Institutional pressures; 
o Financial situation as seen given the transparency of performance; 
o Growth opportunities; 
o Leadership. 
• The perception of feasibility is based on context interpretation and is in particular driven 
by: 
o Institutional pressures; 
o Industry and market dynamics; 
o Resource (including competences) availability; 
o Leadership. 
• Once change has been triggered, top management engages in the design of the new 
organizational template. The transition from trigger phase to design phase is relatively 
abrupt. 
• Based on the perceived urgency and feasibility of change (see Fig. 7.2), top management 
decides among the following design choices: 
o No change; 
o A number of changes which are not clearly aligned; 
o Defensive restructuring; 
o Strategic restructuring. 
• Defensive and strategic restructuring are choices superior to non-aligned change. 
• Key attributes of defensive restructuring are: 
o Organizational template  
Asset restructuring used as downsizing tool 
Focus on downsizing, soft downsizing gives better results than hard 
Focus on various forms of cost-cutting 
Centralization 
Reorganization to achieve better transparency of performance and 
focus on core business 
No significant change in business model of core business 
o Key resources  
Available financial resources used for restructuring 
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Efficient control system 
Basic competence needed within existing business model, including 
competent employees 
Trust in leader and in survival of the company 
o Leadership interventions  
Top-down decision-making 
Intensive communication with major stakeholders and in particular 
employees, aimed at building trust 
Use of coercion to speed up execution and introduce process discipline 
Use of external consultants to secure cost-cutting and process 
improvements 
o Barriers to change 
Poor knowledge, skills and attitudes, in particular those associated with 
market-related competences and initiative-taking 
Fear, in particular of incompetence and layoffs, displayed by middle 
management  
Rigid employee structure 
Very limited organizational learning, as well as insufficient resources 
for investment in competence-building 
• Key attributes of strategic restructuring are: 
o Organizational template  
Clear definition of strategic position and sources of competitive 
advantage 
Focus on building critical competences 
Organizational learning from global sources 
(Appropriate level of) Decentralization 
o Key resources  
Financial resources committed to restructuring, in particular 
competence-building 
Focus on market- and customer-intimacy-related competences 
Trust in leader 
Flexible reaction to changes, in particular new product development 
Avoidance of opportunistic behavior 
Active stakeholder relationship management 
Substantial time available for restructuring 
o Leadership interventions  
Top-down decision-making 
Top-down communications focused on strategic positioning and trust-
building 
Use of external consultants and formal improvement projects to support 
change 
Pressure on middle management to perform and change the way they 
work 
Commitment to culture change, especially to becoming more 
international and initiative-taking 
o Barriers to change 
Lack of competent and initiative-taking middle management 
Fear of losing position displayed by middle management 
• The implementation of the new organizational template may start before its design is 
completed; 
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• The duration of strategic restructuring is on average longer than that of defensive 
restructuring and can take several years; 
• The success of implementation depends on the consistency of the design as well as on 
resources and leadership interventions which match the particular design choice. 
7.2 Limitations of the study and implications for further research  
The main limitations of the research study were the consequences of the chosen methodology 
and the research setting. Although case-study-based research is generally seen as one of the 
most appropriate methodologies for studying a multidisciplinary research topic of this social-
scientific nature, it has shortcomings which need outlining. The purpose of this text is not to 
repeat the theoretical debates on the validity of case research as a qualitative research method 
[Miles 1979, Yin 1981, Eisenhardt 1989a, Otley and Berry 1998, Stake 2000], but rather to 
critically apply to the presented research those arguments which are most frequently raised 
and had to be considered during the research design. Arguments will be grouped according to 
the tests presented in Table 4.1. 
 
One of the arguments that sound justified is the proposal that case studies be used to confirm 
theories not built solely on the ground of theoretical deliberations, but heavily influenced by 
prior observations. This field study was designed to confirm the validity of the research model 
presented in Chapter 3, which was built under the influence of the general observations 
presented in Chapters 2 and 3. However, this does not discredit the validity of the process, 
since the model nevertheless had to be exposed to the realities uncovered in detailed field 
observation. Therefore, this does not threaten the construct validity – although, possibly, the 
external validity. However, even the external validity seems not to have been significantly 
influenced by the process, since the observations influencing model design were based on a 
much broader scope of observations than those from the seven companies used in the study. 
 
The next concern involves the wide focus of the research, spanning multiple academic areas. 
Although clearly defined through the research model and research questions, it requires rich 
cases, potentially obscuring causal relationships among the observed phenomena (“everything 
is important” [Yin 1981]). This is truly a concern worth addressing in future research, since it 
remains open whether the research design managed to eliminate it or not. Somewhat related is 
also the issue of generating alternative explanations to the observed phenomena and then 
selecting the most convincing. Although this is to some degree part of cross-case analysis as 
presented in Chapter 6, a more rigorous process could always be attempted. 
 
The last concern related to construct validity emerges from the remark that case study 
researchers often point out good or bad outcomes of actions with little critical appraisal of the 
source of criteria from whence their notions of good or bad are drawn [Otley and Berry 1998]. 
As noted when discussing the problem of defining performance, this tended to be an even 
more general problem in the particular research setting, where it was difficult to define clear 
criteria. However, the solution may partly lie in the researcher declaring “ownership” of 
personal convictions, provided that these are clearly stated and made an explicit part of the 
research model context. 
 
Most criticism of case study research refers to the internal validity test. A typical remark is 
that cases are nothing more than storytelling, with no rigorous analysis involved. Furthermore, 
participants (of case studies) often object to their findings [Miles 1979]. While a fairly 
systematic analysis according to the elements of the research model was attempted in the field 
study presented, some of the conclusions are based on simplistic logical thinking rather than 
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on more rigorous analytical tools. Internal validity was further enhanced by the research 
design elements presented in Table 4.1 and – a counter to the argument of Miles – the study’s 
participants by and large did not object to its findings (most comments surrounded details of 
description not relevant to them). 
 
Another argument is somewhat tautological: internal validity is damaged by biased witnesses 
(including the researcher, when he or she is part of the setting). Although witness bias can 
hardly be denied, use of witnesses cannot be avoided if the study is to be based on rich data, 
not publicly available. Thus, the researcher must make a deliberate decision on balancing the 
sources and has to use triangulation where possible. Although this study went significantly 
beyond the usual levels of triangulation, introducing seven different sources, one should be 
careful not to overestimate the effects. Some sources may seem independent, but may have 
used the same primary source of information without making it known (this problem was 
confirmed by the researchers in several cases). 
 
Finally, one of the harshest arguments against case study research is lack of rigor in 
establishing controlled boundary conditions. The influence of variables beyond the 
researcher’s control is unavoidable, and genuine internal validity becomes highly 
questionable. While this argument certainly has merit and the level of control was 
significantly below the strict criteria of the positivist approach to academic research, it is also 
highly debatable whether well-controlled experiments can be performed on complex social 
phenomena such as the subject of this research [Llewellyn 1992].  
 
The arguments related to external validity are certainly more justified. Although the use of 
case comparison increased the level of relevance, generalization based on cross-case analysis 
certainly suffered from a low level of statistical significance. Cross-case pattern identification 
may have been subject to preconceptions held by the researchers, rather than being the result 
of convincing analysis of a large enough sample. A good understanding of the theoretical 
criteria for case selection has probably minimized this problem, but has most certainly not 
eliminated it. 
 
Finally, the complaint about low reproducibility, although partly justified, has little true 
relevance and should probably be dismissed. A lengthy period of observation meant that 
conditions changed even during the course of research (which is perfectly acceptable for the 
model being studied), and the possibility of reliable repetition of the study was practically 
eliminated. However, this is the case with most social experiments. 
 
Two principle suggestions can be made for future research. First of all, in order to increase the 
generalization potential of the research model, it would be highly desirable to conduct 
appropriate research on a sample of companies outside Central and Eastern Europe. Also, 
theoretical predictions from the literature do not necessarily restrict the model’s validity to 
companies of the size examined in the presented study. Thus, additional research might test 
the model on multinational companies, or, conversely, on business units within large 
corporations. 
 
In order to increase the internal validity, several new approaches to the research design might 
also be taken. An attempt might be made to use more quantifiable measurements and increase 
the size of the sample, thus combining a qualitative and quantitative methodology. Extensive 
use of closed questionnaires with answers on a scale might be one approach in this context; a 
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better definition of the outcome measurements (e.g. what constitutes successful change) 
would be another. 
7.3 Contribution of the study to management theory 
Once the answers to the main research questions have been given, it is appropriate to consider 
the contribution of the study to management theory. As one might expect from the broad 
nature of the research topic, it contributes to several areas that are spanned by the concept of 
strategic change.  
 
First of all, the study contributes to an understanding of strategic change as an integrative 
phenomenon. While the existing literature rarely approaches strategic change in this way, the 
study clearly demonstrates that no true understanding is possible without a linking of context, 
content and process. The study steps beyond a relatively general concept of context, content 
and process as building blocks of strategic change, towards the structuring of individual 
elements that translate these building blocks into more operational terms. Thus, the context-
content-process model is translated into a trigger-design-implementation model. It is 
important to note that the new model not only explains the mechanisms by which context, 
content and process impact managerial reality, but also introduces time sequence, in the 
phases of strategic change. As opposed to previous integrative models, this one offers both 
simple and detailed explanations. 
 
The next contribution of the study is that it places the perceived urgency and perceived 
feasibility of change in the foreground when considering the first stages of change. These two 
factors are directly related not only to the actual starting point of change, but also to the 
change goals. The study also explicitly links the two factors with a limited number of 
elements in the external and internal context which crucially influence the way management 
perceives these two key determinants of change. 
 
Another contribution made by the study is the notion that change goals can be efficiently 
described using the new organizational template, with its defining of strategy, organizational 
structure and organizational systems. The study further defines the four principal outcomes of 
the design phase as (a) a decision not to change the organizational template in any major way, 
(b) a decision to change it without any obvious coherent pattern, (c) a decision to change it in 
a way corresponding to defensive restructuring, and (d) a decision to change it in a way 
corresponding to strategic restructuring. As noted above, the choice of outcome is influenced 
by the perceived urgency and perceived feasibility of change. 
 
It is important to note that the study also responds to a theoretical dilemma in strategy design: 
should the company take an outside-in perspective (as would be the reasoning of, e. g., the 
environmental school), or an inside-out perspective (as does the resource-based view)? The 
answer is: both, since taking only one perspective does not provide all the answers needed for 
robust design of the new organizational template. 
 
The study also contributes by defining clearly most of the important barriers to change which 
may be expected in defensive or strategic restructuring. It is particularly interesting to note 
that it finds the number of important barriers to be relatively small, contradicting usual 
notions on this subject. 
 
Finally, the study makes a major contribution by linking the success of change 
implementation to the internal consistency of the organizational template, the availability of 
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certain critical resources, and the existence of certain leadership interventions. This 
contribution is particularly important since one of the biggest fallacies of the resource-based 
view, and the main reason for its lack of popularity with practicing managers, is its inability to 
clearly define the core resources for company success in a certain context, and how to build 
them. This study shows that, although critical resources and leadership interventions are not 
identical in defensive and strategic restructuring, both of the latter can be defined clearly, and 
both (a) place trust in a central position as the vital resource needed for change, and (b) view 
trust-building interventions as the primary task of change leaders. 
7.4 Implications of the study for practicing managers 
Many philosophers and writers, including those in the areas of business and management, 
claim that change is the only constant in life (human and company). Change generates 
constant and numerous challenges for managers. What should be done to prepare the 
company for the next round of change? When is the right time to initiate change? What 
should be its scope and scale? What should change aim at? What kind of barriers can we 
expect? Once we initiate it, what should we do to make change happen? 
 
If anything, this study witnesses the importance of change in the life of the companies 
observed. Although change was not always of the same intensity, no strategic goals were 
reached without a significant amount of it, and the companies had to undertake it once the 
goals were set. This is the first important message to managers: do not hope to implement a 
chosen strategy without accepting that you will have to deal with change. 
 
Knowing, or – as many experienced managers may find more appropriate – sensing the right 
moment to commence strategic change may not necessarily be a skill found naturally in the 
realm of managerial “art”. While experience and “feeling” are welcome, managers should 
also accept the need for systematic observation of the context in which they operate. In 
particular, they should ask themselves: does the organizational template (strategy, 
structure and systems) match the requirements of the context? If not, they should expect 
that the company will, gradually at best or abruptly in a worst-case turbulent context scenario, 
lose any sustainable competitive advantage. 
 
Contemporary management science offers many strategic tools for managers to use in 
strategic analysis, and many more are offered by consultants. Some are popular and 
widespread, and others are used by a limited few. Some claim to be simple, while others link 
their attractiveness to complexity. A good example is the influence of the positioning 
approach to strategy. Many managers in the companies observed used the powerful simplicity 
of “High Perceived Value versus Low Delivered Cost” paradigm to define their strategic 
goals. Without a doubt, this was helpful. They could explain their views to their colleagues 
and employees easily, and deploy the desired strategic position as a motivator. However, in 
taking this road they sooner or later ran into a major barrier: while it was easy to define and 
communicate the target strategic position, it was less easy to discover and convince others 
how that position translated into the company’s internal competences. Sometimes managers 
even found that the desired position was nothing more than a dream, since the competence 
gap was simply too wide. Therefore, managers would do well to balance an inside-out 
perspective (based on internal competences) with an outside-in perspective (marked by 
strategic position). Regardless of how difficult it may be to achieve a clear and objective 
inside-out perspective, there is no hope of defining sufficiently clear change goals without it. 
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The above view has an important implication: managers should prepare companies for 
change. There are some generic measures that can be taken in this direction. First of all, 
managers should work towards creating mechanisms which support a regular strategic 
analysis process. They should involve both the external dimension and an understanding, 
explicit definition and communication of existing core competences, including culture. They 
should also build a “change infrastructure”, in particular a capacity for trust and 
communication with all key stakeholders. Finally, they should work towards strengthening 
middle management, which, as discussed below, is usually the key obstacle to change. 
Appropriate HR practices should be introduced, and middle managers stretched to develop 
knowledge, skills and attitudes. 
 
Significant responsibility for timely commencement of change rests with corporate 
governance mechanisms, in particular (supervisory) boards. Strategic risk management should 
in any case be one of their key duties, and it is easy to see that tardiness in starting needed 
strategic change can greatly increase strategic risk. Governors should understand that the 
commencement of strategic change is often related to change at the top of the company. 
If the top manager refuses to recognize the need for a change which is obvious to others, gets 
involved in a string of non-aligned changes or opts for prolonged defensive restructuring, it is 
worth asking a simple question: can this person serve as change leader? Often it is not an 
alteration in external circumstances that triggers significant strategic change, but a fresh view 
from the top which uncovers previously unnoticed opportunities and provides a needed dose 
of focused energy. 
 
A paradox related to initiating change makes managerial life difficult: while it is easier to start 
change in times of crisis, these are also the times when fewer resources are available and 
every mistake made more costly. Thus, managers should not wait for the crisis to initiate 
strategic change. They must find a way to create a feeling of perceived urgency of change, at 
least to the extent needed to move their immediate followers. This will allow them to make 
positive use of financial slack and other resources, otherwise typically believed to slow 
change down. 
 
On the other hand, when managers recognize an urgent need for change which is not matched 
by appropriate resources, paralysis is not the answer. Urgent need for change, even where it 
seems unfeasible, is a call for defensive restructuring. If undertaken properly, defensive 
restructuring will lead to fast improvement of the financial position and serve as a good 
starting-point for strategic restructuring. 
 
Remaining in the defensive restructuring phase for a long period of time (although there are 
no strict rules, most defensive restructuring processes should last less than a year), or 
returning from defensive restructuring to a situation of no change or non-aligned change, are 
dangerous. Defensive restructuring is only half of the job, and should be followed 
immediately by strategic restructuring. If it is not, the downward spiral is very likely to 
reappear and every subsequent round of defensive restructuring will prove more difficult. 
 
Managers should understand that defensive and strategic restructuring require 
significantly different organizational templates, critical resources and leadership 
interventions. Thus, the transition from defensive to strategic restructuring is difficult and 
demands full managerial attention, as well as concentrated effort. Three issues deserve 
particular mention: organizational learning, decentralization and time. Organizational learning 
is absent during defensive restructuring, while it is a key enabler of strategic restructuring, 
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during which a global perspective, customer intimacy and new product development are 
typical requirements. Shifting the organization’s focus from strict implementation and cost 
orientation to innovation and learning is not an easy task. It requires culture change, which 
cannot be achieved without the strong involvement of middle management. Decentralization 
is needed to support this involvement, as is time for the necessary competence building and 
the culture change itself.  
 
Although most of the literature related to strategic change management emphasizes vision as 
the key component in strategic restructuring, one should not become the slave of a potentially 
empty phrase. Managers should not wait for the “big vision” when initiating strategic 
change. Vision can be effectively substituted by trust, which allows the leader to keep 
followers aboard even when steering through major changes in context. This also implies that 
strategic uncertainty should not be regarded as a block and an excuse not to engage in 
strategic restructuring. However, an absence of vision can potentially create entropy, since it 
serves as a framework and filter for strategic initiatives. Therefore, leaders should create a 
framework even if they do not declare it as a formal vision statement. One possible means of 
doing this is via a clear organizational template, and a focus on other elements of the 7S 
framework. The consistency of 7Ss is probably the best test of whether a vision exists in 
practice and how effectively it is translated into managerial action. Growth as a key objective 
should make up part of this framework. 
 
External consultants and various improvement projects can be of help in turning the company 
around. However, managers need to be aware of the tendency of consultants to engage in 
tactical projects, concerned with efficiency rather than value creation. To quote Dr. Peter 
Kralji from McKinsey & Co., this is not surprising as consultants are not entrepreneurial and 
strategic restructuring is closely associated with risk-taking. Also, the results of efficiency-
focused projects are more predictable and show quicker results, both favorable points in 
typical consulting contracts. 
 
Although strategic restructuring relies on trust and consistency, which in turn demand the 
intense participation of middle management, managers should be aware that it is highly likely 
that a significant percentage of middle managers will not make it through strategic 
change. Casualties will be fewer, however, if middle managers are intensively prepared for 
their new challenges, both in terms of education aimed at developing the right set of 
competences and organizational systems strengthening their new role in the organization. 
Nevertheless, middle managers are typically the biggest obstacle to change and often display 
a defensive attitude and much fear (of possible incompetence and of job loss). Thus they need 
help, and should be given clear change-goal-related tasks to be performed according to clear 
performance criteria, which they should fulfill in a fairly short space of time or face 
replacement. Transparency of rewarding and career decisions, as well as face-saving ways out 
where non-performance is evident, can significantly improve the trust level in an 
organization. 
 
Top management bears the ultimate responsibility for the outcome of strategic change. This 
requirement is demanding, and the burden of it should be shared by all the members of the top 
management team. Although company cultures vary, it is wise to use consensus as a 
decision-making mechanism for all issues related to strategic change, particularly in 
strategic restructuring. If a small group at the top fails to reach consensus on a decision, 
then the chances of its successful and rapid implementation will be significantly smaller and it 
may prove better to delay it and seek a consensus-building alternative. 
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Finally, strategic restructuring is a long process. It may easily take a decade or more before 
a company reaches the level of sustainable competitiveness for which it was aiming. This 
means that managers should be prepared to endure long-term demands on their energy 
without loss of drive and consistency, and without making major mistakes in design and 
implementation. Only the support of all key stakeholders can facilitate change, rendering 
management of expectations critical and intense communication invaluable. Managers should 
also not forget that creating wins along the road will add to trust and patience. Therefore, 
managing for today is just as important for strategic change as is managing for 
tomorrow. 
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8. Nederlandse samenvatting 
8.1 Inleiding 
Het voornaamste doel van deze dissertatie is het ontwikkelen van een integraal analytisch 
kader gebaseerd op de nieuwste literatuur op het gebied van concurrentievermogen en 
strategisch veranderingsmanagement, aangepast aan de specifieke behoeften van Slovenië en 
Kroatië, om zo de waargenomen veranderingsprocessen te kunnen verklaren en 
ondernemingen te ondersteunen in hun toekomstige veranderingsprocessen. 
 
Er zijn diverse redenen waarom het gekozen doel van wezenlijk belang is. Ten eerste zijn de 
verandering die hebben plaatsgevonden in Slovenië en Kroatië alleszins representatief voor de 
veranderingen in de bredere regio van Centraal- en Oost-Europa en daarnaast van een schaal, 
reikwijdte en snelheid die slechts zelden wordt waargenomen. Ondanks aanzienlijke algemene 
interesse van buiten de regio, werd er maar weinig onderzoek verricht op microniveau naar 
een verklaring voor de waargenomen verschijnselen en hun relatie met het strategische 
veranderingsmanagement. Gelet op het feit dat de veranderingsprocessen in de regio, inclusief 
bedrijfsherstructurering, nog in volle gang zijn, is een beter inzicht in hun aard niet alleen 
interessant vanwege de mogelijkheid tot generalisatie, maar tevens als hulpmiddel bij het 
voltooien van de gestarte herstructurering. 
 
De volgende twee redenen waarom het onderzoek in deze dissertatie van breder belang is, zijn 
niet gerelateerd aan geografie, maar aan de aard van de geobserveerde ondernemingen en de 
gehanteerde benadering. Aan de ene kant kunnen alle waargenomen bedrijven als middelgroot 
qua omvang worden beschouwd. Ze hebben een paar honderd tot een paar duizend 
werknemers en zijn voornamelijk actief in regionale marktgebieden, maar zelfs de grootste 
verdienen niet het predikaat multinational. Vakliteratuur op het gebied van strategische 
veranderingen voor middelgrote ondernemingen is nogal schaars, aangezien het merendeel 
van het onderzoek hetzij verricht wordt in opdracht van grote multinationals of SME’s. 
Tenslotte is veel van het onderzoek naar de fenomenen inzake strategische veranderingen 
ofwel gericht op de inhoudelijke kant, met name de concurrentiestrategie, ofwel het proces 
van veranderingsmanagement. Er zijn maar weinig pogingen gedaan om een integraal kader 
voor strategisch veranderingsmanagement te creëren, de meeste van hen eindigden als 
abstracte schema’s met weinig praktisch nut voor de beroepskrachten in de 
managementsector.  
 
Het eerste gedeelte van deze dissertatie presenteert een overzicht van de voornaamste 
gebeurtenissen in Slovenië en Kroatië in de waargenomen periode, om zo de lezer vertrouwd 
te maken met de context van strategische verandering. Vervolgens biedt de uitgebreide 
bespreking van vakliteratuur de mogelijkheid van het opzetten van een integraal 
onderzoeksmodel. Na de uitleg van de onderzoeksmethode worden gedetailleerde analyses 
van zeven ondernemingen besproken, die de periode 1991-2003 beslaan. Waarnemingen van 
afzonderlijke ondernemingen zijn geïnterpreteerd binnen het kader van het onderzoeksmodel 
en daarna heeft een kruisanalyse en de integratie van de onderzoeksbevindingen 
plaatsgevonden. Deze zijn op hun beurt gebruikt om het onderzoeksmodel verder te verfijnen 
en conceptuele gevolgtrekkingen af te leiden voor zowel de managementtheorie als 
praktiserende managers.  
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8.2 Kenmerken van veranderingsprocessen op macroniveau in Kroatië en Slovenië in de 
periode 1981-2002  
Kroatië en Slovenië vormen een interessante onderzoekskeuze vanwege hun overeenkomsten 
en verschillen. Beide maakten diverse eeuwen deel uit van het Oostenrijks-Hongaarse 
keizerrijk en bijna een eeuw als republieken van het voormalige Joegoslavië en haar 
voorganger het koningrijk Joegoslavië. Tijdens het proclameren van hun onafhankelijkheid 
van het voormalige Joegoslavië verkeerden zij in vergelijkbare fasen van economische en 
politieke ontwikkeling. Een gedeelde geschiedenis gecombineerd met geografische nabijheid 
en de zelfde linguïstische en culturele wortels binnen de groep van Slavische naties impliceert 
belangrijke overeenkomsten in sociale en culturele context. Toch hebben beide landen zich als 
gevolg van diverse factoren vanaf 1991 zich opvallend anders ontwikkeld, waarbij hun 
onderlinge afwijking voor een groot deel een weerspiegeling vormt van het spectrum aan 
ontwikkelingspaden die in de rest van Centraal- en Oost-Europa zich voordeden. Daarom 
mogen zij worden beschouwd als een “klein universum” en vormen de situaties in hun 
afzonderlijke ondernemingen een potentieel uitgangspunt voor de generalisatie van 
strategische veranderingstheorieën. 
 
Het voormalige Joegoslavië werd gekenmerkt door het politieke monopolie van de 
communistische partij. Het economische systeem was echter uniek en week aanzienlijk af van 
de planeconomieën van het Sovjettype. Het sleutelbegrip waardoor het economische systeem 
van het voormalige Joegoslavië zich onderscheidde van de rest van de wereld was het concept 
“sociaal eigendom”. Sociaal eigendom betekende dat de eigendomstitel van standaard 
handelsentiteiten niet berustte bij particulieren of de staat, maar geabstraheerd werd en aan de 
werknemers werd overhandigd. Theoretisch gezien betekende dit dat de werknemers zogoed 
als alle eigendomsrechten bezaten, zoals de bevoegdheid om een directeur te benoemen, 
goedkeuring te verlenen aan belangrijke strategische maatregelen – inclusief fusies, of het 
bepalen van de bestemming van winsten. Het beslissingssysteem van de werknemers werd 
“zelfmanagement” genoemd, waarbij het “werknemersbestuur” een rol speelde die 
vergelijkbaar is met die van een raad van bestuur. Dit leidde in de praktijk tot een hoog niveau 
van werknemersprivileges die in geen verhouding stonden tot de productiviteit en 
arbeidsethiek. Bij veel bedrijven werden de effecten nog verder versterkt door de afwezigheid 
van geschikt management, omdat de directeuren veelal vanuit de politiek benoemd werden en 
niet of nauwelijks een professionele opleiding hadden genoten en ook niet volledig 
verantwoordelijk waren voor hun prestaties. 
 
Alhoewel de goederenmarkt geleidelijk aan geliberaliseerd werd en er een aantal 
componenten van de planeconomie werden geschrapt, waren de kapitaal- en arbeidsmarkten 
volledig onderontwikkeld. Vanwege politieke inmenging en het gemis aan feedback met 
betrekking tot de resultaten vanwege faillissementen, hetgeen normaliter zou hebben betekend 
het sluiten van slecht presterende bedrijven en het berispen c.q. ontslaan van slecht 
management, was de locale economie nimmer in staat zich zelf te bedruipen.  
 
Toen het moment aanbrak dat het voormalige Joegoslavië haar politieke betekenis verloor, 
stopte de toestroom van buitenlandse voorkeursleningen en stortte de economie ineen. De 
inflatie steeg en de politieke spanningen in Joegoslavië namen toe, hetgeen gedeeltelijk te 
wijten was aan de gigantische verschillen in regionale ontwikkeling, alsmede aan de 
ideologische verschillen tussen de diverse politieke elites in verscheidene delen van het land.   
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Toen Slovenië en Kroatië besloten om openbare verkiezingen uit te schrijven en 
onafhankelijk te worden viel Joegoslavië effectief uiteen. Militaire conflicten staken de kop 
op in Slovenië, doch deze werden snel opgelost, terwijl de er op volgende strijd in Kroatië, 
Bosnië en Herzegovina, Kosovo en Macedonië leidde tot een groot aantal slachtoffers en 
immense verwoesting.  
 
Dit gebeurde tegelijkertijd met de ineenstorting van de Sovjetunie en turbulente 
veranderingen in de rest van Centraal- en Oost-Europa. Bijgevolg zagen bedrijven uit 
Slovenië en Kroatië hun thuis- en voornaamste exportmarkten inkrimpen of geheel 
verdwijnen, hetgeen enorme economische moeilijkheden tot gevolg had op het moment dat 
het economische systeem werd overgeschakeld naar een echte markteconomie. De 
bijkomende privatisering , enorme veranderingen in de sociale, politieke en juridische situatie, 
alsmede de sterkere regionale aanwezigheid van mondiale concurrenten zorgde voor 
additionele uitdagingen voor de lokale ondernemingen. De meeste van hen reageerden 
defensief door in te krimpen en de kosten aan te passen aan de afnemende inkomsten. 
Desondanks slaagden diegenen die de overgangsfase wisten te overleven er spoedig in nieuwe 
inkomstenstromen te genereren, vaak afkomstig van nieuwe markten en tevens te zoeken naar 
nieuwe methoden om hun concurrentievermogen te verbeteren. 
8.3 Literatuurbespreking 
Gelet op de intentie om strategische verandering te benaderen als een integraal verschijnsel 
diende de te bespreken literatuur zowel de inhoud als het proces van strategische verandering 
te bestrijken. Daarnaast moest ook de belangrijkheid van de theoretische concepten binnen de 
waargenomen context worden beoordeeld. 
 
Wat betreft de inhoud van verandering richten de kwesties zich op concurrentievermogen. 
Concurrentievermogen ontpopt zich tot centraal begrip zowel in de eerste periode van 
verandering, waarin ondernemingen zich inspannen om zich snel aan te passen aan de nieuwe 
omgeving en erin slagen een efficiencycurve te bereiken die hun in staat stelt concurrerend te 
zijn in de opnieuw gedefinieerde markten, alsmede in de tweede fase, waarin ondernemingen 
hebben gepoogd zich aan te passen aan de alsmaar toenemende concurrentiedruk. Bijgevolg 
vertegenwoordigt concurrentievermogen in een sterk dynamische omgeving een dimensie in 
het onderzoeksmodel en was een literatuurbespreking noodzakelijk als hulpmiddel bij het 
bouwen van een model binnen deze context. 
 
Desalniettemin ziet het er naar uit dat het proces van verandering, met name bemoeienis van 
het bestuur,  een evenzo belangrijk deel van de puzzel vormt. Gelet op het hoge niveau van 
algemene onzekerheid, enorme dagelijkse druk en de aanzienlijke algehele stress in de 
samenleving en onder de werknemers, hadden de managers een zware kluif aan het opzetten 
en aansturen van het veranderingsproces. Daarom vormt het veranderingsproces de tweede 
dimensie van het onderzoeksmodel, idem dito gebaseerd op de juiste bespreking van de 
vakliteratuur. 
 
Opvallend was de sterke invloed van diverse economische theorieën t.a.v. industriële 
organisatieleer als uitgangspunt voor overwegingen van te handhaven concurrentievoordeel 
(als definitie van de inhoud van de verandering), terwijl wetenschappen zoals psychologie en 
sociologie de meeste invloed lijken te hebben gehad op overwegingen van strategisch 
veranderingsmanagement als een veranderingsproces. 
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Het nalezen van vakliteratuur die zich bezighoudt met te handhaven concurrentievoordeel 
wijst erop dat er twee mogelijke benaderingen bestaan, elk met bepaalde voor- en nadelen. De 
eerste, waarvan de omgevingstroming de meest gevestigde exponent vormt, hanteert de van 
buiten naar binnen-optiek, zoekend naar bronnen van concurrentievoordeel door middel van 
interpretatie van de externe omgeving. De tweede, waarvan de bronstroming de meest 
dominante vertegenwoordiger is, kiest een van binnen naar buiten-optiek, waar 
concurrentievoordeel wordt gekoppeld aan interne factoren. Tegelijkertijd zorgt het nalezen 
van literatuur over strategische verandering voor een focus op kwesties die gerelateerd zijn 
aan de aard van veranderingen en integraal veranderingsmanagement. Het geeft duidelijk in 
overweging dat verandering dient te worden beschouwd als een proces dat zich in fasen 
ontwikkelt. 
 
De geraadpleegde vakliteratuur besloeg een vrij uitgebreid spectrum aan theorieën en daarop 
gebaseerde concepten. Van twintig verschillende concepten werd vastgesteld dat zij bijzonder 
interessant zijn in de waargenomen context. Op diverse manieren leveren zij allemaal het 
fundament waarop het onderzoeksmodel is gebouwd. Het is bijna een paradox, dat het doel, 
het construeren van een simpel onderzoeksmodel van strategisch veranderingsmanagement 
dat inzicht verschaft in de waargenomen strategische transformaties van bedrijven in Kroatië 
en Slovenië werd bereikt, ondanks het feit dat het werd afgeleid uit een veelheid van – vaak 
complexe – concepten en ver reikende daar onderliggende theorieën.  
 
Het onderzoeksmodel beschreef strategische verandering als een gegeven dat in drie fasen 
optreedt: initieel, ontwerp en implementatie met daarin te veranderen barrières en bemoeienis 
van het bestuur (Fig. 8.1). Het definieert tevens de sleutelbegrippen van de afzonderlijke 
fasen. In de initiële en de designfase bestaan deze uit de besefte urgentie en de 
uitvoerbaarheid van verandering, die niet alleen de het besluit om tot verandering over te gaan 
beïnvloeden, maar ook de beoogde uitkomst: het geplande organisatiestructuur (strategieën, 
systemen en structuren). 
 
 
 
 
Figuur 8.1 Strategisch veranderingsmanagementmodel 
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Het onderzoeksmodel legt aan de ene kant de link tussen de besefte urgentie en de 
uitvoerbaarheid van verandering en aan de andere kant de keuze van de 
herstructureringbenadering, waarbij defensieve en strategische herstructurering als 
alternatieve methoden worden aangeduid. (Fig. 8.2). 
 
 
 
Figuur 8.2 Uitkomsten van de ontwerpfase 
 
Tenslotte leverde het naslaan van de vakliteratuur een verzameling attributen van het 
defensieve en strategische herstructureringsproces op, waardoor waarnemingen uit de 
implementatiefase konden worden geconceptualiseerd, met name de kenmerken van nieuwe 
organisatiesjablonen, de essentiële bronnen  voor hun succesvolle implementatie, te 
veranderen barrières en bestuurlijke interventies. 
 
Naast de constructie van het onderzoeksmodel werden er gedetailleerde vragen opgesteld die 
door veldonderzoek moesten worden beantwoord:  
 
V1. Welke factoren hebben de besefte noodzaak tot verandering beïnvloed? Welke factoren 
hebben in het bijzonder het besefte benodigde tijdsbestek voor verandering beïnvloed?  
 
V2. Welke factoren hebben de besefte uitvoerbaarheid van verandering beïnvloed?  
 
V3. Wat was, voor zover aanwezig, het responspatroon t.a.v. het besefte benodigde 
tijdsbestek voor actie en het besef van de uitvoerbaarheid? Hoe was de reactievolgorde? 
 
V4. Indien defensieve herstructurering tot de reacties behoorde, hoe geschiedde dat? Wat 
waren de sleutelbegrippen in het nieuwe organisatiestructuur? Welke essentiële bronnen 
waren er nodig? Wat waren de voornaamste bestuurlijke ingrepen tijdens de implementatie en 
de moeilijkheden tijdens het implementeren van het nieuwe sjabloon? 
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V5. Indien strategische herstructurering tot de reacties behoorde, hoe geschiedde dat? Welke 
essentiële bronnen waren er nodig? Wat waren de voornaamste bestuurlijke ingrepen tijdens 
de implementatie en de moeilijkheden tijdens het implementeren van het nieuwe sjabloon? 
8.4 Onderzoeksmethodiek 
De casusmethode werd gekozen als zijnde de meest geschikte benadering voor deze 
specifieke situatie. Hierbij werd een kwalitatieve, ten faveure van een kwantitatieve 
benadering gehanteerd, zowel vanwege de aard van de vragen, die grondige observatie en 
interpretatie vereisten, alsmede de relatief kleine onderzoeksomvang van beschikbare 
bedrijven. Daarnaast worden casussen algemeen geaccepteerd als een adequaat hulpmiddel bij 
het onderzoek naar zowel onderwerpen met betrekking tot de brongerichte gedachtegang als 
startparadigma voor de analyse van de inhoud van een strategie, alsmede onderwerpen 
omgeven door organisatiegedrag en veranderingsmanagementprocessen, die in de buurt 
komen van traditionele onderzoeksmethoden in de sociale wetenschappen. 
 
De bij het veldonderzoek betrokken ondernemingen werden voorbereid om toegang te 
verschaffen tot alle noodzakelijke informatie en beschikten over het potentieel om 
representatief te zijn en voldoende informatierijke voorbeelden. De data en observaties 
werden verzameld uit zeven brongroepen, inclusief de systematische beoordeling van 
krantenknipsels, jaarverslagen, voor de betreffende bedrijven voorbereide 
consultancyprojecten, studievoorbeelden m.b.t. de bedrijven, gestructureerde interviews met 
zorgvuldig geselecteerde managers (de belangrijkste bron, er werden 62 interviews 
afgenomen met zowel het merendeel van de raad van bestuur als vertegenwoordigers van het 
middenmanagement) en feedback van het management op de voorlopige bevindingen van het 
onderzoek. De data en observaties richtten zich op de periode 1991-2003. Na het verzamelen 
ervan, werd een controle op consistentie uitgevoerd, vervolgstellingen die niet minstens door 
twee methodieken werden gestaafd (niet slechts extra bronnen binnen dezelfde methode) 
werden verworpen. 
 
De observaties uit het veldonderzoek werden apart van elkaar geanalyseerd en kruiselings met 
de overige casussen vergeleken. De bevindingen werden verder gepreciseerd met de hulp van 
een onafhankelijke expert, die de rol van advocaat van de duivel speelde en vraagtekens 
plaatste bij de voorlopige conclusies. De verbeterde casusschets werd naar de betrokken 
ondernemingen gestuurd, waarbij het topmanagement om feedback werd gevraagd. Alle 
zeven firma’s bevestigden dat de casussen een juiste weergave en interpretatie vormden van 
de observatieperiode. 
 
Een specifiek methodologisch probleem vormde de berekening van de geassocieerde 
paarwaarden bij besefte noodzakelijkheid en besefte uitvoerbaarheid, die, in overeenstemming 
met het onderzoeksmodel, de uitkomst definieerden. Naar aanleiding van de interviews met 
de managers en de analyse van het besluitvormingsproces werden er gewichtswaarden 
toegekend aan de individuele factoren die de besefte noodzakelijkheid en besefte 
uitvoerbaarheid hebben beïnvloed. Deze werden opgeteld of afgetrokken, afhankelijk van hun 
aanwezigheid in een individuele veranderingsfase of de aard van hun invloed op de beslissing. 
De eindresultaten werden afgebeeld in diagrammen om zo een voorspelling te kunnen geven 
van het karakter van de beoogde uitkomst. (zie Fig. 8.2). 
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Het veldonderzoek bracht twee belangrijke methodologische beperkingen naar voren: 
generalisatiepotentieel (speciaal in het geval van specifieke context en een kleine 
onderzoeksomvang van bedrijven), alsmede een voor verbetering vatbare betrouwbaarheid 
van de kwalitieve analyse m.b.t. de berekening van de geassocieerde paarwaarden bij het 
besefte noodzaak-besefte uitvoerheidsdiagram. De eerste tekortkoming vraagt om soortgelijk 
onderzoek buiten Slovenië en Kroatië, terwijl de tweede overwonnen zou kunnen worden met 
het gebruik van meer kwantificeerbare metingen en een vergroting van de 
onderzoeksomvang. 
8.5 Strategisch veranderingsmanagement: de casussen van zeven Kroatische en 
Sloveense bedrijven.  
Zeven productiebedrijven werden geselecteerd voor het veldonderzoek: Konar, Lura and 
Podravka uit Kroatië, and Gorenje, Kolinska, Lek and Ljubljanske mlekarne uit Slovenië. 
Elke casus (behalve Lura, dat werd opgericht in 1991) begint met een korte samenvatting van 
de bedrijfsgeschiedenis van voor 1991. Hierna volgt een overzicht van de 
bedrijfsontwikkelingen in de periode 1991-2003, gecategoriseerd onder kopregels die in 
chronologische volgorde de waargenomen veranderingscycli weergeven. Elke casus besluit 
met een bespreking van de onderzoeksbevindingen, samengebracht rondom de elementen van 
het onderzoeksmodel. 
8.5.1 Gorenje 
Bij Gorenje werden er vier veranderingscycli waargenomen. In de eerste cyclus begon de 
verandering laat, toen de financiële situatie (en met name de liquiditeit) van het bedrijf 
kritisch werd. De belangrijkste factoren die van invloed waren op deze late start waren 
institutionele druk (om de werkgelegenheid te handhaven en om het positieve imago van het 
bedrijf en haar topkader in stand houden); gebrek aan transparantie in de gevolgen van 
externe veranderingen m.b.t. de bedrijfsprestaties en gebrek aan eenheid onder de top van het 
management. De rol van het financiële overschot kan als negatief worden beschouwd, omdat 
de verandering pas werd doorgezet nadat deze was opgebruikt. 
 
Zodra de verandering in gang was gezet vertoonde deze de overduidelijke kenmerken van 
defensieve herstructurering. De gekozen strategie werd sterk beïnvloed door institutionele 
druk. Er vond inkrimping plaats in de hoofddivisie, hoewel uitsluitend door vrijwillig vertrek, 
inclusief pensioneringen. Het nieuwe organisatiestructuur bevatte een aanzienlijke 
hoeveelheid centralisatie in de eerste veranderingsperiode en een focus op kostenbesparing en 
bestaande centrale markten. Er was geen spoor van ingrijpende bedrijfsleerprocessen, 
alhoewel er een duidelijke nadruk was op kwaliteitsverbetering gebaseerd op strengere 
discipline. De essentiële bronnen voor het slagen van de strategie in deze fase waren 
financiële injecties, een nieuw boekhoud- en controlesysteem, marktvaardigheid en een 
toegewijd leger aan arbeidskrachten dat haar leiders vertrouwde.  Bestuurlijke interventies 
beperkten zich tot topdown besluitvorming en intensieve communicatie met de werknemers 
en andere belangrijke belanghebbenden. Een bepaalde hoeveelheid dwang was merkbaar, 
maar dit werd gecompenseerd met beloften van behoud van werkgelegenheid. De grootste 
barrière was angst, in het bijzonder bij het middenmanagement. 
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De tweede fase ging door met de nadruk op kostenbesparing, maar op een geheel andere 
wijze: het werd gebruikt als een onderdeel van de concurrentiestrategie in plaats van een 
crisisreactie en werd gecombineerd met andere activiteiten om de toegevoegde waarde te 
verbeteren. Op deze wijze veranderde de herstructurering van een defensieve in een 
strategische. De essentiële bronnen voor het begin van de strategische herstructurering waren 
financiële middelen en technologische vakbekwaamheid. Een andere duidelijke afwijking van 
de eerste fase was het meer vertrouwen op bottom-up processen en duidelijke pogingen om 
nieuwe bedrijfsprocessen te lanceren die het leerproces zouden vergemakkelijken, zoals het 
inzetten van buitenlandse consultants en het richten van de aandacht op technische scholing. 
 
De aanzet voor de derde veranderingscyclus was de interpretatie van het bestuur van de 
nieuwe mogelijkheden in Centraal- en Oost-Europa en de concurrerende bewegingen in de 
branche, alsmede hun herinterpretatie van de behoeften en verlangens van de consument in 
alle markten. De aanzet werd versterkt door de schatting dat de beschikbare bronnen 
toereikend waren om de veranderingen in praktijk te brengen. Het bedrijf besloot om het lage 
kosten- en hoge toegevoegde waarden-standpunten te combineren; het reorganiseerde de 
hoofdproductielijnen en legde de nadruk op R&D, productie en distributie en wijzigde haar 
koers in de richting van globale criteria en externe partnerschappen om zo de kritieke 
onderdelen in haar waardeketen te verbeteren. Gorenje bleef vertrouwen op alle essentiële 
bronnen die tijdens de defensieve herstructurering waren vastgesteld, met een intensivering 
van het gebruik van technologische vakbekwaamheid en klantenbinding om nieuwe producten 
te ontwikkelen. 
 
In de derde cyclus liep de onderneming tegen barrières aan die te maken hadden met de 
groeiende meervoudigheid aan interesses, maar kon deze neutraliseren, voornamelijk dankzij 
een hoger niveau van decentralisatie, meer ad-hoc management en voortdurende intensieve 
communicatie, alsmede druk uit te oefenen op de prestaties van het middenmanagement. 
 
Terwijl de organisatiestructuur dat resulteert uit de vierde cyclus nog niet volledig uit de verf 
is, is het duidelijk dat de aanzet voor deze cyclus bestond uit de interpretatie dat de 
contextuele veranderingen (met name de toetreding tot de EU gecombineerd met 
ontwikkelingen in de branche) significant genoeg waren om direct tot actie over te gaan. Het 
is ook zeer waarschijnlijk dat deze beslissing zwaar beïnvloed werd door een voorspelde 
toename in institutionele druk. 
8.5.2 Kolinska 
Twee veranderingscycli zijn waar te nemen bij Kolinska in de periode 1991-2003. Er zijn een 
aantal aanwijzingen dat de onderneming zich in de overgang naar een derde fase bevindt. De 
eerste cyclus werd duidelijk gekenmerkt door een stoutmoedige inkrimping en vertoonde alle 
tekenen van een defensieve herstructurering. De verandering werd ingezet door een 
inschatting van het management dat de marktontwikkelingen gelijk overeenstemden met een 
van hun voorgedefinieerde scenario’s.  
 
Een vroege start, snel inkrimpen en andere kostenbesparende maatregelen stelden het bedrijf 
in staat om een ernstige financiële crisis te vermijden ondanks de gigantische uitdagingen van 
een aanvankelijke inkomstendaling van 70 %. Het gegeven dat de onderneming een 
betrouwbare managementadministratie had geïnstalleerd, vergrootte de snelheid en 
nauwkeurigheid van haar reactie. Het beperkte tevens de potentiële schade van financiële 
overschotten, aangezien het bedrijf de “overschotverbrandratio” gemakkelijk kon controleren 
en in actie kon komen toen de financiële reserves nog groot waren. 
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De onderneming probeerde ook de inkomsten te vergroten, maar behaalde slechts “meer van 
hetzelfde”. Alle belangrijke beslissingen werden volledig gecentraliseerd op het niveau van de 
Raad van Toezicht. Verbeteringen in specifieke productie- en distributieprocessen werden 
voornamelijk uitgevoerd op basis van bedrijfsinzichten, zonder het profijt van externe 
ondersteuning of vergelijkend onderzoek mondiale concurrenten. De essentiële bronnen die in 
de in de eerste cyclus werden gebruikt waren onder andere voorzichtig gebruik van financiële 
overschotten en diverse institutionele verbanden, intensieve benutting van het 
kostenbeheersysteem en vertrouwensmanagement voor de werknemers. 
 
Bestuurlijke interventies richtten zich op gecentraliseerde besluitvorming en strikt 
brongebruik – deze werden aangewend voor kostenbesparing en distributieondersteuning. Het 
management was betrokken bij een belangrijk communicatie-initiatief, maar maakte ook 
gebruik van dwang om het herstructureringsproces te versnellen. Het gebrek aan 
vaardigheden en kennis vormde een belangrijke hindernis bij de verandering, net zo als angst 
voor baanbehoud. Deze factoren werden ook beschouwd als doorslaggevende beperking bij 
het vermogen van het bedrijf om actief deel te nemen aan organisatorische leerprocessen.  
 
Zodra de directe dreiging van financiële ineenstorting was opgeheven, schatte het 
management opnieuw de noodzaak en de uitvoerbaarheid van verandering in. Verscheidene 
opties m.b.t. strategische herstructurering werden afgewezen, vanwege de aanname dat het 
bedrijf niet over voldoende bronnen beschikte om ze te implementeren, alhoewel de directie 
in het algemeen de noodzaak tot verandering onderschreef. Tenslotte droegen een afnemende 
gelijksoortigheid in de top en een afnemend vertrouwen ook bij aan de veranderingsmodus, 
welke vasthield aan een aantal elementen van defensief herstructureren gecombineerd met een 
aantal niet-aaneengesloten wijzigingen. 
 
Deze situatie leidde tot een verslechtering van de strategische positie. Kolinska kan nog steed 
bogen op gezonde financiële resultaten, maar het presteert onder het branchegemiddelde en 
schijnt niet in staat te zijn om significante vooruitgang te boeken in het verwerven van de 
vaardigheden die nodig zijn voor een strategische herpositionering. De interne communicatie 
is verre van optimaal en het vertrouwen in de leiding van de onderneming neemt af. 
8.5.3 Konar 
Er zijn drie veranderingsfasen waar te nemen in de Konar-casus, waarbij de grens tussen de 
eerste twee enigszins vaag is. De aanzet tot de eerste fase was de verslechterende financiële 
situatie van het bedrijf. Deze werd laat opgemerkt, omdat de rapportagesystemen van Konar 
niet toereikend waren en het moeilijk was om een actueel overzicht te krijgen van de algehele 
bedrijfprestaties.  
 
De inschatting van de situatie door de directie werd zwaar beïnvloed door de aard van de 
branche, alsmede de politieke en economische veranderingen in de omgeving. Tenslotte was 
de onderneming net in een machtsvacuüm beland, vanwege het plotselinge overlijden van 
haar vorige bestuurder. Al deze factoren werden beschouwd als uitermate negatief voor de 
kans op verandering, hetgeen het management blokkeerde en externe krachten dwong om het 
heft in handen te nemen. 
 
Een defensieve herstructurering werd opgestart, waarbij de voorkeur werd gegeven aan een 
faillissement op divisieniveau als korte termijnmiddel. De aandacht richtte zich hoofdzakelijk 
op kosten en financiële liquiditeit. Het zich ontdoen van bedrijfsmiddelen bood weinig 
Nenad Filipovi  Chapter 8 
Strategic Change Management of Medium Size Companies:   
Insights from Slovenia and Croatia   
 229 
soelaas, vanwege de slechte economische omstandigheden in het land. Vanwege de late 
reactie en het totaal onprofessionele interim-management waren de financiële reserves al 
uitgeput voordat de verandering überhaupt werd ingezet. De interne controlesystemen waren 
niet adequaat. De hoge zelfstandigheidniveaus van de afzonderlijke divisies verkleinden de 
transparantie van de bedrijfsprestaties voor het bestuur. De schok van de eerste 
inkrimpingsfase elimineerde zo goed als alle vertrouwen in de directie en in aanzienlijke mate 
dat in het middenkader. Er werd gepoogd  bottom-up veranderingen door te voeren, maar het 
bestuur was niet actief betrokken bij de communicatie en het opbouwen van vertrouwen en 
konden uitsluitend dwang gebruiken om het divisiemanagement aan te sturen. De 
moeilijkheden waarmee het bestuur geconfronteerd werd – afgezien van een extreem 
vijandige zakelijke omgeving – waren gebrek aan vertrouwen, angst en verwarring en 
flagrante non-technische competentie. Er werd praktisch niet geïnvesteerd in opleidingen. 
 
Ondertussen had het divisie- en middenkader onder de nieuwe omstandigheden enige 
zakelijke ervaring opgedaan en hadden de divisies hun vakbekwaamheden aangescherpt. De 
inkrimping werd verder doorgezet en de meeste kenmerken van defensieve herstructurering 
bleven, alhoewel deze herstructurering geschiedde zonder een duidelijk doel voor ogen. In 
deze context kan worden betoogd dat er een tweede veranderingsfase was aangebroken met 
gedeelde kenmerken van defensieve herstructurering en van niet-aaneengesloten 
veranderingen, waarbij de eerste vertegenwoordigd was in de filosofie van de bedrijfstop en 
de tweede in de initiatieven van het divisiekader. Nog een te slechten hindernis stak in de 
context van privatisering en slechte controlesystemen de kop op: een toenemende discrepantie 
van interesses onder divisiemanagers en andere interessegroepen.  
 
De aanzet voor de derde fase was direct gerelateerd aan de veranderingen in de top. De 
nieuwe voorzitter van de raad van bestuur schatte de uitvoerbaarheid van het strategisch 
verbeteren van het concurrentievermogen positief in door het vergroten van de synergie 
tussen de divisies. Alhoewel het moederbedrijf nog steeds een bronnentekort had, begon het 
met de divisies aan te sporen om zich te richten op de doorslaggevende succesfactoren, van 
technologische vakbekwaamheid en nieuwe producten tot het bouwen van vertrouwensrelaties 
met klanten en managementontwikkeling. Konar begon ook met een actieve participatie in 
organisatorische leerprocessen omtrent de meest effectieve mondiale praktijken, door middel 
van consultancyprojecten, systematische betrokkenheid bij biedprocessen en internationale 
trainingsprogramma’s.  
 
Hiermee werd een aanzienlijke verbetering in de prestatietransparantie van zowel 
afzonderlijke divisies als het systeem in zijn geheel bereikt. De nieuwe bestuursvoorzitter 
gebruikte zijn charisma ter compensatie van zijn enigszins autoritaire stijl, maar zorgde 
tegelijkertijd dat de andere leden van de raad van bestuur erbij betrokken werden en liet veel 
ruimte voor divisie-initiatieven. Op deze manier vermeed hij totale centralisatie en verder 
verzet van de divisies.  
8.5.4 Lek 
In de recente geschiedenis van Lek zijn vier veranderingscycli aan te wijzen. De aanzet voor 
de eerste fase was de interpretatie van het bestuur van Lek m.b.t. haar zakelijke 
overlevingskansen ondanks haar relatief solide financiële aanvangspositie. De schatting werd 
beïnvloed door de aard van de branche alsmede het gebrek aan transparantie t.o.v. kern versus 
niet-kernactiviteiten. Het vertrouwen in het bestuur had een positieve invloed op het begin 
van de verandering, terwijl financiële overschotten de eerste reactie vertraagden, maar deze 
uiteindelijk de verandering ondersteunden toen deze begon. 
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De organisatiestructuur werd qua strategische focus aangepast, in die zin dat de aandacht zich 
meer richtte op de kernactiviteiten en de centrale en Oost-Europese markten, de 
organisatieopzet (een divisiestructuur om de prestatietransparantie te vergemakkelijken, maar 
met een hoog centralisatiegehalte) en de tactische gevolgen (kostenbesparing door technische 
aanpassingen en inkrimping).  
 
Na het bereiken van de resultaten van de defensieve herstructurering werd de tweede 
veranderingscyclus gestart, waarin de onderneming de ommekeer maakte naar strategische 
herstructurering. Alhoewel er geen duidelijke en krachtige toekomstvisie werd uitgesproken, 
was deze helder genoeg om als kader voor de strategie te kunnen dienen. Het liet tevens 
ruimte voor het veranderen van de interpretatie van prioriteiten. 
 
In de derde cyclus ging de onderneming van een strategische herstructureringsmodus over 
naar een niet-aaneengesloten veranderingsmodus. De top van het bestuur werd gewijzigd, 
waardoor verandering in de organisatiestructuur optraden, ondanks de aanname dat er geen 
grote veranderingen in de strategie noodzakelijk waren. Vanwege de inschattingsverschillen 
onder de topmanagers m.b.t. de betekenis van externe gebeurtenissen en in hoeverre de 
onderneming daartegen opgewassen was, was er in Lek geen eensgezindheid ten aanzien van 
de noodzaak en richting van verandering. Pas nadat het middenkader en een aantal van de 
meer ervaren managers de noodzaak tot verandering als urgent hadden bestempeld, werd de 
aanzet gegeven tot de volgende veranderingsfase, ondanks haar ogenschijnlijk magere 
succeskansen (gebrek aan steun van de raad van toezicht en de weerstand in de publieke 
media). Het vertrouwen onder de voornaamste belanghebbenden speelde een doorslaggevende 
rol bij de mate van succes van initiatieven in deze periode. 
 
In de vierde veranderingscyclus wijzigde het bedrijf opnieuw haar koers richting strategische 
herstructurering, met het doel om een mondiale speler te worden. Tezamen met een duidelijke 
positionering als een globale generieke onderneming met het vermogen tot toegevoegde 
waarde werd er expliciet binnen de onderneming verwezen naar  onderdelen van de 
waardeketen die de positie ondersteunden vanuit een kosten- en toegevoegde 
waardeperspectief. Er werd veel geleerd van de vergelijkende onderzoeken die door 
ingehuurde consultants werden uitgevoerd en de integratie met Novartis, welke het resultaat 
was van de inschatting van de directie dat Lek zich het beste kan ontwikkelen onder de 
vleugels van een strategische partner. 
 
Wat bestuurlijke interventies betreft hield het bedrijf vast aan het topdown besturingsmodel. 
Echter, het projectmanagement zoals dat door Lek wordt gebruikt, kan worden geïnterpreteerd 
als een participatieconstructie, als compensatie voor het relatief regelmatige ontslag van 
beneden de maat presterende managers uit het middenkader. 
 
Tenslotte waren de hindernissen gedurende de strategische herstructureringsfasen 
voornamelijk gerelateerd aan angst onder werknemers, en in het bijzonder onder het 
middenkader, dat ze niet voldoende competent zouden zijn voor hun nieuwe 
taakomschrijving. Veranderingsmoeheid was merkbaar, maar deze werd als hindernis 
grotendeels geëlimineerd door het hoge impliciete beloningspotentieel van de fusie met 
Sandoz, alsmede door de relatief hoge frequentie van veranderingen van posities in het 
middenkader. 
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8.5.5 Ljubljanske mlekarne 
Er zijn drie fasen waar te nemen in de casus van Ljubljanske mlekarne, en er zijn 
aanwijzingen dat de vierde fase op het punt van aanbreken staat. In de eerste fase wijzigde de 
onderneming haar organisatiestructuur ten opzichte van de voorgaande periode, maar slechts 
in bescheiden mate. Volgens de directie vroegen de veranderingen in de omgeving niet om 
een directe reactie die verder ging dan aandacht voor de kosten en een informele 
personeelsstop. De directie werd beïnvloed door gemengde signalen m.b.t. de veranderingen 
in de branche en de financiële situatie van het bedrijf, te wijten aan problemen met het 
middenkader en de aspiraties van de directeur om de koppositie in Slovenië te bereiken. Als 
gevolg daarvan werden een aantal verbeteringen doorgevoerd, maar het bedrijf week niet af 
van haar productierichting en het tamelijk locaal georiënteerde businessmodel. De 
hoeveelheid organisatorische leerprocessen in deze periode lijkt uitermate beperkt, hetgeen 
grotendeels het resultaat was van de intimiderende manier van leiding geven van de directeur. 
 
De tweede fase werd aangezweld door privatisering, de aannamen van de directie t.a.v. de 
toekomst van de Sloveense zuivelindustrie en het continue streven van de directeur om 
marktleider te worden. Hij ging er van uit dat het bedrijf beperkte maar voldoende bronnen 
bezat, alhoewel hij zich voornamelijk richtte op de financiële en de productiekant, in 
tegenstelling tot personeelomvang en aan de markt gerelateerde vakbekwaamheid. Ondanks 
de aanwezigheid van een potentieel voor strategische herstructurering, ging de mogelijkheid 
daartoe al verloren in de opzetfase. Er werd geen blijk gegeven van een duidelijke visie, noch 
van een optimalisering van de synergie van de bronnen of andere pogingen om de 
organisatiestructuur te wijzigen. Bijgevolg was er een onmiddellijke verschuiving naar niet-
aaneengesloten verandering, in plaats van strategische herstructurering. 
 
De derde fase werd ingeluid door de nieuwe beoordeling van de nieuwe directeur en zijn 
team. Zij hadden de situatie veel kritischer bekeken en kwamen tot de conclusie dat 
onmiddellijke actie noodzakelijk was, ondanks tegenwerkende krachten in en om het bedrijf 
die de kansen op succes verkleinden. Als eerste beschouwden zij de veranderingen in de 
branche als uitermate negatief, en zagen daarbij veel meer dreigingen dan kansen in de 
toetreding tot de EU. Zij schatten ook dat voortdurende institutionele druk een negatieve rol 
zou kunnen spelen bij de onderneming. Alhoewel ze niet in voldoende mate over transparante 
prestatiecijfers beschikten, schatten zij  dat de financiële stabiliteit van het bedrijf niet langer 
dan een paar jaar stand zou houden.  
 
De nieuwe directeur maakte zich ook zorgen over de erfenis van de verstoorde bedrijfscultuur 
en het zeer beperkte aantal van capabele managers. Dit vroeg om defensieve herstructurering 
met centrale besluitvorming, een duidelijke focus op kostenbesparing en in het bijzonder de 
consolidering van productiefaciliteiten. Helaas zorgden sterke institutionele druk en een 
relatief solide financiële positie op de korte termijn ervoor dat de directie niet kon overgaan 
tot drastische maatregelen.   
 
Naar aanleiding van het succes van de derde fase en een verbeterd inzicht in de eigen 
vaardigheden, koos het bestuur bij de aanvang van de vierde cyclus voor een nieuwe 
strategische positie, die meer werd bepaald door het toevoegen van waarde middels een 
uitstekend productenportfolio, een beter op haar taken berekende regionale distributie en een 
verbeterde merkpositie. De eerste stappen, zoals de initiatieven tot het ontwikkelen van 
nieuwe producten of het project om de merknaam te verstevigen, werden volgens de nieuwe 
koers gezet. Desalniettemin werd er door middel van strategische projecten meer bottom-up 
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steun voor verandering gegenereerd, hetgeen uiteindelijk onvermijdelijk leidde tot een nieuwe 
selectieronde in het middenkader. Er werd uitgegaan van een globaal perspectief, vergezeld 
van een significante hoeveelheid van vergelijkend onderzoek en leren van andere bedrijven 
buiten de directe regio. 
8.5.6 Lura 
Er zijn vier afzonderlijke perioden aan te wijzen in de geschiedenis van Lura. In de eerste 
veranderde het bedrijf niets aan haar strategie of de basiselementen in haar 
organisatiestructuur. Er werd geen daadwerkelijke herstructurering doorgevoerd in de 
aangekochte ondernemingen. De productierichting van de overgeërfde bedrijven van de 
voorgaande periode had de overhand, alhoewel er een aantal verbeteringen in de productie en 
distributie werden doorgevoerd. De voornaamste oorzaken liggen in het privatiseringsproces, 
waarin de eigenaar vrije cashflow gebruikte om andere ondernemingen over te nemen, in 
plaats van degene die hij al reeds had aangeschaft te herstructureren, alsmede de oorlog in 
Kroatië, die de concurrentie aanzienlijk decimeerde en Lura in staat stelde om goede 
bedrijfsresultaten te behalen zonder significante verbeteringen door te voeren. Ten slotte 
besloot de eigenaar om de onderneming zelf te leiden, maar ontbeerde daarbij de benodigde 
managementervaring, waardoor hij aarzelde bij het nemen van belangrijke strategische 
ingrepen. 
 
De aanzet tot de tweede cyclus vormde de aanname dat de financiële situatie van het bedrijf 
zou verslechteren vanwege de veranderingen in de sector, hoofdzakelijk samengaand met de 
toetreding van globale concurrenten en consolidatie van de detailhandel. Institutionele druk 
kon deze verandering niet tegenhouden, maar beïnvloedde de snelheid en wijze van 
uitvoering. De aanwezigheid van voldoende financiële bronnen had een positieve invloed 
nadat er besloten werd, dat actie noodzakelijk was. De eigenaar kon daarbij rekenen op zijn 
positie als een leider die vertrouwen genoot, welke hij in de eerste fase had opgebouwd. 
 
De aard van de veranderingen was duidelijk defensief, gelet op de focus van de onderneming 
op kostenbesparing en in het bijzonder inkrimping. Ondanks veranderingen in de top, was de 
besluitvorming nog steeds in hoge mate gecentraliseerd en naar beneden gericht. Er werd 
meer aandacht besteed aan het vermogen van het bedrijf om haar prestaties te kunnen 
controleren. De communicatie met de vakbonden en de werknemers werd geïntensiveerd. Er 
werden maar weinig hindernissen tijdens de verandering waargenomen, voornamelijk door 
managers uit het middenkader die vreesden voor hun baan. Maar een relatief slechte 
organisatiestructuur en een laag niveau van vaardigheden vertraagden de verandering en 
verhinderden het bedrijf bij het doorvoeren van alle mogelijke kostenbesparingen. 
 
De aanzet tot de derde veranderingscyclus, welke de vorm aannam van strategische 
herstructurering, werd duidelijk beïnvloed door de aanname van veranderingen in de sector en 
de beschikbaarheid van bronnen. Echter, na een korte aanvangsperiode werd de 
herstructurering onduidelijk en ging het patroon van veranderingen lijken op zwak 
aaneengesloten verandering die langzaam degradeerde tot niet-aaneengesloten verandering. 
De strategie zwenkte van regionale diversificatie naar strategisch partnerschap, zonder 
helderheid in de redenering en zonder een overtuigend actieplan. De directeur kreeg geen 
steun voor verandering uit de onderlaag. 
 
Daardoor zag de eigenaar zich genoodzaakt om de directeur te ontslaan en opnieuw een 
poging te wagen tot herstructurering. Het nieuwe team bracht een meer gerichte visie naar 
voren, gebruikte consultants, en bracht buitenlandse managers en vergelijkend onderzoek in 
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als leerbronnen en aanstuurders van een nieuwe cultuur, reorganiseerde het bedrijf in business 
units en maakte flink gebruik van IT om de prestaties te optimaliseren en te controleren. Lura 
richtte zich op klantenbinding, ontwikkeling van nieuwe producten en marketing als 
strategisch onderscheidende factoren, evenals procesverbetering om zo een betere 
kostenpositie te bewerkstelligen. De toewijding van het middenkader werd verzekerd door 
een flinke druk op het behalen van hoge prestaties, door middel van werken aan projecten en 
het gezamenlijk ontwikkelen van een strategie, maar ook door middel van door de directeur 
geïnitieerde directe communicatie.  
 
Verzet tegen de verandering was hoofdzakelijk afkomstig van managers uit het middenkader 
die zich bedreigd voelden en onvoldoende opgewassen tegen de aanpassingen. Het gebrek aan 
de benodigde vaardigheden en kennis, alsmede problemen in het veilig stellen van de 
toestroom aan managementtalent, kunnen worden beschouwd als de volgende belangrijke 
hindernissen bij verandering. Er was enige veranderingsmoeheid merkbaar, deze werd 
verhevigd door het wisseltekort bij het middenkader, hetgeen een grote druk voor een kleine 
groep bestaande leiders met zich meebracht, waardoor ze dun werden uitgesmeerd over een 
aantal veranderinginitiatieven, hetgeen de positieve effecten van het overigens hoge niveau 
aan organisatorische leerprocessen in de laatste veranderingsfase dreigde te verminderen. 
8.5.7 Podravka 
Er zijn vier veranderingscycli aan te wijzen in Podravka. Gedurende de eerste cyclus waren er 
of geen veranderingen of incidentele niet-aaneengesloten aanpassingen, zoals het begin van 
de niet-systematische verkoopexpansie in Centraal- en Oost-Europa. Het lijkt erop dat 
institutionele druk en het gebrek aan betrouwbare leiders de belangrijkste factoren zijn bij het 
ontbreken van prikkels. Duidelijk was ook het gebrek aan prestatietransparantie. Echter, zodra 
het duidelijk werd dat de onderneming financieel niet levensvatbaar was, zorgden de 
eigenaren ervoor dat de tweede fase werd ingezet. 
 
De late reactie op de razendsnelle veranderingen in de omgeving brachten het bedrijf niet 
alleen op de rand van de afgrond, maar creëerden ook de typische gedragspatronen van 
“verliezers”, inclusief frustratie, een mix van ontkenning en hulpeloosheid, het de schuld 
geven aan anderen en onethisch gedrag. Omdat er geen intern veranderingstoezicht was, 
werden er externe consultants ingeschakeld om de veranderingen te begeleiden. 
 
Als gevolg van directe druk van de eigenaren werd er gestart met defensieve herstructurering. 
Het herstructureren van de bedrijfsmiddelen leek meer effectief dan aanvankelijk verwacht, 
maar dat lag aan het feit dat dit in het geval van Podravka een methode voorstelde om de 
werkgelegenheid te verlagen in plaats van financieel te profiteren van het afstoten van 
bedrijfsmiddelen. Bijna alle adviezen die door de consultants op basis van hun globale optiek 
werden verstrekt, werden met argwaan begroet. Bijna alle bronnen bevestigen dat alles wat 
zich niet aanpaste aan locale gewoonten, “de manier waarop wij dingen doen”, werd 
behandeld als iets wat tegen de interesses van de locale gemeenschap indruiste, ongeacht of 
het op waarheid berustte. Dit zorgde voor hevig verzet en belemmerde voorgestelde 
veranderingen op het moment dat de consultants deze aan de directie ter uitvoering 
overhandigden. 
 
De aanzet voor de volgende twee veranderingscycli was hetzelfde: de slechte financiële 
situatie van de onderneming en het oordeel van de eigenaren dat verandering noodzakelijk 
was en mogelijk onder nieuw leiderschap. In de derde veranderingscyclus leek dit meer op 
niet-aaneengesloten verandering in plaats van defensieve of strategische herstructurering. 
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Alhoewel de eigenaren in eerste instantie het voortouw namen, lijkt het erop dat de aanname 
van de noodzaak tot verandering te lijden had van uiteenlopende interesses in de top van het 
managementkader. Bijzonder lastig was de wijze waarop het bedrijf haar schaarse financiële 
bronnen aansprak bij het upgraden van haar productiecapaciteit.  
 
De tegenvallende resultaten van de derde veranderingscyclus vroegen om een nieuwe 
wijziging in de top. De nieuwe voorzitter van de raad van bestuur maakte de strategische 
doelpositie van het bedrijf duidelijk: toegevoegde waarde op basis van hoge kwaliteit, locale 
smaak, een sterk merk en een uitstekende distributie. Hij reorganiseerde de onderneming in de 
zakelijke lijnen en introduceerde de benodigde ondersteunende infrastructurele eenheden. Het 
bedrijf schakelde ook over op een globale koers. Echter, omdat het bedrijf zuchtte onder een 
schuldenlast, moest het eerst haar operationele prestaties verbeteren alvorens er ruimte was 
voor significante investeringen in kritieke onderdelen. Dit vormde een andere reden waarom 
het tijdsbestek voor verandering uitermate belangrijk werd. 
 
De nieuwe voorzitter, een buitenstaander met een uitstekende beroepsreputatie, hoopte te 
kunnen rekenen op het initiële vertrouwensniveau dat nodig was om de veranderingen door te 
voeren. Echter, gelet op het bijzonder gesloten karakter van de locale omgeving en het hoge 
niveau van aangenomen dreiging dat hij voorstelde, moest hij aanvankelijk een aantal 
compromissen sluiten, de rechtmatige positie van de gemeenschap accepteren en haar 
vertrouwen winnen door de bedrijfsresultaten te verbeteren, zonder daarbij maatregelen te 
nemen die schadelijk zouden kunnen zijn voor de locale interesses.  
 
Terwijl het in de derde cyclus leek alsof strategische onzekerheid een te overwinnen hindernis 
was, was dit geenszins zo in de laatste fase, waarschijnlijk vanwege de aanwezigheid van een 
duidelijke visie. Andere hindernissen, met name de diverse angstvormen, slechte structuren en 
(in het bijzonder) gebrek aan vaardigheden en kennis, waren allen duidelijk waarneembaar. 
8.6 Kruisanalyse en integratie van de onderzoeksbevindingen 
Alle zeven casussen vertonen een aanzienlijke hoeveelheid veranderingen bij de 
waargenomen ondernemingen, alsmede diverse onderscheidende periodes (cycli) van 
verandering (Tabel 8.1). 
 
Casus Periode 1 Periode 2 Periode 3 Periode 4 
Gorenje Defensief Strategisch Strategisch Strategisch 
Kolinska Defensief Niet-
aaneengesloten  
  
Konar Defensief Niet-
aaneengesloten 
Strategisch  
Lek Defensief Strategisch Niet-
aaneengesloten 
Strategisch 
Ljubljanske 
mlekarne 
Niet-
aaneengesloten 
Niet-
aaneengesloten 
Defensief Strategisch 
Lura Geen 
verandering 
Defensief Strategisch Strategisch 
Podravka Geen 
verandering 
Defensief Niet-
aaneengesloten 
Strategisch 
 
Tabel 8.1 Aard der veranderingen in zeven waargenomen casussen  
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De onderstaande punten vertegenwoordigen de hoofdconclusies van de kruisanalyse: 
 
• Strategische verandering in een onderneming begint met het besef van het bestuur dat 
verandering urgent is, of gemakkelijk uitvoerbaar of beide. De aanzetfase kan langere tijd 
in beslag nemen en inzichten worden cumulatief geformuleerd. 
• Het besef van de noodzaak is gebaseerd op interpretatie van de context en wordt 
voornamelijk aangestuurd door: 
o Institutionele druk; 
o De waargenomen financiële situatie, gelet op de prestatietransparantie; 
o Groeimogelijkheden; 
o Het bestuur. 
• Het besef van uitvoerbaarheid is gebaseerd op interpretatie van de context en wordt 
voornamelijk aangestuurd door: 
o Institutionele druk; 
o Veranderingen binnen de sector en de markt; 
o Beschikbaarheid van bronnen (inclusief vaardigheden); 
o Het bestuur. 
• Zodra de verandering ingezet is, start het bestuur met het opzetten van een nieuwe 
organisatiestructuur. De overgang van de aanzetfase naar de opzetfase is redelijk abrupt.  
• Afhankelijk van de besefte urgentie en de uitvoerbaarheid van verandering (zie Fig. 7.2), 
kiest het bestuur voor de volgende opzetmogelijkheden: 
o Geen verandering; 
o Een aantal veranderingen die niet duidelijk aaneengesloten zijn; 
o Defensieve herstructurering; 
o Strategische herstructurering. 
• Defensieve en strategische herstructurering zijn als optie superieur aan niet-
aaneengesloten verandering. 
• De voornaamste eigenschappen van defensieve herstructurering zijn:  
o Organisatiestructuur  
Herstructurering van de bedrijfsmiddelen gebruikt als middel tot 
inkrimping 
Focus op inkrimping, zacht inkrimpen geeft betere resultaten dan hard 
Focus op diverse vormen van kostenbesparing  
Centralisatie 
Reorganisatie t.b.v. een betere prestatietransparantie en de focus op de 
kernactiviteiten 
Geen significante veranderingen in het businessmodel van de 
kernactiviteiten  
o Voornaamste bronnen 
Beschikbare financiële bronnen worden gebruikt voor herstructurering 
Efficiënt controlesysteem 
Basisbekwaamheid noodzakelijk in het bestaande businessmodel, 
inclusief bekwame werknemers. 
Vertrouwen in de directeur en de overlevingskansen van het bedrijf 
o Bestuurlijke interventies  
Topdown besluitvorming 
Intensieve communicatie met de belangrijke belanghebbenden, met 
name de werknemers, met het doel vertrouwen op te bouwen  
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Gebruik van dwang om uitvoering te versnellen en de introductie van 
procesdiscipline  
Het inzetten van externe consultants om zeker te zijn van 
kostenbesparingen en procesverbeteringen 
o Te overwinnen hindernissen 
Laag niveau van kennis, vaardigheden en een negatieve houding, met 
name diegene die geassocieerd worden met marktgerelateerde 
vaardigheden en het tonen van initiatieven  
Angst, in het bijzonder m.b.t. incompetentie en ontslag, te zien bij het 
middenkader  
Strakke werknemershiërarchie 
Uitermate beperkte organisatorische leerprocessen, alsmede 
onvoldoende bronnen voor investering in het uitbouwen van 
vaardigheden 
• De voornaamste eigenschappen van strategische herstructurering zijn:  
o Organisatiestructuur  
Heldere omschrijving van de strategische positie en de bronnen van 
voordelen m.b.t. concurrentie  
Focus op het uitbouwen van de essentiële vaardigheden  
Organisatorische leerprocessen aan de hand van globale bronnen 
(Het juiste niveau van) Decentralisatie 
o Voornaamste bronnen  
De financiële bronnen worden gebruikt voor herstructurering, met 
name het uitbouwen van vaardigheden  
Focus op marktvaardigheden en klantenbinding 
Vertrouwen in de directeur 
Flexibele reactie op veranderingen, met name ontwikkeling van nieuwe 
producten  
Vermijden van opportunistisch gedrag  
Actief relatiemanagement t.o.v. de belanghebbenden  
Aanzienlijke hoeveelheid tijd beschikbaar voor herstructurering 
o Bestuurlijke interventies  
Topdown besluitvorming 
Topdown communicatie gericht op strategische positionering en het 
bouwen van vertrouwen 
Inzetten van externe consultants en formele verbeteringsprojecten om 
de veranderingen te ondersteunen  
Uitoefenen van druk op de prestaties van het middenkader en 
verandering van hun werkwijze 
Toewijding aan de cultuurverandering, in het bijzonder het meer 
internationaal denken en het tonen van initiatieven  
o Te overwinnen hindernissen 
Gebrek aan competent en initiatiefrijk middenkader  
Middenkader vertoont angst om hun baan te verliezen 
• De implementatie van de nieuwe organisatiestructuur kan al van start gaan voordat haar 
opzet is voltooid; 
• Strategische herstructurering duurt gemiddeld langer dan defensieve herstructurering en 
kan verscheidene jaren in beslag nemen; 
• Het succes van de implementatie hangt af van de consistentie van de opzet alsmede de 
bronnen en de bestuurlijke interventies, die aansluiten op de gekozen opzet.  
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Een belangrijke opmerking is gewijd aan de duidelijkheid van de positionering in de 
diagrammen die besefte urgentie en uitvoerbaarheid van verandering koppelen aan het 
gekozen herstructureringsmodel. Zoals al eerder opgemerkt, werden de waarden voor de 
variabelenparen niet vastgesteld door exacte metingen. Een vergelijkbare losse methodiek 
werd toegepast bij het bepalen van de grenzen van regio’s met de zelfde 
veranderingskenmerken. Desalniettemin lijken de resulterende groeperingen consistent, zoals 
weergegeven in Figuur 8.3 en worden zij stevig ondersteund door de waarnemingen uit het 
veldonderzoek. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figuur 8.3 Afbeelding van de waargenomen aanzetwaarden van de veranderingscyclus en de 
resulterende opzetkenmerken 
 
Zoals hierboven aangegeven, duiden de veranderingscycli dicht bij de regiogrens (omcirkeld 
in Figuur 8.3) op geleidelijke in plaats van plotselinge overgangen tussen de regio’s. 
Alhoewel voor alle cycli geldt dat de regio bepalend is voor de belangrijkste kenmerken van 
de veranderingscyclus, zijn er ook een aantal kenmerken van naburige regio’s 
vertegenwoordigd. Dit impliceert een ander tegen de intuïtie ingaand fenomeen dat 
waargenomen werd tijdens het veldonderzoek: sommige veranderingscycli bezaten de 
dominante kenmerken van defensieve herstructurering met een aantal sporen van strategische 
herstructurering en andersom.  
 
Nogmaals, de nadruk dient te worden gelegd op het feit dat de hierboven getoonde 
positionering een weerspiegeling vormt van de opzetkeuze en niet noodzakelijkerwijs het 
succes of het falen van de gepoogde verandering impliceert. Beter gezegd, de 
veranderingsuitkomsten werden gekoppeld aan de gekozen organisatiestructuur, beschikbare 
bronnen, bestuurlijke interventies en te overwinnen hindernissen.  
8.7 Conclusies 
Parallel met de bevindingen van de kruisanalyse, direct gerelateerd aan de verfijning van het 
onderzoeksmodel zoals te zien in 8.6, biedt het onderzoek diverse relevante inzichten voor de 
managementtheorie en de praktijk.  
 
Strategische 
herstructurering
Defensieve 
herstructurering
Niet-
aaneengesloten 
verandering 
Geen verandering 
veverandering 
Korte termijn 
 
 
 
Beseft tijdsbestek 
nodig voor actie 
 
 
 
 
Lange termijn 
Besefte 
uitvoerbaarheid 
Laag Hoog 
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Ten eerste draagt het onderzoek bij aan het begrijpen van strategische verandering als 
integraal verschijnsel. Terwijl de bestaande literatuur zelden strategische verandering op deze 
wijze benadert, toont het onderzoek duidelijk aan dat er geen echt begrijpen mogelijk is 
zonder een koppeling van context, inhoud en proces. Het onderzoek treedt buiten het relatief 
algemene concept van context, inhoud en process als bouwstenen van strategische 
verandering, in de richting van het structureren van de afzonderlijke elementen die deze 
bouwstenen omzetten naar meer operationele termen. Zo wordt het context-inhoud-proces-
model vertaald naar een aanzet-opzet-implementatie-model.  
 
Het is van belang om op te merken dat het nieuwe model niet alleen de mechanismen 
verklaart waarmee context, inhoud en proces de managementrealiteit beïnvloeden, maar ook 
de tijdsvolgorde introduceert in fasen van strategische verandering. In tegenstelling tot de 
voorgaande integrale modellen biedt deze constructie zowel simpele als gedetailleerde uitleg.  
 
De volgende inbreng van het onderzoek is dat het de besefte noodzaak en uitvoerbaarheid van 
verandering op de voorgrond plaats in de beschouwing van de eerste veranderingsfasen. Deze 
twee factoren zijn niet alleen direct gekoppeld aan het eigenlijke beginpunt van verandering, 
maar ook aan de veranderingsdoelen. Het onderzoek koppelt tevens de twee factoren aan een 
beperkt aantal elementen in de externe en interne context, die een doorslaggevende invloed 
hebben op de wijze waarop het management deze twee sleuteldeterminanten opmerkt. 
 
Een volgende bijdrage van het onderzoek is de notie dat veranderingsdoelen efficiënt kunnen 
worden beschreven middels de nieuwe organisatiestructuur, via haar definities van strategie, 
organisationele opbouw en organisatiesystemen. Het onderzoek omschrijft verder de vier 
voornaamste uitkomsten van de opzetfase als (a) de beslissing om geen grote veranderingen in 
de organisatiestructuur door te voeren, (b) de beslissing om het te veranderen zonder een 
duidelijk coherent patroon, (c) de beslissing om het te veranderen op een wijze die 
overeenkomt met defensieve herstructurering en (d) de beslissing om het te veranderen op een 
manier die correspondeert met strategische herstructurering. Zoals hierboven opgemerkt, 
wordt de gekozen optie beïnvloed door de besefte noodzaak en de uitvoerbaarheid van 
verandering.  
 
Het is van belang om op te merken dat het onderzoek ook een theoretisch dilemma in het 
ontwerp van een strategie beantwoordt: moet de onderneming uitgaan van een van buiten naar 
binnen-optiek (wat de redenering zou zijn van, laten we zeggen, de omgevingsstroming) of 
een van binnen naar buiten-optiek (volgens de bronstroming)? Het antwoord luidt: beide, 
omdat een optiek niet alle antwoorden biedt die nodig zijn voor een solide opzet van de 
nieuwe organisatiestructuur. 
 
Het onderzoek draagt verder bij door het duidelijk omschrijven van de belangrijkste te 
overwinnen hindernissen die verwacht mogen worden bij defensieve of strategische 
herstructurering. Het is vooral interessant om op te merken dat het onderzoek concludeert dat 
er maar relatief weinig knelpunten zijn, in tegenspraak met de gangbare ideeën op dit terrein.    
 
Tenslotte levert het onderzoek een cruciale bijdrage door het koppelen van het succes van de 
implementatie van verandering aan de interne consistentie van de organisatiestructuur, de 
beschikbaarheid van bepaalde doorslaggevende bronnen en het bestaan van bestuurlijke 
interventies. Deze bijdrage is in het bijzonder belangrijk sinds een van de grootste 
misvattingen van de brongerichte optiek, en de voornaamste reden voor haar gebrek aan 
populariteit onder praktiserende managers, is haar onvermogen om helder de vitale bronnen 
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voor het succes van een onderneming in een bepaalde context te kunnen formuleren en hoe ze 
te creëren. Dit onderzoek toont aan dat, alhoewel essentiële bronnen en bestuurlijke 
interventies van elkaar verschillen in defensieve en strategische herstructurering, beide van de 
laatste duidelijk kunnen worden omschreven en beide (a) vertrouwen op een centrale positie 
als de levensbron voor verandering en (b) vertrouwensbouwende interventies als de primaire 
taak van interim-managers zien. 
 
Wat betreft de consequenties voor de praktiserende managers dient men te beginnen door te 
kijken naar de eigenlijke aard van de verandering. Veel filosofen en schrijvers, inclusief 
diegenen actief op het gebied van handel en management, beweren dat verandering de enige 
constante in het leven is (zowel menselijk als zakelijk als). Verandering genereert voortdurend  
een veelheid aan uitdagingen voor managers. Wat moet er gedaan worden om de 
onderneming voor te bereiden op de volgende veranderingsronde? Wat is het juiste tijdstip om 
de verandering te starten? Wat dient haar reikwijdte en schaal te zijn? Wat moet het doel van 
verandering zijn? Welke hindernissen mogen we verwachten? Zodra we verandering op gang 
brengen, wat moeten doen om het daadwerkelijk te laten gebeuren? 
 
Als er iets kan worden gezegd, is het dat dit onderzoek getuigt van het belang van verandering 
in het leven van de geobserveerde ondernemingen. Alhoewel de verandering niet altijd 
dezelfde intensiteit had, werden er geen belangrijke doelen zonder een significante 
hoeveelheid ervan bereikt, en de bedrijven moesten er in meegaan, zodra de doelen waren 
uitgestippeld. Dit is de eerste belangrijke boodschap voor managers: vertrouw er niet op dat 
een gekozen strategie in de praktijk kan worden gebracht zonder te accepteren dat je 
met veranderingen te maken krijgt. 
 
Wetende – of zoals veel ervaren managers meer van toepassing vinden – aanvoelen van het 
juiste moment om te beginnen met strategische verandering is niet noodzakelijkerwijs een 
vaardigheid die van nature in de wereld van het managersvak voorkomt. Alhoewel ervaring 
en gevoel op prijs worden gesteld, dienen managers ook de noodzaak tot systematisch 
observeren van de context waarbinnen zij werkzaam zijn te accepteren. In het bijzonder 
dienen zij zich af te vragen; voldoet de organisatiestructuur (strategie, opbouw en 
systemen) aan de eisen van de context? Zo niet, dan mogen ze verwachten dat de 
onderneming op zijn best geleidelijk of abrupt – in een turbulent worst-case contextscenario – 
haar handhaafbare concurrentievoordelen zal verliezen. 
 
De hedendaagse managementwetenschap biedt diverse strategische hulpmiddelen die 
managers bij een strategische analyse kunnen gebruiken, een veelheid daarvan wordt door 
consultants aangeboden. Sommige zijn populair en wijd verbreid, anderen worden door een 
selecte groep gebruikt. Sommige claimen eenvoudigheid, terwijl anderen hun 
aantrekkingskracht koppelen aan complexiteit. Een goed voorbeeld is de invloed van de 
positioneringsbenadering op de strategie. Veel managers in de geobserveerde bedrijven 
gebruikten de krachtige eenvoud van het “Hoge Besefte Waarde versus Lage 
Afleveringskosten” paradigma om hun strategische doelen te definiëren.  
 
Zonder twijfel heeft dat geholpen. Ze konden gemakkelijk hun ideeën aan hun collega’s en 
werknemers uitleggen, en de beoogde strategische positie als motivator gebruiken. Echter, 
door deze route te nemen liepen ze vroeger of later tegen een belangrijke hindernis aan: 
alhoewel het makkelijk was om de gewenste strategische positie te omschrijven en te 
communiceren, was het minder gemakkelijk om te ontdekken en anderen ervan te overtuigen 
hoe de betreffende positie vertaald kon worden naar de intern in het bedrijf aanwezig 
Nenad Filipovi  Chapter 8 
Strategic Change Management of Medium Size Companies:   
Insights from Slovenia and Croatia   
 240 
vaardigheden. Soms kwamen managers er zelfs achter dat de beoogde positie niet veel meer 
was dan een droom, omdat de vaardigheidskloof eenvoudigweg te groot was.  
 
Daarom doen managers er goed aan om een van binnen naar buiten-optiek (uitgaande van 
interne vaardigheden) te combineren met een van buiten naar binnen-optiek 
(aangegeven door de strategische positie). Ongeacht de moeilijkheid van het verkrijgen van 
een helder en objectief van binnen naar buiten perspectief, zonder bestaat er geen hoop op het 
vastleggen van voldoende duidelijke veranderingsdoelen. 
 
Het hierboven beschreven standpunt heeft een belangrijk gevolg: managers dienen 
ondernemingen voor te bereiden op verandering. Er kunnen op dit gebied een aantal 
algemene stappen worden ondernomen. Ten eerste, managers dienen te werken aan het 
creëren van mechanismen die een regulier strategisch analyseproces ondersteunen. Ze dienen 
zowel de externe dimensie en het begrijpen er bij te betrekken, een expliciete definitie en 
communicatie van de bestaande basisvaardigheden, inclusief de bedrijfscultuur. Ze dienen 
ook een veranderingsinfrastructuur te bouwen, in het bijzonder het vermogen tot vertrouwen 
en communicatie met de voornaamste belanghebbenden. Tot slot dienen ze te werken aan het 
verstevigen van het middenkader, dat, zoals hieronder besproken, meestal het voornaamste 
knelpunt bij verandering vormt. Correcte HR-procedures moeten worden ingevoerd, en het 
middenkader dient zich tot het uiterste in te spannen om kennis, vaardigheden en gedrag 
verder te ontwikkelen.  
 
Een belangrijk deel van de verantwoordelijkheid voor het tijdig initiëren van de verandering 
ligt bij de bedrijfsbesturingsmechanismen, met name raden van toezicht. Strategisch 
risicomanagement dient in ieder geval een van hun hoofdtaken te zijn, en het is eenvoudig in 
te zien dat een trage start bij noodzakelijke strategische veranderingen de kans op strategische 
risico’s ernstig vergroot. Bestuurders dienen zich te realiseren dat het begin van strategische 
verandering vaak gerelateerd is aan verandering in de top van de onderneming. Als de 
topmanager weigert de noodzaak van verandering – die voor anderen duidelijk zichtbaar is - 
in te zien, betrokken raakt bij een reeks van niet-aaneengesloten veranderingen of kiest voor 
verlengde defensieve herstructurering, dan loont het om een eenvoudige vraag te stellen: is 
deze persoon geschikt als interim-bestuurder? Vaak is het niet een wijziging in externe 
omstandigheden die de aanzet vormt voor significante strategische verandering, maar een 
frisse kijk van boven die voorheen ongeziene kansen blootlegt en die in de benodigde dosis 
gerichte energie voorziet. 
 
Er is een paradox gerelateerd aan het initiëren van verandering die het leven van een manager 
lastig maakt: alhoewel het makkelijker is om te beginnen met verandering in crisistijd, is dit 
ook de periode waarin er minder bronnen beschikbaar zijn en elke fout kostbaarder wordt. 
Daarom moeten managers niet wachten met het initiëren van strategische verandering 
tot er een crisis uitbreekt. Ze moeten een manier vinden om een gevoel te creëren van 
besefte noodzaak tot verandering, op zijn minst in de mate die nodig is om hun directe gevolg 
in beweging te krijgen. Dit biedt hun de gelegenheid om positief gebruik te maken van 
financiële overschotten en andere bronnen, die normaliter  worden beschouwd als vertragers 
van verandering. 
 
Aan de andere kant, wanneer managers een urgente noodzaak tot verandering opmerken die 
niet in overeenstemming is met de juiste bronnen, is verlamming niet het antwoord. Een 
absolute noodzaak tot verandering, zelfs als deze onuitvoerbaar lijkt, vraagt om 
defensieve herstructurering. Mits op juiste wijze ondernomen, leidt defensieve 
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herstructurering tot een snelle verbetering van de financiële situatie en kan dienen als een 
goed uitgangspunt voor strategische herstructurering. 
 
Het blijven hangen in de defensieve herstructureringsfase gedurende een lange periode 
(alhoewel er geen strikte regels zijn, mogen de meeste defensieve herstructureringsprocessen  
in principe niet langer dan een jaar duren) of het terugkeren naar een situatie zonder 
verandering of niet-aaneengesloten veranderingen is gevaarlijk. Defensieve herstructurering 
vormt slechts de helft van het karwei en dient onmiddellijk te worden gevolgd door 
strategische herstructurering. Zo niet, is de kans op het opnieuw optreden van de 
neerwaartse spiraal groot en zal elke volgende ronde van defensief herstructureren moeilijker 
blijken.  
 
Managers dienen te begrijpen dat defensieve en strategische herstructurering vragen om 
een significant andere organisatiestructuur, essentiële bronnen en bestuurlijke 
interventies. Bijgevolg, de overgang van defensieve naar strategische herstructurering is 
lastig en vereist volledige aandacht van het management, alsmede gerichte inzet. Drie zaken 
verdienen extra aandacht: organisatorische leerprocessen, decentralisatie en tijd. 
Organisatorische leerprocessen zijn  afwezig tijdens defensieve herstructurering, terwijl deze 
de sleutel vormt tot strategische herstructurering, gedurende welke een mondiaal perspectief, 
klantenbinding en ontwikkeling van nieuwe producten kenmerkende voorwaarden zijn. Het 
verschuiven van de aandacht van strikte implementatie en oriëntering op kosten naar 
innovatie en leerprocessen is geen gemakkelijke opgave. Het vereist een cultuurverandering, 
welke niet kan worden bereikt zonder een sterke betrokkenheid van het middenkader. 
Decentralisatie is nodig om deze toewijding te bewerkstelligen, evenals tijd nodig is voor de 
noodzakelijke uitbouw van vaardigheden en de cultuurverandering zelf. 
 
Alhoewel het merendeel van de aan strategisch veranderingsmanagement gerelateerde 
literatuur de nadruk legt op visie als het sleutelbegrip in strategische herstructurering, moet 
men de slaaf worden van een potentieel lege frase. Managers moeten niet wachten op het 
“grote visioen” wanneer ze een begin maken met strategische verandering. Visie kan 
effectief worden vervangen door vertrouwen, dat er voor zorgt dat de leider zijn volgers aan 
boord houdt zelfs als hij door wilde golven in de context vaart. Dit betekent ook dat 
strategische onzekerheid niet als een blokkade dient te worden beschouwd en als een excuus 
om strategische verandering uit te stellen. Echter, het ontbreken van visie kan entropie 
veroorzaken, aangezien het dient als een kader en filter voor strategische initiatieven. Daarom 
dienen bestuurders een kader te scheppen, zelfs indien zij dit niet formeel als een visie 
poneren. Een methode om dit voor elkaar te krijgen is middels een duidelijke 
organisatiestructuur en een focus op de overige elemnten van het 7S-kader. De consistentie 
van 7S is waarschijnlijk de beste test of een visie in de praktijk bestaat en hoe effectief deze 
vertaald wordt naar managementacties. Groei dient binnen dit kader een van de hoofddoelen 
te vormen binnen. 
 
Externe consultants en diverse verbeteringsprojecten kunnen helpen bij het wijzigen van de 
bedrijfskoers. Echter, managers dienen te letten op de neiging van consultants om tactische 
projecten op te zetten, die zich bezig houden met efficiency in plaats van het creëren van 
waarde. Een citaat van Dr. Peter Kralji from McKinsey & Co.: “Dit is niet verrassend 
aangezien consultants geen ondernemers zijn en strategische herstructurering nauw 
geassocieerd wordt met het nemen van risico’s. Daarnaast zijn de resultaten van 
efficiencygerichte projecten veel beter te voorspellen en sneller zichtbaar, beide favoriete 
punten in de gemiddelde consultancyovereenkomst.”  
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Alhoewel strategische herstructurering bouwt op vertrouwen en consistentie, welke op hun 
beurt een hoge betrokkenheid van het middenkader vragen, dienen managers er op te letten 
dat de kans zeer groot is dat een belangrijk percentage van het middenkader niet door 
de strategische verandering heen komt. Het aantal uitvallers zal echter lager zijn wanneer 
managers uit het middenkader zorgvuldig worden voorbereid op hun nieuwe uitdagingen, 
zowel op het gebied van opleiding gericht op het ontwikkelen van de juiste vaardigheden, als 
organisatiesystemen die hun nieuwe rol in de onderneming versterken. Desalniettemin blijft 
het middenkader de grootste te overwinnen hindernis, het vertoont vaak een verdedigende 
houding en veel angst (voor mogelijke incompetentie en ontslag). Daarom hebben ze hulp 
nodig, en dienen ze duidelijke, aan het veranderingsdoel gerelateerde opdrachten te krijgen, 
die aan de hand van overzichtelijke criteria moeten worden uitgevoerd binnen een redelijk 
kort tijdsbestek of geconfronteerd te worden met vervanging. Transparantie in beloning en 
loopbaanbesluiten, alsmede gezichtsverliesbeperkende ontsnappingsmogelijkheden in het 
geval van onacceptabele prestaties, is evident en verbetert op aanzienlijke wijze het 
vertrouwensniveau in een organisatie. 
 
De management top draagt de ultieme verantwoordelijkheid voor het resultaat van de 
strategische verandering. Deze regel vraagt veel, en de last ervan moet door alle leden worden 
gedeeld. Alhoewel onderlinge bedrijfsculturen verschillen, is het verstandig om consensus 
als besluitvormingsinstrument te gebruiken bij alle aan strategische verandering 
gerelateerde kwesties, met name strategische herstructurering. Als een kleine groep in de 
top niet tot eenstemmigheid komt, zijn de kansen op een succesvolle en snelle implementatie 
aanzienlijk kleiner en loont het om op zoek te gaan naar een consensusbouwend alternatief. 
 
Tot slot, strategische herstructurering is een lang proces. Het duurt al snel een decennium 
voordat een onderneming het beoogde handhaafbare concurrentievermogen bereikt. Dit 
betekent dat managers zich moeten voorbereiden op langdurige aanslagen op hun 
energieniveau, zonder daarbij in te boeten aan gedrevenheid en consistentie, en zonder grote 
fouten in de opzet en implementatie te maken. Alleen de steun van de voornaamste 
belanghebbenden kan verandering vergemakkelijken, het managen van de verwachtingen 
scherp houden en intensieve communicatie van onschatbare waarde maken. Managers dienen 
daarnaast niet te vergeten dat het onderweg maken van winst bijdraagt aan vertrouwen en rust. 
Daarom: het managen van vandaag is net zo belangrijk bij strategische verandering als 
het managen van de dag van morgen. 
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